Wednesday, June 4, 2014

G.R. No. 171219 Case Digest

G.R. No. 171219, September 3, 2012
Atty. Fe Palmiano-Salvador
vs Constantino angeles, respondents
Ponente: Peralta

Facts:
This is a petition to reversed and set aside the decision of the CA dismissing the petition before them.

Respondent Angeles is one of the registered owners of a parcel of land located in Sampaloc, Manila. This land is occupied by Galiga from 1979 to 1993 with a lease contract. Salvador alleged that she bought the land from Galiga who represented the owner.

Angeles then sent a letter to Salvador demanding that Salvador to vacate the property. Angeles then filed a complaint for ejectment with the MTC of Manila.

MTC rendered its decision in favor of Angeles. Salvador filed an appeal saying that Angeles had not authority at the time of the filing of the suit. RTC denied the appeal. Petitioner elevated the case to the CA, but CA affirmed the RTC. Hence, this present petition.

Issue: Diaz's (respondent’s representative) failure to proof his authority to represent.

Held:
"[i]f a complaint is filed for and in behalf of the plaintiff [by one] who is not authorized to do so, the complaint is not deemed filed. An unauthorized complaint does not produce any legal effect. Hence, the court should dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has no jurisdiction over the complaint and the plaintiff."

Pursuant to the foregoing rulings, therefore, the MeTC never acquired jurisdiction over this case and all proceedings before it were null and void. The courts could not have delved into the very merits of the case, because legally, there was no complaint to speak of. The court's jurisdiction cannot be deemed to have been invoked at all.

Petition is granted.


G.R. No. 179488 Case Digest

G.R. No. 179488, April 23, 2012
Cosco Philippines, Inc., petitioner
vs Kemper Insurance Company, respondent
Ponente: Peralta

Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the decision of the CA.

Kemper is a foreign insurance company based in Illinois, USA with no license to engage in business in the Philippines. While petitioner is a domestic shipping company.

1998, Kemper insured the shipment of imported frozen boneless beef. Upon arrival in Manila port, a portion of the shipment was rejected by reason of spoilage arising from the alleged temperature fluctuations of Cosco containers.

So, Genosi (the buyer) filed a claim against both Cosco and Kemper. Thereafter, Kemper paid the claim of Genosi. Hence, in 1999. Kemper filed a complaint for insurance loss and damage against Cosco alleging that that despite the repeated demands, Cosco failed and refused to pay the value loss sustained due to the fault of Cosco's container.

In response, Cosco insisted that Kemper had no capacity to sue since it was doing business in the Philippines without the required license. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss contending that the same was filed by Atty. Lat who failed to show his authority to sue and sign the corresponding certification against forum shopping.

2002, RTC granted the motion to dismiss saying that Atty. Lat has no special power of attorney. Motion for reconsideration was denied. On appeal by respondent, CA reversed and set aside the trial court's order, saying that the certificate for non-forum shopping is mandatory and it must be side not by the counsel but by the plaintiff or principal party concerned. CA also ordered that the case be in the RTC for further proceedings. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was later denied by the CA, hence this present petition.

Issue:
CA erred in their decision saying that Atty. Lat was properly authorized by the respondent to sign the certificate.

Held:
Petition is meritorious.

Certification of non-forum shopping must be signed by the parties or if the principal cannot sign, the behalf must be duly authorized. In case of a corporation, the lawyer assigned must have a personal knowledge of the facts.

In this case, since this is a corporation, it must show that the board of directors has duly authorized Atty. Lat. However, there is no proof that respondent authorized Atty. Lat to sign the certification.




G.R. No. 171855 Case Digest

G.R. No. 171855, October 15, 2012
Fe Rapsing, etc., petitioners
vs Hon. Jdge Maximino Ables, etc., respondents
Ponente: Peralta

Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to set aside the orders of the RTC of Masbate.

Respondents are members of the Alpha Company, 22nd infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army in Masbate. Petitioners are widows of Rapsing, Villanueva and Aparejado, who were allegedly killed by the respondents.

Respondents alleged that on May 3, 2004, they received information about the presence of NPA partisans in Masbate. Acting on the information, they coordinated with the PNP and proceeded to the place. There, they encountered armed elements which resulted to an intense fire fight. After which, seven persons were named dead including the husbands of the petitioners.

Petitioners claimed that there was no encounter ensued. Hence, they requested the NBI to conduct investigation. NBI, relying on the statements of the witnesses who claim that the military massacred helpless and unarmed civilians recommended to the prosecutor of Masbate to conduct a preliminary investigation against the respondents for the crime of multiple murder.

Then, before the warrant of arrest of respondents was issued by the RTC Masbate, Judge advocate general's office of the AFP filed an Omnibus Motion seeking the case against respondents be transferred to the jurisdiction of the military tribunal, it was granted.

Petitioners then sought reconsideration of the order, but was denied by the RTC. Hence, this present petition.

Issue:
Whether Judge Ables abused his discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in granting the transfer.

Held:
Petition is meritorious. RTC abused its discretion in not taking cognizance of the case, which actually falls within its jurisdiction.

It is rule of the procedural law that jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations of the complaint. what determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing in the complaint.

In this case, murder is a crime within the jurisdiction of the RTC. The military tribunals cannot exercise jurisdiction over this case because the offense charged is not included in the enumeration of the "service-connected offenses or crimes".


G.R. No. 174082 Case Digest

G.R. No. 174082, January 16, 2012
Georgia Estel, petitioner
vs Recaredo Diego, Sr. and Recaredo Diego,Jr., respondents
Ponente: Peralta

Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the RTC - Gingoog City denying the motion for reconsideration.

There was a complaint for forcible entry, damages and injunction with application for TRO by Recaredos' with the MTCC of Gingoog. This complaint alleges that on April 1991, they entered with a contract of sale of a parcel of land with the Estel. Estel voluntarily delivered the physical and material possession of the the subject matter after receiving the down payment. Then the Recaredos have occupied the land since then without any disturbances. 5 years after, Esthel with her two sons and 5 other people uprooted the fence surrounding the land, entered the premises and destroyed the trees and plants found therein. Recaredo Sr., witnessed the incident but found himself helpless at that time.

Respondents then prayed for the restoration of their possession, issuance of permanent injunction against petitioner. MTCC issued a TRO against petitioner and any person acting in her behalf.

In her defense and counterclaims, Estel denied the material allegations in the complaint contending that respondents were never physical, actual, public, adverse and uninterrupted possession of the land. Also saying that he sale done before was abrogated when she offered to return the amount which the respondents refused.

MTCC rendered order saying that the petitioners must vacate the premises of the land and return the same to the respondents with additional payments.

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the RTC of Gingoog, but RTC affirmed the decision of MTCC. Petitioner then filed a petition for review with the CA, CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied it as well.

Issue: (1) MTCC of Gingoog has jurisdiction over the subject matter? (2) Complaint states no cause of action? (3) Conclusions are not supported by competent material evidence?

Held:
(1) Petitioner did not raise the issue of jurisdiction in the MTCC and RTC, so she is estopped from raising that issue now. Estoppel sets in when a party participates in all stages of a case before challenging the jurisdiction of the lower court.

(2) Respondents sufficiently alleged in their complaint the material facts constituting forcible entry, as they explicitly claimed that they had prior possession of the land since its purchase from the petitioner, who voluntarily delivered it to them.



G.R. No. 74720 Case Digest

G.R. No. 74720 August 31, 1987
Roberto Ignacio, petitioner
vs Leoncio Banate, Jr., HOn. Aquilino Pimentel, in his capacity as Minister of Local Governments and Community Development and the City Treasurer of Roxas City, respondents
Ponente: Gutierrez, Jr.

Facts:
This is a petition for quo warranto and prohibition with prayer for preliminary and temporary restraining order seeks to nullify the appointment or designation of private respondent Leoncio Banate, Jr. as member of Sangguniang Panlungsod of Roxas City.

Ignacio was elected Brgy. Captain of Tanza, Roxas City on May 17, 1982 for a term of 6 years. Then he was elected as president of association of Brgy. Councils in accordance with the Local Government Code and IRR of Katipunan. By this virtue, he was appointed a member of the sangguniang Panlungsod of Roxas City by President Marcos. Pimentel designated Banate as replacement of Ignacio as member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Roxas City as replacement of Ignacio.

Ignacio contends that Banate is not qualified to be member of Sangguniang Panlungsod to replace him as representative of Katipunan ng mga Barangay of Roxas City because his membership in the city council is governed by the local government code which provides that: Sec. 173. Composition and Compensation. — (l) sangguniang panlungsod as the legislative body of the city, shall be composed of the vice-mayor, as presiding officer, the elected sangguniang panlungsod members, and the members who may be appointed by the President of the Philippines consisting of the presidents of the katipunan panlungsod ng mga barangay and the kabataang barangay city federation.

According to Ignacio, his appointment as member of Sangguniang Panlungsod was by virtue of his having been elected by the Katipunan Panlungsod ng mga Barangay while Banate is not an officer and has not been elected for any position. He further argues that Pimentel's appointment is invalid considering that LGC provides that only the President of the Philippines can do the appointment for such office. He claims that this appointment poser cannot be delegated to minister for this is strictly personal act ordain to be performed by the President alone.

Solicitor General countered that: that the petitioner, as an appointive local government official who assumed office under the 1973 Constitution, is covered by the provisions of Section 2, Article III of Proclamation No. 3 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino, which provides that "All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of their successors, if such is made within a period of one year from February 25, 1986."
With respect to the argument of the petitioner that the appointing power of the President of the Philippines cannot be delegated to Minister Pimentel, the Solicitor General replied that under the provisions of Section 2, Article III of Proclamation No. 3, dated March 25, 1986, issued by President Corazon C. Aquino, otherwise known as the Provisional Constitution, the power to delegate or appoint officers-in-charge in replacement of local government officials by then Minister Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., as alter ego of the President of the Philippines, has been upheld by this Court in several cases.

Held:
Petition is meritorious. Minister Pimentel is the alter ego of the President in appointing a public officer, his appointment has been upheld. However, the appointee to a sangguninang Panlungsod must meet the qualifications required by law of which Banate didn't have.



G.R. No. L-14569 Case Digest

G.R. No. L-14569 November 23, 1960
Benito Codilla, et al., petitioners
vs Jose Martinez, etc., et al., respondents
Ponente: Bautista Angelo

Facts:
January 24, 1956, Mayor Baloyo of Tagum, Davao left for Negros Occidental to attend to a sick brother. Thereupon, he designated the vice mayor to act in his place until advice on his part. The vice mayor in turn fell sick of certain lung trouble which led the vice mayor to designate councilor Macario Bermudez as acting mayor until notice of the contrary. Bermudez was not also in good health so he designated the 3rd ranking councilor Martinez.

Martinez accepted the designation and assumed office, his first official act was to separate the petitioners as policemen of the municipality. Petitioners immediately filed their protest invoking the right to continue in office under RA 557. But acting mayor Martinez appointed Duaso municipal policemen in lieu of Codilla who immediately qualified by taking his oath of office. The appointment was approved by the President of the Philippines and Commission of Civil Service among other appointments.

February 15, 1956, Codilla and his companions filed a petition for mandamus before the CFI of Davao against Martinez and Mayor Baloyo alleging that their separation from the service was illegal because civil service employees cannot be terminated except for cause.

Respondents in their answer set up the defense that the appointments having been made in a temporary capacity, because they are not civil service eligibles, that the same were valid even assuming that Martinez does not have the authority because their office have expired nonetheless.

The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that the separation was made in accordance with the law. Hence the present appeal.

Issue: Martinez, being a 3rd ranking councilor is the lawful designate to be the acting mayor.

Held:
The trial court did not consider the designation of Martinez as acting mayor entirely void, or one that would make him a usurper, but at most a de facto officer whose acts maybe given validity in the eye of the law. Thus, the trial court said: "Although his designation was irregular, still he was acting under a color of authority, as distinguished from a usurper who is "one who has neither title nor color of right of an office." . . . The acts of Jose L. Martinez are therefore official acts of a de facto officer. If they are made within the scope of the authority vested by the law in the office of the mayor of Tagum, such acts of a de facto office are here present.

To constitute a de facto officer, there must be an office having a de facto existence, or at least one recognized by law and the claimant must be in actual possession of the office under color of title or authority.

Another factor that may be invoked in favor of the validity of the official actuation of Acting Mayor Martinez is the fact that his entire official acts done under his designation were subsequently endorsed and ratified by the incumbent mayor when he returned to office. This ratification served to cure any legal infirmity the acts of Acting Mayor Martinez may have suffered because of his irregular designation.


The fact that they were merely given temporary appointments for the reason that they do not have civil service eligibility thus making their status as employee wholly dependent upon the grace of the ruling power. And this we say because, as we ruled in a series of cases, "A temporary appointment is similar to one made in acting capacity, the essence of which lies in its temporary character and its terminability at the pleasure of the appointment power."

G.R. No. 110544 Case Digest

G.R. No. 110544 October 17, 1995
Reynaldo Tuanda, etc., petitioners
vs The Honorable Sandiganbayan, Bartolome Binaohan and Delia Estrellanes, respondents
Ponente: Kapunan

Facts:
Petitioners institute this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set aside the resolution of Sandiganbayan and its orders denying petitioners' motion for suspension of their arraignment.

February 9, 1989 Delia Estrellanes and Bartolome Binaohan were designated as industrial labor sectoral representative and agricultural labor sectoral representative for the Sangguniang Bayan of Jimalalud, Negros Oriental by DILG Secretary Santos. They both took their oath of office on February 16 and 17, 1989.

Then, petitioners filed a petition with the Office of the President for review and recall of said designations. This was denied and enjoined Tuanda to recognize private sectoral representatives. Estrallanes and Binaohan then filed a petition for mandamus with RTC Negros Oriental for recognition as members of the Sangguniang Bayan. It was dismissed.

The matter was then brought to RTC Dumaguete City accusing Tuanda and others of taking advantage of their official functions and unlawfully causing undue injury to Estrellanes and Binaohan.

Petitioners filed a motion with Sandiganbayan for suspension of the Criminal Case on the ground that a prejudicial question exists. The RTC rendered a decision declaring null and void ab initio the designations issued by DILG for violation of the provisions saying that the Sanggunian itself must make a determination first of the number of sectors in the city/municipality to warrant representation.

Meanwhile, the Sandiganbayan has issued a resolution saying that the private respondents have rendered such services and the said appointments enjoy the presumption of regularity; for these reasons, the private respondents were entitled to the salaries attached to their office. Even if the RTC later declare the appointments null and void, they would still be given salaries because of the period they acted as representatives has made them a de facto officers.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution in view of the RTC nullification of the appointments. But it was likewise denied along with the cancellation of their arraignment, instead Sandiganbayan required Tuanda and the others to submit a written show cause why they should not be cited for contempt of court for their failure to appear in court today for the arraignment.

Hence, this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition where petitioners attribute to respondent Sandiganbayan the following errors:
A. The Respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners' motions for the suspension of the proceedings in Criminal Case
B. The Respondent Court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in refusing to suspend the proceedings that would entail a retrial and rehearing by it of the basic issue involved
C. The Respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion and/or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in effectively allowing petitioners to be prosecuted under two alternative theories that private respondents are de jure and/or de facto officers in violation of petitioners' right to due process.

Issue: The legality of private respondents' designation as sectoral representatives.




Held:
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. 14 It has two essential elements:
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. 15
Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bench, we find that the issue in the civil case, CA-G.R. CV No. 36769, constitutes a valid prejudicial question to warrant suspension of the arraignment and further proceedings in the criminal case against petitioners.
All the elements of a prejudicial question are clearly and unmistakably present in this case. There is no doubt that the facts and issues involved in the civil action (No. 36769) and the criminal case (No. 16936) are closely related. The filing of the criminal case was premised on petitioners' alleged partiality and evident bad faith in not paying private respondents' salaries and per diems as sectoral representatives, while the civil action was instituted precisely to resolve whether or not the designations of private respondents as sectoral representatives were made in accordance with law.

Private respondents insist that even if their designations are nullified, they are entitled to compensation for actual services rendered. We disagree. As found by the trial court and as borne out by the records, from the start, private respondents' designations as sectoral representatives have been challenged by petitioners. They began with a petition filed with the Office of the President copies of which were received by private respondents on 26 February 1989, barely eight (8) days after they took their oath of office. Hence, private respondents' claim that they have actually rendered services as sectoral representatives has not been established.

Finally, we find unmeritorious respondent Sandiganbayan's thesis that even in the event that private respondents' designations are finally declared invalid, they may still be considered de facto public officers entitled to compensation for services actually rendered.
The conditions and elements of de facto officership are the following:
1) There must be a de jure office;
2) There must be color of right or general acquiescence by the public; and
3) There must be actual physical possession of the office in good faith.


Sandiganbayan Resolution was set aside.