G.R. No. 180434 Case Digest

G.R. No. 180434, January 20, 2016

CIR

vs Mirant Pagbilao Corp.

Facts:

MPC is corporation engaged in generation and distribution of electricity to NAPOCOR under a build, operate , trnasfer scheme.

1999, BIR approved MPC's application for effective zero-rating for the construction and operation of its power plant.

2002, MPC filed before BIR an administrative claim for refund of its input VAT covering year 2000. Thereafter, fearing that the period for filing a judicial claim for refund was to expire, MPC proceeded to file a petition for review before CTA.

CTA division partially granted MPC's claim for refund and ordered CIR to grant refund or tax credit but have reduced the amount. CTA division held that by virtue of NAPOCOR's exemption from direct and indirect taxes MPC's sale of services to NAPOCOR is subject to VAT at 0% rate.

CIR filed a motion for reconsideration . CTA En Banc affirmed in toto the decision of the division. CIR now seeks recourse to the SC via petition for review on certiorari.

Ruling:

Clearly, MPC's failure to observe the mandatory 120-day period under the law was fatal to its immediate filing of a judicial claim before the CTA. It rendered the filing of the CTA petition premature, and barred the tax court from acquiring jurisdiction over the same. Thus, the dismissal of the petition is in order. "[T]ax refunds or tax credits - just like tax exemptions - are strictly construed against taxpayers, the latter having the burden to prove strict compliance with the conditions for the grant of the tax refund or credit."

With the CTA being barren of jurisdiction to entertain MPC's petition, the Court finds it unnecessary, even inappropriate, to still discuss the main issue of MPC's entitlement to the disputed tax refund. The petition filed by MPC with the CT A instead warrants a dismissal. It is settled that "a void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all."38

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated September 11, 2007 and Resolution dated November 7, 2007 of the Court of Tax Appeals en banc in E.B. Case Nos. 216 and 225 are SET ASIDE, as the CTA Case No. 6417 was prematurely filed, and therefore, the CTA lacked jurisdiction to entertain Mirant Pagbilao Corporation's judicial claim.

G.R. No. 182737 Case Digest

G.R. No. 182737, March 2, 2016

Silicon Phils., Inc.

vs CIR

Facts:

Silicon is engaged in the business of designing, developing, manufacturing and exporting integrated circuit components, registered as a VAT taxpayer with BIR by virtue of its sale of goods and services with a permit to print accounting documents like sales invoice and official receipts.

Later, Silicon sought to recover the VAT it paid on imported capital goods and applied for tax credit/refund. Because of the continuous inaction of CIR, Silicon filed petitions for review before the CTA.

CTA 2nd Division consolidated all their claims and dismissed the petitions for lack of merit.

It ruled that pursuant to Section 112 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), the refund/tax credit of unutilized input VAT is allowed (a) when the excess input VAT is attributable to zero-rated or effectively zero-rated sales; and (b) when the excess input VAT is attributable to capital goods purchased by a VAT-registered person.

In order to prove zero-rated export sales, a VAT-registered person must present the following: (1) the sales invoice as proof of the sale of goods; (2) the export declaration or bill of lading/airway bill as proof of actual shipment of the goods from the Philippines to a foreign country; and (3) bank credit advice or certificate of remittance or any other document proving payment for the goods in acceptable foreign currency or its equivalent in goods and services.

The CTA Second Division found that petitioner presented nothing more than a certificate of inward remittances for the entire year 2001, in compliance with the third requirement only. That being the case, petitioner's reported export sales in the total amount of P2,444,167,418.4028 cannot qualify as VAT zero-rated sales.

Silicon filed a petition for review with CTA En Banc after its motion reconsideration was also denied by the division.

CTA En Banc affrimed the findings of the division. Thus this petition with SC.

Ruling:

In the case of petitioner, its administrative claim for the 2nd quarter of the year 2001 was filed on 16 October 2001, well within the two-year period provided by law. The same is true with regard to the administrative claims for the 3rd and the 4th quarters of 2001, both of which were filed on 4 September 2002.

Considering that there is no evidence in this case showing that petitioner made later submissions of documents in support of its administrative claims, the 120-day period within which respondent is allowed to act on the claims shall be reckoned from 16 October 2001 and 4 September 2002.

Whether respondent rules in favor of or against the taxpayer - or does not act at all on the administrative claim - within the period of 120 days from the submission of complete documents, the taxpayer may resort to a judicial claim before the CTA.

The judicial claim for the 4th quarter of 2001, while filed within the period 10 December 2003 up to 6 October 2010, cannot find solace in BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03. The general interpretative rule allowed the premature filing of judicial claims by providing that the "taxpayer-claimant need not wait for the lapse of the 120-day period before it could seek judicial relief with the CTA by way of Petition for Review."52 The rule certainly did not allow the filing of a judicial claim long after the expiration of the 120+30 day period.53

As things stood, the CTA had no jurisdiction to act upon, take cognizance of, and render judgment upon the petitions for review filed by petitioner. For having been rendered without jurisdiction, the decision of the CTA Second Division in this case - and consequently, the decision of the CTA En Banc - is a total nullity that creates no rights and produces no effect.

G.R. No. 207112 Case Digest

G.R. No. 207112, December 8, 2015

Pilipinas Total Gas, Inc.

vs CIR

Facts:

Total Gas is engaged in the business of selling, transporting and distributing industrial gas, sale of gas equipment and other related business. For this purpose, Total Gas registered itself with BIR as VAT taxpayer.

For the 1st and 2nd quarters of 2007, Total Gas claimed VAT credits from its domestic purchases of non capital goods and services. Later, they filed an administrative claim for refund of the unutilized VAT for the 1st two quarters of 2007. Due to the inaction of CIR, Total Gas elevated their claim to the CTA.

CTA dismissed the petition for being prematurely filed, saying that Total Gas failed to complete necessary documents to substantiate a claim for refund. Motion for reconsideration was denied too by the CTA.

CTA En Banc also denied the petition to review. It ruled that CTA division had no jurisdiction over the case because Total Gas failed to seasonably file its petition.

Issues:

(a) whether the judicial claim for refund was belatedly filed on 23 January 2009, or way beyond the 30-day period to appeal as provided in Section 112(c) of the Tax Code, as amended; and

(b) whether the submission of incomplete documents at the administrative level (BIR) renders the judicial claim premature and dismissible for lack of jurisdiction.

Ruling:

Petition has merit.

Judicial claim timely filed. CIR has 120 days from the date of submission of complete documents to decide a claim for tax credit or refund. CTA counted the period from May 15, 2008.

Indeed, the 120-day period granted to the CIR to decide the administrative claim under the Section 112 is primarily intended to benefit the taxpayer, to ensure that his claim is decided judiciously and expeditiously. After all, the sooner the taxpayer successfully processes his refund, the sooner can such resources be further reinvested to the business translating to greater efficiencies and productivities that would ultimately uplift the general welfare. To allow the CIR to determine the completeness of the documents submitted and, thus, dictate the running of the 120-day period, would undermine these objectives, as it would provide the CIR the unbridled power to indefinitely delay the administrative claim, which would ultimately prevent the filing of a judicial claim with the CTA.

G.R. No. 129918 Case Digest

G.R. No. 129918, July 9, 1998

PNB

vs Hon. Marcelino Sayo, Noahs Ark Sugar Refinery , Alberto Looyuko, Jimmy Go and Wilson Go

Facts:

Noahs Ark issued several warehouse reciepts covering sugar deposits by Rosa Sy, RNS Merchandising and St. Therese Merchandising. Later, 4 of these receipts were negotiated to Luis Ramos and Cresencia Zoleta. Ramos and Zoleta later used these receipts to secure a loan with PNB.

Ramos and Zoleta failed to pay the loan, so PNB is now demanding for the delivery of the sugar deposit covered by the warehouse receipts. Noahs Ark refused to deliver such, and claims ownership over sugar deposits. For such reason, PNB filed a complaint for specific performance with damages and writ of attachment against Noahs Ark.

RTC Manila denied the writ of attachment.

Noahs Ark claim that in an agreement, defendants agreed to sell Rosa Sy of RNS Merchandising and Teresita of St. Therese Merchandising the volume of sugar deposited for 63M. They also claim that the vendees and first endorsers of the receipts did not acquire ownership, thus the subsequent endorsers did not acquire a better right of ownership also.

Rosa Sy and Teresita Ng is saying that the transaction between them and defendants is a simulated sale, thus they are not answerable in damages to him. PNB motion for summary judgment, thereupon filed a Petition for Certiorari with CA.

CA ordered RTC to render a summary judgment in favor of PNB.

Trial court rendered judgment dismissing plaintiffs complaint against private respondents for lack of cause of action and likewise dismissed private respondents counterclaim against PNB and of the Third-Party Complaint and the Third-Party Defendants Counterclaim. On September 4, 1992, the trial court denied PNBs Motion for Reconsideration.

On June 9, 1992, the PNB filed an appeal from the RTC decision with the Supreme Court, G.R. No. 107243, by way of a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Ruling:

SC: (a) to deliver to the petitioner Philippine National Bank, the sugar stocks covered by the Warehouse Receipts/Quedans which are now in the latters possession as holder for value and in due course; or alternatively, to pay (said) plaintiff actual damages in the amount of P39.1 million, with legal interest thereon from the filing of the complaint until full payment; and

(b) to pay plaintiff Philippine National Bank attorneys fees, litigation expenses and judicial costs hereby fixed at the amount of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00) as well as the costs.

While PNB is entitled to the sugar stocks as endorsee of the receipts, delivery to it shall only be effected upon payment of the storage fees. Because it is imperative to the right of the warehouse man to demand payment of his lien. 

G.R. No. L-5877 Case Digest

G.R. No. L-5877, September 28, 1954

People of the Philippines

vs Arturo Mendoza

Ponente: Paras

Facts:

August 1936, Jovita de Asis and Arturo Mendoza got married in Marikina. During their marriage, Arturo was marred to Olga Lema in Manila. When Jovita died, Arturo contracted another marriage with Carmencita Panlillio in Laguna. This last marriage gave rise to his prosecution for bigamy.

Arturo contends that his marriage with Lema is null and void, therefore non-existent at the time he married Jovita. Then his 3rd marriage was valid also because it occurred after the death of Jovita.

Solicitor General argues that, even assuming that Arturo's marriage to Lema is void, he is not exempt from criminal liability in the absence of judicial annulment of said bigamous marriage.

Ruling:

 it is admitted that appellant's second marriage with Olga Lema was contracted during the existence of his first marriage with Jovita de Asis. Section 29 of the marriage law (act 3613), in force at the time the appellant contracted his second marriage in 1941, provides as follows:

Illegal marriages. — Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:

(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;

(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or the absentee being generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, the marriage so contracted being valid in either case until declared null and void by a competent court.

This statutory provision plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere annullable marriages. There is here no pretence that appellant's second marriage with Olga Lema was contracted in the belief that the first spouse, Jovita de Asis, has been absent for seven consecutive years or generally considered as dead, so as to render said marriage valid until declared null and void by a competent court.

Wherefore, the appealed judgment is reversed and the defendant-appellant acquitted, with costs de officio so ordered.

G.R. No. L-19069 Case Digest

G.R. No. L-19069, October 29, 1968

People of the Philippines

vs Amadeo Peralta

Facts:

February 1958, Peralta among other inmates of New Bilibid Prisons, conspired and mutually helped one another, with evident premeditation and treachery, armed with deadly weapons, feloniously killed Jose Carriego, Eugene Barnosa and Santos Cruz, also convicts of New Bilibid. Aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism is present because the crime was committed while the offenders were convicted by final judgments.

Upon motion of the fiscal before trial, the lower court dismissed the charge against one of the accused for lack of evidence. After prosecution of the case, the charge against 6 accused were dismissed for failure to establish a prima facie case against them. After trial, 5 of the accused were also acquitted, then 1 died.

Issues:

(1) it fails to consider the legality of imposing multiple capital penalties; (2) it fails to distinguish between imposition of penalty and service of sentence; (3) it ignores the fact that multiple death sentences could be served simultaneously; and (4) it overlooks the practical merits of imposing multiple death penalties.

Ruling:

The evidence on record proves beyond peradventure that the accused acted in concert from the moment they bolted their common brigade, up until the time they killed their last victim, Santos Cruz. While it is true that Parumog, Larita and Luna did not participate in the actual killing of Carriego, nonetheless, as co-conspirators they are equally guilty and collectively liable for in conspiracy the act of one is the act of all. It is not indispensable that a co-conspirator should take a direct part in every act and should know the part which the others have to perform. Conspiracy is the common design to commit a felony; it is not participation in all the details of the execution of the crime. All those who in one way or another help and cooperate in the consummation of a felony previously planned are co-principals. Hence, all of the six accused are guilty of the slaughter of Carriego, Barbosa and Santos Cruz — each is guilty of three separate and distinct crimes of murder.

Multiple death penalties are not impossible to serve because they will have to be executed simultaneously. A cursory reading of article 70 will show that there are only two modes of serving two or more (multiple) penalties: simultaneously or successively. The first rule is that two or more penalties shall be served simultaneously if the nature of the penalties will so permit. In the case of multiple capital penalties, the nature of said penal sanctions does not only permit but actually necessitates simultaneous service.

In view of the attendance of the special aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism, as all of the six accused at the time of the commission of the offenses were serving sentences in the New Bilibid Prison at Muntinlupa by virtue of convictions by final judgments the penalty for each offense must be imposed in its maximum period, which is the mandate of the first paragraph of article 160 of the Revised Penal Code. Viada observes, in a position, that the severe penalty imposed on a quasi-recidivist is justified because of his perversity and incorrigibility.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo is hereby modified as follows: Amadeo Peralta, Andres Factora, Leonardo Dosal, Angel Parumog, Gervasio Larita and Florencio Luna are each pronounced guilty of three separate and distinct crimes of murder, and are each sentenced to three death penalties; all of them shall, jointly and severally, indemnify the heirs of each of the three deceased victims in the sum of P12,000; each will pay one-sixth of the costs.

G.R. No. 166401 Case Digest

G.R. No. 166401, October 30, 2006

People of the Philippines

vs Alfredo Bon

Ponente: Tinga

Facts:

8 informations were filed against Alfredo Bon charging him with rape of AAA and BBB, the daughters of his brother. The rape allegedly happened many times in the span of 6 years starting in 1994 were the victims were still minors.

RTC convicted Bon on all 8 counts of rape, denying the alibi presented by Bon. RTC considered qualifying circumstances of minority of the victims and the relationship of the victims and Bon.

On appeal on the penalty, CA ruled affirming the 6 counts rape but modified the 2 as attempted rape. According to the CA, the evidence on the 2 rapes was insufficient to make Bon guilty beyond reasonable doubt. CA then reduced the penalty for the 2 counts of rape from death to indeterminate penalty of 10 years as minimum to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal as maximum for attempted rape.

Issues: (1) Whether the Court should affirm the conviction of appellant Alfredo Bon (appellant) for six counts of rape and two counts of attempted rape, the victims being his then-minor nieces.

(2) Whether his penalty for attempted qualified rape, which under the penal law should be two degrees lower than that of consummated qualified rape, should be computed from death or reclusion perpetua.

Ruling:

(1) Court affirms. The Court thus affirms the conclusions of the Court of Appeals that it has been established beyond reasonable doubt that appellant is guilty of six (6) counts of rape and two (2) counts of attempted rape. However, in light of Rep. Act No. 9346, the appropriate penalties for both crimes should be amended.

(2) We close by returning to the matter of appellant Alfredo Bon. By reason of Rep. Act No. 9346, he is spared the death sentence, and entitled to the corresponding reduction of his penalty as a consequence of the downgrading of his offense from two (2) counts consummated rape to two (2) counts of attempted rape. For the six (6) counts of rape, we downgrade the penalty of death to reclusion perpetua with no eligibility for parole, pursuant to Rep. Act No. 9346. For each of the two (2) counts of attempted rape, we downgrade by one degree lower the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals. We hold that there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the penalty of prision mayor should be imposed in it medium period. Consequently, we impose the new penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.