G.R. No. 101689 Case Digest

G.R. No. 101689, March 17, 1993

Carlito Alvizo, petitioner

vs Sandiganbayan, respondent

Ponente: Regalado

Facts:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction seeks to annul and set aside the resolutions of respondent Sandiganbayan for allegedly having been issued with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of jurisdiction and to restrain respondent court from proceeding with petitioner's arraignment and trial in criminal case thereof.

Then Congressman Ernesto Estrella of 2nd district of Surigao del Sur called the attention of then secretary of justice Ordonez to the inability of the provincial fiscal of Surigao del Sur to prosecute petitioner Alvizo, who was then a memebr of the Surigao del Sur Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Alvizo was dismissed as a clark of court when he was found to have incurred a deficiency in his accounts. Petitioner's dismissal was without prejudice to his criminal prosecution.

Acting on Estrella's letter, chief state prosecutor (on behalf of Secretary Ordonez) de Leon referred the matter to the provincial fiscal for appropriate action. PI was conducted by 2nd asst. provincial prosecutor Suarez who recommended the filing of information for malversation against herein petitioner. The recommendation was reversed by the provincial prosecutor but was in turn overruled by the ombudsman which charges Alvizo with malversation of public funds.

On August 29, 1990, Alvizo filed a motion to quash the information allegedly for failure of the same to include a certification by the investigating fiscal that he conducted a personal examination of the complaint and his witnesses during PI. Alvizo also filed a supplemental motion to quash this time contending that the filing of information in his case is violative of his constitutional rights to due process and speedy disposition of the case against him.

Sandiganbayan denied the motion and supplemental motion to quash and motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in a resolution.

Petition is now before the court contending that Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying his aforestated motions despite the timely objection to the lack of a certification in the information of the personal examination conducted by the investigating officer.

Ruling: Petition is devoid of merit.

(1) Respondent court made a finding that the investigating officer who conducted the preliminary investigation personally examined the witness for the prosecution. If it is not stated in the information, this is considered as a mere formal defect which does not prejudice the substantial rights of the accused, hence does not warrant the quash of information. conducted . . ."

In the case at bar, it is clear that there is a certification to the effect that a preliminary investigation had been conducted. What is allegedly lacking is the statement that the investigating prosecutor has personally examined the complainant and his witnesses. We find no compelling reason why the aforementioned doctrinal rules should not be made applicable to the present case where the alleged violation alluded to by petitioner merely consists of a failure to state compliance with a part of the proceedings involved in the conduct of a preliminary investigation, that is, the personal examination by the fiscal of the complainant and his witnesses but which examination was actually conducted. 

(2) He insists that the preliminary investigation which led to the filing of the information in Criminal Case No. 14893 was commenced way back in 1979. But there is nothing in the records to show that indeed a preliminary investigation was initiated and/or conducted in that year. The documents presented by petitioner purporting to be the records of the alleged earlier preliminary investigation do not show that such an investigation has in fact been conducted in 1979. There was no violation of petitioner's right to speedy trial for the simple reason that a fair and rational consideration on both counts of the aforestated evidence on records shows that the preliminary investigation in the present case was begun not in 1979 but only in 1989, and the corresponding information was in due time filed in 1990.