G.R. No. L-25134 Case Digest

G.R. No. L-25134 October 30, 1969

The City of Bacolod, plaintiff-appellee

vs San Miguel Brewery, Inc., defendant-appellant

Ponente: Barredo

Facts:

This is an appeal from the decision of the CFI Negros Occidental ordering the San Miguel Brewery to pay to the City of Bacolod certain fees under existing City ordinances of Bacolod.

February 17, 1949 the City of Bacolod passed Ordinance No. 66 imposing upon "any person, firm or corporation engaged in the manufacturer bottling of coca-cola, pepsi cola, tru orange, lemonade, and other soft drinks within the jurisdiction of the City of Bacolod, ... a fee of ONE TWENTY-FOURTH (1/24) of a centavo for every bottle thereof," plus "a surcharge of 2% every month, but in no case to exceed 24% for one whole year," upon "such local manufacturers or bottler above-mentioned who will be delinquent on any amount of fees due" under the ordinance.

In 1959, this ordinance was amended by Ordinance No. 150, series of 1959, by increasing the fee to "one-eighth (1/8) of a centavo for every bottle thereof." In other words, the fee was increased from P0.01 to P0.03 per case of soft drinks. Appellant refused to pay the additional fee and challenged the validity of the whole ordinance.

appellant filed a motion to dismiss the case on the grounds that: (1) the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment, and (2) a party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of action. This motion was denied by the court a quo in its order dated August 22, 1964; so appellant filed its answer wherein it substantially reiterated, as affirmative defenses, the above-mentioned grounds of its motion to dismiss. Thereafter, the parties submitted the case for judgment on the pleadings, whereupon, the court rendered judgment on March 11, 1965 with the following dispositive portion: .

IN VIEW THEREOF, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant San Miguel Brewery, Inc. to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P36,519.10 representing the surcharges as provided in section 4 of Ordinance 66, series of 1949 of the City of Bacolod. No costs.

Appellants moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied, hence, the instant appeal.

Appellant has only one assignment of error, to wit:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE APPELLANT LIABLE TO THE APPELLEE FOR THE SUM OF P36,519.10 REPRESENTING SURCHARGES AS PROVIDED IN TAX ORDINANCE NO. 66, SERIES OF 1949, AS AMENDED, OF THE CITY OF BACOLOD.

Under this, it argues that the action of appellee cannot be maintained because (1) a party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of action; and (2) appellee's action for recovery of the surcharges in question is barred by prior judgment.

Held:

We find appellant's position essentially correct. There is no question that appellee split up its cause of action when it filed the first complaint on March 23, 1960, seeking the recovery of only the bottling taxes or charges plus legal interest, without mentioning in any manner the surcharges.

The rule on the matter is clear. Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 2 of the Rules of Court of 1940 which were still in force then provided:

SEC. 3. Splitting a cause of action, forbidden. — A single cause of action cannot be split up into two or more parts so as to be made the subject of different complaints. .

SEC. 4. Effect of splitting. — If separate complaints were brought for different parts of a single cause of action, the filing of the first may be pleaded in abatement of the others, and a judgment upon the merits in either is available as a bar in the others.

In the light of these precedents, it cannot be denied that appellant's failure to pay the bottling charges or taxes and the surcharges for delinquency in the payment thereof constitutes but one single cause of action which under the above rule can be the subject of only one complaint, under pain of either of them being barred if not included in the same complaint with the other. The error of appellee springs from a misconception or a vague comprehension of the elements of a cause of action. The classical definition of a cause of action is that it is "a delict or wrong by which the rights of the plaintiff are violated by the defendant." Its elements may be generally stated to be (1) a right existing in favor of the plaintiff; (2) a corresponding obligation on the part of the defendant to respect such right; and (3) an act or omission of the plaintiff which constitutes a violation of the plaintiff's right which defendant had the duty to respect. For purposes, however, of the rule against splitting up of a cause of action, a clearer understanding can be achieved, if together with these elements, the right to relief is considered.

In the case at bar, when appellant failed and refused to pay the difference in bottling charges from July 1, 1959, such act of appellant in violation of the right of appellee to be paid said charges in full under the Ordinance, was one single cause of action, but under the Ordinance, appellee became entitled, as a result of such non-payment, to two reliefs, namely: (1) the recovery of the balance of the basic charges; and (2) the payment of the corresponding surcharges, the latter being merely a consequence of the failure to pay the former. Stated differently, the obligation of appellant to pay the surcharges arose from the violation by said appellant of the same right of appellee from which the obligation to pay the basic charges also arose. Upon these facts, it is obvious that appellee has filed separate complaints for each of two reliefs related to the same single cause of action, thereby splitting up the said cause of action.

" In other words, whenever a plaintiff has filed more than one complaint for the same violation of a right, the filing of the first complaint on any of the reliefs born of the said violation constitutes a bar to any action on any of the other possible reliefs arising from the same violation, whether the first action is still pending, in which event, the defense to the subsequent complaint would be litis pendentia, or it has already been finally terminated, in which case, the defense would be res adjudicata. Indeed, litis pendentia and res adjudicata, on the one hand, and splitting up a cause of action on the other, are not separate and distinct defenses, since either of the former is by law only the result or effect of the latter, or, better said, the sanction for or behind it.