G.R. No. 165678 Case Digest

G.R. No. 165678, July 17, 2009

Rosario Panuncio, petitioner

vs People of the Philippines, respondents

Ponente: Carpio

Facts:

This is a petition for review assailing the decision of Court of Appeals.

On August 3, 1992 around 4pm, the LTO and a special task force led by PNP Superintendent Panfilo Lacson and Police Senior Inspector Cesar Ouano Jr., with search warrant issued by RTC judge Pardo raided the residence of Panuncio a jeepney operator in Quezon City. They confiscated LTO documents and 17 pieces of private vehicle plates, copying machine, typewriters and other tools. 

Panuncio signed a certification of orderly search with Brgy. Chairman Manalo, Panuncio's employee Velasco and Nidua. They all signed the receipt of property seized issued by PO3 Abuda. Panuncio and one Jaime Lopez were arrested.

LTO filed a complaint against Panuncio for violation of Articles 171, 172, 176 and 315 of RPC (on falsified documents). Lopez was not charge because Lopez was just a visitor when the raid took place.

Panuncio filed a motion for reinvestigation which RTC QC granted which gave prosecutor 20 days to submit his report on the reinvestigation. DOJ thenn recommended for Panuncio be prosecuted for falsification. RTC set the arraingment and June 28, 1994 Panuncio entered a plea of not guilty.

During the trial, the falsified documents was presented (showing Manlite as the owner) but which the petitioner denied that she was the source of falsified documents. She alleged that Manlite which she co-own with her husband before has stopped operating and her business now is under the name of Rosario Panuncio. She alleged that she was not at home when the raid took place, that she was just forced to sign the search warrant, inventory receipt and certificate of orderly search.

RTC decision: Panuncio is guilty of falsification.

Panuncio appealed to CA.

CA decision:Affirm RTC with modification. The search warrant did not suffer from any legal infirmity because the items to be seized were already specified and identified in the warrant.

Panuncio filed a motion for reconsideration.

Issues:

1.Whether the elements of falsification of a public document under Article 172(1) in relation to Article 171 of the RPC have been established;

2.Whether the search was regularly conducted;

3.Whether the evidence gathered during the search are  admissible in evidence; and

4.Whether the Court of Appeals properly applied the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL).

Ruling: The petition has no merit.

1. Petitioner failed to raise the issue of the defective information before the trial court through a motion for bill of particulars or a motion to quash the information.  Petitioner’s failure to object to the allegation in the information before she entered her plea of not guilty amounted to a waiver of the defect in the information.The elements of falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 of the RPC are:

(1)  that the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official position;

(2) that he committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the RPC; and

(3) that the falsification was committed in a public, official or commercial document.

The falsified copy of  MVRR No. 63231478 was found during a valid search conducted  in petitioner’s residence.  It was issued in the name of Manlite which petitioner admitted as co-owned by her together with her late husband.  Thus, there is a presumption that she falsified it and she was using it for her benefit.

2 and 3. Even assuming that petitioner or any lawful occupant of the house was not present when the search was conducted, the search was done in the presence of at least two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality.  Manalo was the barangay chairman of the place while Velasco was petitioner’s employee. Petitioner herself signed the certification of orderly search when she arrived at her residence.  Clearly, the requirements of Section 8, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court were complied with by the police authorities who conducted the search.  Further, petitioner failed to substantiate her allegation that she was just forced to sign the search warrant, inventory receipt, and the certificate of orderly search. 

4.In this case, the Court of Appeals sentenced petitioner to serve an indeterminate penalty of two years and four months of prision correccional as minimum to six years of prision correccional as maximum.  There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances, we deem it proper in this case to lower the maximum penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals from six years to four years, nine months and eleven days of prision correccional.  

G.R. No. 165122 Case Digest

G.R. No. 165122, November 23, 2007

Rowland Kim Santos, petitioner,

vs PRYCE Gas Inc., respondents

Ponente: Tinga

Facts:

This is a petition for review on the decision of Court of Appeals to reversed the twin orders of RTC Iloilo City quashing the warrant it issued and ordering the return of LPG cylinders seized from petitioner.

Pryce is a domestic corporation engaged in manufacturing and distributing industrial gases and LPG products. In 2002, Pryce noticed the decline of return of LPG cylinders for refilling. Pryce employees suspected that LPG cylinders had been removed from market circulation and refilled by their competitors, one of whoom is Sun Gas and Santos as the manager.

Figueroa, Pryce's sales manger for Panay sought the assistance of CIDG to recoverLPG cylinders allegedly in posession of Sun Gas. Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) conducted surveillance on the warehouse of Sun Gas then later requested the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) to conduct a routine fire inspection at Sun Gas. CIDG operatives entered the warehouse and were able to take photographs of LPG cylinders (PO@ Demandara).

Demandara applied before RTC Iloilo for a warrant to search the premises with the allegation that Pryce LPG cylinders were tampered and replaced with Sun Gas marking, averred also that Sun Gas is distributing Pryce LPG products without the consent of Pryce. RTC issued the search warrant with the authority to seize the following items: 1. Assorted sizes of PRYCE LPG GAS TANKS CYLINDERS in different kilograms.

2. Suspected LPG gas tanks cylinders with printed/mark SUN GAS INC., trademark and embossed Pryce Gas Trademark scrapped off.

3. Other materials used in tampering the PRYCE LPG GAS TANKS cylinders. The authorities have seize a number of Pryce LPG tanks.

Santos then filed for motion to quash the search warrant on the grounds of lack of probable cause as well as deception and fraud in obtaining evidence in support of the application, violating article 3, section 2 of constitution and Rule 126 of rules of court.

On the same day, CIDG filed a criminal complaint before the office of City Prosecutor of Iloilo against Santos, charging him with violation of RA No. 632.

After hearing, RTC granted the motion to quash , stating that the probable cause as found by it at the time of the application for search warrant fell short of the requisite probable cause necessary to sustain the validity of the search warrant.

Respondent filed a manifestation and motion to hold in abeyance the release of the seized items. It also filed a motion for reconsideration of the 16 July 2002 Order but was denied in an Order dated 9 August 2002.

         

Respondent elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a special civil action for certiorari, arguing that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in quashing the search warrant. The petition essentially questioned the quashal of the search warrant despite a prior finding of probable cause and the failure of petitioner to prove that he bought the seized items from respondent. It also challenged petitioner’s personality to file the motion to quash.

On 16 January 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision, which set aside the two orders of the trial court. The appellate court also ordered the return of the seized items to respondent. Petitioner sought reconsideration but was denied in an order dated 16 July 2004.

Issues: (1) whether or not petitioner has authority to seek the quashal of the search warrant; (2) who has proper custody of the seized items; and (3) whether or not respondent correctly availed of the special civil action for certiorari to assail the quashal of the search warrant.

Ruling:

1. The Court of Appeals ruled against petitioner and reversed the trial court’s quashal of the search warrant solely on the ground that petitioner, being a mere manager of Sun Gas, Inc., failed to show his authority to act on behalf of the corporation and, therefore, had no legal personality to question the validity of the search warrant. Thus, it concluded that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in entertaining and subsequently granting petitioner’s motion to quash.    

Well-settled is the rule that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.

2. In quashing the search warrant, it would appear that the trial court had raised the standard of probable cause to whether there was sufficient cause to hold petitioner for trial. In so doing, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion.

Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discrete and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable cause demands more than bare suspicion; it requires less than evidence which would justify conviction.

3. The Court of Appeals, however, erred in ordering the return of the seized items to respondent. Section 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Criminal Procedure expressly mandates the delivery of the seized items to the judge who issued the search warrant to be kept in custodia legis in anticipation of the criminal proceedings against petitioner. The delivery of the items seized to the court which issued the warrant together with a true and accurate inventory thereof, duly verified under oath, is mandatory in order to preclude the substitution of said items by interested parties. The judge who issued the search warrant is mandated to ensure compliance with the requirements for (1) the issuance of a detailed receipt for the property received, (2) delivery of the seized property to the court, together with (3) a verified true inventory of the items seized.  Any violation of the foregoing constitutes contempt of court.

The seized items should remain in the custody of the trial court which issued the search warrant pending the institution of criminal action against petitioner.

Petition denied.

G.R. No. 164715 Case Digest

G.R. No. 164715, September 20, 2006

Arnel Alcaraz, petitioner

vs Ramon Gonzalez, respondent

Ponente: Callejo, Sr.

Facts:

This is a petition for review of the decision of CA granting the petition for review of the resolution of the secretary of justice for attempted homicide as well as the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration.

August 11, 2000 around 10am, 61 year-old Gonzalez was driving his car along the right outermost lane of the south-luzon expressway on his way to makati city. Atty Alcaraz a customs collector of the Bureau of Customs, Batangas port was driving his car in the middle lane of south-luzon expressway between sucat and bicutan interchange on his way to manila from batangas city. He was armed with a 38 caliber pistol and had a mission order to expire on August 21, 2000. Since Alcarez intended to use the Skyway, he signaled and proceeded to the right-most lane reserved for the vehicles taking skyway.

Gonzalez was then forced to swerve his car to avoid collision with Alcarez and nearly hit the concrete island. Angree, Gonzalez chased after Alcaraz and shouted to Alcaraz through the open window. Alcaraz then raised his pistol to Gonzalez and fired twice hitting some parts of the car. Alcaraz hurriedly drove away but was intercepted by the PNCC guards of the Skyway toll gate and confiscated his pistol. Gonzalez reported the matter to the Paranaque city police station where he gave his statement to the police investigator and filed a criminal complaint for attemted homicide against Alcaraz. PNP examined Gonzalez's car then filed the criminal complaint later.

After the conducted inquest, an information was filed by the prosecutor's office with the MTC of Paranaque. On motion, the MTC ordered the city prosecutor to conduct PI.

In his counter affidavit, Alcaraz admitted firing his gun however alleged that Gonzalez opened his car window and prompted him to take his firearm. He also claimed that he had no intention to hit Gonzalez that's why he didn't aimed his gun to him. 

In his reply-affidavit, Gonzalez insisted that Alcaraz attempted to kill him. Gonzalez pointed it out that firing his gun is in effect an admission of intent to kill him.

The investigating prosecutor maintained his finding of a probable cause and retain the information. Alcaraz filed a motion of reconsideration but was denied, he then filed with DOJ, alleging that (1) the investigating prosecutor erred in giving serious considerations on complainant's theory on the trajectory of the bullet (2) investigating prosecutor erred in holding that he had the intent to kill the complainant (3) investigating prosecutor erred in giving wieght and credence on the allegations of complainant relative to the material points of the incident. On November 2001, DJ granted the petition and ordered the prosecutor to withdraw the information. On the grounds that Gonzalez failed to prove that Alcaraz has the intention to kill him, provided that Gonzalez has provoked Alcaraz.

Gonzalez filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. So, he filed a petition for review before CA, claiming that the DOj secretary acted beyond his authority in finding no probabale cause to charge and ordering to withdraw the information. He insisted that by invoking self-defense, Alcaraz thereby admitted his intention to kill him.

In his comment, Alcaraz averred that CA had no appellate jurisdiction over the petition and that Ginzalez had no legal standing to file the petition under Rule 43 of the rules of court; that justice secretary is not a quasi-judicial officer that may be reviewed by CA. On march 2004, CA granted the petition and reversing the assailed resolutions of the secretary of justice; based on the evidence on record, there was a probabale cause to file an information. 

Ruling: Petition is meritorious.

(1) we agree with the petitioner's contention that respondent resorted to an improper remedy when he filed a petition for review under rule 43, instead of filing a petition for certiorari under rule 65. the determination of the probable cause during PI is in the executive branch has full discretionary authority.The courts are not empowered to substitute the judgement of the secretary of justice or the prosecutor. (2) The resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor is subject to appeal to the Justice Secretary who, under the Revised Administrative Code, exercises the power of control and supervision over said Investigating Prosecutor; and who may affirm, nullify, reverse, or modify the ruling of such prosecutor.Thus, while the CA may review the resolution of the Justice Secretary, it may do so only in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, solely on the ground that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of his discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.

G.R. No. 152456 Case Digest

G.R. No. 152456, April 28, 2004

Sevilla Trading Companny, petitioner,

vs AVA Tomas Semana, Sevilla Trading Workers Union-Super, respondents.

Ponente: Puno

Facts:

This is an appeal in the decision of Court of Appeals sustaining the decision of Semana denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

2 to 3 years prior to 1999, Company engaged in trading business, organized an added base figure in the computation of the 13th month pay of its employees. 

Petitioner claimed that it entrusted the preparation of the payroll to its office staff, including the computation and payment of the 13th month pay and other benefits. Later, after changing the payroll officer, they discovered an error of including non-basic and other benefits in the base figure, petitioner then effected the computation of the 13th month pay, as follows:

Hence the new computation reduced the 13th month pay. The union then contested the  new computation. Parties failed to resolve the issue, so they submitted it to Semana, the Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator for consideration and resolution.

The Union alleged that petitioner violated the rule prohibiting the elimination or diminution of employees’ benefits as provided for in Art. 100 of the Labor Code, as amended. They claimed that paid leaves, like sick leave, vacation leave, paternity leave, union leave, bereavement leave, holiday pay and other leaves with pay in the CBA should be included in the base figure in the computation of their 13th-month pay.

On the other hand, petitioner insisted that the computation of the 13th-month pay is based on basic salary, excluding benefits such as leaves with pay, as per P.D. No. 851, as amended. It maintained that, in adjusting its computation of the 13th-month pay, it merely rectified the mistake its personnel committed in the previous years.

A.V.A. Semana decided in favor of the Union. Hence, this appeal.

Issues: (1) revert of the company's computation is without legal basis (2) correcting errors in computation by companies will not cause grave and irreparable damage to employers.

Ruling: 

We uphold the Court of Appeals in ruling that the proper remedy from the adverse decision of the arbitrator is a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Section 1 of Rule 43 

It is elementary that the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 is not, and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, where the latter remedy is available, as it was in this case. Petitioner Sevilla Trading failed to file an appeal within the fifteen-day reglementary period from its notice of the adverse decision of A.V.A. Semana. It received a copy of the decision of A.V.A. Semana on December 20, 2000, and should have filed its appeal under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on or before January 4, 2001. 

Thus, the decision of A.V.A. Semana had become final and executory when petitioner Sevilla Trading filed its petition for certiorari on February 19, 2001. More particularly, the decision of A.V.A. Semana became final and executory upon the lapse of the fifteen-day reglementary period to appeal, or on January 5, 2001. Hence, the Court of Appeals is correct in holding that it no longer had appellate jurisdiction to alter, or much less, nullify the decision of A.V.A. Semana.

In the light of the clear ruling of this Court, there is, thus no reason for any mistake in the construction or application of the law. When petitioner Sevilla Trading still included over the years non-basic benefits of its employees, such as maternity leave pay, cash equivalent of unused vacation and sick leave, among others in the computation of the 13th-month pay, this may only be construed as a voluntary act on its part. Putting the blame on the petitioner’s payroll personnel is inexcusable.

A company practice favorable to the employees had indeed been established and the payments made pursuant thereto, ripened into benefits enjoyed by them. And any benefit and supplement being enjoyed by the employees cannot be reduced, diminished, discontinued or eliminated by the employer, by virtue of Sec. 10 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing P.D. No. 851, and Art. 100 of the Labor Code of the Philippines which prohibit the diminution or elimination by the employer of the employees’ existing benefits. 

With regard to the length of time the company practice should have been exercised to constitute voluntary employer practice which cannot be unilaterally withdrawn by the employer, we hold that jurisprudence has not laid down any rule requiring a specific minimum number of years. 

G.R. No. 147703 Case Digest

G.R. No. 147703, April 14, 2004

Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, INC., petitioner

v People of the Philippines, respondent

Ponente: Panganiban

Facts:

This is a petition for review under rule 45 of the rules of court assailing resolutions of CA. Petitioner's appeal from the judgment of the RTC of San Fernando, La Union in Criminal Case No. 2535 was dismissed.

On July 1994 accused Macadangdang was found guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to property and was sentenced to suffer the penalty. The court ruled that rabbit bus lines shall be liable for the civil liabilities of the accused in the event of the accused insolvency. Evidently, the judgment against the accused had become final and executory.

Then the accused jumped bail, worth mentioning that rule 8, rule 124 of the rules of court authorizes the dismissal of appeal when appellant jumps bail. The counsel for accused hired by rabbit bus lines filed a notice of appeal which was denied by the trial court.

The CA ruled that the institution of a criminal case implied the institution also of the civil action arising from the offense. Making the subsidiary civil liability of the bus line becomes conclusive and enforceable.

Issues: (1) Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused-employee may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the accused?

Ruling: Petition has no merit.

Appeal in Criminal Cases: Section 1 of rule 122 of the 2000 revised rules of criminal procedures states "any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy"

Appeal by the accused who jumps bail:

Section 8 of rule 124 provides: "the court appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during pendency of the appeal" The accused cannot be accroded right to apeal unless they voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the court or are otherwise arrested within 15days from notice of the judgment against them. They cannot seek relief from the court, as they are deemed to have waived the appeal.

Finality of a decision in a criminal case:

Section 7 of Rule 120 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which we quote:

"A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation."

In the case before us, the accused-employee has escaped and refused to surrender to the proper authorities; thus, he is deemed to have abandoned his appeal. Consequently, the judgment against him has become final and executory.

Civil Actions are deemed instituted in a criminal prosecution. but rabbit bus line is not a direct party to the criminal case. While they may assist their employees, the employer cannot act independently on their own behalf, but can only defend the accused.

Waiver of constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy:

an appeal from the sentence of the trial court implies a waiver and throws the whole case open to a review by the appellate court. 

Effect of absconding on the appeal process: the accused impliedly withdrew his appeal by jumping bail and he is deemed to have his right to appeal waived, Thus conviction is now final and executory.

Subsidiary Liability upon finality of judgment: employers liability in a finding of guilt against its employee is subsidiary. 

No deprivation of due process: employer became subsidiary liable only upon proof of the employee's insolvency and the right to appeal was lost due to the bail of the accused employee not the court.

Petition denied. 

G.R. No. 128345 Case Digest

G.R. No. 128345, May 18, 1999

Phil. Nat'l. Construction Corp., petitioner,

vs NLRC, Rolando Angeles and Ricardo Pablo, Jr., respondents.

Ponente: Puno

Facts:

This is a special civil action for certiorari to the decision of NLRC granting the separation pay to the private respondents inspite of its finding that they were validly dismissed for committing bribery.

Angeles and Pablo were employed by PNCC as tollway guards posted in NLEX. They were terminated on the ground of serious misconduct.

On September 8, 1993, Rosario Maravilla complained to the Tollway General Manager, Mr Paulino about mulcting activities of some security in NLEX. Acting on complaint Mr Paulino formed an investigating team. 

The investigating team staged an entrapment, with a marked money. They handed the marked money to Maravilla with instructions to give to whoever that may demand money from her. Together they rode a jeepney with cargo of dogs destined for Baguio.

The jeepney was stopped by Angeles who was at that time on duty. He allegedly suspected them of illegal transporting of dogs. The members of the investigating team saw Angeles and Pablo accepted cash and a sack containing a dog from Maravilla, then they were allowed to leave.

Upon sight of the investigating team, Angeles dropped the marked money. He was brought to Sta. Rita Field Office for initial investigation and the dog was confiscated from Pablo.

On April 25, 1994, Mr Ibarra issued a notice of Dismissal to private respondents requiring them to answer the charge of serious misconduct. private respondents filed their respective answers and a formal investigation was held. After the formal investigation, dismissal was recommended. Mr Ibarra then issued a termination notice to the respondents informing them of their dismissal.

On June 17, 1994 private respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal alleging that they were dismissed without just or authorized cause and without due process. They claimed that the entrapment was mastermind by Hidalgo. The complaint prayed for reinstatement plus payment of backwages and mid-year bonus.

The Labor arbiter ruled that respondents dismissal was illegal because it failed to prove clear and convincing evidence that they committed serious misconduct. But Labor arbiter didn't order for their reinstatement but ordered for separation pay, backwages and mid-year bonus.

On appeal, NLRC modified the decision and held that the bribery was a sufficient ground for dismissal but ordered nonetheless for the separation pay on ground of equity. Petitioner filed for reconsideration but was denied by NLRC for lack of merit.

Issues: (1) error in not finding the ONCC guilty of estoppel and laches. (2) before NLRC, decision of court has become final and executory. (3) whether entitled to pay, backwages and bonus?

The Solicitor General, on the other hand, filed its comment on May 4, 1998. It submitted that the NLRC erred in awarding separation pay to private respondents although it was correct in awarding mid-year bonus to them. The Solicitor General thus recommended that the decision of the NLRC be modified by deleting the award of separation pay to private respondents. 

In view of the recommendation of the Solicitor General, we required the NLRC to file its own comment if it so desires within ten days from notice. The NLRC, however, failed to file its own comment within the prescribed period.

RUling:

(1) Disagree. Laches, in a general sense, is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier.  Estoppel by laches arises from the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. It does not merely speak of delay but unreasonable delay, which is absent in this case. An employer is not expected to dismiss an erring employee instantly because it may opt to give the employee the chance to reform and to regain his confidence.

(2) There was no fixed standard to determine the reasonableness of the period, but the Court generally considered the period of three (3) months to be reasonable.

The records show that petitioner received the resolution of the NLRC denying its motion for reconsideration on December 16, 1996 and the petition at bar was filed two (2) months and twenty-seven (27) days later. We thus find that the instant petition was filed on time.

(3) We rule in the negative.

An employee who is dismissed for just cause is generally not entitled to separation pay. In some cases, however, the Court awards separation pay to a legally dismissed employee on the grounds of equity and social justice. This is not allowed, though, when the employee has been dismissed for serious misconduct or some other cause reflecting on his moral character. 

In the case at bar, private respondents were caught in the act of accepting bribe in the form of cash and a dog from a motorist who was suspected of illegally transporting dogs. As tollway guards, private respondents had the duty to maintain peace and order at the North Luzon Expressway and to ensure that all tollway rules and regulations are followed. But private respondents did the contrary by yielding to bribery. 

Likewise, private respondents are not entitled to the mid-year bonus they are claiming. We do not agree with the Solicitor General's contention that private respondents have already earned their mid-year bonus at the time of their dismissal. A bonus is a gift from the employer and the grant thereof is a management prerogative. Petitioner may not be compelled to award a bonus to private respondents whom it found guilty of serious misconduct.

G.R. No. 123520 Case Digest

G.R. No. 123520, June 26, 1998

National Semiconductor Distribution, Ltd., petitioner,

vs NLRC and Edgar Philip Santos, respondents

Ponente: Bellosillo

Issue: (1) Who has the burden of providing a claim for night shift differential pay, the worker who claims not to have been paid night shift differentials, or the employer in custody of pertinent documents which would prove the fact of payment of the same? (2) Were the requirements of due process substantially complied with in dismissing the worker?

Facts: 

NSC a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the Phil. manufactures and assembles electronic parts for export in mactan, lapu-lapu city. Santos was employed by NSC as a technicioan in its special products group assigned to the graveyard shift from 10pm-6am.

On January 8, 1993 Santos did not report for work on his shift. He resumed his duties as night shift on January 9. However, at the end of his shift, he made 2 entries in his DTR to make it appear that he worked on both the 8th and 9th.

His supervisor Limisiaco, received the report that there was no technician in the graveyard shift on January 8. Limsiaco then checked the DTRs and found out that Santos did not report on 8th and have found in the DTR the otherwise.

Informal investigation were conducted by management and have required Santos to explain in writing why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for dishonesty, falsifying DTR and violation of company rules. Santos explain that he was sick on the 8th and his DTR was a mere oversight or carelessness on his part.

Not satisfied with the explanation, NSC dismissed Santos for the violations made. Santos then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of wages and other money claims.

Labor arbiter found that Santos was dismissed on legal grounds although he was not afforded due process, ordering NSC to indemnify him and the unpaid night shift differentials.

NSC appealed to NLRC, but NLRC affirmed the labor arbiter holding that the conclusions were sufficiently supported by the evidence.

NSC now imputes grave abuse of discretion to NLRC in affirming the labor arbiter. Contending that the night shift differentials were never raised as an issue nor pusued by Santos; also denied that Santos was not given due process because he was afforded ample opportunity to be heard.

Issues: (1) Was Santos illegally dismissed? (2) Santos entitled for the money claims?

Ruling:

The fact that Santos neglected to substantiate his claim for night shift differentials is not prejudicial to his cause. After all, the burden of proving payment rests on petitioner NSC. Santos' allegation of non-payment of this benefit, to which he is by law entitled, is a negative allegation which need not be supported by evidence unless it is an essential part of his cause of action. It must be noted that his main cause of action is his illegal dismissal, and the claim for night shift differential is but an incident of the protest against such dismissal. Thus, the burden of proving that payment of such benefit has been made rests upon the party who will suffer if no evidence at all is presented by either party. By choosing not to fully and completely disclose information to prove that it had paid all the night shift differentials due to private respondent, petitioner failed to discharge the burden of proof. 

On the issue of due process, we agree with petitioner that Santos was accorded full opportunity to be heard before he was dismissed.

The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side. In the instant case, petitioner furnished private respondent notice as to the particular acts which constituted the ground for his dismissal. By requiring him to submit a written explanation within 48 hours from receipt of the notice, the company gave him the opportunity to be heard in his defense. Private respondent availed of this chance by submitting a written explanation. Furthermore, investigations on the incident were actually conducted.

Finally, private respondent was notified on 14 January 1993 of the management's decision to terminate his services.

Thus, it is clear the minimum requirements of due process have been fulfilled by petitioner.

Petition Dismissed.