G.R. No. L-53373 Case Digest

G.R. No. L-53373, June 30, 1987

Mario Crespo, petitioner

vs Hon. Leodegario L.Mogul, et.al., respondents

Ponente: Gancayco

Facts:

April 1977, Asst. Fiscal de Gala with approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed an information for estafa against Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City. When the case was set for arraignment, Crespo filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with the Sec. of Justice for the filing of the information; which was denied. A motion for reconsideration was denied too in order but the arraignment was referred to August 18, 1997 to afford time for petitioner to elevate the matter to the appellate court.

A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction was filed by the accused in the CA, then CA restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding with arraignment until further orders. 

On March 22, 1978 undersecretary of justice MAcaraig reversed the resolution of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against Crespo. A motion to dismiss was then filed by the Provincial Fiscal with the trial court attaching Macaraig's letter. On November 1978, judge denied the motion and set arraignment.= stating that the motion thrust induce the court to resolve the innocence of the accused on evidence not before it but on that adduced before the undersecretary that disregards the requirements of due process but also erodes court's independence and integrity, motion denied.

Crespo then filed a petition certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with petition for the issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition in the CA. Praying that the decision to move on with arraignment be reversed and set aside declaring the information filed not valid and of no legal force and effect and to dismiss the case and declare Crespo's obligation as purely civil.

Issue: Whether the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the provincial fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits.

Ruling: Petition denied.

(1) It is a cardinal principle that an criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. 17 The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by private persons. 19 It cannot be controlled by the complainant. 

(2) However, the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation or control. The same is subject to the approval of the provincial or city fiscal or the chief state prosecutor as the case maybe and it maybe elevated for review to the Secretary of Justice who has the power to affirm, modify or reverse the action or opinion of the fiscal. Consequently the Secretary of Justice may direct that a motion to dismiss the case be filed in Court or otherwise, that an information be filed in Court.

(3) The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority to hear and determine the case. The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court. 

(4) Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to dismiss was submitted to the Court, the Court in the exercise of its discretion may grant the motion or deny it and require that the trial on the merits proceed for the proper determination of the case.

(5) It is the duty of the fiscal to proceed with the presentation of evidence of the prosecution to the Court to enable the Court to arrive at its own independent judgment as to whether the accused should be convicted or acquitted.

(6) The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation. 

G.R. No. L-41054 Case Digest

G.R. No. L-41054, November 28, 1975

Jose Gamboa and Units optical supply company, petitioners

vs. CA and Benjamin Lu Hayco, respondents

Ponente: Martin

Facts:

This is a petition to review on the judgment of CA involving the theory of continuous crime.

Haycu was a former employee of Units optical with 124 complaints of estafa files against him by the company with the office of city fiscal of manila. after the procedural PI, fiscal filed 75 cases of estafa against Haycu, except as to the dates and amounts of conversions, the 75 informations commonly charge that Haycu having collected and received customers of the company the purchase of goods has converted the sum of money he collected to his own personal account with a bank.

A civil action for accounting was filed also by the owner of the company against Haycu complaining that Haycu initiated discharging the business functions and prerogatives of the company thru deceit and machinations that the owner affixing his signatures to the power of attorney to open account in the bank.

Haycu appealed to the CA to reversed the order of the lower court.asserting that the 75 criminal cases is not only oppressing but also out of the jurisdiction of the city fiscal of manila. asserting also that the 75 were mere components of only one crime.

CA ruled that, with intent Haycu defraud his employer to sign the power of attorney, and the series of deposits made by Haycu constitutes one crime of estafa, there being one criminal resolution and the different acts were aimed at accomplishing the purpose of defrauding his employer.

But the characterization of the estafa as continuing offense cannot be validly seize by haycu because the elements of estafa may separately take place in different jurisdiction until the crime is consummated. and the series of deposits of the company's funds to his personal account is treated separately from that of the case of the power of attorney.

CA is hereby set aside and reversed. 

G.R. No. 191064 Case Digest

G.R. No. 191064, October 20, 2010

People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee,

vs Rolando Araneta y Abella and Marilou Santos y Tantay, accused-appellants.

Ponente: Mendoza

Facts:

This is an appeal from the decision of Court of appeals affirming the decision of RTC Pasig City finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating the comprehensive drugs act of 2002.

Criminal information were filed in RTC against Araneta in addition to the information filed against him and co-accused Santos. Stating that accused willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to PO2 Danilo S. Damasco, a police poseur buyer, one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance weighing of (sic) eight (8) centigrams (0.08 gram), which was found positive to the test for metamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, in violation of said law.

The RTC ruled that all the elements for the prosecution of the illegal sale of dangerous drugs were present during the buy-bust operation conducted by the police officers. These were: 1) the identity of the buyer and the seller; 2) the object of the sale and the consideration; and 3) the delivery of the thing sold and payment therefor.

Furthermore, the RTC held that the defense of denial, frame-up, forcible entry, and extortion could not prevail over the positive identification by the prosecution witnesses. It noted that accused Rolando Araneta was not candid enough to inform the court that no less than eight (8) criminal cases were previously filed against him in different courts for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law. Nevertheless, out of eight (8) criminal cases filed against him, he admitted that one resulted in a conviction and two other cases were dismissed.  The other cases were then still pending trial.

Aggrieved, the accused appealed to the CA arguing that: 1) the RTC erred in not finding that they were illegally arrested and, as such, the sachets of shabu allegedly recovered from them were inadmissible in evidence; and 2) the RTC erred in finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged because the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were replete with inconsistencies and contradictions.

On August 29, 2008, the CA rendered the subject decision affirming the decision of the RTC.

Issue: Whether or not the accused are guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating the comprehensive drugs act?

The accused argue that the evidence adduced by the prosecution was not able to establish without a doubt, that the dangerous drugs presented in court were the very same ones allegedly sold by them. They insist that the police officers failed to strictly abide by the requirements of the law as regards the proper custody of dangerous drugs seized in the course of the alleged buy-bust operation.

The prosecution stands firm by its position that the arrest of the accused and seizure of the shabu and marijuana were lawful and that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were truthful. In the absence of any credible evidence to the contrary, the police officers are presumed to have regularly performed their official duty. More importantly, all the elements necessary for the prosecution of the illegal sale of drugs are present, to wit: 1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and consideration; and 2) the delivery of the thing sold and payment therefor.

The prosecution asserts that the accused cannot raise for the first time on appeal the issue on the alleged failure of the law enforcers to comply strictly with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. At any rate, the prosecution believes that it has shown that the chain of custody of the seized items was not broken.

Ruling:

After due consideration, the Court finds the evidence on record sufficient enough to sustain the verdict of conviction.  It is morally convinced that the accused are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged against them.  The rule is that factual findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of their probative weight are given high respect if not conclusive effect, unless the trial court ignored, misconstrued, misunderstood or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances of substance, which, if considered, will alter the outcome of the case.[5] In this case, the CA found no such inculpatory facts and circumstances and this Court has not stumbled upon any either.

Doubtless, the prosecution was able to establish all the necessary elements required in the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, namely: 1) the identity of the buyer and seller; 2) the identity of the object of the sale and the consideration; and 3) the delivery of the thing sold upon payment.

The Court looked into the accused’s defense of denial and accusations of  frame-up, planting of evidence, forcible entry and extortion by the police officers but found them inherently weak. Aside from their bare allegations, the accused had nothing more to show that the apprehending police officers did not properly perform their duties or that they had ill motives against them. They failed to substantiate their argument that they were framed-up for extortion purposes.

Absent any convincing countervailing evidence, the presumption is that the members of the buy-bust team performed their duties in a regular manner. It was certainly a job well done. Hence, the Court gives full faith and credit to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.

The Court also holds that the seized items were admissible.   A search warrant or warrant of arrest was not needed because it was a buy-bust operation and the accused were caught in flagrante delicto in possession of, and selling, dangerous drugs to the poseur-buyer. It was definitely legal for the buy-bust team to arrest, and search, them on the spot because a buy-bust operation is a justifiable mode of apprehending drug pushers. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. 

G.R. No. 182549 Case Digest

G.R. No. 182549, January 20, 2009

People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee,

vs Sergio Lagarde, accused-appellant.

Ponente: Velasco, Jr.

Facts:

This is an appeal seeking for the reverse of decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of conviction for rape by RTC Leyte.

Lagarde was charged with rape in an information stating that: On December 27, 2001 in Leyte, deliberate and of use of force and intimidation rape an 11 year-old. Upon arraignment, Lagarde pleaded not guilty.

During trial, prosecution presented testimony of the minor and her the doctor who examined her after the incident. Defense presented Lagarde denial contending that he didn't left the house of Lolita during the fiesta celebration, that he had a drinking spree with the other visitors.

The RTC found AAA’s testimony credible, noting that at her age, it is inconceivable for her to concoct a tale of having been raped. Her accusation, according to the RTC, was supported by medical findings that she was indeed sexually abused. The lower court dismissed accused-appellant’s denial and alibi. Lolita’s testimony was likewise disbelieved not only because she was related to accused-appellant but also because she herself was busy drinking tuba in another part of the house. She could not categorically say, the RTC added, that accused-appellant did not leave his seat and molest AAA. 

The appellate court upheld the trial court’s findings of fact and judgment of conviction. With regard to the penalty, however, the CA ruled that the trial court erred when it imposed the death sentence on the basis of the following aggravating circumstances: minority, use of bladed weapon, and uninhabited place. Aside from the abolition of the death penalty, the CA held that:

It is basic in criminal procedure that the purpose of the information is to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him or the charge against him so as to enable him to prepare a suitable defense. It would be a denial of the right of the accused to be informed of the charges against him, and consequently, a denial of due process, if he is charged with simple rape and convicted of its qualified form punishable by death although the attendant circumstances qualifying the offense and resulting in capital punishment were not set forth in the indictment on which he was arraigned. More importantly, they are not the circumstances that would call for the application of death penalty.

Issues: (1) the court gravely erred in finding the guilt of the accused (2) the court gravely erred in imposing upon the accused the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Ruling: Appeal has no merit.

In rape cases, courts are governed by the following principles: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) due to the nature of the crime of rape in which only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. Due to the nature of this crime, only the complainant can testify against the assailant. Accordingly, conviction for rape may be solely based on the complainant’s testimony provided it is credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.

The trial court observed that AAA’s testimony was credible, straightforward, clear, and convincing. She ably identified accused-appellant as her attacker and described in detail how she was sexually assaulted. There is no reason a child would fabricate such a serious accusation such as rape and risk public humiliation if not to seek justice. It is for this reason that testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credence, since when minors say they were raped, they say in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed.

The victim’s credibility is further bolstered by the immediate reporting of the incident to her mother and subsequently to the authorities. Moreover, the medical findings of Drs. Oyzon and Palencia-Jadloc established the fact that complainant had sexual intercourse.

Accused-appellant, on the other hand, could only offer denial and alibi as defenses. His alibi that he spent the afternoon drinking with other visitors does not deserve merit since he was present in the same house where the victim was. 

It is a basic constitutional right of the accused persons to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against them. It would be a denial of accused-appellant’s basic right to due process if he is charged with simple rape and consequently convicted with certain qualifying circumstances which were not alleged in the information.

The appellate court correctly ruled that the use of a bladed weapon and uninhabited place are not circumstances that would call for the imposition of the death penalty. 

The victim’s minority does not also qualify the offense to merit the death penalty. To warrant a death sentence, the victim must be under seven (7) years of age. 

G.R. No. 181084 Case Digest

G.R. No. 181084

People of the Philippines

v Bartolome Tampus and Ida Montesclaros

Ponente: Puno

Facts:

On appeal is the CA Visayas decision affirming with modification the decision of the RTC of Lapu-Lapu city in finding Ida Montesclaros guilty as an accomplice in the commission of rape.

This appeal stems from two criminal cases: (1) the information states that, on april 1, 1995 about 4:30pm in Lapulapu city with the jurisdiction of the RTC Lapu-Lapu, the accused Tampus was in deep slumber due to drunkenness did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the then 13 yer old victim against her will in conspiracy with Ida Montesclaros who gave permission to Tampus to rape the minor.(2) on April 3, 1995 at about 1am, Tampus was armed with a wooden club and by means of threat and intimidation did willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with then 13 year old against her will.

The offended party is the daughter of montesclaros. Montesclaros started o rent a room in a house owned by Tampus, a barangay tanod. Minor testified that she was in the house with her mother and Tampus on April 1, 1995, that the two adults were drinking beer and forced her to drink too. After having 3 bottles then she got sleepy and was lying on the floor when she overheard Tampus requesting her mother to be permitted to have sexual intercourse with the minor. Montesclaros agreed and told Tampus to leave as soon as he is finish with her daughter. Montesclaros then left for work and left the minor along with Tampus. The minor fell asleep and have woken up with pain and blood on her genitals. The minor cried  to her mother but was ignored by Montesclaros.

Minor testified that the abuse was repeated on April 4, 1995. That then made her to seek from her Aunt Nellie who reported the incident to the police. On May 9, 1995 the head of the medico-legal branch of the PNCLS conducted a physical examination of the minor and testified that the result of the examination revealed a deep healed laceration.

On September 22, 1995 the minor filed 2 complaints against Tampus on rape and against Montesclaros on conspiracy to the rape.

Tampus denied the rape with alibis that Ida always bring her daughter to the beer house with her and his duties to the barangay tanod post would prevent the incident of the minor having left at home alone with him.

then the head of Dept. Psychiatry issued a medical certification which showed that Ida was treated as an outpatient diagnosed with Schizophrenia.

Trial court convicted Tampus of 2 rapes and Ida as accomplice.Ida's illness was then appreciated and in effect mitigated her penalty.

CA then dismissed the instant appeal for lack merit but with modification that Ida was guilty beyond reasonable doubt as an accomplice.

CA explained that Ida as accomplice is dependent on proving the principal guilty.

G.R. No. 178323 Case Digest

G.R. No. 178323, March 16, 2011

People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee

v Armando Chingh y Parcia, accused-appellant

Ponente: Peralta

Facts:

Chingh seeks the reversal of the decision of CA convicting him of statutory rape and rape through sexual assault.

On march 2005, an information was filed against Chingh for inserting his fingers and afterwards his penis into the private part of his minor victim.

Upon his arraignment, Chingh pleaded not guilty. at the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of the victim, the victims father, PO3 Solidarios and Dr. Baluyot. The defense presented the lone testimony of Chingh.

On April 2005, the RTC finding the evidence of the prosecution overwhelming against the accused denial and alibi rendered a decision convicting Chingh of statutory rape.

Aggrieved, chingh appealed the decision before CA, on December 2006 CA rendered decision Chingh guilty of statutory rape and rape through sexual assault.

Chingh now comes to court for relief. in a resolution, September 2007, the court required the parties to file their respective supplemental briefs. in their manifestations, the parties waived the filing of their supplemental briefs and instead adopted their respective briefs filed before CA

Chingh raises the following errors: (1) the trial court graved erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime of rape under article 266-a paragraph 1 of the RPC in spite the unnatural and unrealistic testimony of the private complainant. (2) the trial court erred in finding the accused guilty of the offense charged beyond reasonable doubt.

Chingh maintains that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence that will overcome the presumption of innocence. 

ruling: court agreed with RTC that the testimonies presented by the prosecution is favorable than the mere denial and alibi of the accused.

Section 3, Rule 120 of the RPC supports the decision of CA to charged accused with two offenses, since Chingh failed to file a motion to quash the information.

CA's decision is affirmed with modification of the penalty for the sexual assault.

G.R. No. 178060 Case Digest

G.R. No. 178060, February 23, 2011 

People of the Philippines, appellee,

vs Villarama, Jr., and Romeo Dansico y Monay, appellants.

Ponente: Brion

Facts:

This is a petition for review the decision of Court of Appeals in affirming the decision of RTC Camarines Sur finding Dansico and Enriquez guilty beyond reasonable doubt for sale of Marijuana.

Information filed: On September 7, 1998 around 4:30pm in Camarines Sur Dansico and Enriquez are accused of conspiring, confederating and helping one another to sell and deliver a pack of marijuana weighing 900 grams.

With their counsel, they pleaded not guilty of charge. In the pre-trial, the appellants admitted their identities and the existence of the booking sheet and the arrest report against them. Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.

Prosecution Case: The prosecution established its case by presenting the testimonies of three (3) witnesses and the supporting documentary evidence. The prosecution’s account showed that the appellants were caught and arrested for selling marijuana during a buy-bust operation.

Defense Case: The defense denied the charges and countered that the appellants were victims of frame-up and police extortion. The defense presented six (6) witnesses(including the two appellants) and the documentary evidence. Appellant Dansico admitted that the marijuana presented in court was the same marijuana shown to him at the Tigaon Police Station. According to the defense, appellant Dansico had a farm where appellant Cuadra worked. In the afternoon of September 7, 1998, appellant Cuadra was on his way back to the farm when he was accosted by P/Insp. Vargas who poked a gun at him. Appellant Cuadra attempted to flee and even shouted for help but P/Insp. Vargas struck him on the head with his gun.

RTC found the appellants guilty of illegal sale of marijuana and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the corresponding accessory penalties.

The CA, on appeal, affirmed the RTC decision. The CA sustained the convictions of the appellants, finding the prosecution’s version more credible in the absence of any improper motive established against the prosecution witnesses. The CA also relied on the presumption of regularity that attended the conduct of the buy-bust operation which led to the arrest of the appellants.

Issues: (1) The elements of the crime – the sale and delivery of the marijuana, and the knowledge of the sale of marijuana – were not established in evidence.  (2) The evidence failed to establish the existence of the buy-bust operation; for the first time on appeal, the appellants argue that they were instigated into selling marijuana.

Ruling: We find no reversible error committed by the RTC and the CA in appreciating the presented evidence and, therefore, deny the petition for lack of merit.

(a) The fact that an actual buy-bust operation took place involving the appellants is supported not only by the testimonies of Paz  (as the poseur-buyer) and P/Insp. Vargas, but also by the presented documentary evidence consisting of (a) the photocopy of the serial numbers of the marked money used in the buy-bust operation, (b) the Tigaon Police Station police blotter showing the arrest of the appellants on September 7, 1998 and the cause of their arrest by the group of P/Insp. Vargas, (c) the booking sheet and arrest report against the appellants prepared by P/Insp. Vargas, and (d) the Joint Affidavit of Arrest executed by P/Insp. Vargas and Eduardo Buenavente, another civilian volunteer.

(b) The testimonies of Paz and P/Insp. Vargas on the buy-bust operation and the identities of the appellants as the sellers of the marijuana were positive and straightforward; they were consistent with one another with respect to the events that transpired before, during, and after the buy-bust operation that led to the appellants’ arrest. We consider, too, the testimonies of Paz and P/Insp. Vargas to be in accord with the physical evidence showing in detail the process undertaken by P/Insp. Vargas and the police officers immediately after the appellants’ arrest and the confiscation of the marijuana.  We also take into account that no improper motive was ever successfully established showing why the buy-bust team would falsely accuse the appellants.

(c) The defenses of denial, frame-up, and police extortion only become weighty when inconsistencies and improbabilities cast doubt on the credibility of the prosecution evidence. We do not see these inconsistencies and improbabilities in the presented evidence. Besides, the failure of the appellants to file appropriate criminal and administrative cases against the concerned police officers in light of their allegations highly indicates that the appellants’ claims are mere concocted afterthoughts.

(d) The records show that the defenses of denial, frame-up, and police extortion were even contradicted by the appellants’ own conduct during the appeal to the CA. By raising instigation as a defense, the appellants effectively admitted that they sold marijuana; they only now question the circumstances of the sale, with the claim that they were led into it by the police.

(e) The evidence on record belies that the appellants were instigated to sell marijuana. Instigation means luring the accused into a crime that he, otherwise, had no intention to commit, in order to prosecute him. On the other hand, entrapment is the employment of ways and means in order to trap or capture a lawbreaker. Instigation presupposes that the criminal intent to commit an offense originated from the inducer and not the accused who had no intention to commit the crime and would not have committed it were it not for the initiatives by the inducer. In entrapment, the criminal intent or design to commit the offense charged originates in the mind of the accused; the law enforcement officials merely facilitate the apprehension of the criminal by employing ruses and schemes. In instigation, the law enforcers act as active co-principals.  Instigation leads to the acquittal of the  accused, while entrapment does not bar prosecution and conviction. 

G.R. No. 171643 Case Digest

G.R. No. 171643, August 8, 2010

Filemon Verzano,Jr., petitioner

vs Francis Paro, et.al., respondents

Ponente: Peralta

Facts:

On March 2002, Verzano former district manager of Wyeth Philippines, Inc. for the islands of Panay and Negros was dismissed from service upon administrative complaint filed against him. 

The complaint was founded on petitioner's alleged violation of company policy on prohibited sale of drug samples given for free to doctors and for the unauthorized act of transferring of the stocks within the same area falsely creating an impression that there was a sale. After conducting its own investigation and giving petitioner an opportunity to explain his side, wyeth resolved to dismiss petitioner tendering him a Notice of Termination.

Aggrieved, Verzano filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with Regional Labor Arbitration Board, NLRC, Bacolod City against Wyeth. Attached were the affidavits of respondents Paro and Florencio alleging that the respondents' testimony are false and incriminatory machination. The affidavits of the respondents contained falsehood particularly on the material date of the alleged sale of products which are to be given free to doctors.

Subpoenas were issued by the City Prosecutor against respondents for the submission of their respective counter-affidavits; however, the return of the subpoenas showed that respondents could not be located at their given addresses.In a resolution, the city prosecutors resolved to dismiss Verzano's complaint finding no probable cause and insufficiency of evidence.

Verzano filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the city prosecutor in a resolution. Verzano appealed the resolution oof the city prosecutor to the office of regional state prosecutor via petition for review, but regional state prosecutor finding merit in Verzano's petition reversed and directed the prosecutor's office to file information for perjury against Paro, Florencio.

Aggrieved, the respondents filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Regional State Prosecutor.

On September 2004 respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the CA assailing the resolutions of the regional state prosecutor which reversed the earlier resolution of the city prosecutor and prayed for a TRO from CA.

On October 2004, MTC issued warrants of arrest against respondents, Florencio posted bail and Paro followed suit on Ocotber 8, 2004.

On October 14, 2004 a TRO was issued by CA enjoining the public respondent chief prosecutor from acting on the assailed order issued by the regional state prosecutor for a period of 60 days from receipt. In light of the TRO, respondents filed with MTCC a manifestation and urgent motion to suspend proceedings which was granted by the MTCC.

On July 28, 2005 CA ruled in favor of the respondents, granting the petition of the respondents. That the regional state prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion when he directed the filing of the information for perjury on the reason of no counter-affidavits were submitted by respondents. Verzano petitioned for a motion for reconsideration but was denied by CA.

Issues: (1) petition filed by respondents with CA had been rendered moot and academic by the filing of the cases in court. (2) regional state prosecutor did not commit grave abuse of discretion in reversing the resolution of the city prosecutor. (3) petition for certiorari filed by herein private respondents with the CA is not the proper remedy.

Ruling: Petition has no merit.

(1) The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation. (2) The justice secretary's power of review may still be availed of despite the filing of an information in court. The case record will show that your Office, in the determination of probable cause vis-à-vis the attending set of facts and circumstances, failed to consider the application of the procedure laid down under Section 3 paragraph (d) of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Procedure which provides:

If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits within the ten (10)-day period, the investigating officer shall resolve the complaint based on the evidence presented by the complainant.In the instant case, the Investigating Prosecutor found ground to continue with the inquiry which is why he issued subpoenas to the respondents to submit their counter affidavit within the 10-day period, since he could have dismissed it initially if indeed there was really no evidence to serve as a ground for continuing with the inquiry. For failure of the respondents to file their respective counter-affidavits, they are deemed to have forfeited their right to preliminary investigation as due process only requires that the respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavit, if he is so minded. The conclusion reached by the Regional State Prosecutor is manifestly wrong as the CA was correct when it observed that the issuance of a subpoena would become unceremoniously clothed with the untoward implication that probable cause is necessarily extant.(3) CA found that the Regional State Prosecutor acted with grave abuse of discretion when he ordered the City Prosecutor to file the Informations for perjury against respondents. It was because of the CA Decision that the City Prosecutor eventually filed two Motions for Leave to Withdraw Informations. The court may deny or grant a motion to withdraw an information, not out of subservience to the (Special) Prosecutor, but in faithful exercise of judicial discretion and prerogative. The dismissal of the two informations against respondents were subject to the MTCC’s jurisdiction and discretion in view of the circumstances of the case at bar. Such dismissal ultimately renders the case moot and academic.

G.R. No. 171536 Case Digest

G.R. No. 171536, April 7, 2009

April Jor Asetre, et.al., petitioners

vs June; Asetre, et.al., repondents

Ponente: Quisumbing

Facts:

This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of CA to reverse the decision of DOJ ordering the withdrawal of an information for parricide against April Asetre and for murder against others petitioners.

On December 27, 2000 Hanz Asetre, 26 year old, was found dead in his residence. Hanz wife April Asetre alleged that her husband committed suicide by hanging himself using bed covers. She said that her husband was depressed, alcoholic and drug dependent before they got married. And after Hanz mother died of cancer, he started writing letters expressing his desires to follow his mother, he was also depressed because of the debts he had inherited. He went to rehabilitation in Cebu but stayed there for 2 weeks only.

However, Junel Asetre, hanz brother claimed that the mark on Hanz's neck was not of the bed covers but of rope, also claiming that Buenaventure Gamboa knew who killed his brother but was reluctant to divulge. Hanz's sister claimed also that Hanz confided to her few days before the death that April issued checks without his knowing and that he died without reconciling his differences with April.

Office of the city prosecutor then found probable cause against April and the other accused based on the evidence adduced by the parties, the petitioners were physically and actively interacting with Hanz shortly before his death. It can also be gleaned that they connived to kill Hanz and later cover up the crime. The prosecutor rejected the claim for suicide because it is not consistent with the findings of medico-legal, claiming the possibility of murder (poison). The prosecutor recommended that murder charges under Article 248 of the RPC be filed against Ebcas and Gamboas and parricide charge under Article 246 of RPC be filed against April. The cases were filed with RTC Negros Occidental, Branch 50.

On November 26, 2001, the four accused asked DOJ for a review of the prosecutors' findings. DOJ acting secretary Guttierez absolved petitioners and reversed the investigating prosecutor's resolution because she did not find sufficient evidence to sustain the theory of the  prosecution of conspiracy to commit murder. Her reason are the following: (1) the prosecution failed to establish petitioners' motive to kill Hanz (2) alleged quarrel of the spouses is not substantive (3) April's actuations during the incident should not be taken against her as there is no standard human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange experience (4) her actuations of burning the bed covers, letters and opposition to the autopsy could not cost doubt on April's innocent intentions (5) the inconsistent testimonies of the other petitioners could not be taken against them because witnesses could witnessed the same incident with some different details. Accordingly, Guttierez directed the prosecutor to withdraw the information against petitioners.

Pursuant to the ruling, prosecutor filed a motion to withdraw information which was granted by the RTC on January 21, 2003. RTC also recalled the warrant of arrest and later denied the private respondents' motion for reconsideration in an order dated February 27, 2003.

On June 16, 2003, Asetre siblings' motion for reconsideration of the secretary's order was denied by DOJ. So, they filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before CA arguing that DOJ secretary with grave abuse of discretion.

CA found that DOJ committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in reversing the investigating prosecutor's findings of probable cause. According to CA, the facts and circumstances of the case strongly showed a reasonable ground of suspicion. The medico-legal result were credible, impartial and unbiased. In addition, the court acquires jurisdiction over the case until its termination when an information has already been filed. CA denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration thus this petition before us.

Issues: (1) Whether the opinions of the petitioners that Asetre did not commit suicide have sufficient in weight as to the direct testimonies of the other party. (2) Whether the conclusions of CA is supported by sufficient evidence. (3) Whether the secretary of justice committed grave abuse of discretion and exceeded his jurisdiction. (4) Whether the petition for certiorari filed by the private respondents should have been dismissed considering that the RTC was not revealed by the private respondents in their petition for certiorari in their disclaimer of forum shopping.

Ruling: Petition is with merit.

(1) A preliminary investigation falls under the authority of the state prosecutor who is given by law the power to direct and control criminal actions.  He is, however, subject to the control of the Secretary of Justice as Section 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides. The full discretionary authority to determine probable cause in a preliminary investigation to ascertain sufficient ground for the filing of information rests with the executive branch.  Hence, judicial review of the resolution of the Secretary of Justice is limited to a determination whether there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.  As department head, the Secretary of Justice has the power to alter, modify, nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.  It is only where the decision of the Justice Secretary is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction that the Court of Appeals may take cognizance of the case in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. (2) Secretary deserves more credence than that of the CA because: (a) the doctors were not forensic experts, they never impugned that it was improbable for the deceased to commit suicide or not (b) Hanz was obese, the absence of an upward direction of the bed cover around his neck may not be probable to prove that he hang himself (c) conspiracy was not supported by any evidence on record.

G.R. No. 169431 Case Digest

G.R. No. 169431, April 3, 2007

People of the Philippines, appellee

vs Jerry Rapeza y Francisco, appellant

Ponente: Tinga

Facts:

This is an appeal from the decision of the court of appeals affirming the consolidated judgment of the RTC of Palawan where Jerry Rapeza was found guilty of 2 counts of murder sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count, plus indemnity for the heirs of the 2 victims.

In 2 separate information, Rapeza together with Regino was charged with the murder of the spouses Cesar Ganzon and Priscilla Libas.

Information narrates that on October 21, 1995 around 4pm at Culion, Palawan the accused conspired, confiderating together and mutually helped each other, with evident premeditation, treachery and abuse of superior strength and feloniously attacked and killed with bladed weapons the victims.

Regino was at large, so Rapeza was the only one arraigned and pleaded not guilty. The RTC held that the accused is guilty with conspiracy. Case was elevated to the CA for review but RTC was affirmed.

Prosecution: October 21, 1995 unidentified woman went to Culion and reported a killing that took place in Sitio Cawa-Cawa, Culion. the officer in charge sent to the victims' house, the investigating team saw two blooded bodies, which was later identified as Libas and Ganzon. The autopsy reports show that the common cause of death was hypovolemic shock secondary to massive bleeding from multiple stab wounds and both bodies were in the early stage of decomposition. Upon information supplied, appellant had wanted to confess to the crimes. The appellant was found fishing in Asinan Island and invited the latter for questioning. Appellant expressed his willingness to make confession in the presence of a lawyer. The appellant was brought to the police station and later brought to the house of the only available lawyer in the municipality- Atty. Reyes. Because Atty. Reyes is suffering from rheumatism and the typewriter in the police station was out of order, the custodial investigation took place at the house of atty. Reyes in the presence of VM Marasigan of cULION, 2 SB officials, interpreter and SPO2 Gapas (officer in charge).

Rapeza narrated the crime and was signed and was notarized. Thereafter, a complaint for multiple murder was files against Regino who was likewise arrested. MTC of Culion conducted preliminary investigation. Finding probable cause only against Rapeza, Regino was ordered released. Provincial prosecutor however reversed the finding of the TC by including Regino in the information, but then the latter had left Culion already.

Defense: Rapeza testified that he did not know the victims and that he has nothing to do with their deaths. Rapeza is a native of Samar, illiterate and was staying with Regino in Regino's house, 40 meters away from the victims' house.Several days after Rapeza's arrival, the killings took place. Rapeza,, along with Regino and Macabili was asked by the police officer to help load the bodies of the victims kn a banca. Shortly, Rapeza was arrested and brought to the municipal hall. Regino too was arrested with him. While in detention, Rapeza told the police that it was Regino who did the killing but the police did not believe him. Rapeza was told to sign a certain document for his release. Because Rapeza cannot sign, the officer took his thumb, dipped it in ink and marked it on the document. Rapeza denied going to the house of Atty. Reyes or meeting the alleged interpreter. When he was brought to the MTC, the counsel did not assist him, he was later brought to a hut in the mountain where he was told to go farther, which he refused for fear of being shot.

On the basis of appellant's extrajudicial confession, the RTc found him guilty.

Issues: (1) Whether his guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt and (2) whether the qualifying circumstance of evident premediation was likewise proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Ruling:

(1) There is no direct evidence of appellant’s guilt except for the alleged confession and the corpus delicti. Upon careful examination of the alleged confession and the testimony of the witnesses, we hold that the alleged confession is inadmissible and must perforce be discarded.

Thus, the Court has consistently held that an extrajudicial confession, to be admissible, must conform to the following requisites: 1) the confession must be voluntary; 2) the confession must be made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel, preferably of the confessant’s choice; 3) the confession must be express; and 4) the confession must be in writing.

We note that appellant did not voluntarily surrender to the police but was "invited" by SPO2 Gapas to the police station. There he was detained from 11 o’clock in the morning of 22 October 1995 up to the morning of 23 October 1995 before his extrajudicial statement was allegedly taken. At this juncture, appellant should have been informed of his constitutional rights as he was already considered a suspect, contrary to the finding of the trial court that the mandatory constitutional guidelines only attached when the investigators started to propound questions to appellant on 23 October 1995 in the house of Atty. Reyes.

Custodial investigation refers to the critical pre-trial stage when the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular person as a suspect. According to PO3 Palmero, right after appellant’s arrest, the latter already insinuated to him that he would confess his participation in the killing. 

In order to comply with the constitutional mandates, there should likewise be meaningful communication to and understanding of his rights by the appellant, as opposed to a routine, peremptory and meaningless recital thereof. Since comprehension is the objective, the degree of explanation required will necessarily depend on the education, intelligence, and other relevant personal circumstances of the person undergoing investigation.

In this case, it was established that at the time of the investigation appellant was illiterate and was not well versed in Tagalog. This fact should engender a higher degree of scrutiny in determining whether he understood his rights as allegedly communicated to him, as well as the contents of his alleged confession.

The prosecution underscores the presence of an interpreter in the person of Abad to buttress its claim that appellant was informed of his rights in the dialect known to him. However, the presence of an interpreter during the interrogation was not sufficiently established. Although the confession bears the signature of Abad, it is uncertain whether he was indeed present to assist appellant in making the alleged confession.

For another, the prosecution did not present Abad as witness. Abad would have been in the best position to prove that he indeed made the translation from Tagalog to Waray for appellant to understand what was going on. This significant circumstance lends credence to appellant’s claim that he had never met Abad.

The extra-judicial confession was allegedly made in Tagalog when accused-appellant is admittedly not well versed in said language. Even if the confession was made in the presence of an interpreter, there is no showing that the rights of a person under investigation were effectively explained and/or interpreted to accused-appellant. The interpreter was not even presented in Court to prove that said rights were translated in a language understood by accused-appellant. 

(2) The constitutional requirement obviously had not been observed. Settled is the rule that the moment a police officer tries to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information from a suspect, the latter should, at that juncture, be assisted by counsel, unless he waives this right in writing and in the presence of counsel. Appellant did not make any such waiver.

Assuming that Atty. Reyes did assist appellant, still there would be grave doubts as to his competence and independence as appellant’s counsel for purposes of the custodial investigation. 

(3) It is settled that a confession is presumed voluntary until the contrary is proved and the confessant bears the burden of proving the contrary. The trial court found that appellant’s bare denials failed to overcome this presumption. However, several factors constrain us to hold that the confession was not given under conditions that conduce to its admissibility.

First, the confession contains facts and details which appear to have been supplied by the investigators themselves.Second, the prosecution failed to establish the actual date of the killings. The actual date of the commission of the crimes is material in assessing the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and of the admissibility of the alleged confession.

(4) Confession was not sufficiently corroborated.

Courts are slow to accept extrajudicial confessions when they are subsequently disputed unless they are corroborated. There must be such corroboration so that when considered in connection with the confession, it will show the guilt of accused beyond a reasonable doubt.

As a general rule, a confession must be corroborated by those to whom the witness who testified thereto refers as having been present at the time the confession was made or by any other evidence.

The inconsistencies in the testimonies of the police officers as well as any lingering doubt as to the credibility of appellant’s statement could have been laid to rest by the testimonies of Atty. Reyes, of Abad, and of those allegedly present during the custodial investigation. However, they were not presented in court.

Consequently, the non-production of these material witnesses raises a doubt which must be resolved in favor of appellant and the confession should be disregarded as evidence. Verily, we are left with the unconvincing testimony of two police officers against whose abuse of authority the Constitution protects the appellant. As their respective testimonies are sated with inconsistencies and hearsay evidence, we find the same insufficient bases to hold appellant’s extrajudicial confession admissible against him.

G.R. No. 168918 Case Digest

G.R. No. 168918, March 2, 2009

People, petitioner

v Hermenegildo Dumlao y Castiliano and Emilio La'o y Gonzales, respondents

Ponente: Chico-Nazario

Facts:

This is an appeal to the Sandiganbayan resolution which granted the motion to dismiss/quash of respondent Dumlao and dismissed the case against him.

On July 1991 an information was filed before the Sandiganbayan charging respondents Dumlao and others with violation of section 3 of republic act no. 3019 known as anti-graft and corrupt practices act.

The accused are members of the board of trustees of GSIS charged with unlawful entry to contract of lease-purchase with La'o private person. 

When arraigned, Dumlao pleaded not guilty, and as agreed a joint stipulation of facts and admission of exhibit was submitted to the court on January 2005

After the pre-trial, Dumlao filed a motion to dismiss/quash on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, that the alleged board resolution was not approved by the GSIS board of trustees because some signatures did not appear in the minutes therefore concluding that there was no qourum. And was held meritorious.

But on September 2005, people of the Philippines represented by the office of the ombudsman and thru the office of the prosecutor filed a petition for certiorari seeking the reversal and setting aside of the Sandiganbayan resolution.

Issues: (1) whether or not the court acted in accordance with law and jurisprudence when it dismissed the criminal case against dumlao and others? (2) whether or not the signatures of the majority of the GSIS board of trusteea are necessary on the minutes of the meeting to give force and effect to resolution (3) whether or not the validity of the contract is an essential element of violation of section (4) whether or not the court acted in accordance with law and jurisprudence when it resolved to archive the case against respondent La'o?

On the other hand, Dumlao's contention were the following: (1) ombudsman's petition will place him in double jeopardy (2) the Sandiganbayan could not be said to have gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction because it only followed the rule in pre-trial and decided the case on the basis of the facts stipulated in the pre-trial (3) the facts agree by the prosecution and respondents Dumlao in the pre-trial was approved by the Sandiganbayan showed that Dumlao did not commit any crime (4) continuing prosecution of Dumlao, excluding the other GSIS trustees constitutes unfair discrimination and his right to equal protection of the law

Petitioner further contended that they were denied due process because Sandiganbayan has dismissed the case after re-trial before they could present witnesses and offer exhibits.

Ruling: 

Insufficiency of evidence is not of the grounds of motion to quash. Insufficiency is ground for dismissal only after the prosecution rests its case. In this case, Sandiganbayan deprived the prosecution to present its evidence in doing so violated the rights to due process.

Sandiganbayan erred in confusing the resolution and the minutes of the meeting which allegedly approved the lease-purchase agreement. A resolution is distinct and different from the minutes of the meeting.

In the issue of double jeopardy, the court did not agree with Dumlao because the first jeopardy has not yet attached due to the premature dismissal.

In the issue of jurisdiction, in this case there was no error of judgment but a denial of due process resulting in loss of jurisdiction.

In the issue of discrimination, the court is not convinced because Dumlao was the only one left to be prosecuted because his co-conspirators are all dead.

The petition was granted.

G.R. No. 167571 Case Digest

G.R. No. 167571, November 25, 2008

Luis Panaguiton Jr., petitioner

vs DOJ, Ramon Tongson and Rodrigo Cawili, Respondents

Ponente: Tinga

Facts:

This is a petition for Review of CA resolutions dismissing Luis Panaguiton, Jr. petition for certiorari and motion for reconsideration

In 1992, Cawili borrowed money from petitioner and later issued checks as payment both signed by Cawili and his business associate Tongson. But checks were dishonored either for insufficiency of funds or closure of account.

Panaguiton then made a formal demands to Cawili and Tongson to pay but to no avail.

So Panaguiton filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson for violating BP Blg. 22 before QC Prosecutor's Office.

During PI, Tongson filed his counter-affidavit claiming that he had been unjustly included as party-respondent since petitioner had lent money to Cawili in Cawili's personal capacity. He averred that he was not Cawili's business associate and claimed that he himself has criminal cases against Cawili. Tongson also denied that he had issued bounced checks and that his signatures on the checks had been falsified.

As cpunter, Panaguiton presented documents showing Tongson's signature which was the same as the signatures on the checks. Panaguiton presented also an affidavit of adverse claim wherein Tongson claimed to be Cawili's business associate.

December 1995, Prosecutor found probable cause only against Cawili and dismissed the charges against Tongson.

Panaguiton filed a partial appeal before DOJ even the case against Cawili was filed before the proper court.

Later on July 1997, after finding that Tongson was possible to co-sign the bounced checks and had altered his signature in pleadings submitte during PI, Chief State Prosecutor directed the City Prosecutor of QC to conduct reinvestigation of the case against Tongson and refer the signatures to NBI.

On March 1999, Asst. City Prosecutor dismissed the complaint against Tongson without referring to the NBI, holding that the case had already prescribed pursuant to Act. No. 3326, stating that in this case the 4 year period started on the date the checks were dishonored and that the filing of complaint in QC prosecutor's office did not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period as the law contemplates judicial and not administrative proceedings. Four years had elapsed and no information was filed against Tongson. And the order to refer the matter to NBI could no longer be sanctioned under Section 3, Rule 112 of rules of criminal procedure because the initiative should come from the petitioner himself and not from the investigating prosecutor.

Petitioner appealed to DOJ through  undersecretary Teehankee but was dismissed. Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration of DOJ and through undersecretary Gutierrez ruled in his favor and declared that the prescription period was interrupted by the filing of the complaint in the Prosecutor's office.

However, in August 2004, DOJ acting on the motion for reconsideration filed by Tongson ruled the subject offense had already prescribed and ordered the withdrawal of 3 informations for violation of BP Blg. 22 against Tongson. DOJ explained that Act No. 3326 applies to violations of special acts that do not provide for a prescriptive period for the offenses thereunder.

Panguiton thus filed a petition for Certiorari before CA assailing the august resolution of the DOJ, but was dismissed by CA in view of failure to attach a proper verification and certification of non-forum shopping.

Panaguiton then filed for instant petition claiming that CA committed grave error on dismissing his petition on technical grounds and in ruling that the petition before it was without merit and questions are too unsubstantial.

The DOJ stated that CA did not err in dismissing the petition for non-compliance with the rules of court.

Then Cawili and Tongson submitted their comment arguing that CA did not err in dismissing the petition for certiorari, and they also claim that the offense of violation of BP Blg. 22 has prescribed and the long delay, attributable to petitioner and the State violated their constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases. The petition is meritorious.

Issues: (1) Technical Issues, (2) Substantive Aspects

Ruling: (1) verification is merely formal requirement intended to secure an assurance that matters which are alleged are true and correct-the court may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act on them and waive strict compliance so that the ends of justice may be served. We find that by attaching pertinent verification to his motion for reconsideration, petitioner has sufficiently complied with the verification requirement.We also agree that CA erred in dismissing the petition on the ground of failure to attach a certified copy or duplicate original of the 3 resolution of DOJ. 

(2) This court ruled that the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office for PI suspends the running of the prescriptive period.The delay was beyond petitioner's control but that of the DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions and misapplications.

Petition is granted.