G.R. No. L-5877 Case Digest

G.R. No. L-5877, September 28, 1954

People of the Philippines

vs Arturo Mendoza

Ponente: Paras

Facts:

August 1936, Jovita de Asis and Arturo Mendoza got married in Marikina. During their marriage, Arturo was marred to Olga Lema in Manila. When Jovita died, Arturo contracted another marriage with Carmencita Panlillio in Laguna. This last marriage gave rise to his prosecution for bigamy.

Arturo contends that his marriage with Lema is null and void, therefore non-existent at the time he married Jovita. Then his 3rd marriage was valid also because it occurred after the death of Jovita.

Solicitor General argues that, even assuming that Arturo's marriage to Lema is void, he is not exempt from criminal liability in the absence of judicial annulment of said bigamous marriage.

Ruling:

 it is admitted that appellant's second marriage with Olga Lema was contracted during the existence of his first marriage with Jovita de Asis. Section 29 of the marriage law (act 3613), in force at the time the appellant contracted his second marriage in 1941, provides as follows:

Illegal marriages. — Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:

(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;

(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or the absentee being generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, the marriage so contracted being valid in either case until declared null and void by a competent court.

This statutory provision plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere annullable marriages. There is here no pretence that appellant's second marriage with Olga Lema was contracted in the belief that the first spouse, Jovita de Asis, has been absent for seven consecutive years or generally considered as dead, so as to render said marriage valid until declared null and void by a competent court.

Wherefore, the appealed judgment is reversed and the defendant-appellant acquitted, with costs de officio so ordered.

G.R. No. L-19069 Case Digest

G.R. No. L-19069, October 29, 1968

People of the Philippines

vs Amadeo Peralta

Facts:

February 1958, Peralta among other inmates of New Bilibid Prisons, conspired and mutually helped one another, with evident premeditation and treachery, armed with deadly weapons, feloniously killed Jose Carriego, Eugene Barnosa and Santos Cruz, also convicts of New Bilibid. Aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism is present because the crime was committed while the offenders were convicted by final judgments.

Upon motion of the fiscal before trial, the lower court dismissed the charge against one of the accused for lack of evidence. After prosecution of the case, the charge against 6 accused were dismissed for failure to establish a prima facie case against them. After trial, 5 of the accused were also acquitted, then 1 died.

Issues:

(1) it fails to consider the legality of imposing multiple capital penalties; (2) it fails to distinguish between imposition of penalty and service of sentence; (3) it ignores the fact that multiple death sentences could be served simultaneously; and (4) it overlooks the practical merits of imposing multiple death penalties.

Ruling:

The evidence on record proves beyond peradventure that the accused acted in concert from the moment they bolted their common brigade, up until the time they killed their last victim, Santos Cruz. While it is true that Parumog, Larita and Luna did not participate in the actual killing of Carriego, nonetheless, as co-conspirators they are equally guilty and collectively liable for in conspiracy the act of one is the act of all. It is not indispensable that a co-conspirator should take a direct part in every act and should know the part which the others have to perform. Conspiracy is the common design to commit a felony; it is not participation in all the details of the execution of the crime. All those who in one way or another help and cooperate in the consummation of a felony previously planned are co-principals. Hence, all of the six accused are guilty of the slaughter of Carriego, Barbosa and Santos Cruz — each is guilty of three separate and distinct crimes of murder.

Multiple death penalties are not impossible to serve because they will have to be executed simultaneously. A cursory reading of article 70 will show that there are only two modes of serving two or more (multiple) penalties: simultaneously or successively. The first rule is that two or more penalties shall be served simultaneously if the nature of the penalties will so permit. In the case of multiple capital penalties, the nature of said penal sanctions does not only permit but actually necessitates simultaneous service.

In view of the attendance of the special aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism, as all of the six accused at the time of the commission of the offenses were serving sentences in the New Bilibid Prison at Muntinlupa by virtue of convictions by final judgments the penalty for each offense must be imposed in its maximum period, which is the mandate of the first paragraph of article 160 of the Revised Penal Code. Viada observes, in a position, that the severe penalty imposed on a quasi-recidivist is justified because of his perversity and incorrigibility.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo is hereby modified as follows: Amadeo Peralta, Andres Factora, Leonardo Dosal, Angel Parumog, Gervasio Larita and Florencio Luna are each pronounced guilty of three separate and distinct crimes of murder, and are each sentenced to three death penalties; all of them shall, jointly and severally, indemnify the heirs of each of the three deceased victims in the sum of P12,000; each will pay one-sixth of the costs.

G.R. No. 166401 Case Digest

G.R. No. 166401, October 30, 2006

People of the Philippines

vs Alfredo Bon

Ponente: Tinga

Facts:

8 informations were filed against Alfredo Bon charging him with rape of AAA and BBB, the daughters of his brother. The rape allegedly happened many times in the span of 6 years starting in 1994 were the victims were still minors.

RTC convicted Bon on all 8 counts of rape, denying the alibi presented by Bon. RTC considered qualifying circumstances of minority of the victims and the relationship of the victims and Bon.

On appeal on the penalty, CA ruled affirming the 6 counts rape but modified the 2 as attempted rape. According to the CA, the evidence on the 2 rapes was insufficient to make Bon guilty beyond reasonable doubt. CA then reduced the penalty for the 2 counts of rape from death to indeterminate penalty of 10 years as minimum to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal as maximum for attempted rape.

Issues: (1) Whether the Court should affirm the conviction of appellant Alfredo Bon (appellant) for six counts of rape and two counts of attempted rape, the victims being his then-minor nieces.

(2) Whether his penalty for attempted qualified rape, which under the penal law should be two degrees lower than that of consummated qualified rape, should be computed from death or reclusion perpetua.

Ruling:

(1) Court affirms. The Court thus affirms the conclusions of the Court of Appeals that it has been established beyond reasonable doubt that appellant is guilty of six (6) counts of rape and two (2) counts of attempted rape. However, in light of Rep. Act No. 9346, the appropriate penalties for both crimes should be amended.

(2) We close by returning to the matter of appellant Alfredo Bon. By reason of Rep. Act No. 9346, he is spared the death sentence, and entitled to the corresponding reduction of his penalty as a consequence of the downgrading of his offense from two (2) counts consummated rape to two (2) counts of attempted rape. For the six (6) counts of rape, we downgrade the penalty of death to reclusion perpetua with no eligibility for parole, pursuant to Rep. Act No. 9346. For each of the two (2) counts of attempted rape, we downgrade by one degree lower the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals. We hold that there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the penalty of prision mayor should be imposed in it medium period. Consequently, we impose the new penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.

G.R. No. 173473 Case Digest

G.R. No. 173473, December 17, 2008

People of the Philippines

vs Beth Temporada

Ponente: Ynares-Santiago

Facts:

Accused Rosemarie Robles, Bernadette Miranda, Nenita Catacotan, Jojo Resco and Beth Temporada are all employees of ATTC, a Travel and Tour Company, recruited and promised overseas employment for a fee to Rogelio Legaspis Jr, as a technician in Singapore, and other overseas workers. The accused were holding office in Makati but eventually transferred to Manila. After paying placements fees, none of the overseas recruits was able to leave or recover what they have paid, thus they filed separate criminal complaints against accused in Manila.

The accused were then sentenced to life imprisonment for illegal recruitment and estafa. Then the case was referred to the CA for intermediate review, CA affirmed with modification on the penalty. The penalty was lowered for the lower court due to insufficiency of evidence.

Issue: Whether the accused were guilty of 5 counts of estafa and illegal recruitment, and be charged of the penalty of life imprisonment.

Ruling:

The Court affirms the modification of the CA, except for the penalty on the 5 counts of estafa.

Although Temporada is saying that she is not a principal to the illegal recruitment and estafa because she is a mere employee of ATTC and that she was just echoing the requirement of her employer, the Court believes that Temporada actively and consciously participated in illegal recruitment.

The Court agrees with the lower court that the accused were guilty of illegal recruitment by a syndicate with the penalty of life imprisonment. The accused were convicted separately also for 5 counts of estafa. 

G.R. No. 186227 Case Digest

G.R. No. 186227, July 20, 2011

People of the Philippines

vs Allen Udtojan Mantalaba

Ponente: Peralta

Facts:

Task Forcer Regional Anti-Crime Emergency Response (RACER) in Butuan City received a report that Mantalaba who was 17 yrs old was selling shabu. After a buy-bust operation, two informations was filed against Mantalaba which was later on consolidated. Mantalaba pleaded not guilty.

RTC found Mantalaba guilty beyond reasonable doubt and was penalized of reclusion perpetua to death and fine of 500k for selling shabu and  (2) for illegally possessing shabu, Mantalaba was penalized, in application of the ISL, 6 yrs and 1 day as minimum and 8 yrs as maximum of prision mayor and fine of 300k. CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. Thus, the present appeal.

Mantalaba: the lower court gravely erred in convicting him and that there was no evidence of actual sale between him and the poser-buyer during the buy-bust operation. He also claims that the chain of custody of the seized shabu was not established.

Issue: Whether Mantalaba is guilty of drug trafficking and possession.

Ruling:

The petition is without merit.

The buy-bust operation was valid, establishing the following: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefore. From the above testimony of the prosecution witness, it was well established that the elements have been satisfactorily met. The seller and the poseur-buyer were properly identified. The subject dangerous drug, as well as the marked money used, were also satisfactorily presented. The testimony was also clear as to the manner in which the buy-bust operation was conducted.

Non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with Section 21 is not fatal as long as there is justifiable ground therefor, and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team. Its non-compliance will not render an accused arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible.

As to his minority, Mantalaba was minor during the buy-bust operation but was of legal age during the promulgation of the decision. It must be noted that RA 9344 took effect after the promulgation of the RTC's decision against Mantalaba. The RTC did not suspend the sentence in accordance with PD 603 (Child and Youth Welfare Code) and Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law that were applicable at the time of the promulgation of the judgment. However, as ruled in People vs Sarcia, suspension of sentence can still be applied but NOT when the offender upon the promulgation of judgment is 21 yrs old. or older. Mantalaba is now 21 yrs old, therefore his suspension of sentence is already moot and academic.

But as to the penalty, CA must have appreciated Mantalaba's minority as privileged mitigating circumstance in fixing the penalty. Thus, applying the rules stated above, the proper penalty should be one degree lower than reclusion perpetua, which is reclusion temporal, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority having been appreciated. Necessarily, also applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISLAW), the minimum penalty should be taken from the penalty next lower in degree which is prision mayor and the maximum penalty shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal, there being no other mitigating circumstance nor aggravating circumstance. 

G.R. No. 206666 Case Digest

G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015

Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidal, Alfredo Lim

vs COMELEC and Joseph Ejercito Estrada

Ponente: Leonardo-de Castro

Facts:

September 2007, Sandiganbayan convicted Estrada for the crime of plunder with the penalty of reclusion perpetua and accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification.

October 2007, President Arroyo extended executive clemency, by way of pardon to Estrada with "WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office,IN VIEW HEREOF and pursuant to the authority conferred upon me by the Constitution, I hereby grant executive clemency to JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, convicted by the Sandiganbayan of Plunder and imposed a penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. He is hereby restored to his civil and political rights." Which Estrada received and accepted by affixing his signature.

November 2009, Estrada filed a certificate of candidacy for the position of President and has earned 3 oppositions in the COMELEC. In 2012, Estrada filed a COC vying for the position of Manila City Mayor. Then, Risos-Vidal filed a petition for disqualification against Estrada.

COMELEC: petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Risos-Vidal failed to present cogent proof sufficient to reverse Estrada's right to seek public office as effectively restored by the pardon vested by Arroyo.

Risos-Vidal then invoked the Court's jurisdiction saying that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it failed to disqualify Estrada for having been convicted of plunder, an offense involving moral turpitude. And for failing to consider the perpetual disqualification of Estrada.

Issue: whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that former President Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted for in public office as a result of the pardon granted to him by former President Arroyo.

Ruling:

ART. 36. Pardon; its effects.– A pardon shall not work the restoration of the right to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon.

A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence.

ART. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal – Their accessory penalties.– The penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal shall carry with them that of civil interdiction for life or during the period of the sentence as the case may be, and that of perpetual absolute disqualification which the offender shall suffer even though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.

Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified.

The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make the pardon conditional.

Contrary to Risos-Vidal’s declaration, the third preambular clause of the pardon, i.e., "[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office," neither makes the pardon conditional, nor militate against the conclusion that former President Estrada’s rights to suffrage and to seek public elective office have been restored.

This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly impose a condition or limitation, considering the unqualified use of the term "civil and political rights"as being restored. Jurisprudence educates that a preamble is not an essential part of an act as it is an introductory or preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the enactment, usually introduced by the word "whereas." Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute because, strictly speaking, they are not part of the operative language of the statute. In this case, the whereas clause at issue is not an integral part of the decree of the pardon, and therefore, does not by itself alone operate to make the pardon conditional or to make its effectivity contingent upon the fulfilment of the aforementioned commitment nor to limit the scope of the pardon.

G.R. No. 152644 Case Digest

G.R. No. 152644, February 10, 2006

John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid and Pedro Hernandez

vs People of the Philippines

Ponente: Carpio

Facts:

Loney, Reid and Hernandez are the President, CEO and Senior Manager and Resident Manager for Mining Operation of Marcopper in Marinduque. Marcopper built concrete plug at the tunnels discharging tons of tailing into Boac and Makalupnit rivers.

DOJ then filed separate charges against the petitioners in MTC Marinduque for violation of Art. 19 of PD 1067 or the Water code of the Philippines, Section 8 of PD 984 or the National Pollution Control Decree, Section 108 of RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 2005 and Art. 365 of the RPC for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property.

Petitioners moved to quash the information saying that the (1) information was duplicitous for it charges more than one offense for a single act, (2) that Loney and Reid were not yet officers when this incident took place and (3) that the informations contain allegations which constitute legal excuse or justification.

MTC: partially granted the quashing of the informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984 but maintained violation of RA 7942 and RPC. MTC then  issued a consolidated order in so far as the offense against RPC. With such, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with RTC-Marinduque assailing the Consolidated Order.

RTC: granted appeal but denied the petition for certiorari. Consolidated Order was affirmed and ordered the reinstatement of the informations pertaining to the violation of PD 1967 and PD 984. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA alleging grave abuse of discretion reiterating the defense that the informations were made out from a single act.

CA: affirmed RTC

Issues: Whether all the charges filed against petitioners except one should be quashed for duplicity of charges and only the charge for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property should stand.

Ruling:

No duplicity. Duplicity of charges means a single complaint or information charges more than on offense. The filing of several charges is proper. A single act or incident might offend two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution for more than one offense. The only limit is double jeopardy.

G.R. No. 78214 Case Digest

G.R. No. 78214, December 5, 1988

Yolanda Caballes

vs Dept. Agrarian Reform, Hon. Heherson Alvarez and Bienvenido Abajon

Ponente: Sarmiento

Facts:

The landholding subject of the controversy is consists of 60 sqm was acquired by spouses Arturo and Yolanda Caballes by virute of a Deed of Sale executed by Andrea Alicaba Millenes, this land is situated in Lawaan Talisay, Cebu. Before the sale of the property to Caballes, Bienvenido Abajon constructed his house on a protion of the land, paying monthly rental to Andrea Millenes. Abjon was likewise allowed to plant thereon, and they have agreed that the produce thereon would be shred by them 50-50.

When the property was sold, Caballes told Abajon that they will put up a poultry on the land and they intended to build it close to Abajon's house and they pursuaded Abajon to transfer his dwelling to the opposite portion of the land. Abajon offered to pay renta; to the new owners, but they refuse and later demanded for Abajon to vacate. Abajon refused to leave.

DAR concluded that Abajon was a tenant of the former owner, Andrea.

Issue: Whether Abajon is a tenant under the new owners.

Ruling:

Abajon is not a tenant for it only occupied a miniscule portion of the land which cannot be interpreted as economic-family size farm under the definition of RA 3844.

The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are:

1.            The parties are the landowner and the tenant;

2.            The subject is agricultural land;

3.            There is consent;

4.            The purpose is agricultural production;

5.            There is personal cultivation; and

6.            There is sharing of harvests.

All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the parties. The absence of one does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or a planter thereon, a de jure tenant. This is so because unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws.

Therefore, the fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship. Certainly, it is not unusual for a landowner to accept some of the produce of his land from someone who plants certain crops thereon. This is a typical and laudable provinciano trait of sharing or patikim, a native way of expressing gratitude for favor received. This, however, does not automatically make the tiller-sharer a tenant thereof especially when the area tilled is only 60, or even 500, square meters and located in an urban area and in. the heart of an industrial or commercial zone at that. Tenancy status arises only if an occupant of a parcel of land has been given its possession for the primary purpose of agricultural production. The circumstances of this case indicate that the private respondent's status is more of a caretaker who was allowed by the owner out of benevolence or compassion to live in the premises and to have a garden of some sort at its south western side rather than a tenant of the said portion.

Anent the second assignment of error, the petitioner argues that since Abajon, is not an agricultural tenant, the criminal case for malicious mischief filed against him should be declared as proper for trial so that proceedings in the lower court can resume.

G.R. No. 36213 Case Digest

G.R. No. 36213, June 29, 1989

Felix Gonzales and Carmen Gonzales

vs CA, deceased spouses Andres Agcaoile and Leonora Agcaoile, substituted by Lucia Sison

Ponente: Grino-Aquino

Facts:

October 1988, Lucia Sison filed a motion to be substituted in lieu of Andres and Leonora as she inherited the unsold lots of the deceased spouses. The court granted her motion.

Spouses are owners of parcels of land in Bulacan At the time of the purchased of the spouses, Maximo Cruz was th tenant who was planting palay thereon. Maximo continued as tenant until he died and was succeeded by his son Fidel Cruz. After 4 years as tennat, Fidel was succeeded by Pascual Gonzales, father of Felix Gonzales. In 1954, Pascual ceased to be a tenant because the land was proposed to be converted into residential subdivision.

Since 1956, spouses offered to pay rental and acted as agents for the sale of the subdivision lots. While they are renting, the spouses requsted that they may be allowed to plant palay on the lots that have not yet been sold. No specific agreement was concluded with regards of harvest, but spouses delivered part of the yield to Federico Mateo, defendants overseer.

When spouses defaulted in paying the rentals, the owner demanded for payment of rental or to vacate. Spouses then filed to elect the leasehold system and pray for a reliquidation of past harvest embracing the agricultural years. Before summons were served, owners initiated an action against the spouses for recovery of possession. CFI-Bulacan, favored Gonzales, the owner.

CA upheld the decision of the court saying that the property ceased to be an agricultural or farmland, having been converted as residential subdivision.

Issue: Whether an agricultural tenancy relationship can be created over land embraced in an approved residential subdivision.

Ruling:

There is no merit.  An agricultural leasehold cannot be established on land which has ceased to be devoted to cultivation or farming because of its conversion into a residential subdivision.

Petitioners may not invoke Section 36(l) of Republic Act No. 3844 which provides that "when the lessor-owner fails to substantially carry out the conversion of his agricultural land into a subdivision within one year after the dispossession of the lessee, the lessee shall be entitled to reinstatement and damages," for the petitioners were not agricultural lessees or tenants of the land before its conversion into a residential subdivision in 1955. Not having been dispossessed by the conversion of the land into a residential subdivision, they may not claim a right to reinstatement.

Furthermore, their admission that: (1) they leased from the respondents a lot (No. 1285-M) in the subdivision on which they built their house; (2) that as commission agents for the respondents, they were able to sell a subdivision lot to Clemente Bernabe, and received a P 300-commission on the sale; and (3) that "a number of other lots were sold by respondents to different buyers," (p. 51, Rollo) refutes the petitioners' contention that the development of the subdivision was a mere "scheme" to dispossess the previous tenant.

On the other hand, the petitioners' tactic of entering the subdivision as lessee of a homelot and thereafter cultivating some unsold lots ostensibly for temporary use as a home garden, but covertly for the purpose of later claiming the land as "tenanted" farm lots, recalls the fable of the camel that sought shelter inside its master's tent during a storm, and once inside, kicked its master out of the tent. Here, the private respondents' tolerance of the petitioners' supposedly temporary use of some vacant lots in the subdivision was seized by the latter as a weapon to deprive the respondents of their land.

G.R. No. L-62626 Case Digest

G.R. No. L-62626, July 18, 1984

Spouses Cayetano and Patricia Tiongson, etc.

vs CA and Teodoro Macaya

Ponente: Gutierrez

Facts:

1946, Severino Manotok donated and transferred to his 8 children and 2 grandchildren a 34 hectare land in Quezon City. Severino Manotok was appointed judicial guardian of his minor children. There was no tenant occupying the property at the time of the donation.

Later, Teodoro Macaya accompanied Vicente Herrera, the overseer of the property, went to the Manotok and pleaded that he be allowed to live in the property to prevent theft and to guard the property. Manotok allowed Macaya but imposed the condition that any time the owners needed to take the property, Macaya and his family must vacate, and that he could raise animals and plant according to his needs, and that the owners have no responsibility to Macaya and he will use only 3 hectares. These conditions were not put in writing.

In 1950, the property owners organized themselves as a corporation and transferred the 34 hectare land a capital contribution to the capital stock of the corporation. Later, when the owners demanded for payment of taxes, Macaya agreed to help pay the taxes by remitting 10 cavans of palay every year as his contribution. Later, owners requested Macaya to increase his contribution to 20 cavans, Macaya agreed. Later, Macaya pleaded that he will contribute 10 cavans only, the owners said the "he might as well not deliver anymore". Macaya did not deliver palays from then on.

1974, the owners executed a Unilateral Deed of Conveyance of the property to Patricia Tiongson, etc. Macaya was informed that the land is needed for house construction of the owners and was asked to vacate, Macaya pleaded that he may be allowed to harvest first before vacating. However, after harvest, Macaya did not vacate and even expand his cultivation to 6 hectares without the consent of the owners.

Issue: Whether there is tenancy relationship between the parties.

Ruling:

Real estate taxes of the property declare the land as residential. The physical view of the property also shows that the land was a rolling forestal land without any flat portion except the one tilled by Macaya.

As to the sharing, the decision of the petitioners not to ask for anymore contributions from Macaya reveals that there was no tenancy relationship ever agreed upon by the parties. Neither can such relationship be implied from the facts as there was no agreed system of sharing the produce of the property. Moreover, from 1946 to 1956 at which time, Macaya was also planting rice, there was no payment whatsoever. At the most and during the limited period when it was in force, the arrangement was a civil lease where the lessee for a fixed price leases the property while the lessor has no responsibility whatsoever for the problems of production and enters into no agreement as to the sharing of the costs of fertilizers, irrigation, seedlings, and other items. 

As to consent, the lot was taxed as residential land in a metropolitan area. There was clearly no intention on the part of the owners to devote the property for agricultural production but only for residential purposes. Thus, together with the third requisite, the fourth requisite which is the purpose was also not present.

There was no agreement as to any system of sharing the produce of the land. The petitioners did not get anything from the harvest and private respondent Macaya was using and cultivating the land free from any charge or expense.

G.R. No. 108941 Case Digest

G.R. No. 108941, July 6, 2000

Reynaldo Bejasa and Erlinda Bejasa

vs CA, Isabel Candelaria and Jamie Dinglasan

Ponente: Pardo

Facts:

This case involves two parcels of land located in Oriental Mindoro owned by Isabel Candelaria. October 1974, Candelaria entered into a 3-year lease agreement with Pio Malabanan wherein Malabanan agreed to clear, clean and cultivate the land, to purchase calamansi, and other seedlings, to attend and care for whatever plants thereon exist, to make the necessary harvest of fruits.

Malabanan, later hired the Bejasas to plant on the land and to clear it. On May 1977, Candelaria gave Malabanan a 6-year usufruct over the land. 1983, Malabanan died. Candelaria constituted Jaime Dinglasan as her attorney-in-fact, having powers of administration over the land.

October 1984, Candelaria entered into a new lease contract with Victoria Dinglasan, Jaime's wife with a 1-year term. On December 1984, Bejasas agreed to pay Victoria rent in consideration of an "pakyaw na bunga" agreement, with a term of 1 year.

After the 1 year period, Victoria demanded for Bejasas to vacate, but Bejasas continued to stay and did not give any consideration for its use, be in rent or share.  Candelarian again entered with a 3-year lease agreement with Dinglasans, and made Jaime her attorney-in-fact again. Jaime then filed a complaint before Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) seeking for ejectment of Bejasas. COSLAP dismissed the complaint.

Jaime then filed it with RTC for recovery of possession; the case was referred to DAR. DAR certified that ht e case was not proper for trial before the civil courts. Trial court dismissed the complaint of Jaime including the leasehold claim of Bejasas. Bejasas then filed a complaint for confirmation of leasehold and recovery of damages against Candelaria and Jaime.

RTC favored the Bejasas. On appeal, CA reversed the decision saying that (1) there was no tenant relationship, (2) Bejasas are mere overseers and not as permanent tenants, (3) the pakyaw contract have expired, (4) sharing of profits was not proven, (5) the element of personal cultivation was not proven.

Issue: Whether there is tenancy in favor of Bejasas.

Ruling:

There is no tenancy relationship. There was no proof of shared harvests. Between Candelaria (as owner) and the Bejasas, there is no relationship. Candelaria never gave her consent. As to the authority of Dinglasans, they had authority to bind the owner in a tenancy agreement, but there is no proof of such presented.

G.R. No. 176942 Case Digest

G.R. No. 176942, August 28, 2008

Nicorp Management and Development Corp.

vs Leonida de Leon

G.R. No. 177125, August 28, 2008

Salvador Lim

vs Leonida de Leon

Ponente: Ynares-Santiago

Facts:

August 2004, de Leon filed a complaint before Office of Provincial Afrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD)- Region 4 that Lim and NICORP be ordered to respect her tenancy rights over a parcel of land in Cavite, in the name of Leoncia de Leon and Susana de Leon (sisters of Leonida).

de Leon prayed that Lim and NICORP to respect her tenancy rights, as well as to restore the land to its original condition and not to covert it to non-agricultural use.

Lim denied de Leon was a tenant, alleging that de Leon  is a septuagenarian who is no longer physically capable of tilling the land, and that the MARO certified that the land had no registered tenant, and that de Leon cannot be considered landless tiller under CARP because she owns and resides in the property adjacent to the subject land which she acquired from inheritance.

NICORP asserted that it was not a proper party because it is still negotiating with the owners as to acquire ownership of the land, however, NICORP joins that de Leon was not a tenant.

PARAD referred the case to RARAD. RARAD dismissed the complaint for failure to prove substantial evidence of the agricultural tenancy relationship. DARAB affirmed the decision of the RARAD. On appeal, CA reversed the findings of RARAD/DARAB, saying that the letter of Susana to Dolores clearly acknowledged Rolando as tenant, and the sharing of produce was established by the affidavits of neighboring farmers.

CA also held that the reclassification of the land by Sangguniang Panlalawigan as residential cannot be given weight because it is only DAR that can reclassify or convert agricultural land to other classifications, and that the sale of the land to Lim was void because it was violative of CARP.

Issue: Whether de Leon was a tenant.

Ruling:

There is a tenancy relationship if the following essential elements concur: 1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; 3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) the harvest is shared between landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee. All the foregoing requisites must be proved by substantial evidence and the absence of one will not make an alleged tenant a de jure tenant. Unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure or covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws.

In the instant case, there is no substantial evidence to support the appellate court’s conclusion that respondent is a bona fide tenant on the subject property. Respondent failed to prove the third and sixth elements cited above. It was not shown that the De Leon sisters consented to a tenancy relationship with respondent who was their sister-in-law; or that the De Leon sisters received any share in the harvests of the land from respondent or that the latter delivered a proportionate share of the harvest to the landowners pursuant to a tenancy relationship.

As to the letter, de Leon was not mentioned at all in Susana's letter. de Leon will not necessarily be conferred the same status as tenant upon her son's death. There is no evidence that de Leon sisters consented to constitute respondent as their tenant on the subject land.

As to the affidavits, the affidavits did not mention at all that the De Leon sisters received a portion of the harvests or that respondent delivered the same to her sisters-in-law. The affidavits failed to disclose the circumstances or details of the alleged harvest sharing; it merely stated that the affiants have known respondent to be the cultivator of the land since time immemorial. It cannot therefore be deemed as evidence of harvest sharing.

As to the sale, the sale of the subject land to petitioners did not violate Sections 65 and 73(c) of R.A. No. 6657. There was no illegal conversion of the land because Sec. 65 applies only to lands which were covered by the CARP, i.e. those lands beyond the five-hectare retention limit allowed to landowners under the law, which were distributed to farmers-beneficiaries. In the instant case, it was not shown that the subject land was covered by the CARP. Neither was it shown that the sale was made to circumvent the application of R.A. 6657 or aimed at dispossessing tenants of the land that they till.

G.R. No. 70736 Case Digest

G.R. No. 70736, March 16, 1987

Bonifacio Hilario and Eduarda Buencamino Hilario

vs Hon. IAC and Salvador Baltazar

Ponente: Gutierrez

Facts:

January 1981, Salvador Baltazar filed a verified complaint with Courts of Agrarian Relation-Bulacan alleging that since January 1955 he had been continuous possession as a share tenant of a parcel of land in Bulacan which was previously owned by Socorro Vda. de Balagtas. Thereafter, the spouses Hilario began to threaten him to desist from entering and cultivating the land.

Baltazar claims that he became sa tenant of Socorro by virtue of a kasunduan executed in 1979. After the death of Socorro, he allegedly gave the share pertaining to the daughter of Socorro Corazon Pengzon. It was only in December 1980 that Baltazar knew that portion of the land was already owned by the Hilarios.

The Hilarios, aver that they acquired the land from the PNB after it had been foreclosed. CAR ruled that the land in question is not an agricultural land but a plain "bakuran". Hence, Baltazar is not a tenant.

CA however remanded the case to the lower court for further proceesings on the ground that the findings of CAR were not supported by substantial evidence. In compliance, CAR admitted additional evidence.

Again, CAR declared Baltazar as non-tenant. Baltazar appealed with IAC, IAC set aside the decision of the CAR  and entitling Baltazar security of tenure on the land. Spouse Hilario then petition for review.

Issue: Whether Baltazar is a tenant.

Ruling:

The evidence presented is more than sufficient to justify the conclusion that Baltazar is not a tenant of the landholding. (a) The kasunduan refers to 2-hectare land, while the landholding is only 4000 sqm. (b) When Socorro died, no new contract was executed. (c) Corazon did not receive any rental or share from the produce of the land.

G.R. No. 162070 Case Digest

G.R. No. 162070, October 19, 2005

DAR

vs Delia Sutton,etc.

Ponente: Puno

Facts:

Respondents inherited a land in Masbate which has been exclusively devoted to cow and calf breeding, the respondents made a voluntary offer to sell their land to DAR to avail of certain incentives under the law. When CARP took effect, it included to its coverage farms used for raising livestock, poultry and swine.

Since, SC en banc declared lands devoted to poultry and livestock not included in the definition of agricultural land in Luz Farms Case, respondents filed with DAR a formal request to withdraw their offer to sell saying that their land is exempted from the coverage of CARL.

In 1995, DAR partially granted the application of the respondents for exemption applying the retention limits (1hectare:1head of animal) with such, some portion of respondent's land were exempted, some portion were segregated and placed under Compulsory Acquisition. Respondents moved for reconsideration saying that the entire portion of the land must be exempted because it was solely devoted to cattle-raising, their motion was denied.

They filed a notice of appeal with the Office of the President assailing the constitutionality of CARL and pushing their application for exemption. The President affirmed the order of DAR. On appeal, CA declared the DAR Administrative Order (retention limits) null and void, favoring the respondents.

Issue: Whether DAR A.O prescribing a maximum retention limit for owners of lands devoted to livestock raising constitutional.

Ruling:

We find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution. The A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership. However, the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter alia, all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultry- raising. The Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine and poultry-raising are industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of agriculture or agricultural activity. The raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different from crop or tree farming. It is an industrial, not an agricultural, activity. A great portion of the investment in this enterprise is in the form of industrial fixed assets, such as: animal housing structures and facilities, drainage, waterers and blowers, feedmill with grinders, mixers, conveyors, exhausts and generators, extensive warehousing facilities for feeds and other supplies, anti-pollution equipment like bio-gas and digester plants augmented by lagoons and concrete ponds, deepwells, elevated water tanks, pumphouses, sprayers, and other technological appurtenances.

Lands devoted to raising of livestock, poultry and swine have been classified as industrial, not agricultural, lands and thus exempt from agrarian reform. Petitioner DAR argues that, in issuing the impugned A.O., it was seeking to address the reports it has received that some unscrupulous landowners have been converting their agricultural lands to livestock farms to avoid their coverage by the agrarian reform. Again, we find neither merit nor logic in this contention. The undesirable scenario which petitioner seeks to prevent with the issuance of the A.O. clearly does not apply in this case. Respondents family acquired their landholdings as early as 1948. They have long been in the business of breeding cattle in Masbate which is popularly known as the cattle-breeding capital of the Philippines. Petitioner DAR does not dispute this fact. Indeed, there is no evidence on record that respondents have just recently engaged in or converted to the business of breeding cattle after the enactment of the CARL that may lead one to suspect that respondents intended to evade its coverage. It must be stressed that what the CARL prohibits is the conversion of agricultural lands for non-agricultural purposes after the effectivity of the CARL. There has been no change of business interest in the case of respondents.

G.R. No. 86889 Case Digest

G.R. No. 86889, December 4, 1990

Luz Farms

vs Hon. Sec. of the Dept. of Agrarian Reform

Ponente: Paras

Facts:

Luz Farms is a corporation engaged in livestock and poultry business allegedly stands to be adversely affected by the enforcement of CARP. Luz Farms petitions CARP to be declared unconstitutional together with a writ of preliminary injunction or restraining the order. The Court resolved to deny the petition.

Later, after a motion for reconsideration, the Court granted the motion regarding the injunction and required the parties to file their respective memoranda.

Luz Farm: Livestock or poultry raising is not similar to crop or tree farming. Land is not the primary resource in this undertaking and represents no more than five percent (5%) of the total investment of commercial livestock and poultry raisers. Indeed, there are many owners of residential lands all over the country who use available space in their residence for commercial livestock and raising purposes, under "contract-growing arrangements," whereby processing corporations and other commercial livestock and poultry raisers.

DAR: livestock and poultry raising is embraced in the term "agriculture" and the inclusion of such enterprise under Section 3(b) of R.A. 6657 is proper. He cited that Webster's International Dictionary, "Agriculture — the art or science of cultivating the ground and raising and harvesting crops, often, including also, feeding, breeding and management of livestock, tillage, husbandry, farming.

Issue: Constitutionality of CARP, insofar as the said law includes the raising of livestock, poultry, swine in its coverage.

Ruling:

The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the word "agricultural," clearly show that it was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform program of the Government.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 insofar as the inclusion of the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith, are hereby DECLARED null and void for being unconstitutional and the writ of preliminary injunction issued is hereby MADE permanent.

G.R. No. 175175 Case Digest

G.R. No. 175175, September 29, 2008

Landbank of the Philippines

vs Heirs of Eleuterio Cruz

Ponente: Tinga

Facts:

Respondents are registered owners of an unirrigated riceland situated in Cagayan, which was placed by the government under the coverage of the operation land transfer under PD 27. LBP pegged the value of the land but was rejected the valuation.

Because of such rejection, SAC held that the value of the land different from that of the valuation made by the LBP, following the valuation made by the PARAD. On petition, the CA ruled that the area covered by the agrarian reform program was duly established before PARAD, however, CA affirmed the land valuation made by the SAC. Hence, this instant petition.

Issue:

Whether the SAC has the jurisdiction to determine the valuation of the land.

Ruling:

Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 states:

SEC. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors, shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farm workers and by government to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.

A perusal of the PARADs Decision dated 23 November 1999, which mandated payment of just compensation in the amount of P80,000.00 per hectare, reveals that the PARAD did not adhere to the formula prescribed in any of the aforementioned regulations issued by the DAR or was at least silent on the applicability of the aforementioned DAR regulations to the question of just compensation. The PARAD decision also did not refer to any evidence in support of its finding.

The SAC, meanwhile, referred to DAR A.O. No. 6, series of 1992, as amended, as the controlling guideline in fixing just compensation. Pertinently, to obtain the land value, the formula under said regulation requires that the values for the Capitalized Net Income, Comparable Sales and Market Value based on the tax declaration must be shown. Moreover, said formula has been superseded by DAR A.O. No. 05, series of 1998, which also requires values for Capitalized Net Income, Comparable Sales and Market Value, the same parameters laid down in the prior regulation.

Stating that no evidence was presented by respondents on the aforementioned parameters, the SAC ruled that it was constrained to adopt the finding of the PARAD, which fixed the value of the land at P80,000.00 per hectare. On appeal, the CA adopted the same finding. The general rule is that factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, are binding and conclusive on the Court. However, the rule admits of exceptions, as when the factual findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures or when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based.

A perusal of the PARAD decision, which was adopted by both the SAC and the CA, shows that its valuation of P80,000.00 per hectare is sorely lacking in any evidentiary or legal basis. While the Court wants to fix just compensation due to respondents if only to write finis to the controversy, the evidence on record is not sufficient for the Court to do so in accordance with DAR A.O. No. 5, series of 1998.

Decision of CA was reversed and set aside, the case was remanded to RTC to determine the just compensation.

G.R. No. 169008 Case Digest

G.R. No. 169008, July 31, 2008

Landbank of the Philippines

vs Raymunda Martinez

Ponente: Nachura

Facts:

The land owned by Martinez was compulsory acquired by DAR for the purpose of CARP, of which the LBP offered P1,955,485.60 as just compensation. Convinced that the amount was just and confiscatory, Martinez rejected it. Thus, PARAD conducted a summary administrative proceedings for the preliminary determination of the just compensation.

PARAD marked some inconsistencies in the figures and factors used by LBP in its computation, so they rendered an amount of P12,179,492.50 as just compensation.

LBP however, filed at the RTC-Romblon that the ruling of the DARAB on the just compensation has become final after the lapse of 15 days. Martinez opposed the motion. Later on, LBP instituted a petition for certiorari against PARAD, assailing that PARAD gravely abuse its discretion when it issued the order for the 12m just compensation despite the pending petition in the RTC.  CA, finding LBP guilty of forum-shopping dismissed the petition, Hence, this petition.

Issue:

(1) whether or not petitioner could file its appeal solely through its legal department; (2) whether or not petitioner committed forum shopping; and (3) whether or not the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) gravely abused his discretion when he issued a writ of execution despite the pendency of LBP’s petition for fixing of just compensation with the Special Agrarian Court (SAC).

Ruling:

The Court went on to rule that the petition for review on certiorari could not be filed without the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) entering its appearance as the principal legal counsel of the bank or without the OGCC giving its conformity to the LBP Legal Department’s filing of the petition. The Court also found petitioner to have forum-shopped when it moved to quash the PARAD resolutions and at the same time petitioned for their annulment via certiorari under Rule 65. Most importantly, the Court ruled that petitioner was not entitled to the issuance of a writ of certiorari by the appellate court because the Office of the PARAD did not gravely abuse its discretion when it undertook to execute the September 4, 2002 decision on land valuation. The said adjudicator’s decision attained finality after the lapse of the 15-day period stated in Rule XIII, Section 11 of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) Rules of Procedure.

On the supposedly conflicting pronouncements in the cited decisions, the Court reiterates its ruling in this case that the agrarian reform adjudicator’s decision on land valuation attains finality after the lapse of the 15-day period stated in the DARAB Rules. The petition for the fixing of just compensation should therefore, following the law and settled jurisprudence, be filed with the SAC within the said period. Following settled doctrine, we ruled in this case that the PARAD’s decision had already attained finality because of LBP’s failure to file the petition for the fixing of just compensation within the 15-day period.