G.R.No. 117321 Case Digest

G.R.No. 117321 February 11, 1998

People of the Philippines

vs Herson Tan y Verzo

Ponente: Romero

Facts:

Tan, along with amido were charged with the crime of highway robbery with muder before RTC-QC.On arraignment, he pleaded not guilty. December 5, 1988,7pm, tricycle driver Freddie Saavedra, went to see his wife to informe her that he will drive the accused to Brgy. Maligaya. It was the last time he was seen alive.

Then, an abandoned sidecar of a ricycle was found in Brgy. Malinao which was brought back to the headquarters. The police officers, invited Tan in connectiono with the instant case with respect to the two robbery cases reported in Lucena Ciity. Tan, narrated that Amido and him were responsible for the loss of the motorcycle and death of Saavedra. That they sold the motorcycle to Danny Teves.Teves voluntarily surrendered the motorcycle.

On cross-examination, Lt. Carlos testified that he invited Tan to the headquarters, without warrant, he did not inform Tan of his rights to remain silent and counsel, nor did he reduce the confession to writing. Tan alleged that he had no participation in the offense charged. Amido presented an alibi that he was assisting the renovation of his mother's house at the time of the incident. Tan assails the conviction despite failure of the prosecution to positively identify him as culprit. In light of the above facts and circumstances, the appealed decision is set aside and appellant acquitted on the ground that his constitutional rights were violated.

Issue: May the confession of the accused, given before the police investigator upon invitation and without benefit of counsel be admissible against him?

Ruling:

It is well-settled that the Constitution abhors an uncounselled confession or admission and whatever information is derived therefrom shall be regarded as inadmissible in evidence against the confessant.  Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner. The rules on custodial investigation begin to operate as soon as the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the police carries out a process of interrogations that tends itself to eliciting incriminating statements that the rule begins to operate.

Under the Constitution and existing law and jurisprudence, a confession to be admissible must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing.

The evidence for the prosecution shows that when appellant was invited for questioning at the police headquarters, he allegedly admitted his participation in the crime. This will not suffice to convict him, however, of said crime. The constitutional rights of appellant, particularly the right to remain silent and to counsel, are impregnable from the moment he is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, even if the same be initiated by mere invitation.

G.R. No. L-56291 Case Digest

G.R. No. L-56291 June 27, 1988

Cristopher Gamboa

vs Hon. Alfredo Cruz, Judge of CFI-Manila

Ponente: Padilla

Facts:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for TRO to annul and set aside the CFI decision against Gamboa.

Gamboa: he was arrested for vagrancy without warrant of arrest. He was brought to precinct 2, Manila, booked for vagrancy and then detained. The next day, he was identified as a companion to a robbery. He was arraigned. In the hearing, Gamboa filed a motion to acquit or demurrer to evidence presenting that his constitutional right to counsel and due process was violated. Court denied the motion. Hence this instant petition.

Ruling:

The instant petition is one for certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, committed by the respondent judge in issuing the questioned order dated 23 October 1980. It is basic, however, that for certiorari to lie, there must be a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power, the very antithesis of judicial prerogative in accordance with centuries of both civil law and common law traditions.

The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e. when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the respondent/accused. At such point or stage, the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation, for the commission of an offense.

Answer: As aptly observed, however, by the Solicitor General, the police line-up (at least, in this case) was not part of the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet entitled, at such stage, to counsel. It was held that when the process had not yet shifted from the investigatory to the accusatory as when police investigation does not elicit a confession the accused may not yet avail of the services of his lawyer.

On the right to due process, the Court finds that petitioner was not, in any way, deprived of this substantive and constitutional right, as he was duly represented by a member of the Bar. He was accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to substantiate his defense; only that he chose not to, and instead opted to file a Motion to Acquit after the prosecution had rested its case.

G.R. No. L-44690 Case Digest

G.R. No. L-44690 March 28, 1980

People of the Philippines

vs Jose Tampus Y Ponce

Ponente: Aquino

Facts:

This is an automatic review of the CFI decision of sentencing Tampus of murder. Evidence show that 10am of January 14, 1976, Celso Saminado, a prisoner in Muntinlupa and a patient in the emergency ward of the prison hospital went to the toilet. After emerging from the toilet, Tampus and Avila surrendered to a prison guard with their knives. The motive of the killing was revenge.

The officer of the day investigated the incident right away. In his report he  stated that Avila stabbed Saminado when the latter was in the toilet. Two days after the killing, another prison guard investigated the incident and have obtained the confessions of Avila and Tampus. They both pledged guilty to the charge of murder. After the pleading, the court informed them that they may be punish with death penalty.

In his review of the death sentence, counsel de officio, assigned to defend Tampus contends that he was denied his right to public trial because the arraignment and hearing was done at the state penitentiary.

Answer: There is a ruling that the fact that for the convenience of the witnesses a case is tried in Bilibid Prison without any objection on the part of the accused is not a ground for reversal of the judgment of conviction. The accused may waive his right to have a public trial as shown in the rule that the trial court may motu propio exclude the public from the courtroom when the evidence to be offered is offensive to decency or public morals. The court may also, upon request of the defendant, exclude from the trial every person except the officers of the court and the attorneys for the prosecution and defense.

Counsel de officio also stated that the confession of Tampus was taken in violation of the right against self-incrimination.

Answer: The confession made was voluntary. It was made before the investigation, right after the killing.

Right to remain silent: court is not duty-bound to apprise the accused that he has the right to remain silent. If he does not claim it and he calls the accused to the witness stand, then he waives that right.

G.R. No. 74930 Case Digest

G.R. No. 74930, February 13, 1989

Ricardo Valmonte, etc., petitioners

vs Feliciano Belmonte, Jr., respondent

Ponente: Cortes

Facts:

Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke their right to information and pray that respondent be directed:

(a) to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or

(b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencing their respective loans; and/or

(c) to allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject information.

Receiving no reply, petitioners filed an instant suit. On July 19, 1986, the Daily Express carried a news item reporting that 137 former members of the defunct interim and regular Batasang Pambansa, including ten (10) opposition members, were granted housing loans by the GSIS. Separate comments were filed by respondent Belmonte and the Solicitor General. After petitioners filed a consolidated reply, the petition was given due course and the parties were required to file their memoranda. The parties having complied, the case was deemed submitted for decision.

In his comment respondent raises procedural objections to the issuance of a writ of mandamus, among which is that petitioners have failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Respondent claims that actions of the GSIS General Manager are reviewable by the Board of Trustees of the GSIS. Petitioners, however, did not seek relief from the GSIS Board of Trustees. It is therefore asserted that since administrative remedies were not exhausted, then petitioners have no cause of action. To this objection, petitioners claim that they have raised a purely legal issue, viz., whether or not they are entitled to the documents sought, by virtue of their constitutional right to information. Hence, it is argued that this case falls under one of the exceptions to the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Issue: Whether or not mandamus has to compel respondent to perform the acts sought by petitioners to be done, in pursuance of their right to information.

Held:

The courts for reasons of law, comity and convenience will not entertain a case unless the available administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative forum. However, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to settled exceptions, among which is when only a question of law is involved.

The issue raised by petitioners, which requires the interpretation of the scope of the constitutional right to information, is one which can be passed upon by the regular courts more competently than the GSIS or its Board of Trustees, involving as it does a purely legal question. Thus, the exception of this case from the application of the general rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is warranted.

The postulate of public office as a public trust, institutionalized in the Constitution (in Art. XI, Sec. 1) to protect the people from abuse of governmental power, would certainly be were empty words if access to such information of public concern is denied, except under limitations prescribed by implementing legislation adopted pursuant to the Constitution.

Petitioners here are practitioners of media. An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the people. It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the people's will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently.

The right to information is an essential premise of a meaningful right to speech and expression. But this is not to say that the right to information is merely an adjunct of and therefore restricted in application by the exercise of the freedoms of speech and of the press. Far from it. The right to information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure.

(1) The information sought by petitioners in this case is the truth of reports that certain Members of the Batasang Pambansa belonging to the opposition were able to secure "clean" loans from the GSIS immediately before the February 7, 1986 election through the intercession of the former First Lady, Mrs. Imelda Marcos. The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its employees and the administrator of various insurance programs for the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a public character.

The public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern. Respondent however contends that in view of the right to privacy which is equally protected by the Constitution and by existing laws, the documents evidencing loan transactions of the GSIS must be deemed outside the ambit of the right to information.

(2) There can be no doubt that right to privacy is constitutionally protected. the right to privacy belongs to the individual in his private capacity, and not to public and governmental agencies like the GSIS. Moreover, the right cannot be invoked by juridical entities like the GSIS. Respondent next asserts that the documents evidencing the loan transactions of the GSIS are private in nature and hence, are not covered by the Constitutional right to information on matters of public concern which guarantees "access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions" only.

(3) It is argued that the records of the GSIS, a government corporation performing proprietary functions, are outside the coverage of the people's right of access to official records. It is further contended that since the loan function of the GSIS is merely incidental to its insurance function, and then its loan transactions are not covered by the constitutional policy of full public disclosure and the right to information which is applicable only to "official" transactions.

G.R. No. L-72119 Case Digest

G.R. No. L-72119, May 29, 1987

Valentin Legaspi, petitioner

vs Civil Service Commission, respondent

Ponente: Cortes

Facts:

The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public concern is invoked in this special civil action for mandamus instituted by petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi against the Civil Service Commission. The respondent had earlier denied Legaspi's request for information on the civil service eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City.

Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, is guaranteed by the Constitution, and that he has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to acquire the information, petitioner prays for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel the respondent Commission to disclose said information.

They supply the rules by means of which the right to information may be enjoyed (Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations 167 [1927]) by guaranteeing the right and mandating the duty to afford access to sources of information. Hence, the fundamental right there in recognized may be asserted by the people upon the ratification of the constitution without need for any ancillary act of the Legislature. (Id. at, p. 165) What may be provided for by the Legislature are reasonable conditions and limitations upon the access to be afforded which must, of necessity, be consistent with the declared State policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest (Constitution, Art. 11, Sec. 28). However, it cannot be overemphasized that whatever limitation may be prescribed by the Legislature, the right and the duty under Art. III Sec. 7 have become operative and enforceable by virtue of the adoption of the New Charter. Therefore, the right may be properly invoked in a mandamus proceeding such as this one.

Solicitor General's challenges: (1) petitioner's standing to sue (2) there is no ministerial duty on the part of the commission to furnish the petitioner with the information he seeks.

Held:

(1) The petitioner in every case must therefore be an "aggrieved party" in the sense that he possesses a clear legal right to be enforced and a direct interest in the duty or act to be performed. When a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general "public" which possesses the right.

(2) In recognizing the people's right to be informed, both the 1973 Constitution and the New Charter expressly mandate the duty of the State and its agents to afford access to official records, documents, papers and in addition, government research data used as basis for policy development, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. The guarantee has been further enhanced in the New Constitution with the adoption of a policy of full public disclosure, this time "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law.

Thus, while the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation by the government agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern, and to afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies. Certainly, its performance cannot be made contingent upon the discretion of such agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment of the constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by any whimsical exercise of agency discretion. The constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its performance may be compelled by a writ of mandamus in a proper case. In the case before Us, the public right to be enforced and the concomitant duty of the State are unequivocably set forth in the Constitution. The decisive question on the propriety of the issuance of the writ of mandamus in this case is, whether the information sought by the petitioner is within the ambit of the constitutional guarantee.

(3) The incorporation in the Constitution of a guarantee of access to information of public concern is a recognition of the essentiality of the free flow of ideas and information in a democracy. But the constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not absolute. It does not open every door to any and all information. Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc., are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7, second sentence). The law may therefore exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny, such as those affecting national security.

In every case, the availability of access to a particular public record must be circumscribed by the nature of the information sought, i.e., (a) being of public concern or one that involves public interest, and, (b) not being exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. The threshold question is, therefore, whether or not the information sought is of public interest or public concern. This question is first addressed to the government agency having custody of the desired information. However, as already discussed, this does not give the agency concerned any discretion to grant or deny access. In case of denial of access, the government agency has the burden of showing that the information requested is not of public concern, or, if it is of public concern, that the same has been exempted by law from the operation of the guarantee.

In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which can be applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine in a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.

But then, it is not enough that the information sought is of public interest. For mandamus to lie in a given case, the information must not be among the species exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee.

In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny the claims of eligibility, the respondent has failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit the petitioner's right to know who are, and who are not, civil service eligible. We take judicial notice of the fact that the names of those who pass the civil service examinations, as in bar examinations and licensure examinations for various professions, are released to the public. Hence, there is nothing secret about one's civil service eligibility, if actually possessed. Petitioner's request is, therefore, neither unusual nor unreasonable.

G.R. No. 94284 Case Digest

G.R. No. 94284, April 8, 1991

Ricardo Silverio, petitioner

vs The Court of Appeals, Hon. Benigno Gaviola as Judge of RTC-Cebu, respondents

Ponente: Melencio-Herrera

Facts:

Silverio was charged with violation of Revised Securities Act. In due time, he posted bail for his provisional liberty. After more than 2 years after filing the information, respondent filed an urgent ex parte motion to cancel the passport of Silverio on the ground that he had gone abroad several times without necessary court approval resulting in postponements of the arraignment and scheduled hearings.

RTC then issued an order directing the DFA to cancel the passport or to deny his application and the Commission on Immigration to prevent Silverio from leaving the country. This RTC finding that Silverio has not been arraigned and never appeared in court on the scheduled date of his arraignment, and Silverio has been going out of the country without the court's knowledge and permission.

Petitioner contends that respondent Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the Trial Court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing its Orders, dated 4 April and 28 July 1988, (1) on the basis of facts allegedly patently erroneous, claiming that the scheduled arraignments could not be held because there was a pending Motion to Quash the Information; and (2) finding that the right to travel can be impaired upon lawful order of the Court, even on grounds other than the "interest of national security, public safety or public health."

Held:

(1) Although the date of the filing of the Motion to Quash has been omitted by Petitioner, it is apparent that it was filed long after the filing of the Information in 1985 and only after several arraignments had already been scheduled and cancelled due to Petitioner's non-appearance.

(2) Warrants of Arrest having been issued against him for violation of the conditions of his bail bond, he should be taken into custody. "Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his appearance before any court when so required by the Court or the Rules. The foregoing condition imposed upon an accused to make himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction of his right to travel.

Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should by no means be construed as delimiting the inherent power of the Courts to use all means necessary to carry their orders into effect in criminal cases pending before them. When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, process and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such Court or officer.

G.R. No. L-62100 Case Digest

G.R. No. L-62100, May 30, 1986

Ricardo L. Manotoc, Jr., petitioner

vs The Court of Appeals, etc., respondents

POnente: Fernan

Facts:

Manotoc is one of the two principal stockholders of Trans-Insular Management, Inc., and Manotoc Securities, Inc., a stock brokerage house. Following the "run" on stock brokerages caused by stock broker Santamaria's flight from this jurisdiction, petitioner, who was then in the United States, came home, and together with his co-stockholders, filed a petition with the Securities and Exchange Commission for the appointment of a management committee, not only for Manotoc Securities, Inc., but likewise for Trans-Insular Management, Inc.

On March 1, 1982, petitioner filed before each of the trial courts a motion entitled, "motion for permission to leave the country," stating as ground therefor his desire to go to the United States, "relative to his business transactions and opportunities." The prosecution opposed said motion and after due hearing, both trial judges denied the same. "The court sees no urgency."

Petitioner wrote to the Commissioner a letter requesting the recall of the RTC but was also denied. He then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the CA for denying his leave to travel abroad. CA dismisses it for lack of merit. Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts which granted him bail nor the Securities and Exchange Commission which has no jurisdiction over his liberty, could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel.

Issue: Does a person facing a criminal indictment and provisionally released on bail have an unrestricted right to travel?

Held:

A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts.

Petitioner has not specified the duration of the proposed travel or shown that his surety has agreed to it. Petitioner merely alleges that his surety has agreed to his plans as he had posted cash indemnities. The court cannot allow the accused to leave the country without the assent of the surety because in accepting a bail bond or recognizance, the government impliedly agrees "that it will not take any proceedings with the principal that will increase the risks of the sureties or affect their remedies against him.

As petitioner has failed to satisfy the trial courts and the appellate court of the urgency of his travel, the duration thereof, as well as the consent of his surety to the proposed travel, We find no abuse of judicial discretion in their having denied petitioner's motion for permission to leave the country.