G.R. No. 206952 Case Digest

G.R. No. 206952, October 22, 2013

Abang Lingkod Party-list

vs COMELEC

Facts:

This is a petition for certiorari filed by Abang Lingkod challenging the May 2013 resolution issued by COMELEC cancelling the Abang Lingkod's party-list registration.

COMELEC says that it is not enough that the party-list organization claim representation of the marginalized and underrepresented because representation is easy to claim.  Records shows that Abang Lingkod failed to stablish its track record which is important to prove that the party-list continuously represents the marginalized.

Abang Lingkod merely offered pictures of some alleged activities they conducted after the 2010 elections. These pictures appears to be edited. Under The Party-List System Act, a group’s registration may be cancelled for declaring unlawful statements in its petition. Photoshopping images to establish a fact that did not occur is tantamount to declaring unlawful statements. It is on this ground that the Commission cancels ABANG LINGKOD’s registration.

Abang Lingkod filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by COMELEC, thus this current Petition for certiorari.

Issues:

I. Whether national, regional, and sectoral parties and organizations are required under the law to show their genuineness and bona fide existence in determining if they are eligible for registration with the Commission on Elections; and

II. Whether the Commission on Elections gravely abused its discretion in cancelling ABANG LINGKOD’s registration under the party-list system.

Ruling:

(1) A party, by law, is either "a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties."17 A political party is defined as:

x x x an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office. (Emphasis provided)

A party is a national party "when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces comprising the region."

On the other hand, a sectoral party:

x x x refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector.

R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and regional parties under the party-list system to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" is to deprive and exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from the party-list system.

Petitioner is a sectoral party-list group that purports to represent the peasant farmers. However, it did not even comply with the bare requirement that sectoral party-list groups representing a sector should show that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. As correctly argued by the public respondent, petitioner will not, therefore, qualify even under the new parameters set forth in Atong Paglaum.

(2) COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion.

G.R. Nos. 206844-45 Case Digest

G.R. Nos. 206844-45, July 23, 2013

Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizen in the Philippines, Inc.

vs COMELEC

Facts:

March 2007, COMELEC accredited Senior Citizen as a party-list organization. Senior Citizen then participated in the May 2007 elections, however failed to get the 2% total votes cast. In accordance with the procedure set forth in BANAT for the allocation of additional seats under the party-list system, Senior Citizen was given one seat.

Subsequently, Senior Citizen was allowed to participate in the May 2010 elections. After the conduct of the May 10, 2010 elections, SENIOR CITIZENS ranked second among all the party-list candidates and was allocated two seats in the House of Representatives. The first seat was occupied by its first nominee, Rep. Arquiza, while the second was given to its second nominee, David L. Kho (Rep. Kho).

Later, David Kho tendered his resignation letter as representative which was followed by a board resolution of Senior Citizen accepting such resignation in accordance with the term-sharing agreement made between the nominees of the party-list. COMELEC, however, did not recognize the resignation saying that it is against public policy. The term of public offcials cannot be made subject to any agreement of private parties for public office is not a commodity that can be shared, apportioned or be made subject to any private agreement. COMELEC resolved to cancel the registration of the Senior Citizens as party-list.

December 11, 2012, SC initially granted status quo ante orders of  Senior Citizens and directed COMELEC to include the name of Senior Citizens in the printing of offcial ballots for the May 2013 elections. SC later ruled that the cancellation of registration was in order. Thus, this petition.

Ruling:

We find merit.

(1) In the instant case, the review of the registration of SENIOR CITIZENS was made pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 9513 through a summary evidentiary hearing carried out on August 24, 2012 in SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM). In this hearing, both the Arquiza Group and the Datol Group were indeed given the opportunity to adduce evidence as to their continuing compliance with the requirements for party-list accreditation. Nevertheless, the due process violation was committed when they were not apprised of the fact that the term-sharing agreement entered into by the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS in 2010 would be a material consideration in the evaluation of the organization’s qualifications as a party-list group for the May 13, 2013 elections. As it were, both factions of SENIOR CITIZENS were not able to answer this issue squarely. In other words, they were deprived of the opportunity to adequately explain their side regarding the term-sharing agreement and/or to adduce evidence, accordingly, in support of their position.

In its Comment to the petitions, the COMELEC countered that petitioners were actually given the opportunity to present their side on the issue of the term-sharing agreement during the hearing on April 18, 2012. Said hearing was allegedly conducted to determine petitioners’ continuing compliance for accreditation as a party-list organization.

The Court is not persuaded. It is true that during the April 18, 2012 hearing, the rival groups of SENIOR CITIZENS admitted to the existence of the term-sharing agreement. Contrary to the claim of COMELEC, however, said hearing was conducted for purposes of discussing the petition of the Arquiza Group in E.M. No. 12-040. To recall, said petition asked for the confirmation of the replacement of Rep. Kho, who had tendered his resignation effective on December 31, 2011. More specifically, the transcript of the hearing reveals that the focus thereof was on the petition filed by the Arquiza group and its subsequent manifestation, praying that the group be allowed to withdraw its petition. Also, during the hearing, COMELEC Chairman Brillantes did admonish the rival factions of SENIOR CITIZENS about their conflicts and warned them about the complications brought about by their term-sharing agreement. However, E.M. No. 12-040 was not a proceeding regarding the qualifications of SENIOR CITIZENS as a party-list group and the issue of whether the term-sharing agreement may be a ground for disqualification was neither raised nor resolved in that case. Chairman Brillantes’s remonstration was not sufficient as to constitute a fair warning that the term-sharing agreement would be considered as a ground for the cancellation of SENIOR CITIZENS’ registration and accreditation.

(2) The term-sharing agreement among the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS, was not implemented. This fact was manifested by the Arquiza Group even during the April 18, 2012 hearing conducted by the COMELEC En Banc in E.M. No. 12-040 wherein the Arquiza Group manifested that it was withdrawing its petition for confirmation and approval of Rep. Kho’s replacement. Thereafter, in its Resolution dated June 27, 2012 in E.M. No. 12-040, the COMELEC En Banc itself refused to recognize the term-sharing agreement and the tender of resignation of Rep. Kho. The COMELEC even declared that no vacancy was created despite the execution of the said agreement. Subsequently, there was also no indication that the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS still tried to implement, much less succeeded in implementing, the term-sharing agreement. Before this Court, the Arquiza Group and the Datol Group insist on this fact of non-implementation of the agreement. Thus, for all intents and purposes, Rep. Kho continued to hold his seat and served his term as a member of the House of Representatives, in accordance with COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 and the COMELEC En Banc ruling in E.M. No. 12-040. Curiously, the COMELEC is silent on this point.

Indubitably, if the term-sharing agreement was not actually implemented by the parties thereto, it appears that SENIOR CITIZENS, as a party-list organization, had been unfairly and arbitrarily penalized by the COMELEC En Banc. Verily, how can there be disobedience on the part of SENIOR CITIZENS when its nominees, in fact, desisted from carrying out their agreement? Hence, there was no violation of an election law, rule, or regulation to speak of. Clearly then, the disqualification of SENIOR CITIZENS and the cancellation of its registration and accreditation have no legal leg to stand on.

G.R. No. 219603 Case Digest

G.R. No. 219603

Mary Elizabeth Ty-Delgado

vs HRET and Philip Arreza Pichay

Facts:

September 2008, SC convicted Pichay of four counts of libel. October 2012, Pichay filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of member of house of representatives for the 1st district of Surigao del Sur for the May 2013 elections.

February 2013, Ty-Delgado filed a petition for disqualification against Pichay before COMELEC on the ground of the libel conviction, a crime of moral turpitude; and that the 5-year period barring him to be a candidate had yet to lapse.

Pichay answered that the petition for disqualification was filed out of time and argued that libel does not necessarily involve moral turpitude because his conviction was based only on his presumed responsibility as the president of the publishing company.

May 2013, Pichay was proclaimed as duly elected member of the HR. Ty-Delgado then filed an ad cautelam petition for quo warranto before HRET reiterating that Pichay is ineligible. COMELEC dismissed the petition for disqualification for lack of jurisdiction. HRET ruled that that it had jurisdiction over the present quo warranto petition but concluded that Pichay's libel conviction did not involve moral turpitude.

Issues: HRET erred in its decision.

Ruling:

We find merit in the petition.

A sentence by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disqualification under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code:

Sec. 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he was sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.

The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified. (Emphasis supplied)

Moral turpitude is defined as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general.7 Although not every criminal act involves moral turpitude, the Court is guided by one of the general rules that crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude while crimes mala prohibita do not.

G.R. No. 176970 Case Digest

G.R. No. 176970, December 8, 2008

Rogelio Bagabuyo

vs COMELEC

Facts:

RA 9371 was approved dividing Cagayan de Oro into two legislative districts. Later, COMELEC promulgated Resolution 7837 implementing RA 9371.

Bagabuyo then filed a petition against COMELEC and other officers asking for nulliffication of RA 9371 and Res. 7837 saying that RA 9371 failed to conduct a plebiscite which is indispensable for the division or conversion of a local governement unit. The court did not grant the TRO or writ of prelim. injunction, so the May elections proceeded with CDO divided into two legislative districts.

COMELEC, thru OSG argued that: 1) the petitioner did not respect the hierarchy of courts, as the Regional Trial Court (RTC) is vested with concurrent jurisdiction over cases assailing the constitutionality of a statute; 2) R.A. No. 9371 merely increased the representation of Cagayan de Oro City in the House of Representatives and Sangguniang Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution; 3) the criteria established under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution only apply when there is a creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of a province, city, municipality, or barangay; in this case, no such creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries of a local government unit took place; and 4) R.A. No. 9371 did not bring about any change in Cagayan de Oros territory, population and income classification; hence, no plebiscite is required.

1)     Did the petitioner violate the hierarchy of courts rule; if so, should the instant petition be dismissed on this ground?

2)     Does R.A. No. 9371 merely provide for the legislative reapportionment of Cagayan de Oro City, or does it involve the division and conversion of a local government unit?

3)     Does R.A. No. 9371 violate the equality of representation doctrine?

Ruling:

Except for issue on the hierarchy of courts rule, we find the petition totally without merit.

The present petition is of this nature; its subject matter and the nature of the issues raised among them, whether legislative reapportionment involves a division of Cagayan de Oro City as a local government unit are reasons enough for considering it an exception to the principle of hierarchy of courts. Additionally, the petition assails as well a resolution of the COMELEC en banc issued to implement the legislative apportionment that R.A. No. 9371 decrees. As an action against a COMELEC en banc resolution, the case falls under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court that in turn requires a review by this Court via a Rule 65 petition for certiorari. For these reasons, we do not see the principle of hierarchy of courts to be a stumbling block in our consideration of the present case.

Plebiscite

Legislative apportionment is defined by Blacks Law Dictionary as the determination of the number of representatives which a State, county or other subdivision may send to a legislative body. It is the allocation of seats in a legislative body in proportion to the population; the drawing of voting district lines so as to equalize population and voting power among the districts. Reapportionment, on the other hand, is the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by changes in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation.

Article VI (entitled Legislative Department) of the 1987 Constitution lays down the rules on legislative apportionment under its Section 5 which provides:

Sec. 5(1). (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty members unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.

x x x

(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, continuous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.

(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section.

Separately from the legislative districts that legal apportionment or reapportionment speaks of, are the local government units (historically and generically referred to as municipal corporations) that the Constitution itself classified into provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. In its strict and proper sense, a municipality has been defined as a body politic and corporate constituted by the incorporation of the inhabitants of a city or town for the purpose of local government thereof. The creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of local government units, i.e., of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays, are covered by the Article on Local Government (Article X). Section 10 of this Article provides:

No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political unit directly affected.

Under both Article VI, Section 5, and Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution, the authority to act has been vested in the Legislature. The Legislature undertakes the apportionment and reapportionment of legislative districts, and likewise acts on local government units by setting the standards for their creation, division, merger, abolition and alteration of boundaries and by actually creating, dividing, merging, abolishing local government units and altering their boundaries through legislation. Other than this, not much commonality exists between the two provisions since they are inherently different although they interface and relate with one another.

A pronounced distinction between Article VI, Section 5 and, Article X, Section 10 is on the requirement of a plebiscite. The Constitution and the Local Government Code expressly require a plebiscite to carry out any creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of a local

government unit.

Holding of a plebiscite was never a requirement in legislative apportionment or reapportionment. After it became constitutionally entrenched, a plebiscite was also always identified with the creation, division, merger, abolition and alteration of boundaries of local government units, never with the concept of legislative apportionment.

R.A. No. 9371 is, on its face, purely and simply a reapportionment legislation passed in accordance with the authority granted to Congress under Article VI, Section 5(4) of the Constitution. Its core provision Section 1 provides:

SECTION 1. Legislative Districts. The lone legislative district of the City of Cagayan de Oro is hereby apportioned to commence in the next national elections after the effectivity of this Act. Henceforth, barangays Bonbon, Bayabas, Kauswagan, Carmen, Patag, Bulua, Iponan, Baikingon, San Simon, Pagatpat, Canitoan, Balulang, Lumbia, Pagalungan, Tagpangi, Taglimao, Tuburan, Pigsag-an, Tumpagon, Bayanga, Mambuaya, Dansulihon, Tignapoloan and Bisigan shall comprise the first district while barangays Macabalan, Puntod, Consolacion, Camaman-an, Nazareth, Macansandig, Indahag, Lapasan, Gusa, Cugman, FS Catanico, Tablon, Agusan, Puerto, Bugo and Balubal and all urban barangays from Barangay 1 to Barangay 40 shall comprise the second district.

Under these wordings, no division of Cagayan de Oro City as a political and corporate entity takes place or is mandated. Cagayan de Oro City politically remains a single unit and its administration is not divided along territorial lines. Its territory remains completely whole and intact; there is only the addition of another legislative district and the delineation of the city into two districts for purposes of representation in the House of Representatives. Thus, Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution does not come into play and no plebiscite is necessary to validly apportion Cagayan de Oro City into two districts.

G.R. No. 207851 Case Digest

G.R. No. 207851, July 8, 2014

Angel Naval

vs COMELEC and Nelson Julia

Facts:

Naval had served as member of the Sanggunian, 2nd District of CamSur. On October 12, 2009, RA 9716 was approved, reapportioning the legislative district of Province of CamSur.

Notably, 8 out of 10 towns were taken from the old Second District to form the present Third District. The present Second District is composed of the two remaining towns, Gainza and Milaor, merged with five towns from the old First District.

In the 2010 elections, Naval once again won as among the members of the Sanggunian, Third District. He served until 2013.

In the 2013 elections, Naval ran anewand was re-elected as Member of the Sanggunian, Third District.

Julia was likewise a Sanggunian Member candidate from the Third District in the 2013 elections. On October 29, 2012, he invoked Section 7810 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) and filed before the COMELEC a Verified Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Naval. Julia posited that Naval had fully served the entire Province of Camarines Sur for three consecutive terms as a member of the Sanggunian, irrespective of the district he had been elected from. The three-term limit rule’s application is more with reference to the same local elective post, and not necessarily in connection with an identical territorial jurisdiction. Allowing Naval to run as a Sanggunian member for the fourth time is violative of the inflexible three-term limit rule enshrined in the Constitution and the LGC, which must be strictly construed.

COMELEC cancelled Naval's COC.

The conditions for the application of the three-term limit rule are present in the instant case as the records clearly establish that [Naval] is running for the 4th time for the same government post. To put things in a proper perspective, it is imperative to review and discuss the salient points in the case of Latasa v. [COMELEC]. The case involves the question of whether or not a municipal mayor, having been elected and had already served for three (3) consecutive terms, canrun as city mayor in light of the conversion of the municipality to a city. In applying the three-term limit rule, the Court pointed out that the conversion of the municipality into a city did not convert the office of the municipal mayor into a local government post different from the office of the city mayor. The Court took into account the following circumstances: (1) That the territorial jurisdiction of [the] city was the same as that of the municipality; (2) That the inhabitants were the same group of voters who elected the municipal mayor for three (3) consecutive terms; and (3) That the inhabitants were the same group of voters [over] whom he held power and authority as their chief executive for nine years.

Ruling:

Court denies the petition.

A republic is a representative government, a government run by and for the people. It is not a pure democracy where the people govern themselves directly. The essence of republicanism is representation and renovation, the selection by the citizenry of a corps of public functionaries who derive their mandate from the people and act on their behalf, serving for a limited period only, after which they are replaced or retained, at the option of their principal.

R.A.No. 9716 plainly state that the new Second Districtis to be created, but the Third Districtis to be renamed. Verba legis non est recedendum. The terms used in a legal provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers mean what they say.

The rationale behind reapportionment is the constitutional requirement to achieve equality of representation among the districts. It is with this mindset that the Court should consider Naval’s argument anent having a new set of constituents electing him into office in 2010 and 2013.

Naval’s ineligibility to run, by reason of violation of the three-term limit rule, does not undermine the right to equal representation of any of the districts in Camarines Sur. With or without him, the renamed Third District, which he labels as a new set of constituents, would still be represented, albeit by another eligible person. 

G.R. No. 180050 Case Digest

G.R. No. 180050, February 10, 2010

Rodolfo G. Navarro, Victor Bernal and Rene Medina

vs Exec. Sec. Eduardo Ermita

Facts:

April 3, 2002, the Office of the President advised the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Surigao del Norte to deficient population in the propsed Province of Dinagat Islands.

Consequently, Prov. Gov't. of Surigao del Norte conducted a special census with the assitanc eof the NSo District Census Coordinator to determine the population of Dinagat. The census yield 371,576 inhabitants. NSO, however, did not certify the result of the special census.

Bureau of Local Government Finance certified that the average annual income of Dinagat was 82M . The land area is 802.12 sqkm.

Later, Congress passed the bill for the creation of the Province of Dinagat which was approved by then President GMA. Then a plebiscite was ratified and approved by the majority. Consequently, new set of provincial officials took their oath of office following their appointment by PGMA, another set were then elected in the election later.

Petitioners aver that they are taxpayers and residents of the Province of Surigao del Norte, they are Vice-gov and members of the provincial board. They allege that the creation of the Dinagat Islands as a new province is an illegal act of Congress and unjustly deprives the people of Surigao del Norte a large chunk of its territory, IRA and rich resources from the area.

They also claim that the creation is not valid because it failed to comply with the population and land area requirement.

Ruling:

Petition is granted. SEC. 461. Requisites for Creation. -- (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or

(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office:

Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.

(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province.

(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, trust funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.

The requirements for the creation of a province contained in Sec. 461 of the Local Government Code are clear, plain and unambiguous, and its literal application does not result in absurdity or injustice. Hence, the provision in Art. 9(2) of the IRR exempting a proposed province composed of one or more islands from the land-area requirement cannot be considered an executive construction of the criteria prescribed by the Local Government Code. It is an extraneous provision not intended by the Local Government Code and, therefore, is null and void.

R.A. No. 9355 expressly states that the Province of Dinagat Islands "contains an approximate land area of eighty thousand two hundred twelve hectares (80,212 has.) or 802.12 sq. km., more or less, including Hibuson Island and approximately forty-seven (47) islets x x x."33 R.A. No. 9355, therefore, failed to comply with the land area requirement of 2,000 square kilometers.

The Province of Dinagat Islands also failed to comply with the population requirement of not less than 250,000 inhabitants as certified by the NSO. Based on the 2000 Census of Population conducted by the NSO, the population of the Province of Dinagat Islands as of May 1, 2000 was only 106,951.

Although the Provincial Government of Surigao del Norte conducted a special census of population in Dinagat Islands in 2003, which yielded a population count of 371,000, the result was not certified by the NSO as required by the Local Government Code.34 Moreover, respondents failed to prove that with the population count of 371,000, the population of the original unit (mother Province of Surigao del Norte) would not be reduced to less than the minimum requirement prescribed by law at the time of the creation of the new province.

Petitioners contend that the creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands is an act of gerrymandering on the ground that House Bill No. 884 excluded Siargao Island, with a population of 118,534 inhabitants, from the new province for complete political dominance by Congresswoman Glenda Ecleo-Villaroman. This is unsubstantiated.

"Gerrymandering" is a term employed to describe an apportionment of representative districts so contrived as to give an unfair advantage to the party in power. Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, defined "gerrymandering" as the formation of one legislative district out of separate territories for the purpose of favoring a candidate or a party. The Constitution proscribes gerrymandering, as it mandates each legislative district to comprise, as far as practicable, a contiguous, compact and adjacent territory.

As stated by the Office of the Solicitor General, the Province of Dinagat Islands consists of one island and about 47 islets closely situated together, without the inclusion of separate territories. It is an unsubstantiated allegation that the province was created to favor Congresswoman Glenda Ecleo-Villaroman.

G.R. No. 188078 Case Digest

G.R. No. 188078, January 25, 2010

Victorino Aldaba, etc.

vs COMELEC

Facts:

May 1, 2009, RA 9591 passed into a law, amending the Malolos Charter by creating a separate legislative district for the city. The population of Malolos is a contested fact given that the house bill for this law relied on the undated certification issued by NSO that the population of Malolos will be 254,030 by year 2010 due its current population growth rate.

Petitioners, taxpayers and registered residents of Malolos filed this petition contending that RA 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population threshold of 250k for a city to merit representation in Congress.

OSG contended that Congress use of projected population is non-justiciable as it involves a determination on the wisdom of the standard adopted by the legislature to determine compliance with constitutional requirement.

Ruling:

RA 9591 is unconstitutional. The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district, the city must have a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand.[5] The only issue here is whether the City of Malolos has a population of at least 250,000, whether actual or projected, for the purpose of creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos in time for the 10 May 2010 elections. If not, then RA 9591 creating a legislative district in the City of Malolos is unconstitutional.

The Certification of Regional Director Miranda, which is based on demographic projections, is without legal effect because Regional Director Miranda has no basis and no authority to issue the Certification. The Certification is also void on its face because based on its own growth rate assumption, the population of Malolos will be less than 250,000 in the year 2010. In addition, intercensal demographic projections cannot be made for the entire year. In any event, a city whose population has increased to 250,000 is entitled to have a legislative district only in the immediately following election after the attainment of the 250,000 population.

The Certification of Regional Director Miranda does not state that the demographic projections he certified have been declared official by the NSCB. The records of this case do not also show that the Certification of Regional Director Miranda is based on demographic projections declared official by the NSCB. The Certification, which states that the population of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010, violates the requirement that intercensal demographic projections shall be as of the middle of every year. In addition, there is no showing that Regional Director Miranda has been designated by the NSO Administrator as a certifying officer for demographic projections in Region III. In the absence of such official designation, only the certification of the NSO Administrator can be given credence by this Court.

Any population projection forming the basis for the creation of a legislative district must be based on an official and credible source. That is why the OSG cited Executive Order No. 135, otherwise the population projection would be unreliable or speculative.

Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution provides:

Any province that may be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member or such number of members as it may be entitled to on the basis of the number of its inhabitants and according to the standards set forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution. xxx. (Emphasis supplied)