G.R. No. 113811 Case Digest

G.R. No. 113811 October 7, 1994

Ishmael Himagan, petitioner

vs People of the Philippines and Hon. Judge Hilario Mapayo, respondents

Ponente: Kapunan

Facts:

Himagan is policeman assigned with the medical company of the PNP Regional Headquarters as Camp Catitigan, Davao City, and was implicated in the killing of Benjamin Machitar Jr., and the attempted murder of Bernabe Machitar. After the infromations were filed, RTC Davao issued as order suspending petitioner until the termination of the case.

October 11, 1993, Himagan filed a motion to lift the order for his suspension relying on the Civil service Decree that his suspension should be limited to 90 days. But respondent Judge denied the motion pointing out under section 47 of RA 6975, the accused shall be suspended from office until his case is terminated. The motion for reconsideration of the order was denied also, hence this certiorari and mandamus to set aside the orders of respondent Judge.

Held:

First. The language of the first sentence of Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 is clear, plain and free from ambiguity. It gives no other meaning than that the suspension from office of the member of the PNP charged with grave offense where the penalty is six years and one day or more shall last until the termination of the case. The suspension cannot be lifted before the termination of the case. The second sentence of the same Section providing that the trial must be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment does not qualify or limit the first sentence. The two can stand independently of each other. The first refers to the period of suspension. The second deals with the time frame within which the trial should be finished.

Second. Petitioner misapplies Sec. 42 of PD 807. A meticulous reading of the section clearly shows that it refers to the lifting of preventive suspension in pending administrative investigation, not in criminal cases, as here. In the instant case. Petitioner is charged with murder under the Revised Penal Code and it is undisputed that he falls squarely under Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 which categorically states that his suspension shall last until the case is terminated.

The foregoing discussions reveal the legislative intent to place on preventive suspension a member of the PNP charged with grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law exceeds six years of imprisonment and which suspension continues until the case against him is terminated.

The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions.

The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of real differences among men, the equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to the privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. Thus, the equal protection clause does not absolutely forbid classifications, such as the one which exists in the instant case. If the classification is based on real and substantial differences; is germane to the purpose of the law; applies to all members of the same

class; and applies to current as well as future conditions, the classification may not be impugned as violating the Constitution's equal protection guarantee. A distinction based on real and reasonable considerations related to a proper legislative purpose such as that which exists here is neither unreasonable, capricious nor unfounded.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.