G.R. No. L-14639 Case Digest

G.R. No. L-14639, March 25, 1919

Zacarias Villavicencion, et al., petitioners

vs Justo Lukban, et al., respondents

Ponente: Malcolm

Facts:

The Lukban as mayor of Manila ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute be closed, for the purpose of exterminating vices in the city. The women were kept confined to their houses by the police while the city authorities made arrangements with the bureau of labor for sending the women to Davao as laborers. Later at midnight of October 25, the police, Anton Hohmann and the Mayor descended upon the houses and placed them aboard the steamers. The women were given no opportunity to collect their belongings and thought that they would be brought to the police station for an investigation. They have not been asked if they wish to depart from the region and neither been asked of their consent for the deportation.

Upon their arrival in Davao, the provincial governor of Davao had no previous notification that the women were prostitutes who had been expelled in the city of Manila. Then the relatives of the deportees presented an application for habeas corpus to the SC. The application alleged that the women were illegally deported by the order of Lukban. Lukban and Hohman admitted certain facts but prayed that the writ should not be granted because the petitioners were not proper parties to the case that it should have begun in Davao because the women are not in their custody now.

According to the fiscal attachment, the women were destined to be laborers at good salaries on the hacienda of Ynigo and governor sales. Fiscal also admitted that the deportation was without consent of the women.

Issue: Did the Mayor and the Chief of Police presume to act in deporting by duress these persons from Manila to another distant locality within the Philippine Islands?

Held:

What are the remedies of the unhappy victims of official oppression? The remedies of the citizen are three: (1) Civil action; (2) criminal action, and (3) habeas corpus.

Granted that habeas corpus is the proper remedy, respondents have raised three specific objections to its issuance in this instance. The fiscal has argued (l) that there is a defect in parties petitioners, (2) that the Supreme Court should not a assume jurisdiction, and (3) that the person in question are not restrained of their liberty by respondents. It was finally suggested that the jurisdiction of the Mayor and the chief of police of the city of Manila only extends to the city limits and that perforce they could not bring the women from Davao.

(1) The petitioners were relatives and friends of the deportees. The way the expulsion was conducted by the city officials made it impossible for the women to sign a petition for habeas corpus. It was consequently proper for the writ to be submitted by persons in their behalf.

(2) It is a general rule of good practice that, to avoid unnecessary expense and inconvenience, petitions for habeas corpus should be presented to the nearest judge of the court of first instance. But this is not a hard and fast rule. The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court or any judge thereof enforceable anywhere in the Philippine Islands. Whether the writ shall be made returnable before the Supreme Court or before an inferior court rests in the discretion of the Supreme Court and is dependent on the particular circumstances. In this instance it was not shown that the Court of First Instance of Davao was in session or that the women had any means by which to advance their plea before that court.

(3) A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. The forcible taking of these women from Manila by officials of that city, who handed them over to other parties, who deposited them in a distant region, deprived these women of freedom of locomotion just as effectively as if they had been imprisoned. 

G.R. No. L-68729 Case Digest

G.R. No. L-68729 May 29, 1987

Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc., petitioner

vs National Telecommunications Commission and Kayumanggi Radio Network

Ponente: Gutierrez, Jr.

Facts:

Petitioner seeks the reversal of the decision of NTC which ordered Radio Comm to desist from operating its radio telephone services in Catarman, Samar and Sorsogon.

December 14, 1983 Kayumanggi filed a complaint with NTC alleging that Radio Comm was operating in Catarman without certificate of public convenience and necessity. Radio Comm counter-alleged that its telephone services in the areas are covered by the legislative franchise recognized by NTC and its predecessor Public Service Commission.

After conducting hearing, NTC ordered Radio Comm to immediately cease from operating in thise areas. Stating that EO 546 a certificate of public convenience and necessity is mandatory for the operation of communication utilities and services including radio communications.

Radio Comm then filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. Hence, the present petition.

Issue: Whether or not Radio Comm a grantee of legislative franchise to operate a radio company is required to secure a certificate of public convenience and necessity before it can operate.

Ruling: Petition has no merit.

PD No. 1 reorganizing the executive branch of the National Government, Public Service Commission was abolished and its functions were transferred to 3 regulatory boards. The functions transferred were still subject to limitations provided in the Public Service Law as amended.

The new provision states that the exemption enjoyed by radio companies no longer exists because of the changes. And the argument of the petitioner that the franchise has been operating for a long time already cannot be sustained.

In view of the foregoing, we find no reason to disturb the public respondent's findings of fact, and conclusions of law insofar as the private respondent was authorized to operate in Catarman, Samar and San Jose, Mindoro. As a rule, the Commission's findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive upon this Court. We may modify or ignore them only when it clearly appears that there is no evidence to support reasonably such a conclusion. (Halili v. Daplas, 14 SCRA 14). The petitioner has not shown why the private respondent should be denied the authority to operate its services in Samar and Mindoro. It has not overcome the presumption that when the public respondent disturbed the petitioner's monopoly in certain areas, it was doing so pursuant to public interest and the common good.

G.R. Nos. 94054-57 Case Digest

G.R. Nos. 94054-57 February 19, 1991

Vicente Lim, Sr. and Mayor Susana Lim, petitioners

vs Hon. Nemesio Felix and Hon. Antonio Alfane, respondents

G.R. Nos. 94266-69 February 19, 1991

Jolly Fernandez, Florencio Fernandez, Jr., Nonilon Bagalihog, Mayor Nestor Lim and Mayor Antonio Kho, petitioners

vs Hon. Nemesio Felix and Prosecutor Antonio Alfane, respondents

Ponente: Gutierrez, Jr.

Facts:

March 17, 1989, at the Masbate Domestic  Airport, Congressman Espinosa, Sr. and his escorts were attacked and killed by a lone assassin. Only Dante Siblante survived although he suffered a gunshot wound. Investigation of the incident was made.

Thereafter, for the purpose of PI, the designated investigator Tandiado, filed an amended complaint with MTC of Masbate accusing the petitioners of the crime multiple murder and frustrated murder in connection with the airport incident.

After conducting PI, the court issued an order stating that: ". . . after weighing the affidavits and answers given by the witnesses for the prosecution during the preliminary examination in searching questions and answers, concludes that a probable cause has been established for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of named accused in the amended complaint, namely..."

Issue: May a Judge without ascertaining the facts through his own personal determination and relying solely on the certification or recommendation of a prosecutor that a probable cause exists issue a warrant of arrest?

Held:

1973 Constitution which provides:

. . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce

The issuance of a warrant is not a mere ministerial function; it calls for the exercise of judicial discretion on the part of the issuing magistrate. This is clear from the following provisions of Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.

Warrant of arrest, when issued. — If the judge be satisfied from the preliminary examination conducted by him or by the investigating officer that the offense complained of has been committed and that there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused has committed it, he must issue a warrant or order for his arrest.

If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in this case where all the records of the investigation are in Masbate, he or she has not personally determined probable cause. The determination is made by the Provincial Prosecutor. The constitutional requirement has not been satisfied. The Judge commits a grave abuse of discretion.

Judge does not have to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. The Prosecutor can perform the same functions as a commissioner for the taking of the evidence. However, there should be a report and necessary documents supporting the Fiscal's bare certification. All of these should be before the Judge.

We reiterate that in making the required personal determination, a Judge is not precluded from relying on the evidence earlier gathered by responsible officers. The extent of the reliance depends on the circumstances of each case and is subject to the Judge's sound discretion. However, the Judge abuses that discretion when having no evidence before him, he issues a warrant of arrest.

Indubitably, the respondent Judge committed a grave error when he relied solely on the Prosecutor's certification and issued the questioned Order dated July 5, 1990 without having before him any other basis for his personal determination of the existence of a probable cause.

A.M. No. MTJ-08-1715 Case Digest

A.M. No. MTJ-08-1715 March 19, 2009

Rodolfo Mago, complainant

vs Judge Aurea Penalosa-fermo, respondent

Ponente: Carpio Morales

Facts:

Mago filed a complaint before MTC of Camarines Norte for grave coercion against Sheriff Angeles of DARAB. Sheriff Angeles filed a counter-charge for grave threats against complainant and his sons.

Alleging that Judge Aurea committed gross ignorance of the law and bias in the disposition of his complaint and of the counter-charge against him, Mago filed this administrative complaint.

Mago alleges that he received a subpoena to attend a PI of the threat case against him, in compliance, he and his witnesses attended. There even without an assistance of a counsel they were examined through a prepared set of questions by the stenographer, Judge Aurea was not present then. Mago states also that after the PI, he was immediately arrested and was imprisoned for 3 days. He was released after posting the bail.

Judge Aurea explained that, What [complainant] claimed in his Letter-Complaint that the Court Stenographer has a prepared sheet of questions during the preliminary examination is true because after a complaint is filed, the undersigned prepares her questions for preliminary examination based on the affidavits of the complaining witnesses and the counter affidavits of the accused. This is done to make it easy for the Stenographers to take/print the transcript of the proceedings. Some witnesses even ask to read/study the question and request that they write down their answers to the questions for the Stenographers to finalize. Also, this is convenient when more than one preliminary examination is scheduled for the day. This procedure makes it easier for the Stenographers and the witnesses, too, considering the cramped office space.

Judge denied the arrest right after the PI, but rather claimed that after finding probable cause from the PI conducted, she issued a warrant of arrest the next day.

Admitting that there was a delay in scheduling the arraignment, but this was because complainant's counsel opposed the same and filed an omnibus motion. . Respondent adds that after complainant was arraigned on June 6, 2006, the preliminary conference/pre-trial was set but was not terminated due to the absence of complainant or his counsel.

Held: SC agreed with OCA.

June 18, 2008, OCA came up with the evaluation that Judge was liable for her unfamiliarity with the basic rules on PI. There was irregularity during the PI when the Judge allowed the stenographers to handle the latter part of the proceedings.

As regards the issue of continuous hearing of the case by the respondent judge, we opine that the respondent judge only acted in good faith and in accordance with law when she continued to direct the herein complainant to attend the pre-trial. Based on the records, the Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus, Prohibition with Application for Mandatory Injunction and Ex-Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and the Motion for Reconsideration thereto filed by complainant with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 64, Labo, Camarines Norte were already denied; thus the respondent judge had the authority to proceed with the case. The postponements in the pre-trial were not attributable to the respondent judge but to the accused and his counsel.

Finally, on the issue of bias, complainant failed to submit any evidence showing the respondent biased or partial in hearing the case. Bias and partiality of a judge must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Mere suspicion that a judge is bias or partial would not be enough.

G.R. No. 78554 Case Digest

G.R. No. 78554 August 25, 1989

St. Anne Medical Center, petitioner

vs Henry Parel, etc., respondents

Ponente: Sarmiento

Facts:

Submitted for decision is this case, in the nature of challenges (inter alia) to the jurisdiction of the Regional Director of the Department of Labor and Employment to act on money claims.

This case stemmed from a complaint filed against St. Anne Medical Center for underpayment of wages, ECOLA and other money claims. Then Director Parel ordered that St. Anne Medical Center reinstitute the 127 employees with their money claims, excluding the 6 employees found to be holding managerial positions.

The director of the hospital then sought reconsideration alleging that Parel erred in imposing the money award: (1) in the absence of notice and hearing; (2) that the said award was not supported by evidence; and (3) that there was pending with the National Labor Relations Commission an Identical complaint filed by the complaining employees of the hospital. (4) The jurisdiction of RD of DOLE to act on money claims is assailed.

Held:

In addition, it is held that the regional offices of the Department of Labor are charged alone with "mediation and conciliation" and, should the parties fail to agree, they must refer the case to the labor arbiters.

The fact alone that at the time Director Parel entered into the picture, the respondents-workers had earlier commenced identical proceedings in the National Labor Relations Commission, labor arbitrage section, is enough to warrant the grant of this petition. (The Complaint in the NLRC was filed on January 28, 1987, 7 while the Regional Director received the Complaint on February 9,1987.) 8 The rule in civil cases is that the acquisition of jurisdiction by a court of concurrent jurisdiction (assuming that the Regional Director exercises concurrent jurisdiction with the Labor Arbiter in view of the promulgation of Republic Act No. 6715, which took effect on March 19, 1989) divests another of its own jurisdiction. The same rule should apply to labor cases. On account hereof, we set aside the challenged order.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The order of Regional Director Henry Parel is SET ASIDE.

G.R. No. 84628 Case Digest

G.R. No. 84628 November 16, 1989

Heirs of Ildefonso Coscolluela, Sr., INC., petitioner

vs Rico General Insurance Corporation, Court of Appeals, etc., respondents

Ponente: Gutierrez, Jr.

Facts:

Heirs, is a domestic corporation and registered owner of an Isuzu pick-up truck which was insured with Rico General Insurance for a consideration P100,000 excluding 3rd party liability. The premiums and other expenses for insurance paid covered the period from October 1, 1986 to 1987.

On August 28, 1987, the insured vehicle was severely damaged when fired upon by unidentified armed persons in Negros Occidental. In the same incident, four persons died.

Heirs then filed its claim for the repair of the vehicle but Rico refused t grant it. So heirs filed it with the RTC Bacolod City to recover claim, plus interest and attorney's fees. Rico filed a motion to dismiss alleging that it lacks cause of action because firing by armed men is a risk excepted in the insurance policy.

Heirs alleged that the firing was an indirect consequence of rebellion and opposed the motion to dismiss saying that the provision does not apply in the absence of an official proclamation of the conditions. RTC dismissed the complaint of Heirs fo lack of cause of action for the damage arose from a civil commotion or was a direct result thereof.

Heirs filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied by RTC noting that they cannot take cognizance of the general civil disturbance in the country without any executive proclamation.

Petitioner then filed a notice of appeal which was given due course but stated that the proper remedy is a petition for review by way of certiorari. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. CA denied the petition and affirmed the RTC's dismissal order. Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether CA  erred in (1) affirming the dismissal by the trial court of the complaint for damages in the ground of lack of cause of action and in (2) denying due course to a petition for certiorari on the ground that the remedy of the petitioner to assail said order is appeal.

Held:

(1) There is cause of action. The elements were met.

The facts as alleged clearly define the existence of a right of the petitioner to a just claim against the insurer for the payment of the indemnity for a loss due to an event against which the petitioner's vehicle was insured. The insurance contract mentioned therein manifests a right to pursue a claim and a duty on the part of the insurer or private respondent to compensate the insured in case of a risk insured against. The refusal of the insurer to satisfy the claim and the consequent loss to the petitioner in incurring the cost of acquiring legal assistance on the matter constitutes a violation or an injury brought to the petitioner.

(2) The Court is very much cognizant of the principle that a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action stated in the complaint hypothetically admits the truth of the facts therein.

." It is clear that the complaint does no more and no less than state simply that the van was damaged due to the firing by unidentified armed men. Since the complaint does not explicitly state nor intimate civil strife which private respondent insists to be the cause of the damage, the motion to dismiss cannot go beyond the admission of the facts stated and inferences reasonably deducible from them. Any other assertion by the private respondent is subject to proof. Meanwhile, the sufficiency of the petitioner's cause of action has been shown since, admitting the facts alleged, a valid judgment can be rendered.

(3) The private respondent's invocation of the exceptions clause in the insurance policy as the basis for its non-liability and the consequent dismissal of the complaint is without merit. We also reiterate the established rule that when the terms of an insurance contract contain limitations on liability, the court "should construe them in such a way as to preclude the insurer from non-compliance with his obligations."

(4) Contrary to what the respondent appellate court says, this case does not present a pure question of law but demands a factual determination of whether the incident was a result of events falling under the exceptions to the liability of private respondent contained in the policy of insurance.

Petition granted.

G.R. No. 179018 Case Digest

G.R. No. 179018, April 17, 2013

Paglaum Management and Dev't Corp. and Health Marketing Technologies, Inc., petitioners

vs Union Bank of the Philippines, etc., respondents

Ponente: Sereno

Facts:

Union Bank filed this motion for reconsideration saying that restructuring agreement is null and void because the borrower has not complied with the condition precedent of the bank. It is also unenforceable because it was only between Health and Union bank. Paglaum was a party only to the real estate mortgages and not in the restructuring agreement. The venue is exclusively in Cebu City, and the assumption of the RTC's jurisdiction was without basis.

Held:

We deny the Motion for Reconsideration.

Issues raised for the first time in a motion for reconsideration before this Court are deemed waived, because these should have been brought up at the first opportunity.7 Nevertheless, there is no cogent reason to warrant a reconsideration or modification of our 18 June 2012 Decision.

Union Bank raises three new issues that require a factual determination that is not within the province of this Court.8 These questions can be brought to and resolved by the RTC as it is the proper avenue in which to raise factual issues and to present evidence in support of these claims.

Anent Union Bank's last contention, there is no need for the Court to discuss and revisit the issue, being a mere rehash of what we have already resolved in our Decision.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we DENY the Motion for Reconsideration with FINALITY.