212 US 449 Case Digest

212 US 449

Carino vs Insular Government

February 23, 1909

Facts:

Paris, April 11, 1899, as far back as the findings go, the plaintiff and his ancestors had held the land as owners. His grandfather had lived upon it, and had maintained fences sufficient for the holding of cattle, according to the custom of the country, some of the fences, it seems, having been of much earlier date. His father had cultivated parts and had used parts for pasturing cattle, and he had used it for pasture in his turn. They all had been recognized as owners by the Igorots, and he had inherited or received the land from his father in accordance with Igorot custom. No document of title, however, had issued from the Spanish Crown, and although, in 1893-1894 and again in 1896-1897, he made application for one under the royal decrees then in force, nothing seems to have come of it, unless, perhaps, information that lands in Benguet could not be conceded until those to be occupied for a sanatorium, etc., had been designated -- a purpose that has been carried out by the Philippine government and the United States. In 1901, the plaintiff filed a petition, alleging ownership, under the mortgage law, and the lands were registered to him, that process, however, establishing only a possessory title, it is said.

Issue:

(1) Whether the plaintiff owns the land.

The position of the government, shortly stated, is that Spain assumed, asserted, and had title to all the land in the Philippines except so far as it saw fit to permit private titles to be acquired; that there was no prescription against the Crown.

Held:

The adjustment of royal lands wrongfully occupied by private individuals in the Philippine Islands. This begins with the usual theoretic assertion that, for private ownership, there must have been a grant by competent authority; but instantly descends to fact by providing that, for all legal effects, those who have been in possession for certain times shall be deemed owners. For cultivated land, twenty years, uninterrupted, is enough. For uncultivated, thirty. Art. 5. So that, when this decree went into effect, the applicant's father was owner of the land by the very terms of the decree. 

G.R. No.s 171947-48 Case Digest

G.R. No.s 171947-48, December 18, 2008

Concerned Citizens

vs MMDA

Ponente: Velasco

Facts:

January 29, 1999, concerned residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint before the RTC Imus, Cavite against several government agencies for the clean-up, rehabilitation and protection of the Manila Bay/ The complaint alleged that the water quality of Manila Bay is no longer within the allowable standards set by law (esp. PD 1152, Philippine environment Code).

DENR testified for the petitioners and reported that the samples collected from the beaches around Manila Bay is beyond the safe level for bathing standard of the DENR. MWSS testified also about MWSS efforts to reduce pollution along the bay. Philippine Ports Authority presented as evidence its Memorandum Circulars on the study on ship-generated waste treatment and disposal as its Linis Dagat project.

RTC ordered petitioners to Clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay.

The petitioners appealed arguing that the Environment Code relate only to the cleaning of the specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general. Raising the concerns of lack of funds appropriated for cleaning, and asserting that the cleaning of the bay is not a ministerial act which can be compelled by mandamus.

CA sustained the RTC stressing that RTC did not require the agencies to do tasks outside of their usual basic functions.

Issue:

(1) Whether PD 1152 relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents.

(2) Whether the cleaning or rehabilitation of the Manila Bay is not ministerial act of petitioners that can be compelled by mandamus.

Held:
(1) The cleaning of the Manila bay can be compelled by mandamus.

Petitioners’ obligation to perform their duties as defined by law, on one hand, and how they are to carry out such duties, on the other, are two different concepts. While the implementation of the MMDA’s mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus.

The MMDA’s duty in the area of solid waste disposal, as may be noted, is set forth not only in the Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its charter as well. This duty of putting up a proper waste disposal system cannot be characterized as discretionary, for, as earlier stated; discretion presupposes the power or right given by law to public functionaries to act officially according to their judgment or conscience.

(2) Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code

Include Cleaning in General

The disputed sections are quoted as follows:

Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.––Where the quality of water has deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage, the government agencies concerned shall take such measures as may be necessary to upgrade the quality of such water to meet the prescribed water quality standards.

Section 20. Clean-up Operations.––It shall be the responsibility of the polluter to contain, remove and clean-up water pollution incidents at his own expense. In case of his failure to do so, the government agencies concerned shall undertake containment, removal and clean-up operations and expenses incurred in said operations shall be charged against the persons and/or entities responsible for such pollution.

Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government agencies concerned ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning operations when a specific pollution incident occurs. On the contrary, Sec. 17 requires them to act even in the absence of a specific pollution incident, as long as water quality “has deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage.” This section, to stress, commands concerned government agencies, when appropriate, “to take such measures as may be necessary to meet the prescribed water quality standards.” In fine, the underlying duty to upgrade the quality of water is not conditional on the occurrence of any pollution incident.

Note:

- The writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial duty. Ministerial duty is one that requires neither official discretion nor judgment.

G.R. No. 184478 Case Digest

G.R. No. 184478, March 21, 2012

James Perez

vs Spouses Fortunito Madrona and Yolanda Pante

Ponente: Villarama

Facts:

Spouses are registered owners of a residential property in Green Heights Subdivision, Marikina City. In 1989, spouses built their house thereon and enclosed it with concrete fence and steel gate.

1999, James Perez as Chief Demolition Officer sent a letter to the spouses ordering them to remove the fence encroaching the public drainage. As response, Madrona sent a response letter to Perez condemning the order of demolition with the following contention: (1) contained an accusation libellous in nature as it is condemning him and his property without due process; (2) has no basis and authority since there is no court order authorizing him to demolish their structure; (3) cited legal bases which do not expressly give petitioner authority to demolish; and (4) contained a false accusation since their fence did not in fact extend to the sidewalk.

Respondents likewise sought the issuance of TRO to enjoin petitioner and all persons acting under him doing any act of demolition on the property. Petitioner filed a motion to lift the order of default, but the RTC denied the motion. Perez filed a petition for certiorari before CA assailing the default order, CA dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit.

The RTC held that respondents, being lawful owners of the subject property, are entitled to the peaceful and open possession of every inch of their property and petitioner’s threat to demolish the concrete fence around their property is tantamount to a violation of their rights as property owners who are entitled to protection under the Constitution and laws.  The RTC also ruled that there is no showing that respondents’ fence is a nuisance per se and presents an immediate danger to the community’s welfare, nor is there basis for petitioner’s claim that the fence has encroached on the sidewalk as to justify its summary demolition.

Issues: (1) Did the trial court err in reinstating the complaint of respondents? (2) Are the requisites for the issuance of a writ of injunction present? and (3) Is petitioner liable to pay attorney’s fees and costs of suit?

(1) For injunction to issue, two requisites must concur: first, there must be a right to be protected and second, the acts against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of said right. Here, the two requisites are clearly present: there is a right to be protected, that is, respondents’ right over their concrete fence which cannot be removed without due process; and the act, the summary demolition of the concrete fence, against which the injunction is directed, would violate said right.

(2) Respondents’ fence is not a nuisance per se.  By its nature, it is not injurious to the health or comfort of the community.  It was built primarily to secure the property of respondents and prevent intruders from entering it. And as correctly pointed out by respondents, the sidewalk still exists.  If petitioner believes that respondents’ fence indeed encroaches on the sidewalk, it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose.  Not being a nuisance per se, but at most a nuisance per accidens, its summary abatement without judicial intervention is unwarranted.

(3) Petitioner argues that he was just performing his duties and as public officer, he is entitled to the presumption of regularity in the performance of his official functions.  Unless there is clear proof that he acted beyond his authority or in evident malice or bad faith, he contends that he cannot be held liable for attorney’s fees and costs of suit. As respondents were forced to file a case against petitioner to enjoin the impending demolition of their property, the award of attorney’s fees and costs of suit is justified.  Clearly, respondents wanted to settle the problem on their alleged encroachment without resorting to court processes when they replied by letter after receiving petitioner’s first notice.  

G.R. No. 177807/G.R. No. 177933 Case Digest

G.R. No. 177807/G.R. No. 177933, October 11, 2011

Emilio Gancayco

vs City Government of Quezon City and MMDA

Ponente: Sereno

Facts:

In 1950s, retired justice Emilio Gancayco bought a parcel of land located in EDSA. Then on March 1956, Quezon City Council issued Ordinance No. 2904 requiring the construction of arcades for commercial buildings to be constructed.  At the outset, it bears emphasis that at the time Ordinance No. 2904 was passed by the city council, there was yet no building code passed by the national legislature. Thus, the regulation of the construction of buildings was left to the discretion of local government units.  Under this particular ordinance, the city council required that the arcade is to be created by constructing the wall of the ground floor facing the sidewalk a few meters away from the property line.  Thus, the building owner is not allowed to construct his wall up to the edge of the property line, thereby creating a space or shelter under the first floor. In effect, property owners relinquish the use of the space for use as an arcade for pedestrians, instead of using it for their own purposes.

The ordinance covered the property of Justice Gancayco. Subsequently, sometime in 1965, Justice Gancayco sought the exemption of a two-storey building being constructed on his property from the application of Ordinance No. 2904 that he be exempted from constructing an arcade on his property.

On 2 February 1966, the City Council acted favorably on Justice Gancayco’s request and issued Resolution No. 7161, S-66, “subject to the condition that upon notice by the City Engineer, the owner shall, within reasonable time, demolish the enclosure of said arcade at his own expense when public interest so demands.”

Decades after, in March 2003, MMDA conducted operations to clear obstructions along EDSA, in consequence, they sent a notice of demolition to Justice Gancayco alleging that a portion of his building violated the National Building Code.

Gancayco did not comply with the notice and filed a petition for TRO with the RTC Quezon City to prohibit the MMDA from demolishing his property. The RTC rendered its Decision on 30 September 2003 in favor of Justice Gancayco. It held that the questioned ordinance was unconstitutional, ruling that it allowed the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. The RTC said that because 67.5 square meters out of Justice Gancayco’s 375 square meters of property were being taken without compensation for the public’s benefit, the ordinance was confiscatory and oppressive. It likewise held that the ordinance violated owners’ right to equal protection of laws.

MMDA appealed with the CA. CA held that the MMDA went beyond its powers when it demolished the subject property. It further found that Resolution No. 02-28 only refers to sidewalks, streets, avenues, alleys, bridges, parks and other public places in Metro Manila, thus excluding Justice Gancayco’s private property. Lastly, the CA stated that the MMDA is not clothed with the authority to declare, prevent or abate nuisances.

Issues: (1) WHETHER OR NOT JUSTICE GANCAYCO WAS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE VALIDITY OF ORDINANCE NO. 2904. (2) WHETHER OR NOT ORDINANCE NO. 2904 IS CONSTITUTIONAL.(3) WHETHER OR NOT THE WING WALL OF JUSTICE GANCAYCO’S BUILDING IS A PUBLIC NUISANCE. (4) WHETHER OR NOT THE MMDA LEGALLY DEMOLISHED THE PROPERTY OF JUSTICE GANCAYCO.

Ruling:

(1) We find that petitioner was not guilty of estoppel. When it made the undertaking to comply with all issuances of the BIR, which at that time it considered as valid, petitioner did not commit any false misrepresentation or misleading act.

(2) Justice Gancayco may not question the ordinance on the ground of equal protection when he also benefited from the exemption. It bears emphasis that Justice Gancayco himself requested for an exemption from the application of the ordinance in 1965 and was eventually granted one. Moreover, he was still enjoying the exemption at the time of the demolition as there was yet no valid notice from the city engineer. Thus, while the ordinance may be attacked with regard to its different treatment of properties that appears to be similarly situated, Justice Gancayco is not the proper person to do so.

(3) The fact that in 1966 the City Council gave Justice Gancayco an exemption from constructing an arcade is an indication that the wing walls of the building are not nuisances per se.  The wing walls do not per se immediately and adversely affect the safety of persons and property. The fact that an ordinance may declare a structure illegal does not necessarily make that structure a nuisance. Clearly, when Justice Gancayco was given a permit to construct the building, the city council or the city engineer did not consider the building, or its demolished portion, to be a threat to the safety of persons and property. This fact alone should have warned the MMDA against summarily demolishing the structure.

Sangguniang Bayan cannot declare a particular thing as a nuisance per se and order its condemnation. It does not have the power to find, as a fact, that a particular thing is a nuisance when such thing is not a nuisance per se; nor can it authorize the extrajudicial condemnation and destruction of that as a nuisance which in its nature, situation or use is not such. Those things must be determined and resolved in the ordinary courts of law.

MMDA illegally demolished Gancayco's property.

G.R. No. 189248 Case Digest

G.R. No. 189248, February 5, 2014

Teodoro S. Teodoro, substituted by his heirs Nelson Teodoro and Rolando Teodoro

vs Danilo Espino, Rosario Santiago, etc.

Ponente: Perez

Facts:

The subject property is a piece of land registered in the name of Genaro, long deceased ascendant of all the parties. Teodoro is a nephew of Petra (daughter of Genaro), while the respondents are grand nephews.

Of all Genaro's children, only Petra occupied the land and lived at their ancestral house. After Petra's death, her will was probated in RTC Bulacan, which decision on the will's extrinsic validity has become final and executory. In the will, Petra devised the property to Teodoro.

Teodoro then demolished the ancestral house to use the property for other purposes. Soon thereafter, the respondents prevented Teodoro from using the property.

After, Teodoro's demand to vacate went unheeded, he filed the complaint for forcible entry against respondents.

In their answer, the respondents asserted ownership and possession of the land.

MTC dismissed the complaint. Although it its undisputed that Petra Teodoro was in actual possession of the subject lot prior to her demise and that she left a Holographic Will wherein the subject lot was bequeathed to [Teodoro Teodoro], the probate of her last will has not finally settled the question of ownership over the subject lot. Clearly, the subject lot still forms part of the estate of the late Genaro Teodoro. In the absence of an actual and approved partition plan among his heirs, the subject lot remains part of the Genaro Teodoro’s estate. Since his children Santiago, Maria, Petra, Maraino and Ana are all deceased, their children or grandchildren by right of representation have the right to inherit from their ancestor.

A person who claims that he has a better right to real property must prove his ownership of the same x x x. Clearly, [Teodoro Teodoro] has failed to prove his ownership over the property or that of his devisee Petra Teodoro. Thus, the court is convinced that the possession of [respondents] over the subject lot should not be disturbed, until and unless the question of ownership over the same shall have been finally resolved before the appropriate court.

RTC adopted the factual findings of the MTC but reversed the ruling in favor of Teodoro. CA explained that the ancestral house was the clear share of Petra's inheritance and Teodoro claims right to possession only over the said portion, not the entire thing. Teodoro has acknowledge that the rest is occupied.

CA reversed the RTC decision. It specifically ruled that Teodoro Teodoro:

(1) never had physical possession of the subject property, not having lived there at anytime, whether while Petra was alive nor after her death;

(2) did not adduce evidence before the lower courts on proof of payment of any real property tax on the disputed vacant lot, portion of Lot No. 2476, or to the whole of Lot No. 2476;

(3) did not solely or unilaterally cause the demolition of the ancestral house such a fact equating to his exclusive ownership of the subject property and complete control and dominion over it; and

(4) cannot tack his alleged possession of the subject property to that of Petra Teodoro simply by virtue of the latter’s holographic will, leading to the issue of ownership which is insignificant in forcible entry cases.

SC: We grant the petition. We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and restore the decision of the RTC on the appeal reversing the MTC.

Certainly, and as found by the trial courts, the whole of Lot No. 2476 including the portion now litigated is, owing to the fact that it has remained registered in the name of Genaro who is the common ancestor of both parties herein, co-owned property. All, or both Teodoro Teodoro and respondents are entitled to exercise the right of possession as co-owners.

Neither party can exclude the other from possession. Although the property remains unpartitioned, the respondents in fact possess specific areas. Teodoro Teodoro can likewise point to a specific area, which is that which was possessed by Petra. Teodoro Teodoro cannot be dispossessed of such area, not only by virtue of Petra's bequeathal in his favor but also because of his own right of possession that comes from his co-ownership of the property. As the RTC concluded, petitioners, as heirs substituting Teodoro

Teodoro in this suit, should be restored in the lawful possession of the disputed area.

G.R. No. 189420 Case Digest

G.R. No. 189420, March 26, 2014

Raul Arambulo and Teresita Dela Cruz

vs Genaro Nolasco and Jeremy Nolasco

Ponente: Perez

Facts:

Petitioners, together with their siblings and their mother co-owned a 233sq.m. land in Tondo, Manila. When their mother died, she was succeeded by her husband, Genero Nolasco and their children.

On January 8, 1999, petitioners filed a petition for relief alleging that all co-owners, except for Nolasco, have authorized to sell their respective shares to the properties, saying that in the Civil Code, if one or more co-owners shall withhold their consent to the alterations in the thing owned in common, the courts may afford adequate relief.

Nolasco responded that they did not know about the intention to sell, because they were not called to participate in the negotiations regarding the sale of the property.

Issue: Whether the respondents are withholding their consent and whether this withholding is prejudicial to the petitioners.

RTC: ruled in favor with petitioners and ordered Nolasco to give their consent to sale.

Nolasco filed a notice of appeal to the CA.

CA: reversed the RTC decision, saying that the petitioners cannot compel Nolasco to give their consent.

Held: CA was right.

From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co–owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co–owner without the consent of the other co–owners is not null and void. However, only the rights of the co–owner–seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co–owner of the property.

To be a co–owner of a property does not mean that one is deprived of every recognition of the disposal of the thing, of the free use of his right within the circumstantial conditions of such judicial status, nor is it necessary, for the use and enjoyment, or the right of free disposal, that the previous consent of all the interested parties be obtained.

G.R. No. 183546 Case Digest

G.R. No. 183546, September 18, 2009

Wilson Go

vs Harry GO

Ponente: Ynares-Santiago

Facts:

Wilson instituted an action for partition with accounting against Harry Go in RTC Valenzuela City. Wilson alleged that they are among the five children of Spouse Sio Tong Go and they are the registered owner of a parcel of land in Valenzuela City. On the said land, there are 7 warehouses being rented by various businesses without proper authority from Wilson. He also alleges that Harry collected the rental payments for the warehouse without giving Wilson his share to the rental.

Harry countered that there was no co-ownership because he acquired the ownership of the land through extra-judicial settlement between their father and certain Wendell Simsim. That before a partition may be decided, it must be ascertain first whether there is co-ownership.

RTC: ruled in favor of Wilson and ordered Harry to deposit in court the receipt of all the amounts collected by him from the leases. Harry, moved for reconsideration but was denied by the RTC. Harry filed then a petition for certiorari with CA.

CA: ruled in favor of Harry.

It was premature for the respondent court to act favorable on private respondent's motion to deposit in court all rentals collected from the date of death of the said decedent, which according to petitioner is the true owner of the property under co-ownership.

Held:

The Court emphasizes that these are preliminary findings for the sole purpose of resolving the propriety of the subject order requiring the deposit of the monthly rentals with the trial court.  The precise extent of the interest of the parties in the subject land will have to await the final determination by the trial court of the main action for partition after a trial on the merits.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.  The April 21, 2008 Decision and July 4, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100100 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.  The May 4 and July 4, 2007 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City, Branch 172 in Civil Case No. 179-V-06 are SET ASIDE and a new Order is entered directing private respondent to deposit 1/12 of the monthly rentals collected by him from the buildings on TCT No. V-44555 with the trial court from the finality of this Decision and every month thereafter until it is finally adjudged who is lawfully entitled thereto.