G.R. No. 108164 Case Digest

G.R. No. 108164 February 23, 1995
Far East Bank and Trust Company, petitioner
vs Court of Appeals, Luisa Luna and Clarita Luna, respondents
Ponente: Vitug

Facts:
Luis Luna applied for a far east card issued by far east bank at its Pasig branch. Upon his request, the bank also issued a supplemental card to private respondent Clarita Luna. Then Clarita lost her credit card and submitted an affidavit of loss. Later on October 6, 1988 in a restaurant, Luis' credit card was not honored.

Luis thru a counsel then demanded from far east to pay damages for the humiliation he felt. The vice-president of the bank expressed bank's apologies to Luis.

Still evidently feeling aggrieved, private respondents, on 05 December 1988, filed a complaint for damages with the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Pasig against FEBTC.
On 30 March 1990, the RTC of Pasig, given the foregoing factual settings, rendered a decision ordering FEBTC to pay private respondents (a) P300,000.00 moral damages; (b) P50,000.00 exemplary damages; and (c) P20,000.00 attorney's fees.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court, FEBTC has come to this Court with this petition for review.

There is merit in this appeal.
In culpa contractual, moral damages may be recovered where the defendant is shown to have acted in bad faith or with malice in the breach of the contract. The Civil Code provides:
Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.

Bad faith, in this context, includes gross, but not simple, negligence. Exceptionally, in a contract of carriage, moral damages are also allowed in case of death of a passenger attributable to the fault (which is presumed) of the common carrier.

Held:
The Court has not in the process overlooked another rule that a quasi-delict can be the cause for breaching a contract that might thereby permit the application of applicable principles on tort 9 even where there is a pre-existing contract between the plaintiff and the defendant. This doctrine, unfortunately, cannot improve private respondents' case for it can aptly govern only where the act or omission complained of would constitute an actionable tort independently of the contract. The test (whether a quasi-delict can be deemed to underlie the breach of a contract) can be stated thusly: Where, without a pre-existing contract between two parties, an act or omission can nonetheless amount to an actionable tort by itself, the fact that the parties are contractually bound is no bar to the application of quasi-delict provisions to the case. Here, private respondents' damage claim is predicated solely on their contractual relationship; without such agreement, the act or omission complained of cannot by itself be held to stand as a separate cause of action or as an independent actionable tort.