G.R. No. 168546 Case Digest

G.R. No. 168546, July 23, 2008

Michael Padua, petitioner

vs. People of the Philippines, respondent

Ponente: Quisumbing

Facts:

June 16, 2003, Padua and Edgar Ubalde were charged before the RTC Pasig of violation of R.A. No. 9165 [Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs act of 2002] for selling dangerous drugs. When arraigned, Padua assisted by counsel de officio entered a plea of not guilty. During the pre-trial, Padua’s counsel de officio manifested that his client was willing to withdraw his plea of not guilty and enter a plea of guilty to avail the benefits granted to 1^st time offenders. The prosecutor interposed no objection, thus the not guilty plea was withdrawn, Padua re-arraigned and pleaded guilty.

Padua then filed a petition for probation alleging that he is a minor and a 1^st time offender, and that he possess all qualifications and none of the disqualifications of the probation law. RTC ordered for the post-sentenced investigation and recommendation and comment of the probation office and the city prosecutor relatively.

Pasana, the chief probation and parole officer recommended Padua to be placed on probation. However, Judge Reyes-Carpio issued an order denying the petition for probation on the ground that under R.A. No. 9165, any person convicted of drug trafficking cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law.

Padua filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. He filed for a petition for certiorari, but the CA dismissed his petition.

Issue: Whether Padua can avail the benefits of the Probation Law.

Held:

(1)    CA did not err in dismissing Padua’s petition for certiorari. The requisites for the certiorari must occur:  (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

“Without jurisdiction” means that the court acted with absolute lack of authority.  There is “excess of jurisdiction” when the court transcends its power or acts without any statutory authority.  “Grave abuse of discretion” implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

(2)    Any person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing, regardless of the penalty imposed, can not avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or P.D. No. 968.  The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says.  If a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.  This is what is known as the plain-meaning rule or verba legis.  It is expressed in the maxim,index animi sermo, or speech is the index of intention.  Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure.

(3)    Padua cannot argue that his right under Rep. Act No. 9344, the “Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006” was violated.  Nor can he argue that Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC otherwise known as the “Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law” has application in this case.  Section 68 of Rep. Act No. 9344 and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC both pertain to suspension of sentence and not probation.

Petitioner has already reached 21 years of age or over and thus, could no longer be considered a child for purposes of applying Rep. Act 9344. Thus, the application of Sections 38 and 40 appears moot and academic as far as his case is concerned.

G.R. No. 181306 Case Digest

G.R. No. 181306, March 21, 2011

Paterno de los Santos, Jr.

Vs Court of Appeals, et al.

Facts:

On November 20, 1996, RTC Cebu rendered a decision finding petitioner Paterno guilty of crime intentional abortion. Petitioner appealed his conviction to the CA. CA affirmed the conviction with modification as to the penalty.

Petitioner then filed an application for probation. CA denied the application. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was likewise denied. CA contends that the petitioner is ineligible to apply for probation, considering the fact that he has waived his right to avail the benefits of probation law when he appealed the judgment of conviction by the RTC.

Petitioner argues that his case is an exception provided by law – an accused who has appealed his conviction from the benefits of probation, he only became eligible only after the CA modified the judgment and reduced the maximum term of the penalty imposed to 3 years, 6months and 21 days.

In its comment, the Office of the Solicitor asserts that when the petitioner filed an appeal from the trial court’s decision, he was, in effect, precluded from the benefits of probation. Petitioner is disqualified for probation because the RTC sentenced him to suffer an imprisonment of more than 6 years which is not probationable.

Held:

Petition is without merit.

Probation is a special privilege granted by the State to a penitent qualified offender.

The pertinent provision of the Probation Law, as amended, reads:

Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant and upon application by said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction.

It is undisputed that petitioner appealed from the decision of the trial court. This fact alone merits the denial of petitioner's Application for Probation. Having appealed from the judgment of the trial court and having applied for probation only after the Court of Appeals had affirmed his conviction, petitioner was clearly precluded from the benefits of probation.

G.R. No. L-27365 Case Digest

G.R. No. L-27365, January 30, 1970

Felix Lazo, Mercedes Castro de Lazo and Jose Robles

Vs. Republic Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. represented by Antonio Koh, General Manager and as Attorney-in-fact of plaintiffs, Felix and Mercedes Lazo

Ponente: Makalintal

Facts:

December 12, 1963, plaintiffs spouses Lazo filed a complaint against Republic Surety and Insurance co., and its general manager Antonio Koh, the sheriff of Manila and the Register of Deeds of Manila. The spouses Lazo alleged that they guaranteed a loan between Jose Robles and the Philippine Bank of Commerce amounting to P12, 000.00 executed on August 18, 1953. The loan is executed with a real estate mortgage which was foreclosed extra-judicially on July 1, 1958 and sold to the mortgagee. Antonio Koh pursuant to the mortgage right, executed a deed of absolute sale of the foreclosed property. Because of which, the certificate of title of the spouses Lazo was cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of the company.

In a motion to dismiss filed by the defendants, they raised two issues: (a) that the complaint did not state a cause of action and the claim or demand set forth therein had already prescribed; (b) under the rules of court, an accounting could be demanded only in cases where real property is sold on execution by virtue of a final judgment. In the present case, the defendants maintained the redemption period had already expired when the action was commenced.

Issue: Whether or not the plaintiffs were entitled to the accounting sought by them; whether or not the right of redemption with respect to the foreclosed property was still available; whether the foreclosure is valid or not.

The RTC ruled that the transfer of the loan to the Republic Investment Co., Inc. constituted a novation of the obligation, and that the defendant company was released from its liability as co-debtor because it does not appear to have signed the new promissory note executed by the plaintiffs. Consequently, the court concluded, the real estate mortgage in favor of said defendant was extinguished, and the foreclosure thereof was a nullity.

The actuation of the trial court was not legally permissible especially because the theory on which it proceeded involved factual considerations neither touched upon the pleadings nor made the subject of evidence at the trial. Rule 6, Section 1, is quite explicit in providing that "pleadings are the written allegations of the parties of their respective claims and defenses submitted to the court for trial and judgment."

Held:

(1)    The parties admitted that the mortgage was valid and subsisting, therefore, to establish such premise was unnecessary and uncalled for.

(2)    The actuations of the parties after the mortgage was foreclosed, shows with overwhelming preponderance that the said mortgage had not been extinguished.

(3)    Implicit in the application of these provisions is the premise that the period for redemption of the property sold on execution (on extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage in the present case) has not yet expired. For if the right to redeem has been lost it stands to reason that there is no redemption price to speak of, to which the rents received by the purchasers are to be applied or credited.

(4)    The plaintiffs' position is that since the sheriff's certificate of sale was recorded in the office of the Register of Deeds for Manila on March 28, 1963, the one-year period of legal redemption had not yet expired when the action was commenced on December 12 of the same year.

(5)    It is clear, in the light of the facts and circumstances above set forth, that the parties had abandoned entirely the concept of legal redemption in this case and converted it into one of conventional redemption, in which the only governing factor was the agreement between them. The registration of the certificate of sale on March 28, 1963 was entirely unnecessary and irrelevant to the question of when the period of redemption agreed upon expired.

G.R. No. 124354 Case Digest

G.R. No. 124354, December 29, 1999

Rogelio Ramos and Erlinda Ramos (as guardians)

vs. Court of Appeals

Ponente: Kapunan

Issue:

The court is called upon to rule whether a surgeon, an anesthesiologist and a hospital should be made liable for the unfortunate comatose condition of a patient scheduled for cholecystectomy.

Facts:

Erlinda Ramos experiencing a discomfort allegedly caused by the stone in her gall bladder sought professional advice. She was advised to undergo an operation for the removal of a stone in her gall bladder. She underwent series of examination and was declared fit for surgery.  Through the intercession Dr. Buenviaje, Erlinda and her husband met Dr. Hosaka and agreed to have the operation on June 17, 1985.

On the day of the operation, (according to Dr. Hosaka) something went wrong during the intubation. Rogelio, the husband reminded the doctor that the condition of his wife would not have happened, had he looked for a good anesthesiologist. Due to such, Erlinda stayed at the ICU for a month.

The petitioners filed a civil case for damages with the RTC of Quezon City against the respondents alleging negligence in the management and care of Erlinda Ramos. During the trial, the plaintiff presented the testimonies of Dean Herminda Cruz and dr. Gavino (present during the operation) to prove that the sustained by Erlinda was due to lack of oxygen in her brain caused by the faulty management of her airway by the respondent during the anesthesia phase. Respondent relied on the expert testimony of Dr. Jamora, a pulmonologist, to the effect that the cause of brain damage was Erlinda’s allergic reaction to the anesthetic agent.

After considering the evidences, RTC rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. Private respondents interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. CA rendered a decision reversing the findings of the RTC.  The decision of the CA was mistakenly received and has caused for the expiration of the reglementary period for the petitioners. The petitioners then filed for a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, however the CA denied the motion for extension.

In aid of a new counsel, the petitioners were granted extension of 30 days. The petitioners alleged the following issues: (a) CA erred in putting much reliance on the testimonies of respondents DR. Guttierrez, Dr. Calderon and Dr. Jamora; (b) in finding that the negligence of the respondents did not cause the unfortunate comatose condition of the petitioner; (c) in not applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor [the thing speaks for itself]

Held:

(1)    The denial of reglementary period is erroneous, because the delay is attributable to the fact that the decision was not sent to the counsel on records of the petitioners. It is elementary that when a party is represented by counsel, all notices should be sent to the party’s lawyer at his given address.

(2)    Res ipsa loquitor is a maxim for the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiff’s prima facie case and present a question of fact for defendant to meet an explanation. This maxim is not applicable for substantive law thus mere invocation and application of the doctrine does not dispense with the requirement of proof of negligence. Before the doctrine may be applied, the following requisites must be present: (a) the accident is a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence; (b) it is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant of defendants; (c) the possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated. [The control must be shown especially]. Medical malpractice does not escape from the application of this doctrine. Applying the maxim, we find that the damage caused by Erlinda is attributable to the negligence of her doctors.

(3)    As to the testimonies relied by the CA, we disagree. We hold that private respondents were unable to disprove the presumption of negligence on their part in the care of Erlinda and their negligence was the proximate cause of her piteous condition. Dr. Jamora does not qualify as an expert witness based on the standard set by the rules of evidence [Sec. 49. Opinion of expert witness – the opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is shown to possess, may be received in evidence.]. The alleged allergic reaction has no proof as well.

(4)    The court believes that the faulty intubation is the proximate cause of the comatose condition of the patient. Proximate cause is a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.

The doctors as well as the hospital was held liable for the injury incurred by Erlinda, due to their negligence in the operation and management for the hospital.

G.R. No. L-32957-8 Case Digest

G.R. No. L-32957-8 July 25, 1984

People of the Philippines

Vs. Pantaleon Pacis, Eliseo Navarro, Guillermo Agdeppa and Gines Dominguez

Ponente: Concepcion, Jr.

Facts:

This is an appeal of the accused Guillermo from the judgment of the CFI of Cagayan finding him guilty of the crime of frustrated murder.

On November 15, 1967 in the municipality of Sanchez Mira, province of Cagayan, the accused conspired together, armed with guns, with the intent to kill, with treachery and with evident premeditation and taking advantage of superior strength and feloniously attacked and shot Manuel Franco which caused his instantaneous death.

Pacis, one of the appellants and Negre were contenders for the position of mayor in Mira. Pacis was the candidate of the Nacionalista party and was the incumbent mayor, Negre was the candidate of the Liberal party. Franco, the deceased was the incumbent vice-mayor of Pacis but now the campaign manager of Negre.

In the morning of November 15, 1967, the day of the election, Franco and Basco went to Namunac Elementary school to get the election results from the precincts. Of which the two contenders met and from which the firing of gunshots came about.

Agdeppa denied participation in the commission of crimes and interposed an alibi. According to him, he was in Taguiporo where he was employed in the Agricultural Extension Office, at the time of the shooting incident occurred in Namuac. To support the alibi, he presented in evidence the time record he had accomplished and testimony of Jose Tabian who allegedly rode with him on his motorcycle.

The CFI, however, rejected the defense saying that the evidence of the prosecution is more worthy of credence. CFI specially cited the testimony of Basco which, is to its mind, more credible. Counsel for the appellant now contends that the CFI erred in convicting the appellant, citing the maxim of “falsus in uno falsus in omnibuss” [false in one thing is false in everything]

However, the maxim is not a positive law, neither is it an inflexible one of universal application. The testimony of a witness may be believed in part and disbelieved in part. The counsel for the appellant also claims that the bullet marks on the cement conclusively show that the shooting came from the street and not from the truck where Pacis, Navarro and Agdeppa were standing. The trial court discounted the theory.

Issue: Whether the CFI erred in convicting the accused.

Held:

The appellants defense of alibi has nothing to support except the doubtful testimony of Tabian and there is no conclusive evidence that it was physically impossible for the accused to be at the Namuac School which is only 18 kilometers from his office.