G.R. No. 78554 Case Digest

G.R. No. 78554 August 25, 1989

St. Anne Medical Center, petitioner

vs Henry Parel, etc., respondents

Ponente: Sarmiento

Facts:

Submitted for decision is this case, in the nature of challenges (inter alia) to the jurisdiction of the Regional Director of the Department of Labor and Employment to act on money claims.

This case stemmed from a complaint filed against St. Anne Medical Center for underpayment of wages, ECOLA and other money claims. Then Director Parel ordered that St. Anne Medical Center re institute the 127 employees with their money claims, excluding the 6 employees found to be holding managerial positions.

The director of the hospital then sought reconsideration alleging that Parel erred in imposing the money award: (1) in the absence of notice and hearing; (2) that the said award was not supported by evidence; and (3) that there was pending with the National Labor Relations Commission an Identical complaint filed by the complaining employees of the hospital. (4) The jurisdiction of RD of DOLE to act on money claims is assailed.

Held:

In addition, it is held that the regional offices of the Department of Labor are charged alone with "mediation and conciliation" and, should the parties fail to agree, they must refer the case to the labor arbiters.

The fact alone that at the time Director Parel entered into the picture, the respondents-workers had earlier commenced identical proceedings in the National Labor Relations Commission, labor arbitrage section, is enough to warrant the grant of this petition. (The Complaint in the NLRC was filed on January 28, 1987, 7 while the Regional Director received the Complaint on February 9,1987.) 8 The rule in civil cases is that the acquisition of jurisdiction by a court of concurrent jurisdiction (assuming that the Regional Director exercises concurrent jurisdiction with the Labor Arbiter in view of the promulgation of Republic Act No. 6715, which took effect on March 19, 1989) divests another of its own jurisdiction. The same rule should apply to labor cases. On account hereof, we set aside the challenged order.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The order of Regional Director Henry Parel is SET ASIDE.

G.R. No. 84628 Case Digest

G.R. No. 84628 November 16, 1989

Heirs of Ildefonso Coscolluela, Sr., INC., petitioner

vs Rico General Insurance Corporation, Court of Appeals, etc., respondents

Ponente: Gutierrez, Jr.

Facts:

Heirs, is a domestic corporation and registered owner of an Isuzu pick-up truck which was insured with Rico General Insurance for a consideration P100,000 excluding 3rd party liability. The premiums and other expenses for insurance paid covered the period from October 1, 1986 to 1987.

On August 28, 1987, the insured vehicle was severely damaged when fired upon by unidentified armed persons in Negros Occidental. In the same incident, four persons died.

Heirs then filed its claim for the repair of the vehicle but Rico refused t grant it. So heirs filed it with the RTC Bacolod City to recover claim, plus interest and attorney's fees. Rico filed a motion to dismiss alleging that it lacks cause of action because firing by armed men is a risk excepted in the insurance policy.

Heirs alleged that the firing was an indirect consequence of rebellion and opposed the motion to dismiss saying that the provision does not apply in the absence of an official proclamation of the conditions. RTC dismissed the complaint of Heirs fo lack of cause of action for the damage arose from a civil commotion or was a direct result thereof.

Heirs filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied by RTC noting that they cannot take cognizance of the general civil disturbance in the country without any executive proclamation.

Petitioner then filed a notice of appeal which was given due course but stated that the proper remedy is a petition for review by way of certiorari. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. CA denied the petition and affirmed the RTC's dismissal order. Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether CA  erred in (1) affirming the dismissal by the trial court of the complaint for damages in the ground of lack of cause of action and in (2) denying due course to a petition for certiorari on the ground that the remedy of the petitioner to assail said order is appeal.

Held:

(1) There is cause of action. The elements were met.

The facts as alleged clearly define the existence of a right of the petitioner to a just claim against the insurer for the payment of the indemnity for a loss due to an event against which the petitioner's vehicle was insured. The insurance contract mentioned therein manifests a right to pursue a claim and a duty on the part of the insurer or private respondent to compensate the insured in case of a risk insured against. The refusal of the insurer to satisfy the claim and the consequent loss to the petitioner in incurring the cost of acquiring legal assistance on the matter constitutes a violation or an injury brought to the petitioner.

(2) The Court is very much cognizant of the principle that a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action stated in the complaint hypothetically admits the truth of the facts therein.

." It is clear that the complaint does no more and no less than state simply that the van was damaged due to the firing by unidentified armed men. Since the complaint does not explicitly state nor intimate civil strife which private respondent insists to be the cause of the damage, the motion to dismiss cannot go beyond the admission of the facts stated and inferences reasonably deducible from them. Any other assertion by the private respondent is subject to proof. Meanwhile, the sufficiency of the petitioner's cause of action has been shown since, admitting the facts alleged, a valid judgment can be rendered.

(3) The private respondent's invocation of the exceptions clause in the insurance policy as the basis for its non-liability and the consequent dismissal of the complaint is without merit. We also reiterate the established rule that when the terms of an insurance contract contain limitations on liability, the court "should construe them in such a way as to preclude the insurer from non-compliance with his obligations."

(4) Contrary to what the respondent appellate court says, this case does not present a pure question of law but demands a factual determination of whether the incident was a result of events falling under the exceptions to the liability of private respondent contained in the policy of insurance.

Petition granted.

A.M. No. MTJ-08-1715 Case Digest

A.M. No. MTJ-08-1715 March 19, 2009

Rodolfo Mago, complainant

vs Judge Aurea Penalosa-fermo, respondent

Ponente: Carpio Morales

Facts:

Mago filed a complaint before MTC of Camarines Norte for grave coercion against Sheriff Angeles of DARAB. Sheriff Angeles filed a counter-charge for grave threats against complainant and his sons.

Alleging that Judge Aurea committed gross ignorance of the law and bias in the disposition of his complaint and of the counter-charge against him, Mago filed this administrative complaint.

Mago alleges that he received a subpoena to attend a PI of the threat case against him, in compliance, he and his witnesses attended. There even without an assistance of a counsel they were examined through a prepared set of questions by the stenographer, Judge Aurea was not present then. Mago states also that after the PI, he was immediately arrested and was imprisoned for 3 days. He was released after posting the bail.

Judge Aurea explained that, What [complainant] claimed in his Letter-Complaint that the Court Stenographer has a prepared sheet of questions during the preliminary examination is true because after a complaint is filed, the undersigned prepares her questions for preliminary examination based on the affidavits of the complaining witnesses and the counter affidavits of the accused. This is done to make it easy for the Stenographers to take/print the transcript of the proceedings. Some witnesses even ask to read/study the question and request that they write down their answers to the questions for the Stenographers to finalize. Also, this is convenient when more than one preliminary examination is scheduled for the day. This procedure makes it easier for the Stenographers and the witnesses, too, considering the cramped office space.

Judge denied the arrest right after the PI, but rather claimed that after finding probable cause from the PI conducted, she issued a warrant of arrest the next day. 

Admitting that there was a delay in scheduling the arraignment, but this was because complainant's counsel opposed the same and filed an omnibus motion. . Respondent adds that after complainant was arraigned on June 6, 2006, the preliminary conference/pre-trial was set but was not terminated due to the absence of complainant or his counsel.

Held: SC agreed with OCA.

June 18, 2008, OCA came up with the evaluation that Judge was liable for her unfamiliarity with the basic rules on PI. There was irregularity during the PI when the Judge allowed the stenographers to handle the latter part of the proceedings.

As regards the issue of continuous hearing of the case by the respondent judge, we opine that the respondent judge only acted in good faith and in accordance with law when she continued to direct the herein complainant to attend the pre-trial. Based on the records, the Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus, Prohibition with Application for Mandatory Injunction and Ex-Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and the Motion for Reconsideration thereto filed by complainant with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 64, Labo, Camarines Norte were already denied; thus the respondent judge had the authority to proceed with the case. The postponements in the pre-trial were not attributable to the respondent judge but to the accused and his counsel.

Finally, on the issue of bias, complainant failed to submit any evidence showing the respondent biased or partial in hearing the case. Bias and partiality of a judge must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Mere suspicion that a judge is bias or partial would not be enough.

G.R. No. L-3913 Case Digest

G.R. No. L-3913 August 7, 1952

Eulogio Rodriguez, sr., plaintiff-appellant

vs Carlos Tan, defendant-appellee

Ponente: Bautista Angelo

Facts:

Plaintiff seeks to collect from the defendant the aggregate sum of P18,400 as salaries and allowances and the sum of P35,524.55 as damages, upon the plea that the latter usurped the office of Senator of the Philippines which rightfully belongs to the former from December 30, 1947, to December 27, 1949.

Plaintiff claims that on December 30, 1947, defendant usurped the office of Senator of the Philippines, and from that date until December 1949, he continously collected the salaries, emoluments and privileges attendant to that office amounting to P18,400; that protest having been filed by plaintiff against defendant, the Senate Electoral Tribunal on December 16, 1949, rendered judgment declaring plaintiff to have been duly elected to the office; and that by reason of such usurpation, plaintiff suffered damages in the amount of P35,524.55 for expenses he incurred in prosecuting the protest.

On February 2, 1950, defendant filed a motion to dismiss alleging, on one hand, that the judgment rendered by the Senate Electoral Tribunal in the protest case is a bar to this action under the principle of res judicata, and, on the other, that said Tribunal denied without any reservation the claim of the plaintiff for expenses incurred in prosecuting the protest.

Issue: Whether defendant, who has been proclaimed, took the oath of office, and discharged the duties of Senator, can be ordered to reimburse the salaries and emoluments he has received during his incumbency to the plaintiff who has been legally declared elected by the Senate Electoral Tribunal.

Held:

There is no question that the defendant acted as a de facto officer during the time he held the office of Senator. He was one of the candidates of the Liberal Party in the elections of November 11, 1947, and was proclaimed as one of those who had been elected by the Commission on Elections, and thereafter he took the oath of office and immediately entered into the performance of the duties of the position. Having been thus duly proclaimed as Senator and having assumed office as required by law, it cannot be disputed that defendant is entitled to the compensation, emoluments and allowances which our Constitution provides for the position.

Another reason that may be involved in opposition to the claim of the plaintiff is the principle of res judicata. It appears that plaintiff had already set up this claim in the protest he filed against the defendant before the Senate Electoral Tribunal, but when the case was decided on the merits the Tribunal passed up this matter sub silentio. In our opinion, this silence may be interpreted as a denial of the relief.

G.R. No. L-46409 Case Digest

G.R. No. L-46409 April 5, 1939

Insular Motors Incorporated, petitioner

vs City of Manila and Jose Garrido, City Engineer, respondents

Ponente: Laurel

This is an original proceeding for a writ of mandamus filed by the Insular Motor Inc., against the respondents, the City of Manila and the city engineer, for the purpose of compelling the latter official to grant a permit for the construction of its proposed building on a parcel of land indicated in the stipulation of facts.

As stipulated, it appears that the Dominican father granted a lease option of a parcel of land, lot No. 1-B-2, in Intramuros, Manila, to the petitioner which thereupon submitted the plans of buildings which it proposed to erect of said realty, to the city mayor and the city engineer with the request that the same be approved and the corresponding permit issued. After some correspondence, the application was denied due to the refusal of the petitioner to make a written promise that it would comply with the provisions of the zonification ordinance upon its final approval by the President of the Philippines.

Mandamus issues only in cases where the petitioner has a clear legal right to the thing demanded and where the law imposes the imperative duty upon the defendant to perform the act desired. (Tabique vs. Duvall, 16 Phil., 324; and Ynchausti Steamship Co. vs. Dexter and Unson, 41 Phil., 289.) In the instant case, the petitioner has not clearly established his right to the building permit, nor has he shown that the issuance of the same is an imperative duty imposed by law upon the respondents or any one of them. On the contrary, we find that the function of the city engineer of the City of Manila, so far as it relates to the granting of permits, is discretionary which may not be controlled by mandamus except in clear cases of grave abuse. (Felismino vs. Gloria, 47 Phil., 967, and Guanio vs.Fernandez, 55 Phil., 814; Mechem, Law of Public Officers [1890], pp. 631, 632.) The fact that the proposed zonification ordinance is pending approval by the President of the Philippines, does not alter the situation.

The petition is hereby denied, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-20329 Case Digest

G.R. No. L-20329 March 16, 1923

The Standard Oil Company of New York, petitioner

vs Joaquin Jaramillo, respondents

Ponente: Street

Facts:

This is a demurrer interposed by the respondents, Jaramillo, register of deeds of the City of Manila, to an original petition of the Oil Company seeking peremptory mandamus to compel the respondent to record in the proper register a document purporting to be a chattel mortgage executed by Gervasia de la Rosa in favor of the Oil Company.

Gervasia was the lessee of a parcel of land situated in Manila. The clauses in said document describing the property intended to be thus mortgage are expressed in the following words:

Now, therefore, the mortgagor hereby conveys and transfer to the mortgage, by way of mortgage, the following described personal property, situated in the City of Manila, and now in possession of the mortgagor, to wit:

(1) All of the right, title, and interest of the mortgagor in and to the contract of lease hereinabove referred to, and in and to the premises the subject of the said lease;

(2) The building, property of the mortgagor, situated on the aforesaid leased premises.

In Jaramillo's examination, it was not a chattel mortgage.

Held:

The position taken by the respondent is untenable; and it is his duty to accept the proper fee and place the instrument on record. The duties of a register of deeds in respect to the registration of chattel mortgage are of a purely ministerial character; and no provision of law can be cited which confers upon him any judicial or quasi-judicial power to determine the nature of any document of which registration is sought as a chattel mortgage.

In the light of what has been said it becomes unnecessary for us to pass upon the point whether the interests conveyed in the instrument now in question are real or personal; and we declare it to be the duty of the register of deeds to accept the estimate placed upon the document by the petitioner and to register it, upon payment of the proper fee.

The demurrer is overruled; and unless within the period of five days from the date of the notification hereof, the respondent shall interpose a sufficient answer to the petition, the writ of mandamus will be issued, as prayed, but without costs. So ordered.

C.A. No. 263 Case Digest

C.A. No. 263 August 19, 1948

People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee

vs Timoteo Penesa, defendant-appellant

Ponente: Padilla

Facts:

Penesa and Rosario Aguillon lived as husband and wife in Camalingan Camarines Sur with their daughter and 5 children of Rosario by her late husband. Due to continuous wrangles between Penesa and Rosario, they both agreed to part. The next day Penesa returned to the house and asked Rosario to live with her in another house, the request was refused. Then Rosario's cousin came and resulted to a fight and serious physical injuries.

Upon this evidence, trial court found Penesa guilty of frustrated homicide and holding that the mitigating circumstances of passion and obfuscation without aggravating circumstance to offset it. Penesa appealed saying that he was the one attacked by Santiago Cerrado (cousin).

Held:

The trial court found the appellant guilty of frustrated homicide. This is an error. When he went to the house of Rosario early in the morning of 31 August, it was not with the intention to kill anybody, for he went there to entreat Rosario Aguillon to live with him in another house. Neither could the remarks uttered by Crescencio Doro and Santiago Cerrado have aroused his temper to such an extent as to engender the desire and intent to kill them. The finding of the trial court is based on the kind of weapons carried by the appellant when he went to the house and on the parts of the victims' bodies at which the weapons were aimed, as shown by the wounds inflicted. The bolo with the appellant inflicted the wounds upon Santiago Cerrado and Crescencio Doro was one ordinarily used by farm laborers. The dagger was carried for self-defense. The wounds inflicted upon the offended parties by the appellant were caused indiscriminately and not deliberately. Appellant's purpose in going to the house, and not the kind of weapons he carried, nor the parts of the victims' bodies on which the wounds were inflicted indiscriminately, is indicative and determinative of his intent.

It was just slight physical injuries.

G.R. No. L-47207 Case Digest

G.R. No. L-47207 September 25, 1980

Jose Escano, etc., petitioners-appellants

vs Court of Appeals and Republic of the Philippines, respondent-appellees

Ponente: Aquino

Facts:

Petitioners complain about the judgment of the CA, engrafting conditions on their repurchase of 10 lots, which were expropriated to form part of the Lahug Airport in Cebu City, as well as failure of the Appellate Court to grant them compensation for the use of the lots by the Civil Aeronautics Administration from the time that they tendered the redemption price.

Those lots were sold by Mamerto Escano to the Republic for use by the CCA. The sale was subjected to the condition that when CCA would no longer use the lots as airport, the title thereto would revert to the seller upon reimbursement of the price without interest. By means of 2 deeds of assignment, the petitioners became the successors of Mamerto Escano.

Then later, after CCA used the lots, petitioners made on a written tender to the CCA of the repurchase price. But Director of Civil Aviation rejected the tender for the reason that the lots were still used for general aviation.

So petitioners sued the RP CCA in CFI of Cebu for the reconveyance of the ten lots. The trial court ordered CCa to reconvey the petitioners. Petitioners appealed because the lower court did not award to them the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the lots from the time that they tendered the redemption price. The government appealed because it believed that the condition had not yet materialized.

CA affirmed the trial court's judgment but went further on the conditions like tax and rental fees. Petitioners appealed.

Held:

CA erred in imposing the said conditions on the reconveyance.

The fact that the contract of sale does not mention those conditions means that they were never within the contemplation of the parties. The Court of Appeals, in gratuitously imposing those conditions, made a new contract for them.

We hold that, while petitioners' claim for compensation may be justified on the ground that the CAA should have reconveyed the ten lots upon the tender of the redemption price, nevertheless, it would seem to be inequitable to require the CAA to pay compensation when it had not derived any benefit from the lots.

G.R. No. L-14569 Case Digest

G.R. No. L-14569 November 23, 1960

Benito Codilla, et al., petitioners

vs Jose Martinez, etc., et al., respondents

Ponente: Bautista Angelo

Facts:

January 24, 1956, Mayor Baloyo of Tagum, Davao left for Negros Occidental to attend to a sick brother. Thereupon, he designated the vice mayor to act in his place until advice on his part. The vice mayor in turn fell sick of certain lung trouble which led the vice mayor to designate councilor Macario Bermudez a acting mayor until notice of the contrary. Bermudez was not also in good health so he designated the 3rd ranking councilor Martinez.

Martinez accepted the designation and assumed office, his first official act was to separate the petitioners as policemen of the municipality. Petitioners immediately filed their protest invoking the right to continue in office under RA 557. But acting mayor Martinez appointed Duaso municipal policemen in lieu of Codilla who immediately qualified by taking his oath of office. The appointment was approved by the President of the Philippines and Commission of Civil Service among other appointments.

February 15, 1956, Codilla and his companions filed a petition for mandamus before the CFI of Davao against Martinez and Mayor Baloyo alleging that their separation from the service was illegal because civil service employees cannot be terminated except for cause.

Respondents in their answer set up the defense that the appointments having been made in a temporary capacity, because they are not civil service eligibles, that the same were valid even assuming that Martinez does not have the authority because their office have expired nonetheless.

The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that the separation was made in accordance with the law. Hence the present appeal.

Issue: Martinez, being a 3rd ranking councilor is the lawful designate to be the acting mayor.

Held:

The trial court did not consider the designation of Martinez as acting mayor entirely void, or one that would make him a usurper, but at most a de facto officer whose acts maybe given validity in the eye of the law. Thus, the trial court said: "Although his designation was irregular, still he was acting under a color of authority, as distinguished from a usurper who is "one who has neither title nor color of right of an office." . . . The acts of Jose L. Martinez are therefore official acts of a de facto officer. If they are made within the scope of the authority vested by the law in the office of the mayor of Tagum, such acts of a de facto office are here present.

To constitute a de facto officer, there must be an office having a de facto existence, or at least one recognized by law and the claimant must be in actual possession of the office under color of title or authority.

Another factor that may be invoked in favor of the validity of the official actuation of Acting Mayor Martinez is the fact that his entire official acts done under his designation were subsequently endorsed and ratified by the incumbent mayor when he returned to office. This ratification served to cure any legal infirmity the acts of Acting Mayor Martinez may have suffered because of his irregular designation.

The fact that they were merely given temporary appointments for the reason that they do not have civil service eligibility thus making their status as employee wholly dependent upon the grace of the ruling power. And this we say because, as we ruled in a series of cases, "A temporary appointment is similar to one made in acting capacity, the essence of which lies in its temporary character and its terminability at the pleasure of the appointment power."

G.R. No. 110544 Case Digest

G.R. No. 110544 October 17, 1995

Reynaldo Tuanda, etc., petitioners

vs The Honorable Sandiganbayan, Bartolome Binaohan and Delia Estrellanes, respondents

Ponente: Kapunan

Facts:

Petitioners institute this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set aside the resolution of Sandiganbayan and its orders denying petitioners' motion for suspension of their arraignment.

Fabruary 9, 1989 Delia Estrellanes and Bartolome Binaohan were designated as industrial labor sectoral representative and agricultural labor sectoral representative for the Sangguniang Bayan of Jimalalud, Negros Oriental by DILG Secretary Santos. They both took their oath of office on February 16 and 17, 1989.

Then, petitioners filed a petition with the Office of the President for review and recall of said designations. This was denied and enjoined Tuanda to recognize private sectoral representatives. Estrallanes and Binaohan then filed a petition for mandamus with RTC Negros Oriental for recognition as members of the Sangguniang Bayan. It was dismissed.

The matter was then brought to RTC Dumaguete City accusing Tuanda and others of taking advantage of their official functions and unlawfully causing undue injury to Estrellanes and Binaohan.

Petitioners filed a motion with Sandiganbayan for suspension of the Criminal Case on the ground that a prejudicial question exists. The RTC rendered a decision declaring null and void ab initio the designations issued by DILG for violation of the provisions saying that the Sanggunian itself must make a determination first of the number of sectors in the city/municipality to warrant representation.

Meanwhile, the Sandiganbayan has issued a resolution saying that the private respondents have rendered such services and the said appointments enjoy the presumption of regularity; for these reasons, the private respondents were entitled to the slaries attached to their office. Even if the RTC later declare the appointments null and void, they would still be given salaries because of the period they acted as representatives has made them a de facto officers.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution in view of the RTC nullification of the appointments. But it was likewise denied along with the cancellation of their arraignment, instead Sandiganbayan required Tuanda and the others to submit a written show cause why they should not be cited for contempt of court for their failure to appear in court today for the arraignment.

Hence, this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition where petitioners attribute to respondent Sandiganbayan the following errors:

A. The Respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners' motions for the suspension of the proceedings in Criminal Case

B. The Respondent Court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in refusing to suspend the proceedings that would entail a retrial and rehearing by it of the basic issue involved

C. The Respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion and/or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in effectively allowing petitioners to be prosecuted under two alternative theories that private respondents are de jure and/or de facto officers in violation of petitioners' right to due process.

Issue: The legality of private respondents' designation as sectoral representatives.

Held:

The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. 14 It has two essential elements:

(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and

(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. 15

Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bench, we find that the issue in the civil case, CA-G.R. CV No. 36769, constitutes a valid prejudicial question to warrant suspension of the arraignment and further proceedings in the criminal case against petitioners.

All the elements of a prejudicial question are clearly and unmistakably present in this case. There is no doubt that the facts and issues involved in the civil action (No. 36769) and the criminal case (No. 16936) are closely related. The filing of the criminal case was premised on petitioners' alleged partiality and evident bad faith in not paying private respondents' salaries and per diems as sectoral representatives, while the civil action was instituted precisely to resolve whether or not the designations of private respondents as sectoral representatives were made in accordance with law.

Private respondents insist that even if their designations are nullified, they are entitled to compensation for actual services rendered. We disagree. As found by the trial court and as borne out by the records, from the start, private respondents' designations as sectoral representatives have been challenged by petitioners. They began with a petition filed with the Office of the President copies of which were received by private respondents on 26 February 1989, barely eight (8) days after they took their oath of office. Hence, private respondents' claim that they have actually rendered services as sectoral representatives has not been established.

Finally, we find unmeritorious respondent Sandiganbayan's thesis that even in the event that private respondents' designations are finally declared invalid, they may still be considered de facto public officers entitled to compensation for services actually rendered.

The conditions and elements of de facto officership are the following:

1) There must be a de jure office;

2) There must be color of right or general acquiescence by the public; and

3) There must be actual physical possession of the office in good faith.

Sandiganbayan Resolution was set aside.

G.R. No. 105371 Case Digest

G.R. No. 105371 November 11, 1993

The Philippine Judges Association, etc., petitioners

vs Hon. Pete Prado, etc., respondents

Ponente: Cruz

Facts:

The petitioners are members of the mower courts who feel that their official functions as judges will be prejudiced by the Section 35 of RA No. 7354 through Circular No. 92-98 withdrawing the franking privilege from the SC, CA, RTC, MTCs and Land Registration of Deeds and other government offices.

Petitioners assails the constitutionality of RA No. 7354 on the grounds: (1) its title embraces more than one subject and does not express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed among the members before its passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary.

Issue: the independence of the Judiciary.

Held:

(1) We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is germane to the accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a more efficient and effective postal service system. Our ruling is that, by virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35 did not have to be expressly included in the title of the said law.

(2) Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final form were not distributed among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.

(3) The respondents counter that there is no discrimination because the law is based on a valid classification in accordance with the equal protection clause. In fact, the franking privilege has been withdrawn not only from the Judiciary but also the Office of Adult Education, the Institute of National Language; the Telecommunications Office; etc.

(4) We are unable to agree with the respondents that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 represents a valid exercise of discretion by the Legislature under the police power. On the contrary, we find its repealing clause to be a discriminatory provision that denies the Judiciary the equal protection of the laws guaranteed for all persons or things similarly situated. The distinction made by the law is superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the Judiciary and the grantees of the franking privilege.

It is unconstitutional.

G.R. No. 113811 Case Digest

G.R. No. 113811 October 7, 1994

Ishmael Himagan, petitioner

vs People of the Philippines and Hon. Judge Hilario Mapayo, respondents

Ponente: Kapunan

Facts:

Himagan is policeman assigned with the medical company of the PNP Regional Headquarters as Camp Catitigan, Davao City, and was implicated in the killing of Benjamin Machitar Jr., and the attempted murder of Bernabe Machitar. After the infromations were filed, RTC Davao issued as order suspending petitioner until the termination of the case.

October 11, 1993, Himagan filed a motion to lift the order for his suspension relying on the Civil service Decree that his suspension should be limited to 90 days. But respondent Judge denied the motion pointing out under section 47 of RA 6975, the accused shall be suspended from office until his case is terminated. The motion for reconsideration of the order was denied also, hence this certiorari and mandamus to set aside the orders of respondent Judge.

Held:

First. The language of the first sentence of Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 is clear, plain and free from ambiguity. It gives no other meaning than that the suspension from office of the member of the PNP charged with grave offense where the penalty is six years and one day or more shall last until the termination of the case. The suspension cannot be lifted before the termination of the case. The second sentence of the same Section providing that the trial must be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment does not qualify or limit the first sentence. The two can stand independently of each other. The first refers to the period of suspension. The second deals with the time frame within which the trial should be finished.

Second. Petitioner misapplies Sec. 42 of PD 807. A meticulous reading of the section clearly shows that it refers to the lifting of preventive suspension in pending administrative investigation, not in criminal cases, as here. In the instant case. Petitioner is charged with murder under the Revised Penal Code and it is undisputed that he falls squarely under Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 which categorically states that his suspension shall last until the case is terminated.

The foregoing discussions reveal the legislative intent to place on preventive suspension a member of the PNP charged with grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law exceeds six years of imprisonment and which suspension continues until the case against him is terminated.

The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions.

The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of real differences among men, the equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to the privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. Thus, the equal protection clause does not absolutely forbid classifications, such as the one which exists in the instant case. If the classification is based on real and substantial differences; is germane to the purpose of the law; applies to all members of the same

class; and applies to current as well as future conditions, the classification may not be impugned as violating the Constitution's equal protection guarantee. A distinction based on real and reasonable considerations related to a proper legislative purpose such as that which exists here is neither unreasonable, capricious nor unfounded.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

G.R. No. L-59431 Case Digest

G.R. No. L-59431 July 25, 1984

Antero Sison, petitioner

vs Ruben Ancheta, etc., respondents

Ponente: Fernando

Facts:

Sison alleges that Section 1 of BP Blg. 135 which amends Section 21 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977 which provides rates tax on citizens or residents on (a) taxable compensation income, (b) taxable net income, (c) royalties, prizes, and other winnings, (d) interest from bank deposits and yield or any other monetary benefit from deposit substitutes and from trust fund and similar arrangements, (e) dividends and share of individual partner in the net profits of taxable partnership, (f) adjusted gross income. Sison alleged that he would be unduly discriminated by this imposition, characterizing the section as arbitrary amounting to class legislation, oppressive and capricious in character. For Sison, there is a transgression of both the equal protection and due process clauses of the constitution as well as the rule on uniformity in taxation.

Held:

Petition must be dismissed.

Arbitrariness: mere allegation does not suffice. There must be factual foundation of such claim.

Due process: may be invoked where a taxing statute is so arbitrary that it finds no support in the Constitution.

Equal Protection: the laws assailed operate equally and uniformly on all persons under the similar circumstances.

Uniformity: the tax applies equally to all persons, firms and corporations placed in similar situation.

Therefore, the petition is without merit, considering the (1) lack of factual foundation to show the arbitrary character of the assailed provision; 31 (2) the force of controlling doctrines on due process, equal protection, and uniformity in taxation and (3) the reasonableness of the distinction between compensation and taxable net income of professionals and businessman certainly not a suspect classification.

G.R. No. 127410 Case Digest

G.R. No. 127410 January 20, 1999

Conrado Tiu, Juan Montelibano Jr. and Isagani Jungco, petitioners

vs Court of Appeals, etc., respondents

Ponente: Panganiban

Facts:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the CA's decision upholding the constitutionality and validity of EO No. 97-A granting the tax and duty incentives authorized under RA No. 7227 were limited to the business enterprises and residents within the fenced-in area of the Subic Special Economic Zone.

The assailed resolution has denied the motion for reconsideration of the petitioners.

March 13, 1992, Congress with the approval of the President passed RA 7227 creating Bases Conversion and Development Authority for the purpose of providing funds therefor and for other purposes in SSEZ. On June 10, 1993, President Ramos issued EO No. 97 clarifying the tax and duty incentives thus:

Sec. 1. On Import Taxes and Duties. — Tax and duty-free importations shall apply only to raw materials, capital goods and equipment brought in by business enterprises into the SSEZ. Except for these items, importations of other goods into the SSEZ, whether by business enterprises or resident individuals, are subject to taxes and duties under relevant Philippine laws.

The exportation or removal of tax and duty-free goods from the territory of the SSEZ to other parts of the Philippine territory shall be subject to duties and taxes under relevant Philippine laws.

Sec. 2. On All Other Taxes. — In lieu of all local and national taxes (except import taxes and duties), all business enterprises in the SSEZ shall be required to pay the tax specified in Section 12(c) of R.A. No. 7227.

9 days after, President Ramos issued EO 97-A specifying the area within which the tax and duty free privilege was operative. Then petitioners challenged the EO 97-A for being violative of the right to equal protection of the laws.

Ruling of CA: Respondent Court held that "there is no substantial difference between the provisions of EO 97-A and Section 12 of RA 7227. In both, the 'Secured Area' is precise and well-defined as '. . . the lands occupied by the Subic Naval Base and its contiguous extensions as embraced, covered and defined by the 1947 Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States of America, as amended . . .'" The appellate court concluded that such being the case, petitioners could not claim that EO 97-A is unconstitutional, while at the same time maintaining the validity of RA 7227.

The Court of Appeals further justified the limited application of the tax incentives as being within the prerogative of the legislature, pursuant to its "avowed purpose [of serving] some public benefit or interest." It ruled that "EO 97-A merely implements the legislative purpose of [RA 7227]."

Issue: Whether the E0 97-A is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution?

Held:

The constitutional rights to equal protection of the law is not violated by an executive order, issued pursuant to law, granting tax and duty incentives only to the business and residents within the "secured area" of the Subic Special Economic Zone and denying them to those who live within the Zone but outside such "fenced-in" territory. The Constitution does not require absolute equality among residents. It is enough that all persons under like circumstances or conditions are given the same privileges and required to follow the same obligations. In short, a classification based on valid and reasonable standards does not violate the equal protection clause.

We rule in favor of the constitutionality and validity of the assailed EO. Said Order is not violative of the equal protection clause; neither is it discriminatory. Rather, than we find real and substantive distinctions between the circumstances obtaining inside and those outside the Subic Naval Base, thereby justifying a valid and reasonable classification.

The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another. 6 The classification must also be germane to the purpose of the law and must apply to all those belonging to the same class.

Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions, (2) be germane to the purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class.

Purpose of Law: to accelerate the conversion of military reservations into productive uses.

Substantial Distinctions: We believe it was reasonable for the President to have delimited the application of some incentives to the confines of the former Subic military base. It is well-settled that the equal-protection guarantee does not require territorial uniformity of laws. As long as there are actual and material differences between territories, there is no violation of the constitutional clause.

Existing Conditions: We believe that the classification set forth by the executive issuance does not apply merely to existing conditions. As laid down in RA 7227, the objective is to establish a "self-sustaining, industrial, commercial, financial and investment center" in the area. There will, therefore, be a long-term difference between such investment center and the areas outside it.

Apply Equally: the classification applies equally to all the resident individuals and businesses within the "secured area." The residents, being in like circumstances or contributing directly to the achievement of the end purpose of the law, are not categorized further. Instead, they are all similarly treated, both in privileges granted and in obligations required.

G.R. No. L-23794 Case Digest

G.R. No. L-23794 February 17, 1968

Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., plaintiff-appellant

vs The Treasurer of Ormoc City, etc., defendants-appellees

Ponente: Bengzon

Facts:

January 29, 1964, the municipal board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4 Series of 1964 imposing a municipal tax for all productions of centrifugal sugar milled equivalent to 1

% per export sale to USA and other foreign countries. Payments were made under protest by Ormoc sugar Company.

Sugar Company filed before CFI of Leyte a complaint against the City of Ormoc alleging that the ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause and the rule of uniformity of taxation. In response, defendants asserted that the tax ordinance was within the city's power to enact under Local Autonomy Act and the same did not violate constitutional limitations.

After pre-trial and submission of case memoranda, CFI declared the ordinance constitutional, that it is within the charter of the city.

Appeal was then taken to SC by the Ormoc Sugar Company alleging the same statutory and constitutional violations. Appellant questions the authority of the Municipal Board to levy such tax in view of the Revised dministrative Code which denies municipal councils to impose export tax.

Issue: Whether constitutional limits on the power of taxation, and equal protection clause and rule of uniform taxation were infringed?

Held:

We ruled that the equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class.

          A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, for the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.

The ordinance is unconstitutional.

G.R. No. L-45987 Case Digest

G.R. No. L-45987 May 5, 1939

People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee

vs Cayat, defendant-appellant

Ponente: Moran

Facts:

Cayat is a native of Baguio prosecuted for violation of Act No. 1639 and was sentenced by the justice of the peace of Baguio to pay a fine or suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

On January 25, 1937, the City of Baguio accused Cayat of illegally possessing a gin, which the members of his tribe have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of Act No. 1639.

Cayat interposed a demurrer which was overruled. At the trial, Cayat admitted the alleged facts but pleaded not guilty. But trial court found him guilty and sentenced him of the fine or imprisonment.

Cayat challenges the constitutionality of the Act on the following grounds: (1) That it is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws;

(2) That it is violative of the due process clause of the Constitution: and.

(3) That it is improper exercise of the police power of the state.

Held:

It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. And the classification, to be reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.

(1) Substantial Distinction: . It is not based upon "accident of birth or parentage," as counsel to the appellant asserts, but upon the degree of civilization and culture. "The term 'non-Christian tribes' refers, not to religious belief, but, in a way, to the geographical area, and, more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities." This distinction is unquestionably reasonable, for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non-Christian tribes.

(2) Germane to the purpose of law: it is unquestionably designed to insure peace and order in and among the non-Christian tribes. It has been the sad experience of the past, as the observations of the lower court disclose, that the free use of highly intoxicating liquors by the non-Christian tribes have often resulted in lawlessness and crimes, thereby hampering the efforts of the government to raise their standard of life and civilization.

(3) it must not be limited to conditions: The law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of its enactment. It is intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions exist.

(4) apply to all members of the class: that the Act applies equally to all members of the class is evident from a perusal thereof. That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number non-Christians by reason of their degree of culture, is not an argument against the equality of its application.

Act No. 1639, as above stated, is designed to promote peace and order in the non-Christian tribes so as to remove all obstacles to their moral and intellectual growth and, eventually, to hasten their equalization and unification with the rest of their Christian brothers. Its ultimate purpose can be no other than to unify the Filipino people with a view to a greater Philippines.