G.R. No. 110544 Case Digest

G.R. No. 110544 October 17, 1995

Reynaldo Tuanda, etc., petitioners

vs The Honorable Sandiganbayan, Bartolome Binaohan and Delia Estrellanes, respondents

Ponente: Kapunan

Facts:

Petitioners institute this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set aside the resolution of Sandiganbayan and its orders denying petitioners' motion for suspension of their arraignment.

Fabruary 9, 1989 Delia Estrellanes and Bartolome Binaohan were designated as industrial labor sectoral representative and agricultural labor sectoral representative for the Sangguniang Bayan of Jimalalud, Negros Oriental by DILG Secretary Santos. They both took their oath of office on February 16 and 17, 1989.

Then, petitioners filed a petition with the Office of the President for review and recall of said designations. This was denied and enjoined Tuanda to recognize private sectoral representatives. Estrallanes and Binaohan then filed a petition for mandamus with RTC Negros Oriental for recognition as members of the Sangguniang Bayan. It was dismissed.

The matter was then brought to RTC Dumaguete City accusing Tuanda and others of taking advantage of their official functions and unlawfully causing undue injury to Estrellanes and Binaohan.

Petitioners filed a motion with Sandiganbayan for suspension of the Criminal Case on the ground that a prejudicial question exists. The RTC rendered a decision declaring null and void ab initio the designations issued by DILG for violation of the provisions saying that the Sanggunian itself must make a determination first of the number of sectors in the city/municipality to warrant representation.

Meanwhile, the Sandiganbayan has issued a resolution saying that the private respondents have rendered such services and the said appointments enjoy the presumption of regularity; for these reasons, the private respondents were entitled to the slaries attached to their office. Even if the RTC later declare the appointments null and void, they would still be given salaries because of the period they acted as representatives has made them a de facto officers.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution in view of the RTC nullification of the appointments. But it was likewise denied along with the cancellation of their arraignment, instead Sandiganbayan required Tuanda and the others to submit a written show cause why they should not be cited for contempt of court for their failure to appear in court today for the arraignment.

Hence, this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition where petitioners attribute to respondent Sandiganbayan the following errors:

A. The Respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners' motions for the suspension of the proceedings in Criminal Case

B. The Respondent Court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in refusing to suspend the proceedings that would entail a retrial and rehearing by it of the basic issue involved

C. The Respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion and/or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in effectively allowing petitioners to be prosecuted under two alternative theories that private respondents are de jure and/or de facto officers in violation of petitioners' right to due process.

Issue: The legality of private respondents' designation as sectoral representatives.

Held:

The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. 14 It has two essential elements:

(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and

(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. 15

Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bench, we find that the issue in the civil case, CA-G.R. CV No. 36769, constitutes a valid prejudicial question to warrant suspension of the arraignment and further proceedings in the criminal case against petitioners.

All the elements of a prejudicial question are clearly and unmistakably present in this case. There is no doubt that the facts and issues involved in the civil action (No. 36769) and the criminal case (No. 16936) are closely related. The filing of the criminal case was premised on petitioners' alleged partiality and evident bad faith in not paying private respondents' salaries and per diems as sectoral representatives, while the civil action was instituted precisely to resolve whether or not the designations of private respondents as sectoral representatives were made in accordance with law.

Private respondents insist that even if their designations are nullified, they are entitled to compensation for actual services rendered. We disagree. As found by the trial court and as borne out by the records, from the start, private respondents' designations as sectoral representatives have been challenged by petitioners. They began with a petition filed with the Office of the President copies of which were received by private respondents on 26 February 1989, barely eight (8) days after they took their oath of office. Hence, private respondents' claim that they have actually rendered services as sectoral representatives has not been established.

Finally, we find unmeritorious respondent Sandiganbayan's thesis that even in the event that private respondents' designations are finally declared invalid, they may still be considered de facto public officers entitled to compensation for services actually rendered.

The conditions and elements of de facto officership are the following:

1) There must be a de jure office;

2) There must be color of right or general acquiescence by the public; and

3) There must be actual physical possession of the office in good faith.

Sandiganbayan Resolution was set aside.

G.R. No. 105371 Case Digest

G.R. No. 105371 November 11, 1993

The Philippine Judges Association, etc., petitioners

vs Hon. Pete Prado, etc., respondents

Ponente: Cruz

Facts:

The petitioners are members of the mower courts who feel that their official functions as judges will be prejudiced by the Section 35 of RA No. 7354 through Circular No. 92-98 withdrawing the franking privilege from the SC, CA, RTC, MTCs and Land Registration of Deeds and other government offices.

Petitioners assails the constitutionality of RA No. 7354 on the grounds: (1) its title embraces more than one subject and does not express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed among the members before its passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary.

Issue: the independence of the Judiciary.

Held:

(1) We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is germane to the accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a more efficient and effective postal service system. Our ruling is that, by virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35 did not have to be expressly included in the title of the said law.

(2) Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final form were not distributed among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.

(3) The respondents counter that there is no discrimination because the law is based on a valid classification in accordance with the equal protection clause. In fact, the franking privilege has been withdrawn not only from the Judiciary but also the Office of Adult Education, the Institute of National Language; the Telecommunications Office; etc.

(4) We are unable to agree with the respondents that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 represents a valid exercise of discretion by the Legislature under the police power. On the contrary, we find its repealing clause to be a discriminatory provision that denies the Judiciary the equal protection of the laws guaranteed for all persons or things similarly situated. The distinction made by the law is superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the Judiciary and the grantees of the franking privilege.

It is unconstitutional.

G.R. No. 113811 Case Digest

G.R. No. 113811 October 7, 1994

Ishmael Himagan, petitioner

vs People of the Philippines and Hon. Judge Hilario Mapayo, respondents

Ponente: Kapunan

Facts:

Himagan is policeman assigned with the medical company of the PNP Regional Headquarters as Camp Catitigan, Davao City, and was implicated in the killing of Benjamin Machitar Jr., and the attempted murder of Bernabe Machitar. After the infromations were filed, RTC Davao issued as order suspending petitioner until the termination of the case.

October 11, 1993, Himagan filed a motion to lift the order for his suspension relying on the Civil service Decree that his suspension should be limited to 90 days. But respondent Judge denied the motion pointing out under section 47 of RA 6975, the accused shall be suspended from office until his case is terminated. The motion for reconsideration of the order was denied also, hence this certiorari and mandamus to set aside the orders of respondent Judge.

Held:

First. The language of the first sentence of Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 is clear, plain and free from ambiguity. It gives no other meaning than that the suspension from office of the member of the PNP charged with grave offense where the penalty is six years and one day or more shall last until the termination of the case. The suspension cannot be lifted before the termination of the case. The second sentence of the same Section providing that the trial must be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment does not qualify or limit the first sentence. The two can stand independently of each other. The first refers to the period of suspension. The second deals with the time frame within which the trial should be finished.

Second. Petitioner misapplies Sec. 42 of PD 807. A meticulous reading of the section clearly shows that it refers to the lifting of preventive suspension in pending administrative investigation, not in criminal cases, as here. In the instant case. Petitioner is charged with murder under the Revised Penal Code and it is undisputed that he falls squarely under Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 which categorically states that his suspension shall last until the case is terminated.

The foregoing discussions reveal the legislative intent to place on preventive suspension a member of the PNP charged with grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law exceeds six years of imprisonment and which suspension continues until the case against him is terminated.

The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions.

The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of real differences among men, the equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to the privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. Thus, the equal protection clause does not absolutely forbid classifications, such as the one which exists in the instant case. If the classification is based on real and substantial differences; is germane to the purpose of the law; applies to all members of the same

class; and applies to current as well as future conditions, the classification may not be impugned as violating the Constitution's equal protection guarantee. A distinction based on real and reasonable considerations related to a proper legislative purpose such as that which exists here is neither unreasonable, capricious nor unfounded.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

G.R. No. L-59431 Case Digest

G.R. No. L-59431 July 25, 1984

Antero Sison, petitioner

vs Ruben Ancheta, etc., respondents

Ponente: Fernando

Facts:

Sison alleges that Section 1 of BP Blg. 135 which amends Section 21 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977 which provides rates tax on citizens or residents on (a) taxable compensation income, (b) taxable net income, (c) royalties, prizes, and other winnings, (d) interest from bank deposits and yield or any other monetary benefit from deposit substitutes and from trust fund and similar arrangements, (e) dividends and share of individual partner in the net profits of taxable partnership, (f) adjusted gross income. Sison alleged that he would be unduly discriminated by this imposition, characterizing the section as arbitrary amounting to class legislation, oppressive and capricious in character. For Sison, there is a transgression of both the equal protection and due process clauses of the constitution as well as the rule on uniformity in taxation.

Held:

Petition must be dismissed.

Arbitrariness: mere allegation does not suffice. There must be factual foundation of such claim.

Due process: may be invoked where a taxing statute is so arbitrary that it finds no support in the Constitution.

Equal Protection: the laws assailed operate equally and uniformly on all persons under the similar circumstances.

Uniformity: the tax applies equally to all persons, firms and corporations placed in similar situation.

Therefore, the petition is without merit, considering the (1) lack of factual foundation to show the arbitrary character of the assailed provision; 31 (2) the force of controlling doctrines on due process, equal protection, and uniformity in taxation and (3) the reasonableness of the distinction between compensation and taxable net income of professionals and businessman certainly not a suspect classification.

G.R. No. 127410 Case Digest

G.R. No. 127410 January 20, 1999

Conrado Tiu, Juan Montelibano Jr. and Isagani Jungco, petitioners

vs Court of Appeals, etc., respondents

Ponente: Panganiban

Facts:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the CA's decision upholding the constitutionality and validity of EO No. 97-A granting the tax and duty incentives authorized under RA No. 7227 were limited to the business enterprises and residents within the fenced-in area of the Subic Special Economic Zone.

The assailed resolution has denied the motion for reconsideration of the petitioners.

March 13, 1992, Congress with the approval of the President passed RA 7227 creating Bases Conversion and Development Authority for the purpose of providing funds therefor and for other purposes in SSEZ. On June 10, 1993, President Ramos issued EO No. 97 clarifying the tax and duty incentives thus:

Sec. 1. On Import Taxes and Duties. — Tax and duty-free importations shall apply only to raw materials, capital goods and equipment brought in by business enterprises into the SSEZ. Except for these items, importations of other goods into the SSEZ, whether by business enterprises or resident individuals, are subject to taxes and duties under relevant Philippine laws.

The exportation or removal of tax and duty-free goods from the territory of the SSEZ to other parts of the Philippine territory shall be subject to duties and taxes under relevant Philippine laws.

Sec. 2. On All Other Taxes. — In lieu of all local and national taxes (except import taxes and duties), all business enterprises in the SSEZ shall be required to pay the tax specified in Section 12(c) of R.A. No. 7227.

9 days after, President Ramos issued EO 97-A specifying the area within which the tax and duty free privilege was operative. Then petitioners challenged the EO 97-A for being violative of the right to equal protection of the laws.

Ruling of CA: Respondent Court held that "there is no substantial difference between the provisions of EO 97-A and Section 12 of RA 7227. In both, the 'Secured Area' is precise and well-defined as '. . . the lands occupied by the Subic Naval Base and its contiguous extensions as embraced, covered and defined by the 1947 Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States of America, as amended . . .'" The appellate court concluded that such being the case, petitioners could not claim that EO 97-A is unconstitutional, while at the same time maintaining the validity of RA 7227.

The Court of Appeals further justified the limited application of the tax incentives as being within the prerogative of the legislature, pursuant to its "avowed purpose [of serving] some public benefit or interest." It ruled that "EO 97-A merely implements the legislative purpose of [RA 7227]."

Issue: Whether the E0 97-A is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution?

Held:

The constitutional rights to equal protection of the law is not violated by an executive order, issued pursuant to law, granting tax and duty incentives only to the business and residents within the "secured area" of the Subic Special Economic Zone and denying them to those who live within the Zone but outside such "fenced-in" territory. The Constitution does not require absolute equality among residents. It is enough that all persons under like circumstances or conditions are given the same privileges and required to follow the same obligations. In short, a classification based on valid and reasonable standards does not violate the equal protection clause.

We rule in favor of the constitutionality and validity of the assailed EO. Said Order is not violative of the equal protection clause; neither is it discriminatory. Rather, than we find real and substantive distinctions between the circumstances obtaining inside and those outside the Subic Naval Base, thereby justifying a valid and reasonable classification.

The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another. 6 The classification must also be germane to the purpose of the law and must apply to all those belonging to the same class.

Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions, (2) be germane to the purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class.

Purpose of Law: to accelerate the conversion of military reservations into productive uses.

Substantial Distinctions: We believe it was reasonable for the President to have delimited the application of some incentives to the confines of the former Subic military base. It is well-settled that the equal-protection guarantee does not require territorial uniformity of laws. As long as there are actual and material differences between territories, there is no violation of the constitutional clause.

Existing Conditions: We believe that the classification set forth by the executive issuance does not apply merely to existing conditions. As laid down in RA 7227, the objective is to establish a "self-sustaining, industrial, commercial, financial and investment center" in the area. There will, therefore, be a long-term difference between such investment center and the areas outside it.

Apply Equally: the classification applies equally to all the resident individuals and businesses within the "secured area." The residents, being in like circumstances or contributing directly to the achievement of the end purpose of the law, are not categorized further. Instead, they are all similarly treated, both in privileges granted and in obligations required.

G.R. No. L-23794 Case Digest

G.R. No. L-23794 February 17, 1968

Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., plaintiff-appellant

vs The Treasurer of Ormoc City, etc., defendants-appellees

Ponente: Bengzon

Facts:

January 29, 1964, the municipal board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4 Series of 1964 imposing a municipal tax for all productions of centrifugal sugar milled equivalent to 1

% per export sale to USA and other foreign countries. Payments were made under protest by Ormoc sugar Company.

Sugar Company filed before CFI of Leyte a complaint against the City of Ormoc alleging that the ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause and the rule of uniformity of taxation. In response, defendants asserted that the tax ordinance was within the city's power to enact under Local Autonomy Act and the same did not violate constitutional limitations.

After pre-trial and submission of case memoranda, CFI declared the ordinance constitutional, that it is within the charter of the city.

Appeal was then taken to SC by the Ormoc Sugar Company alleging the same statutory and constitutional violations. Appellant questions the authority of the Municipal Board to levy such tax in view of the Revised dministrative Code which denies municipal councils to impose export tax.

Issue: Whether constitutional limits on the power of taxation, and equal protection clause and rule of uniform taxation were infringed?

Held:

We ruled that the equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class.

          A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, for the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.

The ordinance is unconstitutional.

G.R. No. L-45987 Case Digest

G.R. No. L-45987 May 5, 1939

People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee

vs Cayat, defendant-appellant

Ponente: Moran

Facts:

Cayat is a native of Baguio prosecuted for violation of Act No. 1639 and was sentenced by the justice of the peace of Baguio to pay a fine or suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

On January 25, 1937, the City of Baguio accused Cayat of illegally possessing a gin, which the members of his tribe have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of Act No. 1639.

Cayat interposed a demurrer which was overruled. At the trial, Cayat admitted the alleged facts but pleaded not guilty. But trial court found him guilty and sentenced him of the fine or imprisonment.

Cayat challenges the constitutionality of the Act on the following grounds: (1) That it is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws;

(2) That it is violative of the due process clause of the Constitution: and.

(3) That it is improper exercise of the police power of the state.

Held:

It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. And the classification, to be reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.

(1) Substantial Distinction: . It is not based upon "accident of birth or parentage," as counsel to the appellant asserts, but upon the degree of civilization and culture. "The term 'non-Christian tribes' refers, not to religious belief, but, in a way, to the geographical area, and, more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities." This distinction is unquestionably reasonable, for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non-Christian tribes.

(2) Germane to the purpose of law: it is unquestionably designed to insure peace and order in and among the non-Christian tribes. It has been the sad experience of the past, as the observations of the lower court disclose, that the free use of highly intoxicating liquors by the non-Christian tribes have often resulted in lawlessness and crimes, thereby hampering the efforts of the government to raise their standard of life and civilization.

(3) it must not be limited to conditions: The law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of its enactment. It is intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions exist.

(4) apply to all members of the class: that the Act applies equally to all members of the class is evident from a perusal thereof. That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number non-Christians by reason of their degree of culture, is not an argument against the equality of its application.

Act No. 1639, as above stated, is designed to promote peace and order in the non-Christian tribes so as to remove all obstacles to their moral and intellectual growth and, eventually, to hasten their equalization and unification with the rest of their Christian brothers. Its ultimate purpose can be no other than to unify the Filipino people with a view to a greater Philippines.