G.R. No. 112574 Case Digest

G.R. No. 112574, October 8, 1998
Mercidar Fishing Corp. represented by its President Domingo Naval, petitioner,
vs NLRC and Fermin Agao, Jr., respondents
Ponente: Mendoza

Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the decision, dated August 30, 1993 of NLRC dismissing the appeal of petitioner Mercidar from the decision of Labor Arbiter denying the reconsideration.

Complaint was filed by Agao against Mercidar for Illegal dismissal and non-payment of 5 days service incentive leave for 1990. Agao has been employed as a bodegero. He complained that he was constructively dismissed by Mercidar when he refused his assignment aboard its boats.

Agao alleged that he had been sick and was allowed to go on leave without pay for 1 month. When he reported back to work he was told to come back some other time because he can't be reinstated immediately, then on Mercidar refused to give Agao work. For that reason, Agao requested for a certificate of employment but Mercidar refused to give him such certificate unless he submits his resignation. Since Agao didn't submit his resignation, Mercidar gave him separation pay and has prevented him from entering the premises.

Mercidar alleged on the other hand that it was Agao who actually abandoned his work. It claimed that Agao was absent for 3 months  without leave. They also alleged that Agao requested for his certificate of employment for the purpose of his application to another fishing company; and Agao refused to get his certificate and resign unless he was given separation pay.

Then Labor Arbiter Amansec rendered a decision disposing the case, ordering Mercidar to reinstate Agao with backwages, 13th month and incentive leave pay.

Mercidar appealed to NLRC which dismissed the appeal for lack of merit. NLRC dismissed the claim that Mercidar is not liable for service incentive pay as field personnel are not entitled to such pay under the labor code

NLRC denied the later motion for reconsideration of its decision.

Issues: (1) NLRC erred in ruling and sustaining the view that fishing crew members are not field personnel? (2) NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it upheld the Labor Arbiter's decision?

Ruling: The petition has no merit.

In the case at bar, during the entire course of their fishing voyage, fishermen employed by petitioner have no choice but to remain on board its vessel. Although they perform non-agricultural work away from petitioner's business offices, the fact remains that throughout the duration of their work they are under the effective control and supervision of petitioner through the vessel's patron or master as the NLRC correctly held. 

Neither did petitioner gravely abuse its discretion in ruling that private respondent had constructively been dismissed by petitioner. Such factual finding of both the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter is based not only on the pleadings of the parties but also on a medical certificate of fitness which, contrary to petitioner's claim private respondent presented when he reported to work on May 28, 1990. 

G.R. No. 183308 Case Digest

G.R. No. 183308, April 25, 2012

Insular Investment and Trust Corporation, petitioner

vs Capital One Equities Corp., and Planters Development Bank, respondents

Ponente: Mendoza

Facts:

Insular and Capital One and Planters are regularly engaged in trading, sale and purchase of Philippine treasury bills. Then on May 10, 1994, Capital One wrote a letter to Insular demanding the physical delivery of the treasury bills which the Capital one purchased.

Then on July 1, 1994, the 3 companies entered into a tripartite agreement whrein Planters assigned to Insular, which in turn assigned to Capital one, bills with the total value of P50million. But despite the repeated demands, Planters failed to deliver the balance worth of bills making Capital one likewise unable to deliver the remaining bills to Insular.

RTC: the trial court ordered (a) IITC to pay COEC P17,056,608.00 with interest at the rate of 6% from June 10, 1994 until full payment and (b) PDB to pay IITC P136,790,000.00 with interest at the rate of 6% from March 21, 1995 until full payment.

CA: CA affirmed the RTC finding that IITC was not a mere conduit but rather a direct seller to COEC of the treasury bills. The CA, however, absolved PDB from any liability, ruling that because PDB was not involved in the transactions between IITC and COEC, IITC should have alleged and proved that PDB sold treasury bills to IITC.

Hence, this petition.

Issues: (1) Whether IITC acted as a conduit in the transaction between COEC and PDB; (2) Whether COEC can set-off its obligation to IITC as against the latter’s obligation to it; and (3) Whether PDB has the obligation to deliver treasury bills to IITC.

Held:

Petition is meritorious.

(1) IITC did not act as conduit

Petitioner IITC insists that the issue of whether it acted as a conduit is a question of law which can properly be the subject of a petition for review before this Court.  Because the parties already entered into a stipulation of facts and documents, the facts are no longer at issue; rather, the court must now determine the applicable law based on the admitted facts, thereby making it a question of law.  Even assuming that the determination of IITC’s role in the two transactions is a pure question of fact, it falls under the exceptions when the Court may decide to review a question of fact.

(2) The issue raised by IITC is factual in nature as it requires the Court to delve into the records and review the evidence presented by the parties to determine the validity of the findings of both the RTC and the CA as to IITC’s role in the transactions in question.  These are purely factual issues which this Court cannot review.Well-established is the principle that factual findings of the trial court, when adopted and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding and conclusive on this Court and will generally not be reviewed on appeal.

Petition partially granted.

G.R. No. 171873 Case Digest

G.R. No. 171873, July 9, 2010

Municipality of Tiwi

vs Antonio Betito

Ponente: Del Castillo

Facts:

On June 4, 1990, this court issued a decision finding National Power Corporation liable for unpaid real estate taxes on its properties in Albay. This properties consisted geothermal plants in Tiwi and in Daraga. Previously, these properties were sold in an auction, of which the Province of Albay acquired ownership.

Later, NPC and Albay entered into a MOA where Albay agreed to settle its tax liabilities and NPC will make an initial payment upon signing of the agreement, and the rest will be paid in a monthly instalment.

Then on August 3, 1992, then mayor Corral of Tiwi requested Governor Salalima to remit the rightful taxes shares of Tiwi. Salalima replied that the request cannot be granted as the initial payment was only an earnest money and that the total amount to be collected was still being validated.

RTC: The trial court held that petitioners’ answer to the complaint failed to tender an issue, thus, partial judgment on the pleadings is proper.  It noted that petitioners did not specifically deny under oath the actionable documents in this case, particularly, the Contract of Legal Services and Resolution No. 15-92.  Consequently, the genuineness and due execution of these documents are deemed admitted pursuant to Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court.  Thus, the authority of Mayor Corral to enter into the subject contract was deemed established.

CA: The appellate court agreed with the trial court that the genuineness and due execution of the Contract of Legal Services and Resolution No. 15-92 was impliedly admitted by petitioners because of their failure to make a verified specific denial thereof.  Further, the answer filed by the petitioners admitted the material averments of the complaint concerning Tiwi’s liability under the subject contract and its receipt from the NPC of a total of P146,579,661.84 as realty taxes.   Petitioners  cannot claim that the subject contract  required ratification because this is not a requisite for the enforceability of a contract against a local government unit under the express terms of the contract and the provisions of the Local Government Code (LGC). Also, petitioners are estopped from questioning the enforceability of the contract after having collected and enjoyed the benefits derived therefrom.

Issues: (1) The amount of award of attorney’s fees to respondent is unreasonable, unconscionable and without any proof of the extent, nature and “result of his legal service” as required by the purported “contract of legal services” and pursuant to Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.(2) The application of the rule of judgment on the pleadings and/or summary judgment is baseless, improper and unwarranted in the case at bar.(3) The purported “contract of legal services” exceeded the authority of the late Mayor Corral and should have been ratified by the Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi in order to be enforceable.

Held:

The petition is meritorious. Judgment on the pleadings is improper when the answer to the complaint tenders several issues. A motion for judgment on the pleadings admits the truth of all the material and relevant allegations of the opposing party and the judgment must rest on those allegations taken together with such other allegations as are admitted in the pleadings .

In the instant case, a review of the records reveal that respondent (as plaintiff) and petitioners (as defendants) set-up multiple levels of claims and defenses, respectively, with some failing to tender an issue while others requiring the presentation of evidence for resolution.  The generalized conclusion of both the trial and appellate courts that petitioners’ answer admits all the material averments of the complaint is, thus, without basis.  For this reason, a remand of this case is unavoidable. However, in the interest of justice and in order to expedite the disposition of this case which was filed with the trial court way back in 1999, we shall settle the issues that can be resolved based on the pleadings and remand only those issues that require a trial on merits as hereunder discussed.

The foregoing considerations cannot be brushed aside for it would be iniquitous for Tiwi to compensate respondent for legal services which he did not render; or which has no reasonable connection to the recovery of Tiwi’s share in the subject realty taxes; or whose weight or value has not been properly appraised in view of respondent’s admission in his Complaint that the opinion issued by then Chief Presidential Legal Counsel Antonio T. Carpio (in which respondent had no clear participation) was instrumental to the recovery of the subject realty taxes.

G.R. NO. 188920 Case Digest

G.R. NO. 188920, February 16, 2010

Jose Atienza, Jr., etc., petitioners

vs COMELEC

Ponente: Abad

Facts:

July 5, 2005, Drilon, the president of LP announced his party's withdrawal of support for the administration of PGMA but Atienza, LP Chairman, and a number of party members denounced Drilon's move claiming that he made the announcement without consulting the party.

March 2, 2006, Atienza hosted a party conference to discuss local autonomy and party matters, when convened, the party proceeded to declare all positions in the party vacant and elected new officers, making Atienza as the new president of LP. Drilon immediately filed a petition with the COMELEC to nullify the elections. Drilon is claiming that the election was illegal because the party was not properly convened. Drilon also claims that the officers of LP were elected to a fixed 3 year term that was yet to end on November 2007.

Atienza claimed that the majority of LP attended the assembly and that the amendments of LP's constitution were not properly ratified thus the term of Drilon and other officers already ended on July 2006.

COMELEC ruled in favor of Drilon, Hence, this petition,

Issues: (1) Whether or not the LP, which was not impleaded in the case, is an indispensable party; (2) Whether or not petitioners Atienza, et al., as ousted LP members, have the requisite legal standing to question Roxas’ election. (3) Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it upheld the NECO membership that elected respondent Roxas as LP president; (4) Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it resolved the issue concerning the validity of the NECO meeting without first resolving the issue concerning the expulsion of Atienza, et al. from the party; (5) Whether or not respondents Roxas, et al. violated petitioners Atienza, et al.’s constitutional right to due process by the latter’s expulsion from the party.

Held:

(1) Respondents Roxas, et al. assert that the Court should dismiss the petition for failure of petitioners Atienza, et al. to implead the LP as an indispensable party.  Roxas, et al. point out that, since the petition seeks the issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction against the NECO, the controversy could not be adjudicated with finality without making the LP a party to the case.

(2) Respondents Roxas, et al. also claim that petitioners Atienza, et al. have no legal standing to question the election of Roxas as LP president because they are no longer LP members, having been validly expelled from the party or having joined other political parties. As non-members, they have no stake in the outcome of the action.

(3) .  In assailing respondent Roxas’ election as LP president, petitioners Atienza, et al. claim that the NECO members allowed to take part in that election should have been limited to those in the list of NECO members appearing in the party’s 60th Anniversary Souvenir Program. Atienza, et al. allege that respondent Drilon, as holdover LP president, adopted that list in the earlier cases before the COMELEC and it should thus bind respondents Roxas, et al.  The Court’s decision in the earlier cases, said Atienza, et al., anointed that list for the next party election.  Thus, Roxas, et al. in effect defied the Court’s ruling when they removed Atienza as party chairman and changed the NECO’s composition.

(4) Petitioners Atienza, et al. lament that the COMELEC selectively exercised its jurisdiction when it ruled on the composition of the NECO but refused to delve into the legality of their expulsion from the party.  The two issues, they said, weigh heavily on the leadership controversy involved in the case.  The previous rulings of the Court, they claim, categorically upheld the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over intra-party leadership disputes.

(5) Petitioners Atienza, et al. argue that their expulsion from the party is not a simple issue of party membership or discipline; it involves a violation of their constitutionally-protected right to due process of law.  They claim that the NAPOLCO and the NECO should have first summoned them to a hearing before summarily expelling them from the party.  According to Atienza, et al., proceedings on party discipline are the equivalent of administrative proceedings and are, therefore, covered by the due process requirements laid down in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations.

G.R. No. 179169 Case Digest

G.R. No. 179169, March 3, 2010

Leonis Navigation Co.,Inc. and World Marine Panama, S.A., petitioners

vs Catalino Villamater, etc., respondents

Ponente:

Facts:

Villamater was hired as chief engineer for the ship MV Nord Monaco owned by World Marine Panama through the services of Leonis Navigation as the local manning agent. After 4 months of his deployment, Villamater suffered intestinal bleeding and was given a blood transfusion and later diagnosed with multiple liver metatases and other diseases. He was advised then to undergo chemotherapy and continuous supportive treatment.

Villamater was later repatriated after he was deemed fit to travel under medical escort. In the course of his chemotherapy, Villamater filed with the NLRC for payment of permanent and total disability benefits. NLRC decided that his illness was compensable but denied his claim for moral and exemplary damages.

The petitioner companies then appealed for the decision of the NLRC, so with Villamater , still claiming for the moral damages. Both petitions were denied by NLRC.

Issues: (1) Is Villamater entitled to total and permanent disability benefits by reason of his colon cancer? (2) If yes, would he also be entitled to attorney's fees?

Held:

On this matter, noticeably, petitioners were silent when they argued that Villamater's affliction was brought about by diet and genetics. It was only after the Labor Arbiter issued his Decision, finding colon cancer to be compensable because the risk was increased by the victuals provided on board, that petitioners started claiming that the foods available on the vessels also consisted of fresh fruits and vegetables, not to mention fish and poultry. It is also worth mentioning that while Dr. Salvador declared that Villamater's cancer "appears to be not work-related," she nevertheless suggested to petitioners Disability Grade 1, which, under the POEA Standard Contract, "shall be considered or shall constitute total and permanent disability."

During his confinement in Hamburg, Germany, Villamater was diagnosed to have colon cancer and was advised to undergo chemotherapy and medical treatment, including blood transfusions. These findings were, in fact, confirmed by the findings of the company-designated physicians. The statement of Dr. Salvador that Villamater's colon cancer "appears to be not work-related" remained at that, without any medical explanation to support the same. However, this statement, not definitive as it is, was negated by the same doctor's suggestion of Disability Grade 1. Under Section 20-B of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC), it is the company-designated physician who must certify that the seafarer has suffered a permanent disability, whether total or partial, due to either injury or illness, during the term of his employment.

On these points, we sustain the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC in granting total and permanent disability benefits in favor of Villamater, as it was sufficiently shown that his having contracted colon cancer was, at the very least, aggravated by his working conditions.

G.R. No. 152272; G.R. No. 152397 Case Digest

G.R. No. 152272; G.R. No. 152397, March 5, 2012

Juana Complex Homeowners Association, Inc., etc.

vs Fil-Estate Land, Inc.

Ponente: Mendoza

Facts:

Juana Complex and other neighboring subdivisions instituted a complaint on January 20, 1999 for damages who were deprived of the use of La Paz Road. The complaint alleged that were regular commuters and motorists who constantly travelled towards the direction of Manila and Calamba.

RTC issued TRO ordering Fil-estate for a period of 20 days. RTC then conducted several hearings to determine the propriety of the issuance. Fil-estate then filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the complaint failed to state a cause of action and that it was improperly filed as a class suit.

Fil-estate filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that JCHA failed to satisfy the requirements for the issuance of WPI. RTC denied the motion to dismiss and motion for reconsideration filed by fil-estate.

On appeal, CA partially granted the petition, granting the writ of preliminary injunction is hereby annulled and set aside but the portion of the omnibus denying the motion to dismiss is upheld. CA also ruled that the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action as alleged in the complaint.

Issue:

(1) Whether the complaint states a cause of action? (2) Whether the complaint has been properly filed as a class suit (3) whether a WPI is warranted.

Held:

(1) The subject matter of the instant case, i.e., the closure and excavation of the La Paz Road, is initially shown to be of common or general interest to many persons. The records reveal that numerous individuals have filed manifestations with the lower court, conveying their intention to join private respondents in the suit and claiming that they are similarly situated with private respondents for they were also prejudiced by the acts of petitioners in closing and excavating the La Paz Road.

(2) In the case at bench, JCHA, et al. failed to establish a prima facie proof of violation of their right to justify the issuance of a WPI. Their right to the use of La Paz Road is disputable since they have no clear legal right therein.

G.R. No. 163267 Case Digest

G.R. No. 163267, May 5, 2010

Teofilo Evangelista, petitioner

vs People of the Philippines, respondent

Ponente: Del Castillo

Facts:

There was an information saying that on January 30, 1996 at NAIA the accused feloniously have in possession of the firearms without the corresponding permit or license from competent authority.

RTC's ruling: Evangelista guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of the illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions.

Petitioner filed a motion for new trial which the RTC granted. RTC then found the petitioner liable still for the offense charged but modified the penalty of imprisonment.

CA's ruling: CA affirmed the findings of the trial court in its decision. It ruled that the stipulations during the trial are binding on petitioner.

Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether CA gravely erred in not acquitting Evangelista from the charge of the illegal possession of firearms.

Held:

Appeal is devoid of merit.

Contrary to the arguments put forward by petitioner, we entertain no doubt that the crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition for which he was charged was committed in the Philippines. The accomplishment by petitioner of the Customs Declaration Form upon his arrival at the NAIA is very clear evidence that he was already in possession of the subject firearms in the Philippines.

In contrast, petitioner failed to establish by sufficient and competent evidence that the present charge happened in Dubai. It may be well to recall that while in Dubai, petitioner, even in a situation between life and death, firmly denied possession and ownership of the firearms. Furthermore, there is no record of any criminal case having been filed against petitioner in Dubai in connection with the discovered firearms. Since there is no pending criminal case when he left Dubai, it stands to reason that there was no crime committed in Dubai. The age-old but familiar rule that he who alleges must prove his allegation applies.

Petition denied.

G.R. No. 195619 Case Digest

G.R. No. 195619, September 5, 2012

Planters Development Bank, petitioner

vs Julie Chandumal, respondent

Ponente: Reyes

Facts:

BF Homes and Julie Chandumal entered into a contract to sell a parcel of land located in Las Pinas. Later, BF Homes sold to PDB all its rights over the contract.

Chandumal paid her monthly amortizations until she defaulted in her payments. So, PDB sent a notice to Chandumal with a demand to vacate the land within 30days, otherwise all of her rights will be extinguished and the contract will be terminated and deemed rescinded. In spite of the demand, Chandumal failed to settle her account.

PDB filed an action for judicial confirmation of notarial rescission and delivery of possession but still Chandumal refused to do so. Summons were then issued and served by deputy sheriff Galing but its was unavailing as she was always out of her house on the dates the summons were served.

RTC then issued an order granting the motion of PDB. Chandumal filed an urgent motion to set aside order of default and to admit attached answer. Chandumal said that she did not receive the summons and was not notified of the same and her failure to file an answer within the reglementary period was due to fraud. RTC denied Chandumal's motion to set aside the order of default.

Chandumal appealed to the CA. CA nullified the RTC's decision.

Issue: (1) Whether there was valid substituted service of summons? (2) Whether Chandumal voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC? (3) Whether there was proper rescission by notarial act of the contract to sell?

Held:

(1) Correctly ruled that the sheriff’s return failed to justify a resort to substituted service of summons. According to the CA, the Return of Summons does not specifically show or indicate in detail the actual exertion of efforts or any positive step taken by the officer or process server in attempting to serve the summons personally to the defendant.

(2) The Court notes that aside from the allegation that she did not receive any summons, Chandumal’s motion to set aside order of default and to admit attached answer failed to positively assert the trial court lack of jurisdiction. In fact, what was set forth therein was the substantial claim that PDB failed to comply with the requirements of R.A. No. 6552 on payment of cash surrender value, which already delves into the merits of PDB’s cause of action. In addition, Chandumal even appealed the RTC decision to the CA, an act which demonstrates her recognition of the trial court’s jurisdiction to render said judgment.

(3) R.A. No. 6552 recognizes the right of the seller to cancel the contract but any such cancellation must be done in conformity with the requirements therein prescribed. In addition to the notarial act of rescission, the seller is required to refund to the buyer the cash surrender value of the payments on the property. The actual cancellation of the contract can only be deemed to take place upon the expiry of a thirty (30)-day period following the receipt by the buyer of the notice of cancellation or demand for rescission by a notarial act and the full payment of the cash surrender value.

Petition is denied.

G.R. No. 179232 Case Digest

G.R. No. 179232, August 23, 2012

Del Monte Fresh Produce, petitioner

vs DOW Chemical Company, etc., respondents

G.R. No. 179290

DOW Chamical Company and Occidental Chemical Corp., petitioners

vs Hon. Jesus Grageda, etc., respondents

Ponente: Villarama

Facts:

August 11, 1995, a joint complaint for damages based on quasi-delict was filed before the RTC of Panabo City, Davao by 1,185 individuals against Del Monte, Dow Chemical Corporations and other companies alleging that the companies were negligent in the manufacture, distribution and sale or in not informing the users of the hazardous effects of the chemical they used. They said that they were exposed to the chemicals since 1970s that they suffered serious and permanent injuries to their health.

Del Monte filed motions/oppositions saying that the complaint must be dismissed because the claimants had been paid, waived, abandoned and extinguish their rights in effect of their compromise agreement with the claimants.

Court rendered that all other motions filed by the parties in relation to or in connection to the issues hereinabove resolved but which have been wittingly or unwittingly left unresolved are hereby considered moot and academic; likewise, all previous orders contrary to or not in accordance with the foregoing resolutions are hereby reconsidered, set aside and vacated.

The Dow/Occidental defendants argue, among others, that the RTC gravely abused its discretion when it did not dismiss the cross-claims filed by the Dole, Del Monte and Chiquita defendants despite the following: (1) the cross-claims were already filed beyond the reglementary period; and (2) the complaint against them and the Del Monte and Chiquita defendants, including their respective counterclaims, were already dismissed on the basis of the compromise agreements they each had with the plaintiffs.

The CA, however, ruled that the RTC gravely abused its discretion when it admitted the cross-claims against the Dow/Occidental defendants without any qualification. It held that only the cross-claims filed by the Dole defendants, the Chiquita defendants (with respect to the claims of James Bagas and Dante Bautista) and the Del Monte defendants (with respect to the 16 non-compromising plaintiffs) against the Dow/Occidental defendants can be rightly admitted by the RTC.

Unsatisfied, the Dow/Occidental defendants, as petitioners in G.R. No. 179290, come to this Court arguing that the CA committed reversible error in not finding that the cross-claims of the Dole, Del Monte and Chiquita defendants should all be dismissed and the Request for Admission was timely filed and proper.

Issues:

(1) Does the dismissal of the civil case against the Dow/Occidental defendants carry with it the dismissal of cross-claims against them? (2) Is the Request for Admission by the Dow/Occidental defendants proper?

Held:

Deny the petitions.

There are two requisites for a court to allow an omitted counterclaim or cross-claim by amendment: (1) there was oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, or when justice requires; and (2) the amendment is made before judgment.

The CA correctly held that there is basis for allowing the cross-claims of the Dole, Del Monte and Chiquita defendants against the Dow/Occidental defendants as they complied with the rules. It is undisputed that the Dole, Del Monte and Chiquita defendants sought to amend their answers to include their cross-claims before judgment. More importantly, justice requires that they be allowed to do so in consonance with the policy against multiplicity of suits.

We also uphold the appellate court’s ruling that the RTC gravely abused its discretion when it admitted the cross-claims against the Dow/Occidental defendants without any qualification. The Del Monte and Chiquita defendants’ cross-claims against the Dow/Occidental defendants cannot extend to the plaintiffs with whom they had settled.

G.R. No. 182645 Case Digest

G.R. No. 182645, December 15, 2010

Rene Pascual, petitioner

vs Jaime Robles, respondent

Ponente: Peralta

Facts:

Robles prays for the reversal of the presently assailed Decision and the entry of a new judgment requiring him to file his comment and memorandum to the petition. Robles also seeks the reinstatement of the December 15, 1994 Order of the RTC declaring him as the only heir and next of kin of Hermogenes Rodriguez.

September 14, 1989, a petition for declaration of heirship and appointment of administrator was filed before the RTC of Iriga City. It was filed by the Rodriguez' claiming that they are the sole and surviving heirs of late Antonio Rodriguez and Hermogenes Rodriguez.

In the initial hearing of the claim, nobody opposed the petition, so RTC allowed them to submit evidence in support of their claim. RTC rendered partial judgment declaring Henry and Rosalina as heirs, Henry as administrator. Henry then filed a bond and took his oath of office as administrator of the estates.

Then, 6 groups of oppositors entered their appearance. Among which is Robles, praying that he be appointed regular administrator to the estates and be allowed to sell a certain portion of the land in Pasig. After hearing on Robles' application, RTC declared him heir and thus qualified to be administrator.

On April 27, 1999, the RTC declared some oppositors co-heirs and reiterated its partial judgment of that of Henry and Rosalina. The decision dismissed the oppositions of Robles and Rodriguez for their failure to substantiate their claims.

August 13, 1999, RTC then reversed its decision on the co-heirs. Robles then appealed by filing a notice of appeal but the same was denied by the RTC. Robles questioned the denial of his appeal by filing a petition for review on certiorari with SC. SC referred the petition to CA for consideration of the merits on the ground that the said court has jurisdiction concurrent to take cognizance of the said case. CA annulled the amended RTC decision. An instant petition was later filed assailing the decision of the SC on the notice of appeal and record on appeal against Robles.

Held:

In the case at bar, Robles is an indispensable party. He stands to be injured or benefited by the outcome of the petition. He has an interest in the controversy that a final decree would necessarily affect his rights, such that the courts cannot proceed without his presence. Moreover, as provided for under the aforequoted Section 5, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, Robles is interested in sustaining the assailed CA Decision, considering that he would benefit from such judgment. As such, his non-inclusion would render the petition for certiorari defective.

Petitioner, thus, committed a mistake in failing to implead Robles as respondent.

Based on the foregoing, and in the interest of fair play, the Court finds it proper to set aside its decision and allow Robles to file his comment on the petition.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is PARTLY GRANTED.

G.R. No. 192615 Case Digest

G.R. No. 192615, January 30, 2013

Spouses Eugene Lim and Constancia Lim, petitioners

vs Court of Appeals, Judge Florenci Sealana-Abbu and the Bank of the Philippine Islands, respondents

Ponente: Brion

Facts:

January 26, 1999, BPI filed before the RTC, Branch 20 of Cagayan de Oro a complaint for collection of money with prayer for preliminary injunction against petitioners. Verification and certification against forum-shopping attached to the complaint were signed by Ramos the BPI vice-president and Mindanao Region Lending Head.

Petitioners moved to dismiss the BPI complaint on the ground that there was a pending action for forclosure proceedings in Ozamis City. RTC found that the present complaint involved causes of action, hence RTC denied the motion to dismiss and the subsequent motion for reconsideration.

Petitioners filed another motion to dismiss, this time on the ground that there had been fatal defect in the verification against forum shopping. That it did not state that Ramos was the one filing the complaint in his capacity as authorized by BPI's board of directors.

BPI answered and submitted a copy of the special power of attorney signed by the VP granting Ramos authority to represent the bank. RTC denied the second motion to dismiss. So petitioner filed with CA petition for certiorari. CA dismissed the certiorari, ruling that the SPA granting Ramos substantially complied with the Rules of Court. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but CA denied their motion, hence this petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: (1) whether CA erred and (2) SPA is a substantial compliance?

Held:

(1) CA did not commit a grave error.

(2) BPI’s subsequent execution of the SPA, however, constituted a ratification of Ramos’ unauthorized representation in the collection case filed against the petitioners. A corporation can act only through natural persons duly authorized for the purpose or by a specific act of its board of directors, and can also ratify the unauthorized acts of its corporate officers. The act of ratification is confirmation of what its agent or delegate has done without or with insufficient authority.

We note that, at the time the complaint against the petitioners was filed, Ramos also held the position of Assistant Vice-President for BPI Northern Mindanao and was then the highest official representing the bank in the Northern Mindanao area. This position and his standing in the BPI hierarchy, to our mind, place him in a sufficiently high and authoritative position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the subject complaint, to justify his authority in filing the complaint and to sign the verification and certification against forum shopping. Whatever is lacking, from the strictly corporate point of view, was cured when BPI subsequently (although belatedly) issued the appropriate SPA.

G.R. No. 169272 Case Digest

G.R. No. 169272, July 11, 2012

National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha'is of the Philippines, petitioner

vs Alfredo Pascual, respondent

Ponente: Brion

Facts:

December 11, 2000, Bahais filed a complaint with RTC for quieting of title, injunction and other claims against Silverio Songcuan and/or his heirs, the secretary of DENR and the regional executive director of DENR of Tuguegarao, Cagayan.

Bahais alleged that it is the lawful and absolute owner of two parcels of land, who acquired ownership from Marcelina Ordono. The Bahais had been in possession of the land for 30 years, until the Bureau of Lands rejected the sales applications of the Bahais predecessors-in-interest for the lots and ordered all those in privity to vacate the lots and to remove their improvements. DENR secretary affirmed with this decision. Recourse to the office of the President had been unavailing, so DENR issued writs of execution pursuant to the President's decision.

Pascual moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state cause of action. Saying that the petitioner had no legal right to file the complaint since the final and executory Bureau of Lands’ decision ruled that the petitioner was not entitled to possess the lots.

RTC's Ruling: denied the motion to dismiss, Bureau of Lands was not yet final since President's ruling on the appeal was unavailable. Respondent elevated this case to the CA, questioning the propriety of the RTC's denial of the motion to dismiss.

CA's Ruling:CA set aside the RTC, the RTC should have dismissed the complaint for prematurity.

Issue: Whether CA committed a reversible error in finding that RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing the complaint.

Held:

Petition lacks merit, CA committed no reversible error.

A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.

A complaint states a cause of action when it contains three essential elements: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and whatever law it arises; (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant to respect such right; and (3) the act or omission of the defendant violates the right of the plaintiff. If any of these elements is absent, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.

"Failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of allegation in the pleading. In resolving a motion to dismiss based on the failure to state a cause of action only the facts alleged in the complaint must be considered. The test is whether the court can render a valid judgment on the complaint based on the facts alleged and the prayer asked for."

From these allegations, we find it clear that the petitioner no longer had any legal or equitable title to or interest in the lots. The petitioner’s status as possessor and owner of the lots had been settled in the final and executory December 4, 1985 decision of the Bureau of Lands that the DENR Secretary and the OP affirmed on appeal. Thus, the petitioner is not entitled to the possession and ownership of the lots.

G.R.No. 117321 Case Digest

G.R.No. 117321 February 11, 1998

People of the Philippines

vs Herson Tan y Verzo

Ponente: Romero

Facts:

Tan, along with amido were charged with the crime of highway robbery with muder before RTC-QC.On arraignment, he pleaded not guilty. December 5, 1988,7pm, tricycle driver Freddie Saavedra, went to see his wife to informe her that he will drive the accused to Brgy. Maligaya. It was the last time he was seen alive.

Then, an abandoned sidecar of a ricycle was found in Brgy. Malinao which was brought back to the headquarters. The police officers, invited Tan in connectiono with the instant case with respect to the two robbery cases reported in Lucena Ciity. Tan, narrated that Amido and him were responsible for the loss of the motorcycle and death of Saavedra. That they sold the motorcycle to Danny Teves.Teves voluntarily surrendered the motorcycle.

On cross-examination, Lt. Carlos testified that he invited Tan to the headquarters, without warrant, he did not inform Tan of his rights to remain silent and counsel, nor did he reduce the confession to writing. Tan alleged that he had no participation in the offense charged. Amido presented an alibi that he was assisting the renovation of his mother's house at the time of the incident. Tan assails the conviction despite failure of the prosecution to positively identify him as culprit. In light of the above facts and circumstances, the appealed decision is set aside and appellant acquitted on the ground that his constitutional rights were violated.

Issue: May the confession of the accused, given before the police investigator upon invitation and without benefit of counsel be admissible against him?

Ruling:

It is well-settled that the Constitution abhors an uncounselled confession or admission and whatever information is derived therefrom shall be regarded as inadmissible in evidence against the confessant.  Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner. The rules on custodial investigation begin to operate as soon as the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the police carries out a process of interrogations that tends itself to eliciting incriminating statements that the rule begins to operate.

Under the Constitution and existing law and jurisprudence, a confession to be admissible must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing.

The evidence for the prosecution shows that when appellant was invited for questioning at the police headquarters, he allegedly admitted his participation in the crime. This will not suffice to convict him, however, of said crime. The constitutional rights of appellant, particularly the right to remain silent and to counsel, are impregnable from the moment he is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, even if the same be initiated by mere invitation.

G.R. No. L-56291 Case Digest

G.R. No. L-56291 June 27, 1988

Cristopher Gamboa

vs Hon. Alfredo Cruz, Judge of CFI-Manila

Ponente: Padilla

Facts:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for TRO to annul and set aside the CFI decision against Gamboa.

Gamboa: he was arrested for vagrancy without warrant of arrest. He was brought to precinct 2, Manila, booked for vagrancy and then detained. The next day, he was identified as a companion to a robbery. He was arraigned. In the hearing, Gamboa filed a motion to acquit or demurrer to evidence presenting that his constitutional right to counsel and due process was violated. Court denied the motion. Hence this instant petition.

Ruling:

The instant petition is one for certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, committed by the respondent judge in issuing the questioned order dated 23 October 1980. It is basic, however, that for certiorari to lie, there must be a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power, the very antithesis of judicial prerogative in accordance with centuries of both civil law and common law traditions.

The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e. when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the respondent/accused. At such point or stage, the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation, for the commission of an offense.

Answer: As aptly observed, however, by the Solicitor General, the police line-up (at least, in this case) was not part of the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet entitled, at such stage, to counsel. It was held that when the process had not yet shifted from the investigatory to the accusatory as when police investigation does not elicit a confession the accused may not yet avail of the services of his lawyer.

On the right to due process, the Court finds that petitioner was not, in any way, deprived of this substantive and constitutional right, as he was duly represented by a member of the Bar. He was accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to substantiate his defense; only that he chose not to, and instead opted to file a Motion to Acquit after the prosecution had rested its case.

G.R. No. L-44690 Case Digest

G.R. No. L-44690 March 28, 1980

People of the Philippines

vs Jose Tampus Y Ponce

Ponente: Aquino

Facts:

This is an automatic review of the CFI decision of sentencing Tampus of murder. Evidence show that 10am of January 14, 1976, Celso Saminado, a prisoner in Muntinlupa and a patient in the emergency ward of the prison hospital went to the toilet. After emerging from the toilet, Tampus and Avila surrendered to a prison guard with their knives. The motive of the killing was revenge.

The officer of the day investigated the incident right away. In his report he  stated that Avila stabbed Saminado when the latter was in the toilet. Two days after the killing, another prison guard investigated the incident and have obtained the confessions of Avila and Tampus. They both pledged guilty to the charge of murder. After the pleading, the court informed them that they may be punish with death penalty.

In his review of the death sentence, counsel de officio, assigned to defend Tampus contends that he was denied his right to public trial because the arraignment and hearing was done at the state penitentiary.

Answer: There is a ruling that the fact that for the convenience of the witnesses a case is tried in Bilibid Prison without any objection on the part of the accused is not a ground for reversal of the judgment of conviction. The accused may waive his right to have a public trial as shown in the rule that the trial court may motu propio exclude the public from the courtroom when the evidence to be offered is offensive to decency or public morals. The court may also, upon request of the defendant, exclude from the trial every person except the officers of the court and the attorneys for the prosecution and defense.

Counsel de officio also stated that the confession of Tampus was taken in violation of the right against self-incrimination.

Answer: The confession made was voluntary. It was made before the investigation, right after the killing.

Right to remain silent: court is not duty-bound to apprise the accused that he has the right to remain silent. If he does not claim it and he calls the accused to the witness stand, then he waives that right.

G.R. No. 74930 Case Digest

G.R. No. 74930, February 13, 1989

Ricardo Valmonte, etc., petitioners

vs Feliciano Belmonte, Jr., respondent

Ponente: Cortes

Facts:

Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke their right to information and pray that respondent be directed:

(a) to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or

(b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencing their respective loans; and/or

(c) to allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject information.

Receiving no reply, petitioners filed an instant suit. On July 19, 1986, the Daily Express carried a news item reporting that 137 former members of the defunct interim and regular Batasang Pambansa, including ten (10) opposition members, were granted housing loans by the GSIS. Separate comments were filed by respondent Belmonte and the Solicitor General. After petitioners filed a consolidated reply, the petition was given due course and the parties were required to file their memoranda. The parties having complied, the case was deemed submitted for decision.

In his comment respondent raises procedural objections to the issuance of a writ of mandamus, among which is that petitioners have failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Respondent claims that actions of the GSIS General Manager are reviewable by the Board of Trustees of the GSIS. Petitioners, however, did not seek relief from the GSIS Board of Trustees. It is therefore asserted that since administrative remedies were not exhausted, then petitioners have no cause of action. To this objection, petitioners claim that they have raised a purely legal issue, viz., whether or not they are entitled to the documents sought, by virtue of their constitutional right to information. Hence, it is argued that this case falls under one of the exceptions to the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Issue: Whether or not mandamus has to compel respondent to perform the acts sought by petitioners to be done, in pursuance of their right to information.

Held:

The courts for reasons of law, comity and convenience will not entertain a case unless the available administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative forum. However, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to settled exceptions, among which is when only a question of law is involved.

The issue raised by petitioners, which requires the interpretation of the scope of the constitutional right to information, is one which can be passed upon by the regular courts more competently than the GSIS or its Board of Trustees, involving as it does a purely legal question. Thus, the exception of this case from the application of the general rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is warranted.

The postulate of public office as a public trust, institutionalized in the Constitution (in Art. XI, Sec. 1) to protect the people from abuse of governmental power, would certainly be were empty words if access to such information of public concern is denied, except under limitations prescribed by implementing legislation adopted pursuant to the Constitution.

Petitioners here are practitioners of media. An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the people. It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the people's will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently.

The right to information is an essential premise of a meaningful right to speech and expression. But this is not to say that the right to information is merely an adjunct of and therefore restricted in application by the exercise of the freedoms of speech and of the press. Far from it. The right to information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure.

(1) The information sought by petitioners in this case is the truth of reports that certain Members of the Batasang Pambansa belonging to the opposition were able to secure "clean" loans from the GSIS immediately before the February 7, 1986 election through the intercession of the former First Lady, Mrs. Imelda Marcos. The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its employees and the administrator of various insurance programs for the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a public character.

The public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern. Respondent however contends that in view of the right to privacy which is equally protected by the Constitution and by existing laws, the documents evidencing loan transactions of the GSIS must be deemed outside the ambit of the right to information.

(2) There can be no doubt that right to privacy is constitutionally protected. the right to privacy belongs to the individual in his private capacity, and not to public and governmental agencies like the GSIS. Moreover, the right cannot be invoked by juridical entities like the GSIS. Respondent next asserts that the documents evidencing the loan transactions of the GSIS are private in nature and hence, are not covered by the Constitutional right to information on matters of public concern which guarantees "access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions" only.

(3) It is argued that the records of the GSIS, a government corporation performing proprietary functions, are outside the coverage of the people's right of access to official records. It is further contended that since the loan function of the GSIS is merely incidental to its insurance function, and then its loan transactions are not covered by the constitutional policy of full public disclosure and the right to information which is applicable only to "official" transactions.

G.R. No. L-72119 Case Digest

G.R. No. L-72119, May 29, 1987

Valentin Legaspi, petitioner

vs Civil Service Commission, respondent

Ponente: Cortes

Facts:

The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public concern is invoked in this special civil action for mandamus instituted by petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi against the Civil Service Commission. The respondent had earlier denied Legaspi's request for information on the civil service eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City.

Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, is guaranteed by the Constitution, and that he has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to acquire the information, petitioner prays for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel the respondent Commission to disclose said information.

They supply the rules by means of which the right to information may be enjoyed (Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations 167 [1927]) by guaranteeing the right and mandating the duty to afford access to sources of information. Hence, the fundamental right there in recognized may be asserted by the people upon the ratification of the constitution without need for any ancillary act of the Legislature. (Id. at, p. 165) What may be provided for by the Legislature are reasonable conditions and limitations upon the access to be afforded which must, of necessity, be consistent with the declared State policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest (Constitution, Art. 11, Sec. 28). However, it cannot be overemphasized that whatever limitation may be prescribed by the Legislature, the right and the duty under Art. III Sec. 7 have become operative and enforceable by virtue of the adoption of the New Charter. Therefore, the right may be properly invoked in a mandamus proceeding such as this one.

Solicitor General's challenges: (1) petitioner's standing to sue (2) there is no ministerial duty on the part of the commission to furnish the petitioner with the information he seeks.

Held:

(1) The petitioner in every case must therefore be an "aggrieved party" in the sense that he possesses a clear legal right to be enforced and a direct interest in the duty or act to be performed. When a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general "public" which possesses the right.

(2) In recognizing the people's right to be informed, both the 1973 Constitution and the New Charter expressly mandate the duty of the State and its agents to afford access to official records, documents, papers and in addition, government research data used as basis for policy development, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. The guarantee has been further enhanced in the New Constitution with the adoption of a policy of full public disclosure, this time "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law.

Thus, while the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation by the government agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern, and to afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies. Certainly, its performance cannot be made contingent upon the discretion of such agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment of the constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by any whimsical exercise of agency discretion. The constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its performance may be compelled by a writ of mandamus in a proper case. In the case before Us, the public right to be enforced and the concomitant duty of the State are unequivocably set forth in the Constitution. The decisive question on the propriety of the issuance of the writ of mandamus in this case is, whether the information sought by the petitioner is within the ambit of the constitutional guarantee.

(3) The incorporation in the Constitution of a guarantee of access to information of public concern is a recognition of the essentiality of the free flow of ideas and information in a democracy. But the constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not absolute. It does not open every door to any and all information. Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc., are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7, second sentence). The law may therefore exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny, such as those affecting national security.

In every case, the availability of access to a particular public record must be circumscribed by the nature of the information sought, i.e., (a) being of public concern or one that involves public interest, and, (b) not being exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. The threshold question is, therefore, whether or not the information sought is of public interest or public concern. This question is first addressed to the government agency having custody of the desired information. However, as already discussed, this does not give the agency concerned any discretion to grant or deny access. In case of denial of access, the government agency has the burden of showing that the information requested is not of public concern, or, if it is of public concern, that the same has been exempted by law from the operation of the guarantee.

In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which can be applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine in a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.

But then, it is not enough that the information sought is of public interest. For mandamus to lie in a given case, the information must not be among the species exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee.

In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny the claims of eligibility, the respondent has failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit the petitioner's right to know who are, and who are not, civil service eligible. We take judicial notice of the fact that the names of those who pass the civil service examinations, as in bar examinations and licensure examinations for various professions, are released to the public. Hence, there is nothing secret about one's civil service eligibility, if actually possessed. Petitioner's request is, therefore, neither unusual nor unreasonable.