G.R. No. L-30896 Case Digest

G.R. No. L-30896, April 28, 1983

Jose Sia

vs The people of the Philippines

Ponente: De Castro

Facts:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the CA affirming the decision of the CFI of Manila convicting the appellant of estafa.

Based on the information filed, the accused allegedly defraud the Continental Bank, under the obligation on the part of said accused of holding the said steel sheets in trust receipt agreement, which cold rolled steel sheets were consigned to the continental bank.

In reviewing the evidence, the CA came up with the following findings of facts which the solicitor general alleges should be conclusive upon this court:

Sia was general manager of the Metal Manufacturing Company of the Philippines, Inc. engaged in the manufacture of steel office equipment. He applied for a letter of credit to import steel sheets from Mitsui Bussan Kaisha, Ltd. of Japan, the application being directed to the Continental Bank.

Issue: (1) whether Sia, having only acted for and in behalf of the Metal Manufacturing Company of the Philippines as president thereof in dealing with the complainant, the continental bank he may be liable for the crime charged.

Ruling:

(1st issue) In disputing the theory of petitioner, the Solicitor General relies on the general principle that when a corporation commits an act which would constitute a punishable offense under the law, it is the responsible officers thereof, acting for the corporation, who would be punished for the crime, The Court of Appeals has subscribed to this view when it quoted approvingly from the decision of the trial court the following:

A corporation is an artificial person, an abstract being. If the defense theory is followed unscrupulously legions would form corporations to commit swindle right and left where nobody could be convicted, for it would be futile and ridiculous to convict an abstract being that cannot be pinched and confined in jail like a natural, living person, hence the result of the defense theory would be hopeless chose in business and finance. It is completely untenable. (Rollo [CA], p. 108.)

The act is imposed by agreement of parties, as a practice observed in the usual pursuit of a business or a commercial transaction. The offense may arise, if at all, from the peculiar terms and condition agreed upon by the parties to the transaction, not by direct provision of the law. The intention of the parties, therefore, is a factor determinant of whether a crime was committed or whether a civil obligation alone intended by the parties.

In the absence of an express provision of law making the petitioner liable for the criminal offense committed by the corporation of which he is a president as in fact there is no such provisions in the Revised Penal Code under which petitioner is being prosecuted, the existence of a criminal liability on his part may not be said to be beyond any doubt. In all criminal prosecutions, the existence of criminal liability for which the accused is made answerable must be clear and certain. The maxim that all doubts must be resolved in favor of the accused is always of compelling force in the prosecution of offenses. This Court has thus far not ruled on the criminal liability of an officer of a corporation signing in behalf of said corporation a trust receipt of the same nature as that involved herein.

(2nd issue) We consider the view that the trust receipt arrangement gives rise only to civil liability as the more feasible, before the promulgation of P.D. 115. The transaction being contractual, the intent of the parties should govern. The parties, therefore, are deemed to have consciously entered into a purely commercial transaction that could give rise only to civil liability, never to subject the "entrustee" to criminal prosecution.