G.R. No. L-30896 Case Digest

G.R. No. L-30896, April 28, 1983

Jose Sia

vs The people of the Philippines

Ponente: De Castro

Facts:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the CA affirming the decision of the CFI of Manila convicting the appellant of estafa.

Based on the information filed, the accused allegedly defraud the Continental Bank, under the obligation on the part of said accused of holding the said steel sheets in trust receipt agreement, which cold rolled steel sheets were consigned to the continental bank.

In reviewing the evidence, the CA came up with the following findings of facts which the solicitor general alleges should be conclusive upon this court:

Sia was general manager of the Metal Manufacturing Company of the Philippines, Inc. engaged in the manufacture of steel office equipment. He applied for a letter of credit to import steel sheets from Mitsui Bussan Kaisha, Ltd. of Japan, the application being directed to the Continental Bank.

Issue: (1) whether Sia, having only acted for and in behalf of the Metal Manufacturing Company of the Philippines as president thereof in dealing with the complainant, the continental bank he may be liable for the crime charged.

Ruling:

(1st issue) In disputing the theory of petitioner, the Solicitor General relies on the general principle that when a corporation commits an act which would constitute a punishable offense under the law, it is the responsible officers thereof, acting for the corporation, who would be punished for the crime, The Court of Appeals has subscribed to this view when it quoted approvingly from the decision of the trial court the following:

A corporation is an artificial person, an abstract being. If the defense theory is followed unscrupulously legions would form corporations to commit swindle right and left where nobody could be convicted, for it would be futile and ridiculous to convict an abstract being that cannot be pinched and confined in jail like a natural, living person, hence the result of the defense theory would be hopeless chose in business and finance. It is completely untenable. (Rollo [CA], p. 108.)

The act is imposed by agreement of parties, as a practice observed in the usual pursuit of a business or a commercial transaction. The offense may arise, if at all, from the peculiar terms and condition agreed upon by the parties to the transaction, not by direct provision of the law. The intention of the parties, therefore, is a factor determinant of whether a crime was committed or whether a civil obligation alone intended by the parties.

In the absence of an express provision of law making the petitioner liable for the criminal offense committed by the corporation of which he is a president as in fact there is no such provisions in the Revised Penal Code under which petitioner is being prosecuted, the existence of a criminal liability on his part may not be said to be beyond any doubt. In all criminal prosecutions, the existence of criminal liability for which the accused is made answerable must be clear and certain. The maxim that all doubts must be resolved in favor of the accused is always of compelling force in the prosecution of offenses. This Court has thus far not ruled on the criminal liability of an officer of a corporation signing in behalf of said corporation a trust receipt of the same nature as that involved herein.

(2nd issue) We consider the view that the trust receipt arrangement gives rise only to civil liability as the more feasible, before the promulgation of P.D. 115. The transaction being contractual, the intent of the parties should govern. The parties, therefore, are deemed to have consciously entered into a purely commercial transaction that could give rise only to civil liability, never to subject the "entrustee" to criminal prosecution.

G.R. No. L-32409 Case Digest

G.R. No. L-32409, February 27, 1971

Bache & Co., etc

vs Hon. Judge Vivencio Ruiz, etc.

Ponente: Villamor

Facts:

Petitioner prays to declare null and void the search warrant issued by the respondent judge against the petitioner corporation.

Allegedly, Judge Ruiz issued a search warrant against petitioners for violation of the National Internal Revenue Code by authorized Revenue Examiner de Leon to mail and file the application for search warrant. 3 days later, BIR agents served the warrant at the petitioner’s offices. Petitioner's lawyers protested the search on the ground that no formal complaint or transcript of testimony was attached to the warrant. The agents nevertheless proceeded with their search and yielded 6 boxes of documents.

Later, petitioners filed a petition with the CFI praying that the search warrant be quashed and declared null and void, with damages and attorney's fees. In the meantime, the BIR made a tax assessment on petitioner based on the documents seized, with the following reasons: (1) Judge Ruiz failed to personally examine the complaint and his witness. (2) The search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense. (3) The search warrant did not describe the things to be seized.

Ruling:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is granted. Accordingly, Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 issued by respondent Judge is declared null and void; respondents are permanently enjoined from enforcing the said search warrant; the documents, papers and effects seized there under are ordered to be returned to petitioners; and respondent officials the Bureau of Internal Revenue and their representatives are permanently enjoined from enforcing the assessments mentioned in Annex "G" of the present petition, as well as other assessments based on the documents, papers and effects seized under the search warrant herein nullified, and from using the same against petitioners in any criminal or other proceeding. No pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. L-19550 Case Digest

G.R. No. L-19550, June 19, 1967

Harry Stonehill,etc.

vs Hon. Jose Diokno, etc.

Ponente: Conception

Facts:

Respondents issued 42 search warrants against the petitioners. However, petitioners questioned the legality of the warrants on the ground that, according to them, (1) did not describe the particularity of the documents to be seized, (2) cash money not mentioned in the warrants were seized, (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence in a deportation case against them, (4) the search and seizure were made in an illegal manner, (5) the seized documents and money were not delivered to the courts.

In response, the respondents said that the (1) search was valid and if there are any defects, (2) it has already been cured by the consent of the petitioners. The court granted the preliminary injunction prayed by the petitioners, but it was partially dissolved as to the documents seized from the office of the corporation. Maintaining the injunction as regards to the documents seized in the residences of the petitioners.

In the corporate documents, the petitioners have no cause of action to question the legality of the warrants because the corporation have a separate personality from its stockholders. But with the documents seized in the residence may raise 2 questions to be settled:

Issues: (1) whether the search warrants were made under the authority and (2) and if the answer is negative, whether those documents may be used as evidence against the petitioners in deportation case.

Ruling:

Constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.

None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws.

Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights — that the things to be seized be particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants.

Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that, even if the searches and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein. Upon mature deliberation, however, we are unanimously of the opinion that the position taken in the Moncado case must be abandoned. Said position was in line with the American common law rule.

We are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions said motion for reconsideration, and the contents of the aforementioned affidavits and other papers submitted in support of said motion, have sufficiently established the facts or conditions contemplated in the cases relied upon by the petitioners; to warrant application of the views therein expressed, should we agree thereto. At any rate, we do not deem it necessary to express our opinion thereon, it being best to leave the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future.

We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are concerned; that the aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. 168546 Case Digest

G.R. No. 168546, July 23, 2008

Michael Padua, petitioner

vs. People of the Philippines, respondent

Ponente: Quisumbing

Facts:

June 16, 2003, Padua and Edgar Ubalde were charged before the RTC Pasig of violation of R.A. No. 9165 [Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs act of 2002] for selling dangerous drugs. When arraigned, Padua assisted by counsel de officio entered a plea of not guilty. During the pre-trial, Padua’s counsel de officio manifested that his client was willing to withdraw his plea of not guilty and enter a plea of guilty to avail the benefits granted to 1^st time offenders. The prosecutor interposed no objection, thus the not guilty plea was withdrawn, Padua re-arraigned and pleaded guilty.

Padua then filed a petition for probation alleging that he is a minor and a 1^st time offender, and that he possess all qualifications and none of the disqualifications of the probation law. RTC ordered for the post-sentenced investigation and recommendation and comment of the probation office and the city prosecutor relatively.

Pasana, the chief probation and parole officer recommended Padua to be placed on probation. However, Judge Reyes-Carpio issued an order denying the petition for probation on the ground that under R.A. No. 9165, any person convicted of drug trafficking cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law.

Padua filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. He filed for a petition for certiorari, but the CA dismissed his petition.

Issue: Whether Padua can avail the benefits of the Probation Law.

Held:

(1)    CA did not err in dismissing Padua’s petition for certiorari. The requisites for the certiorari must occur:  (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

“Without jurisdiction” means that the court acted with absolute lack of authority.  There is “excess of jurisdiction” when the court transcends its power or acts without any statutory authority.  “Grave abuse of discretion” implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

(2)    Any person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing, regardless of the penalty imposed, can not avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or P.D. No. 968.  The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says.  If a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.  This is what is known as the plain-meaning rule or verba legis.  It is expressed in the maxim,index animi sermo, or speech is the index of intention.  Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure.

(3)    Padua cannot argue that his right under Rep. Act No. 9344, the “Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006” was violated.  Nor can he argue that Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC otherwise known as the “Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law” has application in this case.  Section 68 of Rep. Act No. 9344 and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC both pertain to suspension of sentence and not probation.

Petitioner has already reached 21 years of age or over and thus, could no longer be considered a child for purposes of applying Rep. Act 9344. Thus, the application of Sections 38 and 40 appears moot and academic as far as his case is concerned.

G.R. No. 181306 Case Digest

G.R. No. 181306, March 21, 2011

Paterno de los Santos, Jr.

Vs Court of Appeals, et al.

Facts:

On November 20, 1996, RTC Cebu rendered a decision finding petitioner Paterno guilty of crime intentional abortion. Petitioner appealed his conviction to the CA. CA affirmed the conviction with modification as to the penalty.

Petitioner then filed an application for probation. CA denied the application. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was likewise denied. CA contends that the petitioner is ineligible to apply for probation, considering the fact that he has waived his right to avail the benefits of probation law when he appealed the judgment of conviction by the RTC.

Petitioner argues that his case is an exception provided by law – an accused who has appealed his conviction from the benefits of probation, he only became eligible only after the CA modified the judgment and reduced the maximum term of the penalty imposed to 3 years, 6months and 21 days.

In its comment, the Office of the Solicitor asserts that when the petitioner filed an appeal from the trial court’s decision, he was, in effect, precluded from the benefits of probation. Petitioner is disqualified for probation because the RTC sentenced him to suffer an imprisonment of more than 6 years which is not probationable.

Held:

Petition is without merit.

Probation is a special privilege granted by the State to a penitent qualified offender.

The pertinent provision of the Probation Law, as amended, reads:

Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant and upon application by said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction.

It is undisputed that petitioner appealed from the decision of the trial court. This fact alone merits the denial of petitioner's Application for Probation. Having appealed from the judgment of the trial court and having applied for probation only after the Court of Appeals had affirmed his conviction, petitioner was clearly precluded from the benefits of probation.

G.R. No. L-27365 Case Digest

G.R. No. L-27365, January 30, 1970

Felix Lazo, Mercedes Castro de Lazo and Jose Robles

Vs. Republic Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. represented by Antonio Koh, General Manager and as Attorney-in-fact of plaintiffs, Felix and Mercedes Lazo

Ponente: Makalintal

Facts:

December 12, 1963, plaintiffs spouses Lazo filed a complaint against Republic Surety and Insurance co., and its general manager Antonio Koh, the sheriff of Manila and the Register of Deeds of Manila. The spouses Lazo alleged that they guaranteed a loan between Jose Robles and the Philippine Bank of Commerce amounting to P12, 000.00 executed on August 18, 1953. The loan is executed with a real estate mortgage which was foreclosed extra-judicially on July 1, 1958 and sold to the mortgagee. Antonio Koh pursuant to the mortgage right, executed a deed of absolute sale of the foreclosed property. Because of which, the certificate of title of the spouses Lazo was cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of the company.

In a motion to dismiss filed by the defendants, they raised two issues: (a) that the complaint did not state a cause of action and the claim or demand set forth therein had already prescribed; (b) under the rules of court, an accounting could be demanded only in cases where real property is sold on execution by virtue of a final judgment. In the present case, the defendants maintained the redemption period had already expired when the action was commenced.

Issue: Whether or not the plaintiffs were entitled to the accounting sought by them; whether or not the right of redemption with respect to the foreclosed property was still available; whether the foreclosure is valid or not.

The RTC ruled that the transfer of the loan to the Republic Investment Co., Inc. constituted a novation of the obligation, and that the defendant company was released from its liability as co-debtor because it does not appear to have signed the new promissory note executed by the plaintiffs. Consequently, the court concluded, the real estate mortgage in favor of said defendant was extinguished, and the foreclosure thereof was a nullity.

The actuation of the trial court was not legally permissible especially because the theory on which it proceeded involved factual considerations neither touched upon the pleadings nor made the subject of evidence at the trial. Rule 6, Section 1, is quite explicit in providing that "pleadings are the written allegations of the parties of their respective claims and defenses submitted to the court for trial and judgment."

Held:

(1)    The parties admitted that the mortgage was valid and subsisting, therefore, to establish such premise was unnecessary and uncalled for.

(2)    The actuations of the parties after the mortgage was foreclosed, shows with overwhelming preponderance that the said mortgage had not been extinguished.

(3)    Implicit in the application of these provisions is the premise that the period for redemption of the property sold on execution (on extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage in the present case) has not yet expired. For if the right to redeem has been lost it stands to reason that there is no redemption price to speak of, to which the rents received by the purchasers are to be applied or credited.

(4)    The plaintiffs' position is that since the sheriff's certificate of sale was recorded in the office of the Register of Deeds for Manila on March 28, 1963, the one-year period of legal redemption had not yet expired when the action was commenced on December 12 of the same year.

(5)    It is clear, in the light of the facts and circumstances above set forth, that the parties had abandoned entirely the concept of legal redemption in this case and converted it into one of conventional redemption, in which the only governing factor was the agreement between them. The registration of the certificate of sale on March 28, 1963 was entirely unnecessary and irrelevant to the question of when the period of redemption agreed upon expired.

G.R. No. 124354 Case Digest

G.R. No. 124354, December 29, 1999

Rogelio Ramos and Erlinda Ramos (as guardians)

vs. Court of Appeals

Ponente: Kapunan

Issue:

The court is called upon to rule whether a surgeon, an anesthesiologist and a hospital should be made liable for the unfortunate comatose condition of a patient scheduled for cholecystectomy.

Facts:

Erlinda Ramos experiencing a discomfort allegedly caused by the stone in her gall bladder sought professional advice. She was advised to undergo an operation for the removal of a stone in her gall bladder. She underwent series of examination and was declared fit for surgery.  Through the intercession Dr. Buenviaje, Erlinda and her husband met Dr. Hosaka and agreed to have the operation on June 17, 1985.

On the day of the operation, (according to Dr. Hosaka) something went wrong during the intubation. Rogelio, the husband reminded the doctor that the condition of his wife would not have happened, had he looked for a good anesthesiologist. Due to such, Erlinda stayed at the ICU for a month.

The petitioners filed a civil case for damages with the RTC of Quezon City against the respondents alleging negligence in the management and care of Erlinda Ramos. During the trial, the plaintiff presented the testimonies of Dean Herminda Cruz and dr. Gavino (present during the operation) to prove that the sustained by Erlinda was due to lack of oxygen in her brain caused by the faulty management of her airway by the respondent during the anesthesia phase. Respondent relied on the expert testimony of Dr. Jamora, a pulmonologist, to the effect that the cause of brain damage was Erlinda’s allergic reaction to the anesthetic agent.

After considering the evidences, RTC rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. Private respondents interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. CA rendered a decision reversing the findings of the RTC.  The decision of the CA was mistakenly received and has caused for the expiration of the reglementary period for the petitioners. The petitioners then filed for a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, however the CA denied the motion for extension.

In aid of a new counsel, the petitioners were granted extension of 30 days. The petitioners alleged the following issues: (a) CA erred in putting much reliance on the testimonies of respondents DR. Guttierrez, Dr. Calderon and Dr. Jamora; (b) in finding that the negligence of the respondents did not cause the unfortunate comatose condition of the petitioner; (c) in not applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor [the thing speaks for itself]

Held:

(1)    The denial of reglementary period is erroneous, because the delay is attributable to the fact that the decision was not sent to the counsel on records of the petitioners. It is elementary that when a party is represented by counsel, all notices should be sent to the party’s lawyer at his given address.

(2)    Res ipsa loquitor is a maxim for the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiff’s prima facie case and present a question of fact for defendant to meet an explanation. This maxim is not applicable for substantive law thus mere invocation and application of the doctrine does not dispense with the requirement of proof of negligence. Before the doctrine may be applied, the following requisites must be present: (a) the accident is a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence; (b) it is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant of defendants; (c) the possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated. [The control must be shown especially]. Medical malpractice does not escape from the application of this doctrine. Applying the maxim, we find that the damage caused by Erlinda is attributable to the negligence of her doctors.

(3)    As to the testimonies relied by the CA, we disagree. We hold that private respondents were unable to disprove the presumption of negligence on their part in the care of Erlinda and their negligence was the proximate cause of her piteous condition. Dr. Jamora does not qualify as an expert witness based on the standard set by the rules of evidence [Sec. 49. Opinion of expert witness – the opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is shown to possess, may be received in evidence.]. The alleged allergic reaction has no proof as well.

(4)    The court believes that the faulty intubation is the proximate cause of the comatose condition of the patient. Proximate cause is a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.

The doctors as well as the hospital was held liable for the injury incurred by Erlinda, due to their negligence in the operation and management for the hospital.