G.R. No. 119655 Case Digest

G.R. No. 119655 May 24, 1996

Sps. Antonio A Tibay, etc.

vs Court of Appeals and Fortunate Life and General Insurance Co., Inc.

Ponente: Bellosillo

Facts:

January 22, 1987 Fortune Life issued a fire insurance policy in favor of Violeta Tibay and/or Nicolas Roraldo on their two-storey residential building located in Makati City, together with all their personal effects therein. The insurance was for P600k covering the period of Jan 23 19887 to Jan 23 1988. On Jan 23 1987 Violeta paid P600 of the premium of P2, 983.50 leaving a considerable balance unpaid.

On March 8, 1987, the insured building was completely destroyed by fire. Two days later Violeta paid the balance of the premium and filed, on the same day, a claim on the fire insurance policy. Fortune denied the claim. Violeta then filed for damages against Fortune representing the amount of the insurance policy plus interest and attorney's fees.

RTC adjudged Fortune liable for the claim of Violeta. On appeal, CA reversed the decision of the RTC declaring Fortune not liable. Hence this petition.

Issue: May a fire insurance policy be valid, binding and enforceable upon mere partial payment of premium?

Ruling:

We find no merit, hence, we affirm the CA.

In a contract of insurance, the consideration is the premium which must be paid at the time and in the way and manner specified in the policy, and if not so paid, the policy will lapse and be forfeited by its own terms.

Clearly the Policy provides for payment of premium in full. Accordingly, where the premium has only been partially paid and the balance paid only after the peril insured against has occurred, the insurance contract did not take effect and the insured cannot collect at all on the policy.

Petitioners maintain otherwise. Insisting that FORTUNE is liable on the policy despite partial payment of the premium due and the express stipulation thereof to the contrary, petitioners rely heavily on the 1967 case of Philippine Phoenix and Insurance Co., Inc. v. Woodworks, Inc. where the Court through Mr. Justice Arsenio P. Dizon sustained the ruling of the trial court that partial payment of the premium made the policy effective during the whole period of the policy. In that case, the insurance company commenced action against the insured for the unpaid balance on a fire insurance policy. In its defense the insured claimed that non-payment of premium produced the cancellation of the insurance contract.

The 1967 Phoenix case is not persuasive; neither is it decisive of the instant dispute. For one, the factual scenario is different. In Phoenix it was the insurance company that sued for the balance of the premium, i.e., it recognized and admitted the existence of an insurance contract with the insured. In the case before us, there is, quite unlike in Phoenix, a specific stipulation that (t)his policy . . . is not in force until the premium has been fully paid and duly receipted by the Company . . . Resultantly, it is correct to say that in Phoenix a contract was perfected upon partial payment of the premium since the parties had not otherwise stipulated that prepayment of the premium in full was a condition precedent to the existence of a contract.

In Phoenix, by accepting the initial payment of P3,000.00 and then later demanding the remainder of the premium without any other precondition to its enforceability as in the instant case, the insurer in effect had shown its intention to continue with the existing contract of insurance, as in fact it was enforcing its right to collect premium, or exact specific performance from the insured. This is not so here. By express agreement of the parties, no vinculum juris or bond of law was to be established until full payment was effected prior to the occurrence of the risk insured against.

The insurance contract itself expressly provided that the policy would be effective only when the premium was paid in full. It would have been altogether different were it not so stipulated. Ergo, petitioners had absolute freedom of choice whether or not to be insured by FORTUNE under the terms of its policy and they freely opted to adhere thereto.

It must be emphasized here that all actuarial calculations and various tabulations of probabilities of losses under the risks insured against are based on the sound hypothesis of prompt payment of premiums. Upon this bedrock insurance firms are enabled to offer the assurance of security to the public at favorable rates. But once payment of premium is left to the whim and caprice of the insured, as when the courts tolerate the payment of a mere P600.00 as partial undertaking out of the stipulated total premium of P2,983.50 and the balance to be paid even after the risk insured against has occurred, as petitioners have done in this case, on the principle that the strength of the vinculum juris is not measured by any specific amount of premium payment, we will surely wreak havoc on the business and set to naught what has taken actuarians centuries to devise to arrive at a fair and equitable distribution of risks and benefits between the insurer and the insured.

The terms of the insurance policy constitute the measure of the insurer's liability. In the absence of statutory prohibition to the contrary, insurance companies have the same rights as individuals to limit their liability and to impose whatever conditions they deem best upon their obligations not inconsistent with public policy.

Petition is denied.

G.R. No. 138941 Case Digest

G.R. No. 138941 October 8, 2001

American Home Insurance Company

vs Tantuco Enterprises, Inc.

Ponente: Puno

Facts:

Tantuco Enterprises is engaged in the coconut oil milling and refining industry. It owns two oil mills both located in Lucena City. The two oil mills were separately covered by fire insurance policies issued by American Home, 3M and 6M respectively to the two mills.

A fire broke out on September 30, 1991 gutted and consumed the new oil mill (6M policy). Tantuco immediately notified the insurance company of the incident. American Home then sent appraisers who inspected the burned premises and the properties destroyed. Thereafter, American Home rejected the insurance claim on ground that no policy was issued covering the burned oil mill, saying that the 6M policy insures the property located in building no. 5, while the affected oil mill was under building no. 14.

A complaint for specific performance and damages was consequently instituted by the respondent with the RTC. RTC rendered the insurance company liable on the insurance policy. American Home appealed at the CA, but the CA upheld the same decision.

Issues:

(1) The Court of Appeals erred in its conclusion that the issue of non-payment of the premium was beyond its jurisdiction because it was raised for the first time on appeal.

(2) The Court of Appeals erred in its legal interpretation of 'Fire Extinguishing Appliances Warranty' of the policy.

(3) With due respect, the conclusion of the Court of Appeals giving no regard to the parole evidence rule and the principle of estoppel is erroneous.

Ruling:

Petition is devoid of merit.

(1) In construing the words used descriptive of a building insured, the greatest liberality is shown by the courts in giving effect to the insurance. In view of the custom of insurance agents to examine buildings before writing policies upon them, and since a mistake as to the identity and character of the building is extremely unlikely, the courts are inclined to consider that the policy of insurance covers any building which the parties manifestly intended to insure, however inaccurate the description may be.

Notwithstanding, therefore, the misdescription in the policy, it is beyond dispute, to our mind, that what the parties manifestly intended to insure was the new oil mill. This is obvious from the categorical statement embodied in the policy, extending its protection:

On machineries and equipment with complete accessories usual to a coconut oil mill including stocks of copra, copra cake and copra mills whilst contained in the new oil mill building, situate (sic) at UNNO. ALONG NATIONAL HIGH WAY, BO. IYAM, LUCENA CITY UNBLOCKED.

If the parties really intended to protect the first oil mill, then there is no need to specify it as new.

(2) Anent petitioner's argument that the respondent is barred by estoppel from claiming that the description of the insured oil mill in the policy was wrong, we find that the same proceeds from a wrong assumption. Evidence on record reveals that respondent's operating manager, Mr. Edison Tantuco, notified Mr. Borja (the petitioner's agent with whom respondent negotiated for the contract) about the inaccurate description in the policy. However, Mr. Borja assured Mr. Tantuco that the use of the adjective new will distinguish the insured property. The assurance convinced respondent, despite the impreciseness in the specification of the boundaries, the insurance will cover the new oil mill.

(3) When the issues to be resolved in the trial court were formulated at the pre-trial proceedings, the question of the supposed inadequate payment was never raised. Most significant to point, petitioner fatally neglected to present, during the whole course of the trial, any witness to testify that respondent indeed failed to pay the full amount of the premium.

(4) Petitioner argues that the warranty clearly obligates the insured to maintain all the appliances specified therein. The breach occurred when the respondent failed to install internal fire hydrants inside the burned building as warranted. This fact was admitted by the oil mill's expeller operator, Gerardo Zarsuela.

Again, the argument lacks merit. We agree with the appellate court's conclusion that the aforementioned warranty did not require respondent to provide for all the fire extinguishing appliances enumerated therein. Additionally, we find that neither did it require that the appliances are restricted to those mentioned in the warranty. In other words, what the warranty mandates is that respondent should maintain in efficient working condition within the premises of the insured property, fire fighting equipments such as, but not limited to, those identified in the list, which will serve as the oil mill's first line of defense in case any part of it bursts into flame.

To be sure, respondent was able to comply with the warranty. Within the vicinity of the new oil mill can be found the following devices: numerous portable fire extinguishers, two fire hoses, fire hydrant, and an emergency fire engine. All of these equipments were in efficient working order when the fire occurred.

G.R. No. 116940 Case Digest

G.R. No. 116940 June 11, 1997

The Phil. American Gen. Insurance Co., Inc.

vs Court of Appeals and Felman Shipping Lines

Ponente: Bellosillo

Facts:

July 6, 1983 Coca-cola loaded on board MV Asilda, owned and operated by Felman, 7,500 cases of 1-liter Coca-Cola soft drink bottles to be transported to Zamboanga City to Cebu. The shipment was insured with Philamgen.

July 7, the vessel sank in Zamboanga del Norte. July 15, cocacola filed a claim with respondent Felman for recovery of damages. Felman denied thus prompted cocacola to file an insurance claim with Philamgen. Philamgen later on claimed its right of subrogation against Felman which disclaimed any liability for the loss.

Philamgen alleged that the sinking and loss were due to the vessel's unseaworthiness, that the vessel was improperly manned and its officers were grossly negligent. Felman filed a motion to dismiss saying that there is no right of subrogation in favor of Philamgen was transmitted by the shipper.

RTC dismissed the complaint of Philamgen. CA set aside the dismissal and remanded the case to the lower court for trial on the merits. Felman filed a petition for certiorari but was denied.

RTC rendered judgment in favor of Felman. it ruled that the vessel was seaworthy when it left the port of Zamboanga as evidenced by the certificate issued by the Phil. Coast Guard and the ship owner’s surveyor. Thus, the loss is due to a fortuitous event, in which, no liability should attach unless there is stipulation or negligence.

On appeal, CA rendered judgment finding the vessel unseaworthy for the cargo for being top-heavy and the cocacola bottles were also improperly stored on deck. Nonetheless, the CA denied the claim of Philamgen, saying that Philamgen was not properly subrogated to the rights and interests of the shipper plus the filing of notice of abandonment had absolved the ship owner from liability under the limited liability rule.

Issues: (a) Whether the vessel was seaworthy, (b) whether limited liability rule should apply and (c) whether Philamgen was properly subrogated to the rights against Felman.

Ruling:

(a) The vessel was unseaworthy. The proximate cause thru the findings of the Elite Adjusters, Inc., is the vessel's being top-heavy. Evidence shows that days after the sinking coca-cola bottles were found near the vicinity of the sinking which would mean that the bottles were in fact stowed on deck which the vessel was not designed to carry substantial amount of cargo on deck. The inordinate loading of cargo deck resulted in the decrease of the vessel's metacentric height thus making it unstable.

(b) Art. 587 of the Code of Commerce is not applicable, the agent is liable for the negligent acts of the captain in the care of the goods. This liability however can be limited through abandonment of the vessel, its equipment and freightage. Nonetheless, there are exceptions wherein the ship agent could still be held answerable despite the abandonment, as where the loss or injury was due to the fault of the ship owner and the captain. The international rule is that the right of abandonment of vessels, as legal limitation of liability, does not apply to cases where the injury was occasioned by the fault of the ship owner. Felman was negligent, it cannot therefore escape liability.

(c) Generally, in marine insurance policy, the assured impliedly warrants to the assurer that the vessel is seaworthy and such warranty is as much a term of the contract as if expressly written on the face of the policy. However, the implied warranty of seaworthiness can be excluded by terms in writing in the policy of the clearest language. The marine policy issued by Philamgen to cocacola has dispensed that the "seaworthiness of the vessel as between the assured and the underwriters in hereby admitted."

The result of the admission of seaworthiness by Philamgen may mean two things: (1) the warranty of seaworthiness is fulfilled and (2) the risk of unseaworthiness is assumed by the insurance company. This waiver clause would mean that Philamgen has accepted the risk of unseaworthiness, therefore Philamgen is liable.

On the matter of subrogation, it is provided that;

 Art. 2207.            If the plaintiff's property has been insured, and he has received indemnity from the insurance company for the injury or loss arising out of the wrong or breach of contract complained of, the insurance company shall be subrogated to the rights of the insured against the wrongdoer or the person who has violated the contract. If the amount paid by the insurance company does not fully cover the injury or loss, the aggrieved party shall be entitled to recover the deficiency from the person causing the loss or injury.

Pan Malayan Insurance Corp. vs CA: The right of subrogation is not dependent upon, nor does it grow out of any privity of contract or upon payment by the insurance company of the insurance claim. It accrues simply upon payment by the insurance company of the insurance claim.

Therefore, the payment made by PHILAMGEN to Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc., gave the former the right to bring an action as subrogee against FELMAN. Having failed to rebut the presumption of fault, the liability of FELMAN for the loss of the 7,500 cases of 1-liter Coca-Cola soft drink bottles is inevitable.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Respondent FELMAN SHIPPING LINES is ordered to pay petitioner PHILIPPINE AMERICAN GENERAL INSURANCE CO., INC.

G.R. No. 168546 Case Digest

G.R. No. 168546, July 23, 2008

Michael Padua, petitioner

vs. People of the Philippines, respondent

Ponente: Quisumbing

Facts:

June 16, 2003, Padua and Edgar Ubalde were charged before the RTC Pasig of violation of R.A. No. 9165 [Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs act of 2002] for selling dangerous drugs. When arraigned, Padua assisted by counsel de officio entered a plea of not guilty. During the pre-trial, Padua’s counsel de officio manifested that his client was willing to withdraw his plea of not guilty and enter a plea of guilty to avail the benefits granted to 1^st time offenders. The prosecutor interposed no objection, thus the not guilty plea was withdrawn, Padua re-arraigned and pleaded guilty.

Padua then filed a petition for probation alleging that he is a minor and a 1^st time offender, and that he possess all qualifications and none of the disqualifications of the probation law. RTC ordered for the post-sentenced investigation and recommendation and comment of the probation office and the city prosecutor relatively.

Pasana, the chief probation and parole officer recommended Padua to be placed on probation. However, Judge Reyes-Carpio issued an order denying the petition for probation on the ground that under R.A. No. 9165, any person convicted of drug trafficking cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law.

Padua filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. He filed for a petition for certiorari, but the CA dismissed his petition.

Issue: Whether Padua can avail the benefits of the Probation Law.

Held:

(1)    CA did not err in dismissing Padua’s petition for certiorari. The requisites for the certiorari must occur:  (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

“Without jurisdiction” means that the court acted with absolute lack of authority.  There is “excess of jurisdiction” when the court transcends its power or acts without any statutory authority.  “Grave abuse of discretion” implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

(2)    Any person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing, regardless of the penalty imposed, can not avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or P.D. No. 968.  The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says.  If a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.  This is what is known as the plain-meaning rule or verba legis.  It is expressed in the maxim,index animi sermo, or speech is the index of intention.  Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure.

(3)    Padua cannot argue that his right under Rep. Act No. 9344, the “Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006” was violated.  Nor can he argue that Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC otherwise known as the “Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law” has application in this case.  Section 68 of Rep. Act No. 9344 and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC both pertain to suspension of sentence and not probation.

Petitioner has already reached 21 years of age or over and thus, could no longer be considered a child for purposes of applying Rep. Act 9344. Thus, the application of Sections 38 and 40 appears moot and academic as far as his case is concerned.

G.R. No. 181306 Case Digest

G.R. No. 181306, March 21, 2011

Paterno de los Santos, Jr.

Vs Court of Appeals, et al.

Facts:

On November 20, 1996, RTC Cebu rendered a decision finding petitioner Paterno guilty of crime intentional abortion. Petitioner appealed his conviction to the CA. CA affirmed the conviction with modification as to the penalty.

Petitioner then filed an application for probation. CA denied the application. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was likewise denied. CA contends that the petitioner is ineligible to apply for probation, considering the fact that he has waived his right to avail the benefits of probation law when he appealed the judgment of conviction by the RTC.

Petitioner argues that his case is an exception provided by law – an accused who has appealed his conviction from the benefits of probation, he only became eligible only after the CA modified the judgment and reduced the maximum term of the penalty imposed to 3 years, 6months and 21 days.

In its comment, the Office of the Solicitor asserts that when the petitioner filed an appeal from the trial court’s decision, he was, in effect, precluded from the benefits of probation. Petitioner is disqualified for probation because the RTC sentenced him to suffer an imprisonment of more than 6 years which is not probationable.

Held:

Petition is without merit.

Probation is a special privilege granted by the State to a penitent qualified offender.

The pertinent provision of the Probation Law, as amended, reads:

Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant and upon application by said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction.

It is undisputed that petitioner appealed from the decision of the trial court. This fact alone merits the denial of petitioner's Application for Probation. Having appealed from the judgment of the trial court and having applied for probation only after the Court of Appeals had affirmed his conviction, petitioner was clearly precluded from the benefits of probation.

G.R. No. L-27365 Case Digest

G.R. No. L-27365, January 30, 1970

Felix Lazo, Mercedes Castro de Lazo and Jose Robles

Vs. Republic Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. represented by Antonio Koh, General Manager and as Attorney-in-fact of plaintiffs, Felix and Mercedes Lazo

Ponente: Makalintal

Facts:

December 12, 1963, plaintiffs spouses Lazo filed a complaint against Republic Surety and Insurance co., and its general manager Antonio Koh, the sheriff of Manila and the Register of Deeds of Manila. The spouses Lazo alleged that they guaranteed a loan between Jose Robles and the Philippine Bank of Commerce amounting to P12, 000.00 executed on August 18, 1953. The loan is executed with a real estate mortgage which was foreclosed extra-judicially on July 1, 1958 and sold to the mortgagee. Antonio Koh pursuant to the mortgage right, executed a deed of absolute sale of the foreclosed property. Because of which, the certificate of title of the spouses Lazo was cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of the company.

In a motion to dismiss filed by the defendants, they raised two issues: (a) that the complaint did not state a cause of action and the claim or demand set forth therein had already prescribed; (b) under the rules of court, an accounting could be demanded only in cases where real property is sold on execution by virtue of a final judgment. In the present case, the defendants maintained the redemption period had already expired when the action was commenced.

Issue: Whether or not the plaintiffs were entitled to the accounting sought by them; whether or not the right of redemption with respect to the foreclosed property was still available; whether the foreclosure is valid or not.

The RTC ruled that the transfer of the loan to the Republic Investment Co., Inc. constituted a novation of the obligation, and that the defendant company was released from its liability as co-debtor because it does not appear to have signed the new promissory note executed by the plaintiffs. Consequently, the court concluded, the real estate mortgage in favor of said defendant was extinguished, and the foreclosure thereof was a nullity.

The actuation of the trial court was not legally permissible especially because the theory on which it proceeded involved factual considerations neither touched upon the pleadings nor made the subject of evidence at the trial. Rule 6, Section 1, is quite explicit in providing that "pleadings are the written allegations of the parties of their respective claims and defenses submitted to the court for trial and judgment."

Held:

(1)    The parties admitted that the mortgage was valid and subsisting, therefore, to establish such premise was unnecessary and uncalled for.

(2)    The actuations of the parties after the mortgage was foreclosed, shows with overwhelming preponderance that the said mortgage had not been extinguished.

(3)    Implicit in the application of these provisions is the premise that the period for redemption of the property sold on execution (on extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage in the present case) has not yet expired. For if the right to redeem has been lost it stands to reason that there is no redemption price to speak of, to which the rents received by the purchasers are to be applied or credited.

(4)    The plaintiffs' position is that since the sheriff's certificate of sale was recorded in the office of the Register of Deeds for Manila on March 28, 1963, the one-year period of legal redemption had not yet expired when the action was commenced on December 12 of the same year.

(5)    It is clear, in the light of the facts and circumstances above set forth, that the parties had abandoned entirely the concept of legal redemption in this case and converted it into one of conventional redemption, in which the only governing factor was the agreement between them. The registration of the certificate of sale on March 28, 1963 was entirely unnecessary and irrelevant to the question of when the period of redemption agreed upon expired.

G.R. No. 124354 Case Digest

G.R. No. 124354, December 29, 1999

Rogelio Ramos and Erlinda Ramos (as guardians)

vs. Court of Appeals

Ponente: Kapunan           

Issue:

The court is called upon to rule whether a surgeon, an anesthesiologist and a hospital should be made liable for the unfortunate comatose condition of a patient scheduled for cholecystectomy.

Facts:

Erlinda Ramos experiencing a discomfort allegedly caused by the stone in her gall bladder sought professional advice. She was advised to undergo an operation for the removal of a stone in her gall bladder. She underwent series of examination and was declared fit for surgery.  Through the intercession Dr. Buenviaje, Erlinda and her husband met Dr. Hosaka and agreed to have the operation on June 17, 1985.

On the day of the operation, (according to Dr. Hosaka) something went wrong during the intubation. Rogelio, the husband reminded the doctor that the condition of his wife would not have happened, had he looked for a good anesthesiologist. Due to such, Erlinda stayed at the ICU for a month.

The petitioners filed a civil case for damages with the RTC of Quezon City against the respondents alleging negligence in the management and care of Erlinda Ramos. During the trial, the plaintiff presented the testimonies of Dean Herminda Cruz and dr. Gavino (present during the operation) to prove that the sustained by Erlinda was due to lack of oxygen in her brain caused by the faulty management of her airway by the respondent during the anesthesia phase. Respondent relied on the expert testimony of Dr. Jamora, a pulmonologist, to the effect that the cause of brain damage was Erlinda’s allergic reaction to the anesthetic agent.

After considering the evidences, RTC rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. Private respondents interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. CA rendered a decision reversing the findings of the RTC.  The decision of the CA was mistakenly received and has caused for the expiration of the reglementary period for the petitioners. The petitioners then filed for a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, however the CA denied the motion for extension.

In aid of a new counsel, the petitioners were granted extension of 30 days. The petitioners alleged the following issues: (a) CA erred in putting much reliance on the testimonies of respondents DR. Guttierrez, Dr. Calderon and Dr. Jamora; (b) in finding that the negligence of the respondents did not cause the unfortunate comatose condition of the petitioner; (c) in not applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor [the thing speaks for itself]

Held:

(1)    The denial of reglementary period is erroneous, because the delay is attributable to the fact that the decision was not sent to the counsel on records of the petitioners. It is elementary that when a party is represented by counsel, all notices should be sent to the party’s lawyer at his given address.

(2)    Res ipsa loquitor is a maxim for the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiff’s prima facie case and present a question of fact for defendant to meet an explanation. This maxim is not applicable for substantive law thus mere invocation and application of the doctrine does not dispense with the requirement of proof of negligence. Before the doctrine may be applied, the following requisites must be present: (a) the accident is a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence; (b) it is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant of defendants; (c) the possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated. [The control must be shown especially]. Medical malpractice does not escape from the application of this doctrine. Applying the maxim, we find that the damage caused by Erlinda is attributable to the negligence of her doctors.

(3)    As to the testimonies relied by the CA, we disagree. We hold that private respondents were unable to disprove the presumption of negligence on their part in the care of Erlinda and their negligence was the proximate cause of her piteous condition. Dr. Jamora does not qualify as an expert witness based on the standard set by the rules of evidence [Sec. 49. Opinion of expert witness – the opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is shown to possess, may be received in evidence.]. The alleged allergic reaction has no proof as well.

(4)    The court believes that the faulty intubation is the proximate cause of the comatose condition of the patient. Proximate cause is a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.

The doctors as well as the hospital was held liable for the injury incurred by Erlinda, due to their negligence in the operation and management for the hospital.