G.R. No. 108941 Case Digest

G.R. No. 108941, July 6, 2000

Reynaldo Bejasa and Erlinda Bejasa

vs CA, Isabel Candelaria and Jamie Dinglasan

Ponente: Pardo

Facts:

This case involves two parcels of land located in Oriental Mindoro owned by Isabel Candelaria. October 1974, Candelaria entered into a 3-year lease agreement with Pio Malabanan wherein Malabanan agreed to clear, clean and cultivate the land, to purchase calamansi, and other seedlings, to attend and care for whatever plants thereon exist, to make the necessary harvest of fruits.

Malabanan, later hired the Bejasas to plant on the land and to clear it. On May 1977, Candelaria gave Malabanan a 6-year usufruct over the land. 1983, Malabanan died. Candelaria constituted Jaime Dinglasan as her attorney-in-fact, having powers of administration over the land.

October 1984, Candelaria entered into a new lease contract with Victoria Dinglasan, Jaime's wife with a 1-year term. On December 1984, Bejasas agreed to pay Victoria rent in consideration of an "pakyaw na bunga" agreement, with a term of 1 year.

After the 1 year period, Victoria demanded for Bejasas to vacate, but Bejasas continued to stay and did not give any consideration for its use, be in rent or share.  Candelarian again entered with a 3-year lease agreement with Dinglasans, and made Jaime her attorney-in-fact again. Jaime then filed a complaint before Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) seeking for ejectment of Bejasas. COSLAP dismissed the complaint.

Jaime then filed it with RTC for recovery of possession; the case was referred to DAR. DAR certified that ht e case was not proper for trial before the civil courts. Trial court dismissed the complaint of Jaime including the leasehold claim of Bejasas. Bejasas then filed a complaint for confirmation of leasehold and recovery of damages against Candelaria and Jaime.

RTC favored the Bejasas. On appeal, CA reversed the decision saying that (1) there was no tenant relationship, (2) Bejasas are mere overseers and not as permanent tenants, (3) the pakyaw contract have expired, (4) sharing of profits was not proven, (5) the element of personal cultivation was not proven.

Issue: Whether there is tenancy in favor of Bejasas.

Ruling:

There is no tenancy relationship. There was no proof of shared harvests. Between Candelaria (as owner) and the Bejasas, there is no relationship. Candelaria never gave her consent. As to the authority of Dinglasans, they had authority to bind the owner in a tenancy agreement, but there is no proof of such presented.

G.R. No. 176942 Case Digest

G.R. No. 176942, August 28, 2008

Nicorp Management and Development Corp.

vs Leonida de Leon

G.R. No. 177125, August 28, 2008

Salvador Lim

vs Leonida de Leon

Ponente: Ynares-Santiago

Facts:

August 2004, de Leon filed a complaint before Office of Provincial Afrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD)- Region 4 that Lim and NICORP be ordered to respect her tenancy rights over a parcel of land in Cavite, in the name of Leoncia de Leon and Susana de Leon (sisters of Leonida).

de Leon prayed that Lim and NICORP to respect her tenancy rights, as well as to restore the land to its original condition and not to covert it to non-agricultural use.

Lim denied de Leon was a tenant, alleging that de Leon  is a septuagenarian who is no longer physically capable of tilling the land, and that the MARO certified that the land had no registered tenant, and that de Leon cannot be considered landless tiller under CARP because she owns and resides in the property adjacent to the subject land which she acquired from inheritance.

NICORP asserted that it was not a proper party because it is still negotiating with the owners as to acquire ownership of the land, however, NICORP joins that de Leon was not a tenant.

PARAD referred the case to RARAD. RARAD dismissed the complaint for failure to prove substantial evidence of the agricultural tenancy relationship. DARAB affirmed the decision of the RARAD. On appeal, CA reversed the findings of RARAD/DARAB, saying that the letter of Susana to Dolores clearly acknowledged Rolando as tenant, and the sharing of produce was established by the affidavits of neighboring farmers.

CA also held that the reclassification of the land by Sangguniang Panlalawigan as residential cannot be given weight because it is only DAR that can reclassify or convert agricultural land to other classifications, and that the sale of the land to Lim was void because it was violative of CARP.

Issue: Whether de Leon was a tenant.

Ruling:

There is a tenancy relationship if the following essential elements concur: 1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; 3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) the harvest is shared between landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee. All the foregoing requisites must be proved by substantial evidence and the absence of one will not make an alleged tenant a de jure tenant. Unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure or covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws.

In the instant case, there is no substantial evidence to support the appellate court’s conclusion that respondent is a bona fide tenant on the subject property. Respondent failed to prove the third and sixth elements cited above. It was not shown that the De Leon sisters consented to a tenancy relationship with respondent who was their sister-in-law; or that the De Leon sisters received any share in the harvests of the land from respondent or that the latter delivered a proportionate share of the harvest to the landowners pursuant to a tenancy relationship.

As to the letter, de Leon was not mentioned at all in Susana's letter. de Leon will not necessarily be conferred the same status as tenant upon her son's death. There is no evidence that de Leon sisters consented to constitute respondent as their tenant on the subject land.

As to the affidavits, the affidavits did not mention at all that the De Leon sisters received a portion of the harvests or that respondent delivered the same to her sisters-in-law. The affidavits failed to disclose the circumstances or details of the alleged harvest sharing; it merely stated that the affiants have known respondent to be the cultivator of the land since time immemorial. It cannot therefore be deemed as evidence of harvest sharing.

As to the sale, the sale of the subject land to petitioners did not violate Sections 65 and 73(c) of R.A. No. 6657. There was no illegal conversion of the land because Sec. 65 applies only to lands which were covered by the CARP, i.e. those lands beyond the five-hectare retention limit allowed to landowners under the law, which were distributed to farmers-beneficiaries. In the instant case, it was not shown that the subject land was covered by the CARP. Neither was it shown that the sale was made to circumvent the application of R.A. 6657 or aimed at dispossessing tenants of the land that they till.

G.R. No. 70736 Case Digest

G.R. No. 70736, March 16, 1987

Bonifacio Hilario and Eduarda Buencamino Hilario

vs Hon. IAC and Salvador Baltazar

Ponente: Gutierrez

Facts:

January 1981, Salvador Baltazar filed a verified complaint with Courts of Agrarian Relation-Bulacan alleging that since January 1955 he had been continuous possession as a share tenant of a parcel of land in Bulacan which was previously owned by Socorro Vda. de Balagtas. Thereafter, the spouses Hilario began to threaten him to desist from entering and cultivating the land.

Baltazar claims that he became sa tenant of Socorro by virtue of a kasunduan executed in 1979. After the death of Socorro, he allegedly gave the share pertaining to the daughter of Socorro Corazon Pengzon. It was only in December 1980 that Baltazar knew that portion of the land was already owned by the Hilarios.

The Hilarios, aver that they acquired the land from the PNB after it had been foreclosed. CAR ruled that the land in question is not an agricultural land but a plain "bakuran". Hence, Baltazar is not a tenant.

CA however remanded the case to the lower court for further proceesings on the ground that the findings of CAR were not supported by substantial evidence. In compliance, CAR admitted additional evidence.

Again, CAR declared Baltazar as non-tenant. Baltazar appealed with IAC, IAC set aside the decision of the CAR  and entitling Baltazar security of tenure on the land. Spouse Hilario then petition for review.

Issue: Whether Baltazar is a tenant.

Ruling:

The evidence presented is more than sufficient to justify the conclusion that Baltazar is not a tenant of the landholding. (a) The kasunduan refers to 2-hectare land, while the landholding is only 4000 sqm. (b) When Socorro died, no new contract was executed. (c) Corazon did not receive any rental or share from the produce of the land.

G.R. No. 162070 Case Digest

G.R. No. 162070, October 19, 2005

DAR

vs Delia Sutton,etc.

Ponente: Puno

Facts:

Respondents inherited a land in Masbate which has been exclusively devoted to cow and calf breeding, the respondents made a voluntary offer to sell their land to DAR to avail of certain incentives under the law. When CARP took effect, it included to its coverage farms used for raising livestock, poultry and swine.

Since, SC en banc declared lands devoted to poultry and livestock not included in the definition of agricultural land in Luz Farms Case, respondents filed with DAR a formal request to withdraw their offer to sell saying that their land is exempted from the coverage of CARL.

In 1995, DAR partially granted the application of the respondents for exemption applying the retention limits (1hectare:1head of animal) with such, some portion of respondent's land were exempted, some portion were segregated and placed under Compulsory Acquisition. Respondents moved for reconsideration saying that the entire portion of the land must be exempted because it was solely devoted to cattle-raising, their motion was denied.

They filed a notice of appeal with the Office of the President assailing the constitutionality of CARL and pushing their application for exemption. The President affirmed the order of DAR. On appeal, CA declared the DAR Administrative Order (retention limits) null and void, favoring the respondents.

Issue: Whether DAR A.O prescribing a maximum retention limit for owners of lands devoted to livestock raising constitutional.

Ruling:

We find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution. The A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership. However, the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter alia, all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultry- raising. The Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine and poultry-raising are industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of agriculture or agricultural activity. The raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different from crop or tree farming. It is an industrial, not an agricultural, activity. A great portion of the investment in this enterprise is in the form of industrial fixed assets, such as: animal housing structures and facilities, drainage, waterers and blowers, feedmill with grinders, mixers, conveyors, exhausts and generators, extensive warehousing facilities for feeds and other supplies, anti-pollution equipment like bio-gas and digester plants augmented by lagoons and concrete ponds, deepwells, elevated water tanks, pumphouses, sprayers, and other technological appurtenances.

Lands devoted to raising of livestock, poultry and swine have been classified as industrial, not agricultural, lands and thus exempt from agrarian reform. Petitioner DAR argues that, in issuing the impugned A.O., it was seeking to address the reports it has received that some unscrupulous landowners have been converting their agricultural lands to livestock farms to avoid their coverage by the agrarian reform. Again, we find neither merit nor logic in this contention. The undesirable scenario which petitioner seeks to prevent with the issuance of the A.O. clearly does not apply in this case. Respondents family acquired their landholdings as early as 1948. They have long been in the business of breeding cattle in Masbate which is popularly known as the cattle-breeding capital of the Philippines. Petitioner DAR does not dispute this fact. Indeed, there is no evidence on record that respondents have just recently engaged in or converted to the business of breeding cattle after the enactment of the CARL that may lead one to suspect that respondents intended to evade its coverage. It must be stressed that what the CARL prohibits is the conversion of agricultural lands for non-agricultural purposes after the effectivity of the CARL. There has been no change of business interest in the case of respondents.

G.R. No. 86889 Case Digest

G.R. No. 86889, December 4, 1990

Luz Farms

vs Hon. Sec. of the Dept. of Agrarian Reform

Ponente: Paras

Facts:

Luz Farms is a corporation engaged in livestock and poultry business allegedly stands to be adversely affected by the enforcement of CARP. Luz Farms petitions CARP to be declared unconstitutional together with a writ of preliminary injunction or restraining the order. The Court resolved to deny the petition.

Later, after a motion for reconsideration, the Court granted the motion regarding the injunction and required the parties to file their respective memoranda.

Luz Farm: Livestock or poultry raising is not similar to crop or tree farming. Land is not the primary resource in this undertaking and represents no more than five percent (5%) of the total investment of commercial livestock and poultry raisers. Indeed, there are many owners of residential lands all over the country who use available space in their residence for commercial livestock and raising purposes, under "contract-growing arrangements," whereby processing corporations and other commercial livestock and poultry raisers.

DAR: livestock and poultry raising is embraced in the term "agriculture" and the inclusion of such enterprise under Section 3(b) of R.A. 6657 is proper. He cited that Webster's International Dictionary, "Agriculture — the art or science of cultivating the ground and raising and harvesting crops, often, including also, feeding, breeding and management of livestock, tillage, husbandry, farming.

Issue: Constitutionality of CARP, insofar as the said law includes the raising of livestock, poultry, swine in its coverage.

Ruling:

The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the word "agricultural," clearly show that it was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform program of the Government.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 insofar as the inclusion of the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith, are hereby DECLARED null and void for being unconstitutional and the writ of preliminary injunction issued is hereby MADE permanent.

G.R. No. 175175 Case Digest

G.R. No. 175175, September 29, 2008

Landbank of the Philippines

vs Heirs of Eleuterio Cruz

Ponente: Tinga

Facts:

Respondents are registered owners of an unirrigated riceland situated in Cagayan, which was placed by the government under the coverage of the operation land transfer under PD 27. LBP pegged the value of the land but was rejected the valuation.

Because of such rejection, SAC held that the value of the land different from that of the valuation made by the LBP, following the valuation made by the PARAD. On petition, the CA ruled that the area covered by the agrarian reform program was duly established before PARAD, however, CA affirmed the land valuation made by the SAC. Hence, this instant petition.

Issue:

Whether the SAC has the jurisdiction to determine the valuation of the land.

Ruling:

Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 states:

SEC. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors, shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farm workers and by government to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.

A perusal of the PARADs Decision dated 23 November 1999, which mandated payment of just compensation in the amount of P80,000.00 per hectare, reveals that the PARAD did not adhere to the formula prescribed in any of the aforementioned regulations issued by the DAR or was at least silent on the applicability of the aforementioned DAR regulations to the question of just compensation. The PARAD decision also did not refer to any evidence in support of its finding.

The SAC, meanwhile, referred to DAR A.O. No. 6, series of 1992, as amended, as the controlling guideline in fixing just compensation. Pertinently, to obtain the land value, the formula under said regulation requires that the values for the Capitalized Net Income, Comparable Sales and Market Value based on the tax declaration must be shown. Moreover, said formula has been superseded by DAR A.O. No. 05, series of 1998, which also requires values for Capitalized Net Income, Comparable Sales and Market Value, the same parameters laid down in the prior regulation.

Stating that no evidence was presented by respondents on the aforementioned parameters, the SAC ruled that it was constrained to adopt the finding of the PARAD, which fixed the value of the land at P80,000.00 per hectare. On appeal, the CA adopted the same finding. The general rule is that factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, are binding and conclusive on the Court. However, the rule admits of exceptions, as when the factual findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures or when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based.

A perusal of the PARAD decision, which was adopted by both the SAC and the CA, shows that its valuation of P80,000.00 per hectare is sorely lacking in any evidentiary or legal basis. While the Court wants to fix just compensation due to respondents if only to write finis to the controversy, the evidence on record is not sufficient for the Court to do so in accordance with DAR A.O. No. 5, series of 1998.

Decision of CA was reversed and set aside, the case was remanded to RTC to determine the just compensation.

G.R. No. 169008 Case Digest

G.R. No. 169008, July 31, 2008

Landbank of the Philippines

vs Raymunda Martinez

Ponente: Nachura

Facts:

The land owned by Martinez was compulsory acquired by DAR for the purpose of CARP, of which the LBP offered P1,955,485.60 as just compensation. Convinced that the amount was just and confiscatory, Martinez rejected it. Thus, PARAD conducted a summary administrative proceedings for the preliminary determination of the just compensation.

PARAD marked some inconsistencies in the figures and factors used by LBP in its computation, so they rendered an amount of P12,179,492.50 as just compensation.

LBP however, filed at the RTC-Romblon that the ruling of the DARAB on the just compensation has become final after the lapse of 15 days. Martinez opposed the motion. Later on, LBP instituted a petition for certiorari against PARAD, assailing that PARAD gravely abuse its discretion when it issued the order for the 12m just compensation despite the pending petition in the RTC.  CA, finding LBP guilty of forum-shopping dismissed the petition, Hence, this petition.

Issue:

(1) whether or not petitioner could file its appeal solely through its legal department; (2) whether or not petitioner committed forum shopping; and (3) whether or not the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) gravely abused his discretion when he issued a writ of execution despite the pendency of LBP’s petition for fixing of just compensation with the Special Agrarian Court (SAC).

Ruling:

The Court went on to rule that the petition for review on certiorari could not be filed without the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) entering its appearance as the principal legal counsel of the bank or without the OGCC giving its conformity to the LBP Legal Department’s filing of the petition. The Court also found petitioner to have forum-shopped when it moved to quash the PARAD resolutions and at the same time petitioned for their annulment via certiorari under Rule 65. Most importantly, the Court ruled that petitioner was not entitled to the issuance of a writ of certiorari by the appellate court because the Office of the PARAD did not gravely abuse its discretion when it undertook to execute the September 4, 2002 decision on land valuation. The said adjudicator’s decision attained finality after the lapse of the 15-day period stated in Rule XIII, Section 11 of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) Rules of Procedure.

On the supposedly conflicting pronouncements in the cited decisions, the Court reiterates its ruling in this case that the agrarian reform adjudicator’s decision on land valuation attains finality after the lapse of the 15-day period stated in the DARAB Rules. The petition for the fixing of just compensation should therefore, following the law and settled jurisprudence, be filed with the SAC within the said period. Following settled doctrine, we ruled in this case that the PARAD’s decision had already attained finality because of LBP’s failure to file the petition for the fixing of just compensation within the 15-day period.