G.R. No. L-32957-8 Case Digest

G.R. No. L-32957-8 July 25, 1984

People of the Philippines

Vs. Pantaleon Pacis, Eliseo Navarro, Guillermo Agdeppa and Gines Dominguez

Ponente: Concepcion, Jr.

Facts:

This is an appeal of the accused Guillermo from the judgment of the CFI of Cagayan finding him guilty of the crime of frustrated murder.

On November 15, 1967 in the municipality of Sanchez Mira, province of Cagayan, the accused conspired together, armed with guns, with the intent to kill, with treachery and with evident premeditation and taking advantage of superior strength and feloniously attacked and shot Manuel Franco which caused his instantaneous death.

Pacis, one of the appellants and Negre were contenders for the position of mayor in Mira. Pacis was the candidate of the Nacionalista party and was the incumbent mayor, Negre was the candidate of the Liberal party. Franco, the deceased was the incumbent vice-mayor of Pacis but now the campaign manager of Negre.

In the morning of November 15, 1967, the day of the election, Franco and Basco went to Namunac Elementary school to get the election results from the precincts. Of which the two contenders met and from which the firing of gunshots came about.

Agdeppa denied participation in the commission of crimes and interposed an alibi. According to him, he was in Taguiporo where he was employed in the Agricultural Extension Office, at the time of the shooting incident occurred in Namuac. To support the alibi, he presented in evidence the time record he had accomplished and testimony of Jose Tabian who allegedly rode with him on his motorcycle.

The CFI, however, rejected the defense saying that the evidence of the prosecution is more worthy of credence. CFI specially cited the testimony of Basco which, is to its mind, more credible. Counsel for the appellant now contends that the CFI erred in convicting the appellant, citing the maxim of “falsus in uno falsus in omnibuss” [false in one thing is false in everything]

However, the maxim is not a positive law, neither is it an inflexible one of universal application. The testimony of a witness may be believed in part and disbelieved in part. The counsel for the appellant also claims that the bullet marks on the cement conclusively show that the shooting came from the street and not from the truck where Pacis, Navarro and Agdeppa were standing. The trial court discounted the theory.

Issue: Whether the CFI erred in convicting the accused.

Held:

The appellants defense of alibi has nothing to support except the doubtful testimony of Tabian and there is no conclusive evidence that it was physically impossible for the accused to be at the Namuac School which is only 18 kilometers from his office. 

G.R. No. L-15121 Case Digest

G.R. No. L-15121, August 31, 1962

Gregorio Palacio and Mario Palacio (minor)

vs Fely Transportation Company

Ponente: Regala

                      

Facts:

In their complaint, the Palacio alleged that Fely hired Alfredo Canillo as driver who negligently run over a child (Mario). Gregorio , the father of Mario is a welder and in the account of his child's injuries has abandoned his shop which is the family's source of income.

Fely filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that there is no cause of action against the company and that the cause of action is barred by prior judgment. But the court deferred the determination of the grounds alleged in the motion to dismiss until the trial of the case.

The defendant then alleges (1) that complaint states no cause of action against defendant, and (2) that the sale and transfer of the jeep AC-687 by Isabelo Calingasan to the Fely Transportation was made on December 24, 1955, long after the driver Alfredo Carillo of said jeep had been convicted and had served his sentence.

In view of the evidence presented, the lower court barred the judgment in the criminal case and held that the person subsidiarily liable to pay damages is Isabel Calingasan, the employer.

Issue: Whether Fely Transportation can be held liable for the damages.

Ruling:

The Court agrees with this contention of the plaintiffs. Isabelo Calingasan and defendant Fely Transportation may be regarded as one and the same person. It is evident that Isabelo Calingasan's main purpose in forming the corporation was to evade his subsidiary civil liability resulting from the conviction of his driver, Alfredo Carillo. This conclusion is borne out by the fact that the incorporators of the Fely Transportation are Isabelo Calingasan, his wife, his son, Dr. Calingasan, and his two daughters.

Accordingly, defendants Fely Transportation and Isabelo Calingasan should be held subsidiarily liable for P500.00 which Alfredo Carillo was ordered to pay in the criminal case and which amount he could not pay on account of insolvency.

G.R. No. L-41337 Case Digest

G.R. No. L-41337, June 30, 1988

Tan Boon Bee & Co., Inc.

vs The Hon. Hilarion Jarencio and Graphic Publishing, Inc., and Phil. American Can Drug Company

Ponente: Paras

Facts:

Tan is doing business under the name and style of Anchor Supply Co., sold on credit to Graphics paper products. On December 20, 1972, Graphic made partial payment by check to Tan. Then on 1973 Graphic failed to pay, in consequence, a writ of execution was issued by respondent judge, but the a fore stated writ having expired without the sheriff finding any property of Graphic, an alias writ of execution was issued on July 2, 1974.

Pursuant to the alias writ of execution, the sheriff levied upon 1 unit printing machine found in the premises of Graphic, which is scheduled for auction sale. Then PADCO desist the sheriff from taking the machine saying that the machine is not a property of Graphic. Notwithstanding the letter of PADCO, the sheriff proceeded with the auction sale and sold the property to Tan. Thereafter, the CFI nullified the sale and ruled in favor of PADCO.

Tan filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied for lack of merit. Hence,this petition.

Issue:

Whether the Judge gravely abused his discretion when he refused to pierce the PADCO;s identity.

Ruling:

Petitioner's evidence established that PADCO was never engaged in the printing business; that the BOD and officers of Graphic and PADCO were the same; that PADCO holds 50% of stock of Graphic. It was also extablished that the machine was in the premises of Graphics since May 1965 long before PADCO even acquired its alleged title in July 11, 1966.

Thus, respondent judge should pierced PADCO's veil of corporate identity.  

A.M. No. R-181-P Digest

A.M. No. R-181-P, July 31, 1987

Adelio Cruz

vs Quiterio Dalisay

Ponente: Fernan

Facts:

Dalisay, attached and levied the money belonging to complainant Cruz when he was not himself the judgment debtor in the final judgment of NLRC sought to be enforced but rather the company known as "Qualitrans Limousine Service, Inc." a duly registered corporation.

In his comments, Dalisay explained that he is just ding his ministerial duty. While it is true that the writ was addressed to the company, yet Cruz executed an affidavit stating that he is the owner of the company, and because of that, the counsel for the plaintiff advised him to serve notice of garnishment on the Philtrust Bank.

Ruling:

We hold that Dalisay's action calls for disciplinary action, especially for an officer directly connected with the administration of justice and the execution of judgments, must at all times be free from the appearance of impropriety.

G.R. No. 125986 Case Digest

G.R. No. 125986, January 28, 1999

Luxuria Homes Inc., and Aida Posadas

vs Hon. Court of Appeals, James Builder Construction and Jaime Bravo

Ponente: Martinez

Facts:

Aida and her 2 minor children co-owned a 1.6 hectare property in Sucat, Muntinlupa which was occupied by squatters. Aida then contracted Bravo regarding the development of the property and to negotiate with the squatters. 7 months later, Aida and her children assigned the property to Luxuria Homes, Bravo was a witness to the execution of the deed of assignment and the articles of incorporation of Luxuria.

Then in 1992, the relationship between Aida and Bravo turned sour, which resulted to Bravo demanding payment for services rendered in connection with the development of the land. Aida, refuses to pay. Thus, James Builder and Bravo initiated a complaint against Aida and Luxuria Homes.

The trial court declared Aida in default and ordered Aida, jointly and in solidum with Luxuria to pay Bravo. Aggrieved, Aida appealed to the CA. The CA then modified the decision of the trial court and deleted the award of moral damages on the ground that James Builder is a corporation and hence could not experience physical suffering and mental anguish.

Issue: Can petitioner Luxuria Homes be held liable to private respondents for the transactions supposedly entered into between Aida and Bravo?

Ruling:

We hold that the CA committed a reversible error in making Luxuria Homes liable. It cannot be said that the incorporation of Luxuria Homes and eventual transfer of the subject property to it were in fraud of private respondent as such were done with full knowledge of Bravo himself.

To disregard the separate juridical personality of a corporation, the wrong doing must be clearly and convincingly established. It cannot be presumed.

G.R. No. L-14441 Case Digest

G.R. No. L-14441, December 17, 1966

Pedro R. Palting

vs Sanjose Petroleum Inc.

Ponente: Barrera

Facts:

San Jose Petroleum a corporation organized and existing in the Republic of Panama, PETROLEUM filed with the Philippine Securities and Exchange Commission a sworn registration statement, for the registration and licensing for sale in the Philippines Voting Trust Certificates.

It was alleged that the entire proceeds of the sale of said securities will be devoted or used exclusively to finance the operations of San Jose Oil Company, Inc. which is a domestic mining corporation. Pedro R. Palting and others, allegedly prospective investors in the shares of SAN JOSE PETROLEUM, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission an opposition to registration and licensing of the securities on the grounds that the tie-up between SAN JOSE PETROLEUM, and SAN JOSE OIL, violates the Constitution of the Philippines, the Corporation Law and the Petroleum Act of 1949.

Issue:

Whether or not the "tie-up" between the respondent SAN JOSE PETROLEUM, and SAN JOSE OIL COMPANY, INC., is violative of the

Constitution, the Laurel-Langley Agreement, the Petroleum Act of 1949

Held:

Yes. In the 1946 Ordinance Appended to the Constitution, this right was extended to citizens of the United States; states that to all forms of business enterprises owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by citizens of the United States in the same manner as to, and under the same conditions imposed upon, citizens of the Philippines or corporations or associations owned or controlled by citizens of the Philippines, would have the privilege of disposition, exploitation, development, and utilization of all Philippine natural resources. However, respondent is owned, controlled, directly and indirectly by Panamanian Corporation.

The Laurel-Langley Agreement also states that with respect to natural resources in the public domain in the Philippines, only through the medium of a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines and at least 60% of the capital stock of which is owned or controlled by citizens of the United States.

Although it was claimed that the corporation has stockholders residing in United States, there was no indication if they are all citizens of America, how much percentage do they occupy as stockholders, and if they have the same rules that apply to the conditions mentioned. In the circumstances, the court ruled that the respondent SAN JOSE PETROLEUM, as presently constituted, is not a business enterprise that is authorized to exercise the parity privileges under the Parity Ordinance, the Laurel-Langley Agreement and the Petroleum Law. Its tie-up with SAN JOSE OIL is, consequently, illegal.

The parity rights agreement is not applicable to SJP. The parity rights are only granted to American business enterprises or enterprises directly or indirectly controlled by US citizens. SJP is a Panamanian corporate citizen. The other owners of SJO are Venezuelan corporations, not Americans. SJP was not able to show contrary evidence. Further, the Supreme Court emphasized that the stocks of these corporations are being traded in stocks exchanges abroad which renders their foreign ownership subject to change from time to time. This fact renders a practical impossibility to meet the requirements under the parity rights. Hence, the tie up between SJP and SJO is illegal, SJP not being a domestic corporation or an American business enterprise contemplated under the Laurel-Langley Agreement.

G.R. No. 75885 Case Digest

G.R. No. 75885, May 27, 1987

Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co

vs. PCGG

Ponente: Narvasa

Facts:

Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Co., Inc (BASECO) – private corporation

Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) – issued the sequestration order

The corporation known as BASECO was owned or controlled by President Marcos during his administration, through nominees, by taking undue advantage of his public office and/or using his powers, authority, or influence, and that it was by and through the same means, that BASECO had taken over the business and/or assets of the National Shipyard and Engineering Co., Inc., and other government-owned or controlled entities.

As evidence found in Malacanang shortly after the sudden flight of President Marcos were certificates corresponding to more than ninety-five percent (95%) of all the outstanding shares of stock of BASECO, endorsed in blank, together with deeds of assignment of practically all the outstanding shares of stock of the three (3) corporations above mentioned (which hold 95.82% of all BASECO stock), signed by the owners thereof although not notarized. While the petitioner's counsel was quick to dispute this asserted fact, assuring the Court that the BASECO stockholders were still in possession of their respective stock certificates and had never endorsed them in blank or to anyone else, that denial is exposed by his own prior and subsequent recorded statements as a mere gesture of defiance rather than a verifiable factual declaration.

In accordance with Executive Orders Numbered 1 and 2 promulgated by President Corazon Aquino, PCGG through its commissioners and agent ordered sequestration, takeover and other provisional orders affecting BASECO.

Commissioner Diaz invoked the provisions of Section 3 (c) of Executive Order No. 1, empowering the Commission —To provisionally takeover in the public interest or to prevent its disposal or dissipation, business enterprises and properties taken over by the government of the Marcos Administration or by entities or persons close to former President Marcos, until the transactions leading to such acquisition by the latter can be disposed of by the appropriate authorities.

Issues:

1.      Are the provisional remedies involved in this case unconstitutional?

2.      Are the acts of PCGG and its Commissioners done without or in excess of its powers or with grave abuse of discretion?

3.      Was there a violation of the right against self-Incrimination and unreasonable searches and seizures?

Ruling:

1. No.

The Provisional or "Freedom" Constitution recognizes the power and duty of the President to enact "measures to achieve the mandate of the people to recover ill- gotten properties amassed by the leaders and supporters of the Marcos regime and protect the interest of the people through orders of sequestration or freezing of assets or accounts. And as also already adverted to, Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution treats of, and ratifies the authority to issue sequestration or freeze orders under Proclamation No. 3. The institution of these provisional remedies is also premised upon the State's inherent police power, regarded, as t lie power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property, and as the most essential, insistent and illimitable of powers in the promotion of general welfare and the public interest, and said to be co-extensive with self-protection and not inaptly termed also the law of overruling necessity.

2. No, PCGG’s general function is to conduct investigations in order to collect evidence establishing instances of ill-gotten wealth, issue sequestration, and such orders as may be warranted by the evidence thus collected and as may be necessary to preserve and conserve the assets of which it takes custody and control and prevent their disappearance, loss or dissipation; and eventually file and prosecute in the proper court of competent jurisdiction all cases investigated by it as may be warranted by its findings. It does not try and decide, or hear and determine, or adjudicate with any character of finality or compulsion, cases involving the essential issue of whether or not property should be forfeited and transferred to the State because ill-gotten within the meaning of the Constitution and the executive orders.

3. No. The right against self-incrimination has no application to juridical persons. While an individual may lawfully refuse to answer incriminating questions unless protected by an immunity statute, it does not follow that a corporation, vested with special privileges and franchises, may refuse to show its hand when charged with an abuse of such privileges.