G.R. No. 124354 Case Digest

G.R. No. 124354, December 29, 1999

Rogelio Ramos and Erlinda Ramos (as guardians)

vs. Court of Appeals

Ponente: Kapunan

Issue:

The court is called upon to rule whether a surgeon, an anesthesiologist and a hospital should be made liable for the unfortunate comatose condition of a patient scheduled for cholecystectomy.

Facts:

Erlinda Ramos experiencing a discomfort allegedly caused by the stone in her gall bladder sought professional advice. She was advised to undergo an operation for the removal of a stone in her gall bladder. She underwent series of examination and was declared fit for surgery.  Through the intercession Dr. Buenviaje, Erlinda and her husband met Dr. Hosaka and agreed to have the operation on June 17, 1985.

On the day of the operation, (according to Dr. Hosaka) something went wrong during the intubation. Rogelio, the husband reminded the doctor that the condition of his wife would not have happened, had he looked for a good anesthesiologist. Due to such, Erlinda stayed at the ICU for a month.

The petitioners filed a civil case for damages with the RTC of Quezon City against the respondents alleging negligence in the management and care of Erlinda Ramos. During the trial, the plaintiff presented the testimonies of Dean Herminda Cruz and dr. Gavino (present during the operation) to prove that the sustained by Erlinda was due to lack of oxygen in her brain caused by the faulty management of her airway by the respondent during the anesthesia phase. Respondent relied on the expert testimony of Dr. Jamora, a pulmonologist, to the effect that the cause of brain damage was Erlinda’s allergic reaction to the anesthetic agent.

After considering the evidences, RTC rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. Private respondents interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. CA rendered a decision reversing the findings of the RTC.  The decision of the CA was mistakenly received and has caused for the expiration of the reglementary period for the petitioners. The petitioners then filed for a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, however the CA denied the motion for extension.

In aid of a new counsel, the petitioners were granted extension of 30 days. The petitioners alleged the following issues: (a) CA erred in putting much reliance on the testimonies of respondents DR. Guttierrez, Dr. Calderon and Dr. Jamora; (b) in finding that the negligence of the respondents did not cause the unfortunate comatose condition of the petitioner; (c) in not applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor [the thing speaks for itself]

Held:

(1)    The denial of reglementary period is erroneous, because the delay is attributable to the fact that the decision was not sent to the counsel on records of the petitioners. It is elementary that when a party is represented by counsel, all notices should be sent to the party’s lawyer at his given address.

(2)    Res ipsa loquitor is a maxim for the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiff’s prima facie case and present a question of fact for defendant to meet an explanation. This maxim is not applicable for substantive law thus mere invocation and application of the doctrine does not dispense with the requirement of proof of negligence. Before the doctrine may be applied, the following requisites must be present: (a) the accident is a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence; (b) it is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant of defendants; (c) the possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated. [The control must be shown especially]. Medical malpractice does not escape from the application of this doctrine. Applying the maxim, we find that the damage caused by Erlinda is attributable to the negligence of her doctors.

(3)    As to the testimonies relied by the CA, we disagree. We hold that private respondents were unable to disprove the presumption of negligence on their part in the care of Erlinda and their negligence was the proximate cause of her piteous condition. Dr. Jamora does not qualify as an expert witness based on the standard set by the rules of evidence [Sec. 49. Opinion of expert witness – the opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is shown to possess, may be received in evidence.]. The alleged allergic reaction has no proof as well.

(4)    The court believes that the faulty intubation is the proximate cause of the comatose condition of the patient. Proximate cause is a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.

The doctors as well as the hospital was held liable for the injury incurred by Erlinda, due to their negligence in the operation and management for the hospital.

G.R. No. L-32957-8 Case Digest

G.R. No. L-32957-8 July 25, 1984

People of the Philippines

Vs. Pantaleon Pacis, Eliseo Navarro, Guillermo Agdeppa and Gines Dominguez

Ponente: Concepcion, Jr.

Facts:

This is an appeal of the accused Guillermo from the judgment of the CFI of Cagayan finding him guilty of the crime of frustrated murder.

On November 15, 1967 in the municipality of Sanchez Mira, province of Cagayan, the accused conspired together, armed with guns, with the intent to kill, with treachery and with evident premeditation and taking advantage of superior strength and feloniously attacked and shot Manuel Franco which caused his instantaneous death.

Pacis, one of the appellants and Negre were contenders for the position of mayor in Mira. Pacis was the candidate of the Nacionalista party and was the incumbent mayor, Negre was the candidate of the Liberal party. Franco, the deceased was the incumbent vice-mayor of Pacis but now the campaign manager of Negre.

In the morning of November 15, 1967, the day of the election, Franco and Basco went to Namunac Elementary school to get the election results from the precincts. Of which the two contenders met and from which the firing of gunshots came about.

Agdeppa denied participation in the commission of crimes and interposed an alibi. According to him, he was in Taguiporo where he was employed in the Agricultural Extension Office, at the time of the shooting incident occurred in Namuac. To support the alibi, he presented in evidence the time record he had accomplished and testimony of Jose Tabian who allegedly rode with him on his motorcycle.

The CFI, however, rejected the defense saying that the evidence of the prosecution is more worthy of credence. CFI specially cited the testimony of Basco which, is to its mind, more credible. Counsel for the appellant now contends that the CFI erred in convicting the appellant, citing the maxim of “falsus in uno falsus in omnibuss” [false in one thing is false in everything]

However, the maxim is not a positive law, neither is it an inflexible one of universal application. The testimony of a witness may be believed in part and disbelieved in part. The counsel for the appellant also claims that the bullet marks on the cement conclusively show that the shooting came from the street and not from the truck where Pacis, Navarro and Agdeppa were standing. The trial court discounted the theory.

Issue: Whether the CFI erred in convicting the accused.

Held:

The appellants defense of alibi has nothing to support except the doubtful testimony of Tabian and there is no conclusive evidence that it was physically impossible for the accused to be at the Namuac School which is only 18 kilometers from his office. 

G.R. No. 166579 Case Digest

G.R. No. 166579, February 18, 2010
Jordan Chan Paz
vs Jeanice Pavon
Ponente: Carpio

Facts:

In 1996, Jordan and Jeanice met when Jeanice was 19 and Jordan was 27. They had their civil wedding in 1997. They have one son, who was born on 1998. After a big fight, Jeanice left their conjugal home on 1999.

Jeanice then filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against Jordan alleging that Jordan was psychologically incapable of assuming the essential obligations of marriage; manifested by Jordan's tendency to be self-preoccupied and violent.

Psychologist Cristina R. Gates (Gates) testified that Jordan was afflicted with “Borderline Personality Disorder as manifested in his impulsive behavior, delinquency and instability.”[5]  Gates concluded that Jordan’s  psychological maladies antedate their marriage and are rooted in his family background. Gates added that with no indication of reformation, Jordan’s personality disorder appears to be grave and incorrigible.  

Jordan denied Jeanice allegations and denied any interview or psychological tests by Gates. 

RTC Ruling: granted Jeanice petition. 

Jordan then filed a notice of appeal which was promptly approved. Jeanice filed a motion to dismiss with the court of appeals. 

CA: dismissed Jordan's appeal and the next motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether Jordan is incapacitated to comply with the marital obligations.

Held: Petition has merit.

Jeanice failed to prove Jordan's incapacity. Saying that psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, judicial antecedence and incurability. 

G.R. No. 150666 Case Digest

G.R. No. 150666, August 3, 2010

Luciano Briones and Nelly Briones

vs Jose Macabagdal and Vergon Realty Investment Corporation

Ponente: Villarama, Jr.

Facts:

Respondents’ spouses purchased a land from Vergon Realty located in a subdivision in Las Pinas (Lot 2R) with a registered TCT. Vergon on the other hand owns the adjacent land (Lot 2S).

In 1984, after obtaining the building permit and approval of Vergon, Jose Macabagdal constructed a house on Lot 2R which they thought was Lot 2S. After being informed of the mix up, spouses immediately demanded for demolition of the house constructed. Jose, refused. Spouses then filed an action to recover ownership and possession of the said land in RTC Makati.

Jose, insisted that the lot which they constructed their house was the lot which was consistently pointed to them by the Vergon's agents over the 7-year period of paying the lot. They interposed the defense of being buyers in good faith and impleaded indemnity from Vergon because of the warranty against eviction, in case the suit is decided against them.

RTC ruled in favor of the spouses. Defendants were ordered to demolish their house and vacate the premises and return the possession of the lot to the spouses with damages. Defendants counterclaim as well as the 3rd-party complaint were dismissed for lack of merit and with no cause of action.  On appeal, CA affirmed the RTC. Saying that, there was no basis that the error was Vergon's fault and that they cannot invoke the defense of a purchaser in good faith for wrongful occupation of the land.

Thus, this petition.

Issue:

In the main, it is petitioners' position that they must not bear the damage alone. Petitioners insist that they relied with full faith and confidence in the reputation of Vergon's agents when they pointed the wrong property to them. Even the President of Vergon, Felix Gonzales, consented to the construction of the house when he signed the building permit. Also, petitioners are builders in good faith.

Held: Petition is partly meritorious.

RTC erred in out rightly ordering petitioners to vacate the subject property or to pay respondent spouses the prevailing price of the land as compensation.  Article 527[14] of the Civil Code presumes good faith, and since no proof exists to show that the mistake was done by petitioners in bad faith, the latter should be presumed to have built the house in good faith (Art. 448).

The builder in good faith can compel the landowner to make a choice between appropriating the building by paying the proper indemnity or obliging the builder to pay the price of the land. The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that accords with the principle of accession, i.e., that the accessory follows the principal and not the other way around.  However, even as the option lies with the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive. He must choose one. He cannot, for instance, compel the owner of the building to remove the building from the land without first exercising either option.  It is only if the owner chooses to sell his land, and the builder or planter fails to purchase it where its value is not more than the value of the improvements, that the owner may remove the improvements from the land.  The owner is entitled to such remotion only when, after having chosen to sell his land, the other party fails to pay for the same.

Moreover, petitioners have the right to be indemnified for the necessary and useful expenses they may have made on the subject property. Articles 546 and 548 of the Civil Code provide,

ART. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor in good faith may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor.

Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the same right of retention, the person who has defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding the amount of the expenses or of paying the increase in value which the thing may have acquired by reason thereof.

ART. 548.  Expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure shall not be refunded to the possessor in good faith; but he may remove the ornaments with which he has embellished the principal thing if it suffers no injury thereby, and if his successor in the possession does not prefer to refund the amount expended.

Consequently, the respondent-spouses have the option to appropriate the house on the subject land after payment to petitioners of the appropriate indemnity or to oblige petitioners to pay the price of the land, unless its value is considerably more than the value of the structures, in which case petitioners shall pay reasonable rent.

As to the liability of Vergon, petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to show negligence on Vergon's part. It is the plaintiff who has to prove by a preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose act he must respond; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the damages incurred.

G.R. No. 167017 Case Digest

G.R. No. 167017, June 22, 2009

Serafin Cheng

vs Spouses Vittorio and Ma. Helen Donini

Ponente: Corona

Facts:

Cheng agreed to lease his property located in Mandaluyong City to the spouses who intended to put a restaurant thereon, they agreed to a monthly rental of 17k to commence in December 1990. Bearing an interim grant of authority executed by Cheng, spouses proceeded to introduce improvements in the premises.

But before the business could take off and before final lease agreement could be drafted and signed, the parties began to have serious disagreements regarding the terms and conditions. Cheng then demanded for the deposits and rentals with the intention of not continuing with the lease. The spouses ignored the demand and continued to occupy the premises until their caretaker voluntarily surrendered the property to Cheng.

Spouses then filed an action for specific performance and damages with a prayer for the issues of writ of preliminary injunction in RTC Pasig. Respondents prayed that petitioner be ordered to execute a written lease contract for five years, deducting from the deposit and rent the cost of repairs in the amount of P445,000, or to order petitioner to return their investment in the amount of P964,000 and compensate for their unearned net income of P200,000 with interest, plus attorney’s fees.

Petitioner denied the claims and sought for moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. RTC favored the Cheng.

Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) which, in its decision[5] dated March 31, 2004, recalled and set aside the RTC decision, and entered a new one ordering petitioner to pay respondents the amount of P964,000 representing the latter’s expenses incurred for the repairs and improvements of the premises.

Issue: spouses possessors in good faith?

Held:

The relationship between petitioner and respondents was explicitly governed by the Civil Code provisions on lease, which clearly provide for the rule on reimbursement of useful improvements and ornamental expenses after termination of a lease agreement. Article 1678 states:

If the lessee makes, in good faith, useful improvements which are suitable to the use for which the lease is intended, without altering the form or substance of the property leased, the lessor upon the termination of the lease shall pay the lessee one-half of the value of the improvements at that time. Should the lessor refuse to reimburse said amount, the lessee may remove the improvements, even though the principal thing may suffer damage thereby. He shall not, however, cause any more impairment upon the property leased than is necessary.

With regard to ornamental expenses, the lessee shall not be entitled to any reimbursement, but he may remove the ornamental objects, provided no damage is caused to the principal thing, and the lessor does not choose to retain them by paying their value at the time the lease is extinguished.

Contrary to respondents’ position, Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code did not apply.  Under these provisions, to be entitled to reimbursement for useful improvements introduced on the property, respondents must be considered builders in good faith.  Articles 448 and 546, which allow full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is made, apply only to a possessor in good faith or one who builds on land in the belief that he is the owner thereof.  A builder in good faith is one who is unaware of any flaw in his title to the land at the time he builds on it.

Respondents are not entitled to reimbursement for the ornamental expenses under the express provision of Article 1678.  Moreover, since they failed to remove these ornaments despite the opportunity to do so when they vacated the property, then they were deemed to have waived or abandoned their right of removal.

(1) petitioner Serafin Cheng is ORDERED to pay  respondents, spouses Vittorio and Ma. Helen Donini, the amount of P171,650.95 as indemnity for the useful improvements; and

(2) respondents, spouses Vittorio and Ma. Helen Donini, are ORDERED to pay petitioner Serafin Cheng the following sums: (a) P100,000.00 moral damages; (b) P50,000.00 exemplary damages and (c) P25,000.00 attorney’s fees.

G.R. No. 153829 Case Digest

G.R. No. 153829, August 17, 2011

Roman Catholic Archbishop of San Fernando

vs Eduardo Soriano, etc.

Ponente: Villarama

Facts:

RCA claimed that it is the owner of the vast tract of land located in Pampanga covered with a registered TCT. RCA alleged that several individuals occupied the land and refused to vacate despite repeated demands. RCA, filed an ejectment case against the alleged intruders.

On the other hand, defendants countered that the RCA has no cause of action against them because its title is spurious. They contended that the subject land belonged to the State, but they have already acquired the same by acquisitive prescription as they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in continuous possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years.

RTC ruled in favor of the RCA. During the pendency of the ejectment case in the MCTC, some of the defendants claimed they are in actual possession of the land in the concept of owners and alleged that the title in the name of the RCA is fake.

Issue: Essentially, the issue before us is whether the CA erred in not holding that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to dismiss filed by the RCA.

Held: We affirm the ruling of the CA.

Well-entrenched in our jurisdiction is the rule that the trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a certiorari proceeding under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.  This is because a certiorari writ is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. The appropriate course of action of the movant in such event is to file an answer and interpose as affirmative defenses the objections raised in the motion to dismiss. 

The only exception to this rule is when the trial court gravely abused its discretion in denying the motion. This exception is, nevertheless, applied sparingly, and only in instances when there is a clear showing that the trial court exercised its judicial power in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.

The CA explained that the requirement stated in Article 477 is not a condition precedent before one can file an action for quieting of title.  Rather, it is a requisite for an action to quiet title to prosper and the existence or nonexistence of the requisite should be determined only after trial on the merits. The CA also agreed with the trial court in ruling that the RCA cannot raise in a motion to dismiss the ground that the complaint is already barred by laches for it still remains to be established during trial how long the plaintiffs have slept on their rights, if such be the case. 

The complaint filed with the RTC pertinently alleged that the claim of ownership by the RCA is spurious as its title, denominated as OCT No. 17629, is fake for the following reasons: (1) that the erasures are very apparent and the title itself is fake; (2) it was made to appear under Memorandum of Encumbrance Entry No. 1007 that the title is a reconstituted title when in truth, it is not; and (3) the verification reveals that there was no petition filed before any court where an order was issued for the reconstitution and re-issuance of an owner's duplicate copy. It is thus clear from the foregoing that the case filed questioning the genuineness of OCT No. 17629 is a direct attack on the title of the RCA.

In this case, the defendants in the ejectment case possess no such legal rights that merit the protection of the courts through the writ of preliminary injunction.  The MCTC has already rendered a decision in favor of the RCA and ordered the defendants therein to vacate the premises.  Their appeal to the RTC was dismissed and the decision has become final.  Evidently, their right to possess the property in question has already been declared inferior or inexistent in relation to the right of the RCA in the MCTC decision which has already become final and executory.

G.R. No. 154270 Case Digest

G.R. No. 154270, March 9, 2010

Teofisto Ono, etc.

vs Vicente Lim

Ponente: Bersamin

Facts:

1992, Lim filed in RTC Cebu a petition for reconstitution of the owner's duplicate copy of OCT, alleging that the same OCT was lost during World War 2 by his mother, Luisa. This land was located in Balamban, Cebu which was sold to Luisa by spouses Ono. Although the deed evidencing the sale was lost, the only legitimate son of Ono had executed a notarized document in favor of Luisa denominated as confirmation of the sale which was duly filed in Provincial Assessor's Office of Cebu.

Now, Spouses Ono's successors-in-interest opposed Lim's petition contending that they had the certificate of title of the land.

Lim then converted the petition into a complaint for quieting of title, averring that they had been in actual possession of the property since 1973, cultivating and developing it, enjoying its fruits and paying taxes corresponding to it.

The other party claimed that the land was never sold to Luisa, and that the confirmation by the legitimate son was fabricated, the signature not being authentic.

RTC ruled in favor of Lim. CA affirmed the RTC. The CA ruled that the action for quieting of title was not a collateral, but a direct attack on the title; and that the Lims' undisturbed possession had given them a continuing right to seek the aid of the courts to determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on their own title.

The petitioners raise the following issues:

Whether or not the validity of the OCT could be collaterally attacked through an ordinary civil action to quiet title;

Whether or not the ownership over registered land could be lost by prescription, laches, or adverse possession;

Whether or not there was a deed of sale executed by Spouses Ono in favor of Luisa and whether or not said deed was lost during World War II;

Whether or not the confirmation of sale executed by Antonio in favor of Luisa existed; and

Whether or not the signature purportedly of Antonio in that confirmation of sale was genuine.

Held: Petition has no merit.

(1) Action for cancellation of title is not an attack on the title. The attack is direct when the objective is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof.

(2) Prescription was not relevant. Prescription, in general, is a mode of acquiring or losing ownership and other real rights through the lapse of time in the manner and under the conditions laid down by law. However, prescription was not relevant to the determination of the dispute herein, considering that Lim did not base his right of ownership on an adverse possession over a certain period. He insisted herein, instead, that title to the land had been voluntarily transferred by the registered owners themselves to Luisa, his predecessor-in-interest.