G.R. No. 112386 Case Digest

G.R. No. 112386 June 14, 1994

Marcelino Libanan, petitioner

vs Sandiganbayan  and Agustin Docena, respondents

Ponente: Vitug

Facts:

Libanan is the incumbent Vice Governor of Eastern Samar and was a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan prior to the 1992 May elections. He was charged and suspended for preventing and excluding Docena, a duly appointed and qualified replacement of deceased Panlalawigan member Capito. Libanan filed a motion for reconsideration but denied by Sandiganbayan. 

Libanan presents 3 grounds: (1) order of suspension if executed would constitute an affront on Libanan's constitutional right to due process (2) order of suspension once implemented would amount to assault on the sacred covenant reposed on the Vice Governor by the people of Samar (3) the reason sought to be prevented by the suspension order pendente lite no longer exist.

Held:

Petition was held without merit.

(1) Suspension order cannot amount to deprivation of property without due process of law because public office is a public agency or trust.

(2) Libanan's so-called "covenant" is far from being synonymous of equivalent of license. He cannot used it as a defense from the law.

(3) The statute is clear and explicit, there is hardly no room for any extended court rationalization of the law. RA No. 3019 unequivocally mandates the suspension of a public official from office pending a criminal prosecution against him. 

G.R. No. 74720 Case Digest

G.R. No. 74720 August 31, 1987

Roberto Ignacio, petitioner

vs Leoncio Banate, Jr., Hon. Aquilino Pimentel, in his capacity as Minister of Local Governments and Community Development and the City Treasurer of Roxas City, respondents

Ponente: Gutierrez, Jr.

Facts:

This is a petition for quo warranto and prohibition with prayer for preliminary and temporary restraining order seeks to nullify the appointment or designation of private respondent Leoncio Banate, Jr. as member of Sangguniang Panlungsod of Roxas City.

Ignacio was elected Brgy. Captain of Tanza, Roxas City on May 17, 1982 for a term of 6 years. Then he was elected as president of association of Brgy. Councils in accordance with the Local Government Code and IRR of Katipunan. By this virtue, he was appointed a member of the sangguniang Panlungsod of Roxas City by President Marcos. Pimentel designated Banate as replacement of Ignacio as member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Roxas City as replacement of Ignacio.

Ignacio contends that Banate is not qualified to be member of Sangguniang Panlungsod to replace him as representative of Katipunan ng mga Barangay of Roxas City because his membership in the city council is governed by the local government code which provides that: Sec. 173. Composition and Compensation. — (l) sangguniang panlungsod as the legislative body of the city, shall be composed of the vice-mayor, as presiding officer, the elected sangguniang panlungsod members, and the members who may be appointed by the President of the Philippines consisting of the presidents of the katipunan panlungsod ng mga barangay and the kabataang barangay city federation.

According to Ignacio, his appointment as member of Sangguniang Panlungsod was by virtue of his having been elected by the Katipunan Panlungsod ng mga Barangay while Banate is not an officer and has not been elected for any position. He further argues that Pimentel's appointment is invalid considering that LGC provides that only the President of the Philippines can do the appointment for such office. He claims that this appointment poser cannot be delegated to minister for this is strictly personal act ordain to be performed by the President alone.

Solicitor General countered that: that the petitioner, as an appointive local government official who assumed office under the 1973 Constitution, is covered by the provisions of Section 2, Article III of Proclamation No. 3 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino, which provides that "All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of their successors, if such is made within a period of one year from February 25, 1986."

With respect to the argument of the petitioner that the appointing power of the President of the Philippines cannot be delegated to Minister Pimentel, the Solicitor General replied that under the provisions of Section 2, Article III of Proclamation No. 3, dated March 25, 1986, issued by President Corazon C. Aquino, otherwise known as the Provisional Constitution, the power to delegate or appoint officers-in-charge in replacement of local government officials by then Minister Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., as alter ego of the President of the Philippines, has been upheld by this Court in several cases.

Held:

Petition is meritorious. Minister Pimentel is the alter ego of the President in appointing a public officer, his appointment has been upheld. However, the appointee to a Sangguninang Panlungsod must meet the qualifications required by law of which Banate didn't have. 

G.R. No. L-53373 Case Digest

G.R. No. L-53373, June 30, 1987

Mario Crespo, petitioner

vs Hon. Leodegario L.Mogul, et.al., respondents

Ponente: Gancayco

Facts:

April 1977, Asst. Fiscal de Gala with approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed an information for estafa against Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City. When the case was set for arraignment, Crespo filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with the Sec. of Justice for the filing of the information; which was denied. A motion for reconsideration was denied too in order but the arraignment was referred to August 18, 1997 to afford time for petitioner to elevate the matter to the appellate court.

A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction was filed by the accused in the CA, then CA restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding with arraignment until further orders. 

On March 22, 1978 undersecretary of justice MAcaraig reversed the resolution of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against Crespo. A motion to dismiss was then filed by the Provincial Fiscal with the trial court attaching Macaraig's letter. On November 1978, judge denied the motion and set arraignment.= stating that the motion thrust induce the court to resolve the innocence of the accused on evidence not before it but on that adduced before the undersecretary that disregards the requirements of due process but also erodes court's independence and integrity, motion denied.

Crespo then filed a petition certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with petition for the issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition in the CA. Praying that the decision to move on with arraignment be reversed and set aside declaring the information filed not valid and of no legal force and effect and to dismiss the case and declare Crespo's obligation as purely civil.

Issue: Whether the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the provincial fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits.

Ruling: Petition denied.

(1) It is a cardinal principle that an criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. 17 The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by private persons. 19 It cannot be controlled by the complainant. 

(2) However, the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation or control. The same is subject to the approval of the provincial or city fiscal or the chief state prosecutor as the case maybe and it maybe elevated for review to the Secretary of Justice who has the power to affirm, modify or reverse the action or opinion of the fiscal. Consequently the Secretary of Justice may direct that a motion to dismiss the case be filed in Court or otherwise, that an information be filed in Court.

(3) The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority to hear and determine the case. The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court. 

(4) Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to dismiss was submitted to the Court, the Court in the exercise of its discretion may grant the motion or deny it and require that the trial on the merits proceed for the proper determination of the case.

(5) It is the duty of the fiscal to proceed with the presentation of evidence of the prosecution to the Court to enable the Court to arrive at its own independent judgment as to whether the accused should be convicted or acquitted.

(6) The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation. 

G.R. No. L-41054 Case Digest

G.R. No. L-41054, November 28, 1975

Jose Gamboa and Units optical supply company, petitioners

vs. CA and Benjamin Lu Hayco, respondents

Ponente: Martin

Facts:

This is a petition to review on the judgment of CA involving the theory of continuous crime.

Haycu was a former employee of Units optical with 124 complaints of estafa files against him by the company with the office of city fiscal of manila. after the procedural PI, fiscal filed 75 cases of estafa against Haycu, except as to the dates and amounts of conversions, the 75 informations commonly charge that Haycu having collected and received customers of the company the purchase of goods has converted the sum of money he collected to his own personal account with a bank.

A civil action for accounting was filed also by the owner of the company against Haycu complaining that Haycu initiated discharging the business functions and prerogatives of the company thru deceit and machinations that the owner affixing his signatures to the power of attorney to open account in the bank.

Haycu appealed to the CA to reversed the order of the lower court.asserting that the 75 criminal cases is not only oppressing but also out of the jurisdiction of the city fiscal of manila. asserting also that the 75 were mere components of only one crime.

CA ruled that, with intent Haycu defraud his employer to sign the power of attorney, and the series of deposits made by Haycu constitutes one crime of estafa, there being one criminal resolution and the different acts were aimed at accomplishing the purpose of defrauding his employer.

But the characterization of the estafa as continuing offense cannot be validly seize by haycu because the elements of estafa may separately take place in different jurisdiction until the crime is consummated. and the series of deposits of the company's funds to his personal account is treated separately from that of the case of the power of attorney.

CA is hereby set aside and reversed. 

G.R. No. 191064 Case Digest

G.R. No. 191064, October 20, 2010

People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee,

vs Rolando Araneta y Abella and Marilou Santos y Tantay, accused-appellants.

Ponente: Mendoza

Facts:

This is an appeal from the decision of Court of appeals affirming the decision of RTC Pasig City finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating the comprehensive drugs act of 2002.

Criminal information were filed in RTC against Araneta in addition to the information filed against him and co-accused Santos. Stating that accused willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to PO2 Danilo S. Damasco, a police poseur buyer, one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance weighing of (sic) eight (8) centigrams (0.08 gram), which was found positive to the test for metamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, in violation of said law.

The RTC ruled that all the elements for the prosecution of the illegal sale of dangerous drugs were present during the buy-bust operation conducted by the police officers. These were: 1) the identity of the buyer and the seller; 2) the object of the sale and the consideration; and 3) the delivery of the thing sold and payment therefor.

Furthermore, the RTC held that the defense of denial, frame-up, forcible entry, and extortion could not prevail over the positive identification by the prosecution witnesses. It noted that accused Rolando Araneta was not candid enough to inform the court that no less than eight (8) criminal cases were previously filed against him in different courts for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law. Nevertheless, out of eight (8) criminal cases filed against him, he admitted that one resulted in a conviction and two other cases were dismissed.  The other cases were then still pending trial.

Aggrieved, the accused appealed to the CA arguing that: 1) the RTC erred in not finding that they were illegally arrested and, as such, the sachets of shabu allegedly recovered from them were inadmissible in evidence; and 2) the RTC erred in finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged because the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were replete with inconsistencies and contradictions.

On August 29, 2008, the CA rendered the subject decision affirming the decision of the RTC.

Issue: Whether or not the accused are guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating the comprehensive drugs act?

The accused argue that the evidence adduced by the prosecution was not able to establish without a doubt, that the dangerous drugs presented in court were the very same ones allegedly sold by them. They insist that the police officers failed to strictly abide by the requirements of the law as regards the proper custody of dangerous drugs seized in the course of the alleged buy-bust operation.

The prosecution stands firm by its position that the arrest of the accused and seizure of the shabu and marijuana were lawful and that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were truthful. In the absence of any credible evidence to the contrary, the police officers are presumed to have regularly performed their official duty. More importantly, all the elements necessary for the prosecution of the illegal sale of drugs are present, to wit: 1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and consideration; and 2) the delivery of the thing sold and payment therefor.

The prosecution asserts that the accused cannot raise for the first time on appeal the issue on the alleged failure of the law enforcers to comply strictly with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. At any rate, the prosecution believes that it has shown that the chain of custody of the seized items was not broken.

Ruling:

After due consideration, the Court finds the evidence on record sufficient enough to sustain the verdict of conviction.  It is morally convinced that the accused are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged against them.  The rule is that factual findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of their probative weight are given high respect if not conclusive effect, unless the trial court ignored, misconstrued, misunderstood or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances of substance, which, if considered, will alter the outcome of the case.[5] In this case, the CA found no such inculpatory facts and circumstances and this Court has not stumbled upon any either.

Doubtless, the prosecution was able to establish all the necessary elements required in the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, namely: 1) the identity of the buyer and seller; 2) the identity of the object of the sale and the consideration; and 3) the delivery of the thing sold upon payment.

The Court looked into the accused’s defense of denial and accusations of  frame-up, planting of evidence, forcible entry and extortion by the police officers but found them inherently weak. Aside from their bare allegations, the accused had nothing more to show that the apprehending police officers did not properly perform their duties or that they had ill motives against them. They failed to substantiate their argument that they were framed-up for extortion purposes.

Absent any convincing countervailing evidence, the presumption is that the members of the buy-bust team performed their duties in a regular manner. It was certainly a job well done. Hence, the Court gives full faith and credit to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.

The Court also holds that the seized items were admissible.   A search warrant or warrant of arrest was not needed because it was a buy-bust operation and the accused were caught in flagrante delicto in possession of, and selling, dangerous drugs to the poseur-buyer. It was definitely legal for the buy-bust team to arrest, and search, them on the spot because a buy-bust operation is a justifiable mode of apprehending drug pushers. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. 

G.R. No. 182549 Case Digest

G.R. No. 182549, January 20, 2009

People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee,

vs Sergio Lagarde, accused-appellant.

Ponente: Velasco, Jr.

Facts:

This is an appeal seeking for the reverse of decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of conviction for rape by RTC Leyte.

Lagarde was charged with rape in an information stating that: On December 27, 2001 in Leyte, deliberate and of use of force and intimidation rape an 11 year-old. Upon arraignment, Lagarde pleaded not guilty.

During trial, prosecution presented testimony of the minor and her the doctor who examined her after the incident. Defense presented Lagarde denial contending that he didn't left the house of Lolita during the fiesta celebration, that he had a drinking spree with the other visitors.

The RTC found AAA’s testimony credible, noting that at her age, it is inconceivable for her to concoct a tale of having been raped. Her accusation, according to the RTC, was supported by medical findings that she was indeed sexually abused. The lower court dismissed accused-appellant’s denial and alibi. Lolita’s testimony was likewise disbelieved not only because she was related to accused-appellant but also because she herself was busy drinking tuba in another part of the house. She could not categorically say, the RTC added, that accused-appellant did not leave his seat and molest AAA. 

The appellate court upheld the trial court’s findings of fact and judgment of conviction. With regard to the penalty, however, the CA ruled that the trial court erred when it imposed the death sentence on the basis of the following aggravating circumstances: minority, use of bladed weapon, and uninhabited place. Aside from the abolition of the death penalty, the CA held that:

It is basic in criminal procedure that the purpose of the information is to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him or the charge against him so as to enable him to prepare a suitable defense. It would be a denial of the right of the accused to be informed of the charges against him, and consequently, a denial of due process, if he is charged with simple rape and convicted of its qualified form punishable by death although the attendant circumstances qualifying the offense and resulting in capital punishment were not set forth in the indictment on which he was arraigned. More importantly, they are not the circumstances that would call for the application of death penalty.

Issues: (1) the court gravely erred in finding the guilt of the accused (2) the court gravely erred in imposing upon the accused the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Ruling: Appeal has no merit.

In rape cases, courts are governed by the following principles: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) due to the nature of the crime of rape in which only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. Due to the nature of this crime, only the complainant can testify against the assailant. Accordingly, conviction for rape may be solely based on the complainant’s testimony provided it is credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.

The trial court observed that AAA’s testimony was credible, straightforward, clear, and convincing. She ably identified accused-appellant as her attacker and described in detail how she was sexually assaulted. There is no reason a child would fabricate such a serious accusation such as rape and risk public humiliation if not to seek justice. It is for this reason that testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credence, since when minors say they were raped, they say in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed.

The victim’s credibility is further bolstered by the immediate reporting of the incident to her mother and subsequently to the authorities. Moreover, the medical findings of Drs. Oyzon and Palencia-Jadloc established the fact that complainant had sexual intercourse.

Accused-appellant, on the other hand, could only offer denial and alibi as defenses. His alibi that he spent the afternoon drinking with other visitors does not deserve merit since he was present in the same house where the victim was. 

It is a basic constitutional right of the accused persons to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against them. It would be a denial of accused-appellant’s basic right to due process if he is charged with simple rape and consequently convicted with certain qualifying circumstances which were not alleged in the information.

The appellate court correctly ruled that the use of a bladed weapon and uninhabited place are not circumstances that would call for the imposition of the death penalty. 

The victim’s minority does not also qualify the offense to merit the death penalty. To warrant a death sentence, the victim must be under seven (7) years of age. 

G.R. No. 181084 Case Digest

G.R. No. 181084

People of the Philippines

v Bartolome Tampus and Ida Montesclaros

Ponente: Puno

Facts:

On appeal is the CA Visayas decision affirming with modification the decision of the RTC of Lapu-Lapu city in finding Ida Montesclaros guilty as an accomplice in the commission of rape.

This appeal stems from two criminal cases: (1) the information states that, on april 1, 1995 about 4:30pm in Lapulapu city with the jurisdiction of the RTC Lapu-Lapu, the accused Tampus was in deep slumber due to drunkenness did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the then 13 yer old victim against her will in conspiracy with Ida Montesclaros who gave permission to Tampus to rape the minor.(2) on April 3, 1995 at about 1am, Tampus was armed with a wooden club and by means of threat and intimidation did willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with then 13 year old against her will.

The offended party is the daughter of montesclaros. Montesclaros started o rent a room in a house owned by Tampus, a barangay tanod. Minor testified that she was in the house with her mother and Tampus on April 1, 1995, that the two adults were drinking beer and forced her to drink too. After having 3 bottles then she got sleepy and was lying on the floor when she overheard Tampus requesting her mother to be permitted to have sexual intercourse with the minor. Montesclaros agreed and told Tampus to leave as soon as he is finish with her daughter. Montesclaros then left for work and left the minor along with Tampus. The minor fell asleep and have woken up with pain and blood on her genitals. The minor cried  to her mother but was ignored by Montesclaros.

Minor testified that the abuse was repeated on April 4, 1995. That then made her to seek from her Aunt Nellie who reported the incident to the police. On May 9, 1995 the head of the medico-legal branch of the PNCLS conducted a physical examination of the minor and testified that the result of the examination revealed a deep healed laceration.

On September 22, 1995 the minor filed 2 complaints against Tampus on rape and against Montesclaros on conspiracy to the rape.

Tampus denied the rape with alibis that Ida always bring her daughter to the beer house with her and his duties to the barangay tanod post would prevent the incident of the minor having left at home alone with him.

then the head of Dept. Psychiatry issued a medical certification which showed that Ida was treated as an outpatient diagnosed with Schizophrenia.

Trial court convicted Tampus of 2 rapes and Ida as accomplice.Ida's illness was then appreciated and in effect mitigated her penalty.

CA then dismissed the instant appeal for lack merit but with modification that Ida was guilty beyond reasonable doubt as an accomplice.

CA explained that Ida as accomplice is dependent on proving the principal guilty.