G.R. No. 173473 Case Digest

G.R. No. 173473, December 17, 2008

People of the Philippines

vs Beth Temporada

Ponente: Ynares-Santiago

Facts:

Accused Rosemarie Robles, Bernadette Miranda, Nenita Catacotan, Jojo Resco and Beth Temporada are all employees of ATTC, a Travel and Tour Company, recruited and promised overseas employment for a fee to Rogelio Legaspis Jr, as a technician in Singapore, and other overseas workers. The accused were holding office in Makati but eventually transferred to Manila. After paying placements fees, none of the overseas recruits was able to leave or recover what they have paid, thus they filed separate criminal complaints against accused in Manila.

The accused were then sentenced to life imprisonment for illegal recruitment and estafa. Then the case was referred to the CA for intermediate review, CA affirmed with modification on the penalty. The penalty was lowered for the lower court due to insufficiency of evidence.

Issue: Whether the accused were guilty of 5 counts of estafa and illegal recruitment, and be charged of the penalty of life imprisonment.

Ruling:

The Court affirms the modification of the CA, except for the penalty on the 5 counts of estafa.

Although Temporada is saying that she is not a principal to the illegal recruitment and estafa because she is a mere employee of ATTC and that she was just echoing the requirement of her employer, the Court believes that Temporada actively and consciously participated in illegal recruitment.

The Court agrees with the lower court that the accused were guilty of illegal recruitment by a syndicate with the penalty of life imprisonment. The accused were convicted separately also for 5 counts of estafa. 

G.R. No. 186227 Case Digest

G.R. No. 186227, July 20, 2011

People of the Philippines

vs Allen Udtojan Mantalaba

Ponente: Peralta

Facts:

Task Forcer Regional Anti-Crime Emergency Response (RACER) in Butuan City received a report that Mantalaba who was 17 yrs old was selling shabu. After a buy-bust operation, two informations was filed against Mantalaba which was later on consolidated. Mantalaba pleaded not guilty.

RTC found Mantalaba guilty beyond reasonable doubt and was penalized of reclusion perpetua to death and fine of 500k for selling shabu and  (2) for illegally possessing shabu, Mantalaba was penalized, in application of the ISL, 6 yrs and 1 day as minimum and 8 yrs as maximum of prision mayor and fine of 300k. CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. Thus, the present appeal.

Mantalaba: the lower court gravely erred in convicting him and that there was no evidence of actual sale between him and the poser-buyer during the buy-bust operation. He also claims that the chain of custody of the seized shabu was not established.

Issue: Whether Mantalaba is guilty of drug trafficking and possession.

Ruling:

The petition is without merit.

The buy-bust operation was valid, establishing the following: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefore. From the above testimony of the prosecution witness, it was well established that the elements have been satisfactorily met. The seller and the poseur-buyer were properly identified. The subject dangerous drug, as well as the marked money used, were also satisfactorily presented. The testimony was also clear as to the manner in which the buy-bust operation was conducted.

Non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with Section 21 is not fatal as long as there is justifiable ground therefor, and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team. Its non-compliance will not render an accused arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible.

As to his minority, Mantalaba was minor during the buy-bust operation but was of legal age during the promulgation of the decision. It must be noted that RA 9344 took effect after the promulgation of the RTC's decision against Mantalaba. The RTC did not suspend the sentence in accordance with PD 603 (Child and Youth Welfare Code) and Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law that were applicable at the time of the promulgation of the judgment. However, as ruled in People vs Sarcia, suspension of sentence can still be applied but NOT when the offender upon the promulgation of judgment is 21 yrs old. or older. Mantalaba is now 21 yrs old, therefore his suspension of sentence is already moot and academic.

But as to the penalty, CA must have appreciated Mantalaba's minority as privileged mitigating circumstance in fixing the penalty. Thus, applying the rules stated above, the proper penalty should be one degree lower than reclusion perpetua, which is reclusion temporal, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority having been appreciated. Necessarily, also applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISLAW), the minimum penalty should be taken from the penalty next lower in degree which is prision mayor and the maximum penalty shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal, there being no other mitigating circumstance nor aggravating circumstance. 

G.R. No. 206666 Case Digest

G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015

Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidal, Alfredo Lim

vs COMELEC and Joseph Ejercito Estrada

Ponente: Leonardo-de Castro

Facts:

September 2007, Sandiganbayan convicted Estrada for the crime of plunder with the penalty of reclusion perpetua and accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification.

October 2007, President Arroyo extended executive clemency, by way of pardon to Estrada with "WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office,IN VIEW HEREOF and pursuant to the authority conferred upon me by the Constitution, I hereby grant executive clemency to JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, convicted by the Sandiganbayan of Plunder and imposed a penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. He is hereby restored to his civil and political rights." Which Estrada received and accepted by affixing his signature.

November 2009, Estrada filed a certificate of candidacy for the position of President and has earned 3 oppositions in the COMELEC. In 2012, Estrada filed a COC vying for the position of Manila City Mayor. Then, Risos-Vidal filed a petition for disqualification against Estrada.

COMELEC: petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Risos-Vidal failed to present cogent proof sufficient to reverse Estrada's right to seek public office as effectively restored by the pardon vested by Arroyo.

Risos-Vidal then invoked the Court's jurisdiction saying that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it failed to disqualify Estrada for having been convicted of plunder, an offense involving moral turpitude. And for failing to consider the perpetual disqualification of Estrada.

Issue: whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that former President Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted for in public office as a result of the pardon granted to him by former President Arroyo.

Ruling:

ART. 36. Pardon; its effects.– A pardon shall not work the restoration of the right to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon.

A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence.

ART. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal – Their accessory penalties.– The penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal shall carry with them that of civil interdiction for life or during the period of the sentence as the case may be, and that of perpetual absolute disqualification which the offender shall suffer even though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.

Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified.

The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make the pardon conditional.

Contrary to Risos-Vidal’s declaration, the third preambular clause of the pardon, i.e., "[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office," neither makes the pardon conditional, nor militate against the conclusion that former President Estrada’s rights to suffrage and to seek public elective office have been restored.

This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly impose a condition or limitation, considering the unqualified use of the term "civil and political rights"as being restored. Jurisprudence educates that a preamble is not an essential part of an act as it is an introductory or preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the enactment, usually introduced by the word "whereas." Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute because, strictly speaking, they are not part of the operative language of the statute. In this case, the whereas clause at issue is not an integral part of the decree of the pardon, and therefore, does not by itself alone operate to make the pardon conditional or to make its effectivity contingent upon the fulfilment of the aforementioned commitment nor to limit the scope of the pardon.

G.R. No. 152644 Case Digest

G.R. No. 152644, February 10, 2006

John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid and Pedro Hernandez

vs People of the Philippines

Ponente: Carpio

Facts:

Loney, Reid and Hernandez are the President, CEO and Senior Manager and Resident Manager for Mining Operation of Marcopper in Marinduque. Marcopper built concrete plug at the tunnels discharging tons of tailing into Boac and Makalupnit rivers.

DOJ then filed separate charges against the petitioners in MTC Marinduque for violation of Art. 19 of PD 1067 or the Water code of the Philippines, Section 8 of PD 984 or the National Pollution Control Decree, Section 108 of RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 2005 and Art. 365 of the RPC for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property.

Petitioners moved to quash the information saying that the (1) information was duplicitous for it charges more than one offense for a single act, (2) that Loney and Reid were not yet officers when this incident took place and (3) that the informations contain allegations which constitute legal excuse or justification.

MTC: partially granted the quashing of the informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984 but maintained violation of RA 7942 and RPC. MTC then  issued a consolidated order in so far as the offense against RPC. With such, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with RTC-Marinduque assailing the Consolidated Order.

RTC: granted appeal but denied the petition for certiorari. Consolidated Order was affirmed and ordered the reinstatement of the informations pertaining to the violation of PD 1967 and PD 984. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA alleging grave abuse of discretion reiterating the defense that the informations were made out from a single act.

CA: affirmed RTC

Issues: Whether all the charges filed against petitioners except one should be quashed for duplicity of charges and only the charge for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property should stand.

Ruling:

No duplicity. Duplicity of charges means a single complaint or information charges more than on offense. The filing of several charges is proper. A single act or incident might offend two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution for more than one offense. The only limit is double jeopardy.

G.R. No. 78214 Case Digest

G.R. No. 78214, December 5, 1988

Yolanda Caballes

vs Dept. Agrarian Reform, Hon. Heherson Alvarez and Bienvenido Abajon

Ponente: Sarmiento

Facts:

The landholding subject of the controversy is consists of 60 sqm was acquired by spouses Arturo and Yolanda Caballes by virute of a Deed of Sale executed by Andrea Alicaba Millenes, this land is situated in Lawaan Talisay, Cebu. Before the sale of the property to Caballes, Bienvenido Abajon constructed his house on a protion of the land, paying monthly rental to Andrea Millenes. Abjon was likewise allowed to plant thereon, and they have agreed that the produce thereon would be shred by them 50-50.

When the property was sold, Caballes told Abajon that they will put up a poultry on the land and they intended to build it close to Abajon's house and they pursuaded Abajon to transfer his dwelling to the opposite portion of the land. Abajon offered to pay renta; to the new owners, but they refuse and later demanded for Abajon to vacate. Abajon refused to leave.

DAR concluded that Abajon was a tenant of the former owner, Andrea.

Issue: Whether Abajon is a tenant under the new owners.

Ruling:

Abajon is not a tenant for it only occupied a miniscule portion of the land which cannot be interpreted as economic-family size farm under the definition of RA 3844.

The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are:

1.            The parties are the landowner and the tenant;

2.            The subject is agricultural land;

3.            There is consent;

4.            The purpose is agricultural production;

5.            There is personal cultivation; and

6.            There is sharing of harvests.

All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the parties. The absence of one does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or a planter thereon, a de jure tenant. This is so because unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws.

Therefore, the fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship. Certainly, it is not unusual for a landowner to accept some of the produce of his land from someone who plants certain crops thereon. This is a typical and laudable provinciano trait of sharing or patikim, a native way of expressing gratitude for favor received. This, however, does not automatically make the tiller-sharer a tenant thereof especially when the area tilled is only 60, or even 500, square meters and located in an urban area and in. the heart of an industrial or commercial zone at that. Tenancy status arises only if an occupant of a parcel of land has been given its possession for the primary purpose of agricultural production. The circumstances of this case indicate that the private respondent's status is more of a caretaker who was allowed by the owner out of benevolence or compassion to live in the premises and to have a garden of some sort at its south western side rather than a tenant of the said portion.

Anent the second assignment of error, the petitioner argues that since Abajon, is not an agricultural tenant, the criminal case for malicious mischief filed against him should be declared as proper for trial so that proceedings in the lower court can resume.

G.R. No. 36213 Case Digest

G.R. No. 36213, June 29, 1989

Felix Gonzales and Carmen Gonzales

vs CA, deceased spouses Andres Agcaoile and Leonora Agcaoile, substituted by Lucia Sison

Ponente: Grino-Aquino

Facts:

October 1988, Lucia Sison filed a motion to be substituted in lieu of Andres and Leonora as she inherited the unsold lots of the deceased spouses. The court granted her motion.

Spouses are owners of parcels of land in Bulacan At the time of the purchased of the spouses, Maximo Cruz was th tenant who was planting palay thereon. Maximo continued as tenant until he died and was succeeded by his son Fidel Cruz. After 4 years as tennat, Fidel was succeeded by Pascual Gonzales, father of Felix Gonzales. In 1954, Pascual ceased to be a tenant because the land was proposed to be converted into residential subdivision.

Since 1956, spouses offered to pay rental and acted as agents for the sale of the subdivision lots. While they are renting, the spouses requsted that they may be allowed to plant palay on the lots that have not yet been sold. No specific agreement was concluded with regards of harvest, but spouses delivered part of the yield to Federico Mateo, defendants overseer.

When spouses defaulted in paying the rentals, the owner demanded for payment of rental or to vacate. Spouses then filed to elect the leasehold system and pray for a reliquidation of past harvest embracing the agricultural years. Before summons were served, owners initiated an action against the spouses for recovery of possession. CFI-Bulacan, favored Gonzales, the owner.

CA upheld the decision of the court saying that the property ceased to be an agricultural or farmland, having been converted as residential subdivision.

Issue: Whether an agricultural tenancy relationship can be created over land embraced in an approved residential subdivision.

Ruling:

There is no merit.  An agricultural leasehold cannot be established on land which has ceased to be devoted to cultivation or farming because of its conversion into a residential subdivision.

Petitioners may not invoke Section 36(l) of Republic Act No. 3844 which provides that "when the lessor-owner fails to substantially carry out the conversion of his agricultural land into a subdivision within one year after the dispossession of the lessee, the lessee shall be entitled to reinstatement and damages," for the petitioners were not agricultural lessees or tenants of the land before its conversion into a residential subdivision in 1955. Not having been dispossessed by the conversion of the land into a residential subdivision, they may not claim a right to reinstatement.

Furthermore, their admission that: (1) they leased from the respondents a lot (No. 1285-M) in the subdivision on which they built their house; (2) that as commission agents for the respondents, they were able to sell a subdivision lot to Clemente Bernabe, and received a P 300-commission on the sale; and (3) that "a number of other lots were sold by respondents to different buyers," (p. 51, Rollo) refutes the petitioners' contention that the development of the subdivision was a mere "scheme" to dispossess the previous tenant.

On the other hand, the petitioners' tactic of entering the subdivision as lessee of a homelot and thereafter cultivating some unsold lots ostensibly for temporary use as a home garden, but covertly for the purpose of later claiming the land as "tenanted" farm lots, recalls the fable of the camel that sought shelter inside its master's tent during a storm, and once inside, kicked its master out of the tent. Here, the private respondents' tolerance of the petitioners' supposedly temporary use of some vacant lots in the subdivision was seized by the latter as a weapon to deprive the respondents of their land.

G.R. No. L-62626 Case Digest

G.R. No. L-62626, July 18, 1984

Spouses Cayetano and Patricia Tiongson, etc.

vs CA and Teodoro Macaya

Ponente: Gutierrez

Facts:

1946, Severino Manotok donated and transferred to his 8 children and 2 grandchildren a 34 hectare land in Quezon City. Severino Manotok was appointed judicial guardian of his minor children. There was no tenant occupying the property at the time of the donation.

Later, Teodoro Macaya accompanied Vicente Herrera, the overseer of the property, went to the Manotok and pleaded that he be allowed to live in the property to prevent theft and to guard the property. Manotok allowed Macaya but imposed the condition that any time the owners needed to take the property, Macaya and his family must vacate, and that he could raise animals and plant according to his needs, and that the owners have no responsibility to Macaya and he will use only 3 hectares. These conditions were not put in writing.

In 1950, the property owners organized themselves as a corporation and transferred the 34 hectare land a capital contribution to the capital stock of the corporation. Later, when the owners demanded for payment of taxes, Macaya agreed to help pay the taxes by remitting 10 cavans of palay every year as his contribution. Later, owners requested Macaya to increase his contribution to 20 cavans, Macaya agreed. Later, Macaya pleaded that he will contribute 10 cavans only, the owners said the "he might as well not deliver anymore". Macaya did not deliver palays from then on.

1974, the owners executed a Unilateral Deed of Conveyance of the property to Patricia Tiongson, etc. Macaya was informed that the land is needed for house construction of the owners and was asked to vacate, Macaya pleaded that he may be allowed to harvest first before vacating. However, after harvest, Macaya did not vacate and even expand his cultivation to 6 hectares without the consent of the owners.

Issue: Whether there is tenancy relationship between the parties.

Ruling:

Real estate taxes of the property declare the land as residential. The physical view of the property also shows that the land was a rolling forestal land without any flat portion except the one tilled by Macaya.

As to the sharing, the decision of the petitioners not to ask for anymore contributions from Macaya reveals that there was no tenancy relationship ever agreed upon by the parties. Neither can such relationship be implied from the facts as there was no agreed system of sharing the produce of the property. Moreover, from 1946 to 1956 at which time, Macaya was also planting rice, there was no payment whatsoever. At the most and during the limited period when it was in force, the arrangement was a civil lease where the lessee for a fixed price leases the property while the lessor has no responsibility whatsoever for the problems of production and enters into no agreement as to the sharing of the costs of fertilizers, irrigation, seedlings, and other items. 

As to consent, the lot was taxed as residential land in a metropolitan area. There was clearly no intention on the part of the owners to devote the property for agricultural production but only for residential purposes. Thus, together with the third requisite, the fourth requisite which is the purpose was also not present.

There was no agreement as to any system of sharing the produce of the land. The petitioners did not get anything from the harvest and private respondent Macaya was using and cultivating the land free from any charge or expense.