G.R.
No. L-68555, March 19, 1993
Prime
White Cement Corporation
vs
Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court and Alejandro Te
Ponente:
Campos, Jr.
Facts:
July
1969, plaintiff and Defendant Corporation thru its President, entered into a
dealership agreement whereby plaintiff was obligated to act as the exclusive
distributor of the cement products in Mindanao for 5 years.
As
a result, some business associates propose to be a sub-dealer in Mindanao.
Relying on the dealership agreement, plaintiff entered into a written agreement
with several hardware stores dealing in buying and selling white cement in
Davao and Cagayan de Oro.
Later
on, the defendant corporation decide to impose conditions which were answered
by several demands from the plaintiff to comply with the dealership agreement.
However, defendant refused to comply. After the trial court adjudged the
corporation liable to Alejandro Te, the CA affirmed the said decision based on:
There
is no dispute that when Zosimo R. Falcon and Justo B. Trazo signed the
dealership agreement Exhibit “A”, they was the President and Chairman of the
Board, respectively, of defendant-appellant Corporation. Neither is the
genuineness of the said agreement contested. As a matter of fact, it appears on
the face of the contract itself that both officers were duly authorized to
enter into the said agreement and signed the same for and in behalf of the
corporation. When they, therefore, entered into the said transaction they
created the impression that they were duly clothed with the authority to do so.
It cannot now be said that the disputed agreement which possesses all the
essential requisites of a valid contract was never intended to bind the
corporation as this avoidance is barred by the principle of estoppel.
Issue:
Whether or not the dealership agreement referred by the President and Chairman
of he Board of petitioner corporation is
valid and enforceable contract.
Ruling:
No, it is not valid.
Under
the Corporation Law, which was then in force at the time this case arose, as
well as under the present Corporation Code, all corporate powers shall be
exercised by the Board of Directors, except as otherwise provided by law.
Although it cannot completely abdicate its power and responsibility to act for
the juridical entity, the Board may expressly delegate specific powers to its
President or any of its officers. In the absence of such express delegation, a
contract entered into by its President, on behalf of the corporation, may still
bind the corporation if the board should ratify the same expressly or
impliedly.
Furthermore,
even in the absence of express or implied authority by ratification, the
President as such may, as a general rule, bind the corporation by a contract in
the ordinary course of business, provided the same is reasonable under the
circumstances. These rules are basic, but are all general and thus quite
flexible. They apply where the President or other officer, purportedly acting
for the corporation, is dealing with a third person, i. e., a person outside
the corporation.
The
situation is quite different where a director or officer is dealing with his
own corporation. In the instant case respondent Te was not an ordinary
stockholder; he was a member of the Board of Directors and Auditor of the
corporation as well. He was what is often referred to as a
"self-dealing" director. A director of a corporation holds a position
of trust and as such, he owes a duty of loyalty to his corporation. In case his
interests conflict with those of the corporation, he cannot sacrifice the
latter to his own advantage and benefit.
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