G.R. No. 189793 Case Digest

G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010

Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo

vs COMELEC

Facts:

RA 9716 was signed into law by PGMA on October 2009. This law created an additional legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing 1st and 2nd districts of CamSur.

Aquino and Robredo contend that the reapportionment runs foul of the constitutional standard that requires minimum population of 250k for a creation of legislative district (the new 1st and 2nd district in RA 9716 has population less than 250k).

Respondents, represented by Office of Solicitor General seek to dismiss the petition based on: On procedural matters, the respondents argue that the petitioners are guilty of two (2) fatal technical defects: first, petitioners committed an error in choosing to assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716 via the remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; and second, the petitioners have no locus standi to question the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716.

On substantive matters, the respondents call attention to an apparent distinction between cities and provinces drawn by Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The respondents concede the existence of a 250,000 population condition, but argue that a plain and simple reading of the questioned provision will show that the same has no application with respect to the creation of legislative districts in provinces.13 Rather, the 250,000 minimum population is only a requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city.

Ruling:

1. Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that we set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.

2. Absence of direct injury on the part of the party seeking judicial review may be excused when the latter is able to craft an issue of transcendental importance. In Lim v. Executive Secretary,22 this Court held that in cases of transcendental importance, the cases must be settled promptly and definitely, and so, the standing requirements may be relaxed.

3. We start with the basics. Any law duly enacted by Congress carries with it the presumption of constitutionality.24 Before a law may be declared unconstitutional by this Court, there must be a clear showing that a specific provision of the fundamental law has been violated or transgressed. When there is neither a violation of a specific provision of the Constitution nor any proof showing that there is such a violation, the presumption of constitutionality will prevail and the law must be upheld.

There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that must compose a legislative district. The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly provides: "Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative." The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase "each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand" from the phrase "or each province" point to no other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population is only required for a city, but not for a province.

G.R. No. L-11776 Case Digest

G.R. No. L-11776, August 30, 1958

Ramon Gonzales

vs Go Tiong and Luzon Surety Co., Inc.

Facts:

Go Tiong owned a rice mill and warehouse located in Pangasinan. To secure the performance as warehouseman, Luzon Surety executed a guaranty bond in the sum of 18, 334 conditioned particularly on the fulfillment by Go Tiong of his duty to deliver the palay stored in his warehouse upon demand or to pay the market value thereof, in case he cannot return the same.

Before his issuance of license as warehouse, Go Tiong had several palay deposit from Gonzales, totaling 368 sacks for which he issued receipts. After he was licensed, Gonzales deposited 492 sacks more, all the grand total of 860 sacks valued at 8,600.

March 1953, Gonzales demanded from Go Tiong the value of the deposits but he was told to come back 2 days after. A few days later, the warehouse of Go Tiong was burned to the ground.

After the burning, Gonzales, along with other palay depositors filed their claims with the BOC. While the case was pending in court, parties entered into a contract of amicable settlement agrreing that Gonzales will withdraw all actions against Go Tiong once the accounts due were settled.

In this present petition, both parties contend that the governing law shall be the civil code and not the bonded warehouse act for the reson that Go Tiong issued ordinary receipts to Gonzales, and because the deposits were gratuitous.

Ruling:

Act No. 3893 as amended is a special law regulating the business of receiving commodities for storage and defining the rights and obligations of a bonded warehouseman and those transacting business with him. Consequently, any deposit made with him as a bonded warehouseman must necessarily be governed by the provisions of Act No. 3893. The kind or nature of the receipts issued by him for the deposits is not very material much less decisive. Though it is desirable that receipts issued by a bonded warehouseman should conform to the provisions of the Warehouse Receipts Law, said provisions in our opinion are not mandatory and indispensable in the sense that if they fell short of the requirements of the Warehouse Receipts Act, then the commodities delivered for storage become ordinary deposits and will not be governed by the provisions of the Bonded Warehouse Act. Under Section 1 of the Warehouse Receipts Act, one would gather the impression that the issuance of a warehouse receipt in the form provided by it is merely permissive and directory and not obligatory:

SECTION 1. Persons who may issue receipts. — Warehouse receipts may be issued by any warehouseman.,

and the Bonded Warebouse Act as amended permits the warehouseman to issue any receipt, thus:

. . . . "receipt" as any receipt issued by a warehouseman for commodity delivered to him.

As the trial court well observed, as far as Go Tiong was concerned, the fact that the receipts issued by him were not "quedans" is no valid ground for defense because he was the principal obligor. Furthermore, as found by the trial court, Go Tiong had repeatedly promised plaintiff to issue to him "quedans" and had assured him that he should not worry; and that Go Tiong was in the habit of issuing ordinary receipts (not "quedans") to his depositors.

Considering the fact, as already stated, that prior to the burning of the warehouse, plaintiff demanded the payment of the value of his palay from Go Tiong on two occasions but was put off without any valid reason, under the circumstances, the better rule which we accept is the following:

. . . . This rule proceeds upon the theory that the facts surrounding the care of the property by a bailee are peculiarly within his knowledge and power to prove, and that the enforcement of any other rule would impose great difficulties upon the bailors. ... It is illogical and unreasonable to hold that the presumption of negligence in case of this kind is rebutted by the bailee by simply proving that the property bailed was destroyed by an ordinary fire which broke out on the bailee's own premises, without regard to the care exercised by the latter to prevent the fire, or to save the property after the commencement of the fire. All the authorities seem to agree that the rule that there shall be a presumption of negligence in bailment cases like the present one, where there is default in delivery or accounting, for the goods is just a necessary one. . . . (9 A.L.R. 566; see also Hanes vs. Shapiro, 84 S.E. 33; J. Russel Mfg. Co. vs. New Haven, S.B. Co., 50 N.Y. 211; Beck vs. Wilkins-Ricks Co., 102 S.E. 313, Fleishman vs. Southern R. Co., 56 S.E. 974).

Besides, as observed by the trial court, the defendant violated the terms of his license by accepting for deposit palay in excess of the limit authorized by his license, which fact must have increased the risk.

The Luzon Surety claims that the amicable settlement by and between Gonzales and Go Tiong constituted a material alteration of its bond, thereby extinguishing and discharging its liability. It is evident, however, that while there was an attempt to settle the case amicably, the settlement was never consummated because Go Tiong failed to settle the accounts of Gonzales to the latter's satisfaction.

G.R. No. 129918 Case Digest

G.R. No. 129918, July 9, 1998

PNB

vs Hon. Marcelino Sayo, Noahs Ark Sugar Refinery , Alberto Looyuko, Jimmy Go and Wilson Go

Facts:

Noahs Ark issued several warehouse reciepts covering sugar deposits by Rosa Sy, RNS Merchandising and St. Therese Merchandising. Later, 4 of these receipts were negotiated to Luis Ramos and Cresencia Zoleta. Ramos and Zoleta later used these receipts to secure a loan with PNB.

Ramos and Zoleta failed to pay the loan, so PNB is now demanding for the delivery of the sugar deposit covered by the warehouse receipts. Noahs Ark refused to deliver such, and claims ownership over sugar deposits. For such reason, PNB filed a complaint for specific performance with damages and writ of attachment against Noahs Ark.

RTC Manila denied the writ of attachment.

Noahs Ark claim that in an agreement, defendants agreed to sell Rosa Sy of RNS Merchandising and Teresita of St. Therese Merchandising the volume of sugar deposited for 63M. They also claim that the vendees and first endorsers of the receipts did not acquire ownership, thus the subsequent endorsers did not acquire a better right of ownership also.

Rosa Sy and Teresita Ng is saying that the transaction between them and defendants is a simulated sale, thus they are not answerable in damages to him. PNB motion for summary judgment, thereupon filed a Petition for Certiorari with CA.

CA ordered RTC to render a summary judgment in favor of PNB.

Trial court rendered judgment dismissing plaintiffs complaint against private respondents for lack of cause of action and likewise dismissed private respondents counterclaim against PNB and of the Third-Party Complaint and the Third-Party Defendants Counterclaim. On September 4, 1992, the trial court denied PNBs Motion for Reconsideration.

On June 9, 1992, the PNB filed an appeal from the RTC decision with the Supreme Court, G.R. No. 107243, by way of a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Ruling:

SC: (a) to deliver to the petitioner Philippine National Bank, the sugar stocks covered by the Warehouse Receipts/Quedans which are now in the latters possession as holder for value and in due course; or alternatively, to pay (said) plaintiff actual damages in the amount of P39.1 million, with legal interest thereon from the filing of the complaint until full payment; and

(b) to pay plaintiff Philippine National Bank attorneys fees, litigation expenses and judicial costs hereby fixed at the amount of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00) as well as the costs.

While PNB is entitled to the sugar stocks as endorsee of the receipts, delivery to it shall only be effected upon payment of the storage fees. Because it is imperative to the right of the warehouse man to demand payment of his lien.

G.R. No. 180434 Case Digest

G.R. No. 180434, January 20, 2016

CIR

vs Mirant Pagbilao Corp.

Facts:

MPC is corporation engaged in generation and distribution of electricity to NAPOCOR under a build, operate , trnasfer scheme.

1999, BIR approved MPC's application for effective zero-rating for the construction and operation of its power plant.

2002, MPC filed before BIR an administrative claim for refund of its input VAT covering year 2000. Thereafter, fearing that the period for filing a judicial claim for refund was to expire, MPC proceeded to file a petition for review before CTA.

CTA division partially granted MPC's claim for refund and ordered CIR to grant refund or tax credit but have reduced the amount. CTA division held that by virtue of NAPOCOR's exemption from direct and indirect taxes MPC's sale of services to NAPOCOR is subject to VAT at 0% rate.

CIR filed a motion for reconsideration . CTA En Banc affirmed in toto the decision of the division. CIR now seeks recourse to the SC via petition for review on certiorari.

Ruling:

Clearly, MPC's failure to observe the mandatory 120-day period under the law was fatal to its immediate filing of a judicial claim before the CTA. It rendered the filing of the CTA petition premature, and barred the tax court from acquiring jurisdiction over the same. Thus, the dismissal of the petition is in order. "[T]ax refunds or tax credits - just like tax exemptions - are strictly construed against taxpayers, the latter having the burden to prove strict compliance with the conditions for the grant of the tax refund or credit."

With the CTA being barren of jurisdiction to entertain MPC's petition, the Court finds it unnecessary, even inappropriate, to still discuss the main issue of MPC's entitlement to the disputed tax refund. The petition filed by MPC with the CT A instead warrants a dismissal. It is settled that "a void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all."38

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated September 11, 2007 and Resolution dated November 7, 2007 of the Court of Tax Appeals en banc in E.B. Case Nos. 216 and 225 are SET ASIDE, as the CTA Case No. 6417 was prematurely filed, and therefore, the CTA lacked jurisdiction to entertain Mirant Pagbilao Corporation's judicial claim.

G.R. No. 182737 Case Digest

G.R. No. 182737, March 2, 2016

Silicon Phils., Inc.

vs CIR

Facts:

Silicon is engaged in the business of designing, developing, manufacturing and exporting integrated circuit components, registered as a VAT taxpayer with BIR by virtue of its sale of goods and services with a permit to print accounting documents like sales invoice and official receipts.

Later, Silicon sought to recover the VAT it paid on imported capital goods and applied for tax credit/refund. Because of the continuous inaction of CIR, Silicon filed petitions for review before the CTA.

CTA 2nd Division consolidated all their claims and dismissed the petitions for lack of merit.

It ruled that pursuant to Section 112 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), the refund/tax credit of unutilized input VAT is allowed (a) when the excess input VAT is attributable to zero-rated or effectively zero-rated sales; and (b) when the excess input VAT is attributable to capital goods purchased by a VAT-registered person.

In order to prove zero-rated export sales, a VAT-registered person must present the following: (1) the sales invoice as proof of the sale of goods; (2) the export declaration or bill of lading/airway bill as proof of actual shipment of the goods from the Philippines to a foreign country; and (3) bank credit advice or certificate of remittance or any other document proving payment for the goods in acceptable foreign currency or its equivalent in goods and services.

The CTA Second Division found that petitioner presented nothing more than a certificate of inward remittances for the entire year 2001, in compliance with the third requirement only. That being the case, petitioner's reported export sales in the total amount of P2,444,167,418.4028 cannot qualify as VAT zero-rated sales.

Silicon filed a petition for review with CTA En Banc after its motion reconsideration was also denied by the division.

CTA En Banc affrimed the findings of the division. Thus this petition with SC.

Ruling:

In the case of petitioner, its administrative claim for the 2nd quarter of the year 2001 was filed on 16 October 2001, well within the two-year period provided by law. The same is true with regard to the administrative claims for the 3rd and the 4th quarters of 2001, both of which were filed on 4 September 2002.

Considering that there is no evidence in this case showing that petitioner made later submissions of documents in support of its administrative claims, the 120-day period within which respondent is allowed to act on the claims shall be reckoned from 16 October 2001 and 4 September 2002.

Whether respondent rules in favor of or against the taxpayer - or does not act at all on the administrative claim - within the period of 120 days from the submission of complete documents, the taxpayer may resort to a judicial claim before the CTA.

The judicial claim for the 4th quarter of 2001, while filed within the period 10 December 2003 up to 6 October 2010, cannot find solace in BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03. The general interpretative rule allowed the premature filing of judicial claims by providing that the "taxpayer-claimant need not wait for the lapse of the 120-day period before it could seek judicial relief with the CTA by way of Petition for Review."52 The rule certainly did not allow the filing of a judicial claim long after the expiration of the 120+30 day period.53

As things stood, the CTA had no jurisdiction to act upon, take cognizance of, and render judgment upon the petitions for review filed by petitioner. For having been rendered without jurisdiction, the decision of the CTA Second Division in this case - and consequently, the decision of the CTA En Banc - is a total nullity that creates no rights and produces no effect.

G.R. No. 207112 Case Digest

G.R. No. 207112, December 8, 2015

Pilipinas Total Gas, Inc.

vs CIR

Facts:

Total Gas is engaged in the business of selling, transporting and distributing industrial gas, sale of gas equipment and other related business. For this purpose, Total Gas registered itself with BIR as VAT taxpayer.

For the 1st and 2nd quarters of 2007, Total Gas claimed VAT credits from its domestic purchases of non capital goods and services. Later, they filed an administrative claim for refund of the unutilized VAT for the 1st two quarters of 2007. Due to the inaction of CIR, Total Gas elevated their claim to the CTA.

CTA dismissed the petition for being prematurely filed, saying that Total Gas failed to complete necessary documents to substantiate a claim for refund. Motion for reconsideration was denied too by the CTA.

CTA En Banc also denied the petition to review. It ruled that CTA division had no jurisdiction over the case because Total Gas failed to seasonably file its petition.

Issues:

(a) whether the judicial claim for refund was belatedly filed on 23 January 2009, or way beyond the 30-day period to appeal as provided in Section 112(c) of the Tax Code, as amended; and

(b) whether the submission of incomplete documents at the administrative level (BIR) renders the judicial claim premature and dismissible for lack of jurisdiction.

Ruling:

Petition has merit.

Judicial claim timely filed. CIR has 120 days from the date of submission of complete documents to decide a claim for tax credit or refund. CTA counted the period from May 15, 2008.

Indeed, the 120-day period granted to the CIR to decide the administrative claim under the Section 112 is primarily intended to benefit the taxpayer, to ensure that his claim is decided judiciously and expeditiously. After all, the sooner the taxpayer successfully processes his refund, the sooner can such resources be further reinvested to the business translating to greater efficiencies and productivities that would ultimately uplift the general welfare. To allow the CIR to determine the completeness of the documents submitted and, thus, dictate the running of the 120-day period, would undermine these objectives, as it would provide the CIR the unbridled power to indefinitely delay the administrative claim, which would ultimately prevent the filing of a judicial claim with the CTA.

G.R. No. 129918 Case Digest

G.R. No. 129918, July 9, 1998

PNB

vs Hon. Marcelino Sayo, Noahs Ark Sugar Refinery , Alberto Looyuko, Jimmy Go and Wilson Go

Facts:

Noahs Ark issued several warehouse reciepts covering sugar deposits by Rosa Sy, RNS Merchandising and St. Therese Merchandising. Later, 4 of these receipts were negotiated to Luis Ramos and Cresencia Zoleta. Ramos and Zoleta later used these receipts to secure a loan with PNB.

Ramos and Zoleta failed to pay the loan, so PNB is now demanding for the delivery of the sugar deposit covered by the warehouse receipts. Noahs Ark refused to deliver such, and claims ownership over sugar deposits. For such reason, PNB filed a complaint for specific performance with damages and writ of attachment against Noahs Ark.

RTC Manila denied the writ of attachment.

Noahs Ark claim that in an agreement, defendants agreed to sell Rosa Sy of RNS Merchandising and Teresita of St. Therese Merchandising the volume of sugar deposited for 63M. They also claim that the vendees and first endorsers of the receipts did not acquire ownership, thus the subsequent endorsers did not acquire a better right of ownership also.

Rosa Sy and Teresita Ng is saying that the transaction between them and defendants is a simulated sale, thus they are not answerable in damages to him. PNB motion for summary judgment, thereupon filed a Petition for Certiorari with CA.

CA ordered RTC to render a summary judgment in favor of PNB.

Trial court rendered judgment dismissing plaintiffs complaint against private respondents for lack of cause of action and likewise dismissed private respondents counterclaim against PNB and of the Third-Party Complaint and the Third-Party Defendants Counterclaim. On September 4, 1992, the trial court denied PNBs Motion for Reconsideration.

On June 9, 1992, the PNB filed an appeal from the RTC decision with the Supreme Court, G.R. No. 107243, by way of a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Ruling:

SC: (a) to deliver to the petitioner Philippine National Bank, the sugar stocks covered by the Warehouse Receipts/Quedans which are now in the latters possession as holder for value and in due course; or alternatively, to pay (said) plaintiff actual damages in the amount of P39.1 million, with legal interest thereon from the filing of the complaint until full payment; and

(b) to pay plaintiff Philippine National Bank attorneys fees, litigation expenses and judicial costs hereby fixed at the amount of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00) as well as the costs.

While PNB is entitled to the sugar stocks as endorsee of the receipts, delivery to it shall only be effected upon payment of the storage fees. Because it is imperative to the right of the warehouse man to demand payment of his lien.