G.R. No. 166579 Case Digest

G.R. No. 166579, February 18, 2010
Jordan Chan Paz
vs Jeanice Pavon
Ponente: Carpio

Facts:

In 1996, Jordan and Jeanice met when Jeanice was 19 and Jordan was 27. They had their civil wedding in 1997. They have one son, who was born on 1998. After a big fight, Jeanice left their conjugal home on 1999.

Jeanice then filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against Jordan alleging that Jordan was psychologically incapable of assuming the essential obligations of marriage; manifested by Jordan's tendency to be self-preoccupied and violent.

Psychologist Cristina R. Gates (Gates) testified that Jordan was afflicted with “Borderline Personality Disorder as manifested in his impulsive behavior, delinquency and instability.”[5]  Gates concluded that Jordan’s  psychological maladies antedate their marriage and are rooted in his family background. Gates added that with no indication of reformation, Jordan’s personality disorder appears to be grave and incorrigible.  

Jordan denied Jeanice allegations and denied any interview or psychological tests by Gates. 

RTC Ruling: granted Jeanice petition. 

Jordan then filed a notice of appeal which was promptly approved. Jeanice filed a motion to dismiss with the court of appeals. 

CA: dismissed Jordan's appeal and the next motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether Jordan is incapacitated to comply with the marital obligations.

Held: Petition has merit.

Jeanice failed to prove Jordan's incapacity. Saying that psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, judicial antecedence and incurability. 

G.R. No. 150666 Case Digest

G.R. No. 150666, August 3, 2010

Luciano Briones and Nelly Briones

vs Jose Macabagdal and Vergon Realty Investment Corporation

Ponente: Villarama, Jr.

Facts:

Respondents’ spouses purchased a land from Vergon Realty located in a subdivision in Las Pinas (Lot 2R) with a registered TCT. Vergon on the other hand owns the adjacent land (Lot 2S).

In 1984, after obtaining the building permit and approval of Vergon, Jose Macabagdal constructed a house on Lot 2R which they thought was Lot 2S. After being informed of the mix up, spouses immediately demanded for demolition of the house constructed. Jose, refused. Spouses then filed an action to recover ownership and possession of the said land in RTC Makati.

Jose, insisted that the lot which they constructed their house was the lot which was consistently pointed to them by the Vergon's agents over the 7-year period of paying the lot. They interposed the defense of being buyers in good faith and impleaded indemnity from Vergon because of the warranty against eviction, in case the suit is decided against them.

RTC ruled in favor of the spouses. Defendants were ordered to demolish their house and vacate the premises and return the possession of the lot to the spouses with damages. Defendants counterclaim as well as the 3rd-party complaint were dismissed for lack of merit and with no cause of action.  On appeal, CA affirmed the RTC. Saying that, there was no basis that the error was Vergon's fault and that they cannot invoke the defense of a purchaser in good faith for wrongful occupation of the land.

Thus, this petition.

Issue:

In the main, it is petitioners' position that they must not bear the damage alone. Petitioners insist that they relied with full faith and confidence in the reputation of Vergon's agents when they pointed the wrong property to them. Even the President of Vergon, Felix Gonzales, consented to the construction of the house when he signed the building permit. Also, petitioners are builders in good faith.

Held: Petition is partly meritorious.

RTC erred in out rightly ordering petitioners to vacate the subject property or to pay respondent spouses the prevailing price of the land as compensation.  Article 527[14] of the Civil Code presumes good faith, and since no proof exists to show that the mistake was done by petitioners in bad faith, the latter should be presumed to have built the house in good faith (Art. 448).

The builder in good faith can compel the landowner to make a choice between appropriating the building by paying the proper indemnity or obliging the builder to pay the price of the land. The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that accords with the principle of accession, i.e., that the accessory follows the principal and not the other way around.  However, even as the option lies with the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive. He must choose one. He cannot, for instance, compel the owner of the building to remove the building from the land without first exercising either option.  It is only if the owner chooses to sell his land, and the builder or planter fails to purchase it where its value is not more than the value of the improvements, that the owner may remove the improvements from the land.  The owner is entitled to such remotion only when, after having chosen to sell his land, the other party fails to pay for the same.

Moreover, petitioners have the right to be indemnified for the necessary and useful expenses they may have made on the subject property. Articles 546 and 548 of the Civil Code provide,

ART. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor in good faith may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor.

Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the same right of retention, the person who has defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding the amount of the expenses or of paying the increase in value which the thing may have acquired by reason thereof.

ART. 548.  Expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure shall not be refunded to the possessor in good faith; but he may remove the ornaments with which he has embellished the principal thing if it suffers no injury thereby, and if his successor in the possession does not prefer to refund the amount expended.

Consequently, the respondent-spouses have the option to appropriate the house on the subject land after payment to petitioners of the appropriate indemnity or to oblige petitioners to pay the price of the land, unless its value is considerably more than the value of the structures, in which case petitioners shall pay reasonable rent.

As to the liability of Vergon, petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to show negligence on Vergon's part. It is the plaintiff who has to prove by a preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose act he must respond; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the damages incurred.

G.R. No. 167017 Case Digest

G.R. No. 167017, June 22, 2009

Serafin Cheng

vs Spouses Vittorio and Ma. Helen Donini

Ponente: Corona

Facts:

Cheng agreed to lease his property located in Mandaluyong City to the spouses who intended to put a restaurant thereon, they agreed to a monthly rental of 17k to commence in December 1990. Bearing an interim grant of authority executed by Cheng, spouses proceeded to introduce improvements in the premises.

But before the business could take off and before final lease agreement could be drafted and signed, the parties began to have serious disagreements regarding the terms and conditions. Cheng then demanded for the deposits and rentals with the intention of not continuing with the lease. The spouses ignored the demand and continued to occupy the premises until their caretaker voluntarily surrendered the property to Cheng.

Spouses then filed an action for specific performance and damages with a prayer for the issues of writ of preliminary injunction in RTC Pasig. Respondents prayed that petitioner be ordered to execute a written lease contract for five years, deducting from the deposit and rent the cost of repairs in the amount of P445,000, or to order petitioner to return their investment in the amount of P964,000 and compensate for their unearned net income of P200,000 with interest, plus attorney’s fees.

Petitioner denied the claims and sought for moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. RTC favored the Cheng.

Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) which, in its decision[5] dated March 31, 2004, recalled and set aside the RTC decision, and entered a new one ordering petitioner to pay respondents the amount of P964,000 representing the latter’s expenses incurred for the repairs and improvements of the premises.

Issue: spouses possessors in good faith?

Held:

The relationship between petitioner and respondents was explicitly governed by the Civil Code provisions on lease, which clearly provide for the rule on reimbursement of useful improvements and ornamental expenses after termination of a lease agreement. Article 1678 states:

If the lessee makes, in good faith, useful improvements which are suitable to the use for which the lease is intended, without altering the form or substance of the property leased, the lessor upon the termination of the lease shall pay the lessee one-half of the value of the improvements at that time. Should the lessor refuse to reimburse said amount, the lessee may remove the improvements, even though the principal thing may suffer damage thereby. He shall not, however, cause any more impairment upon the property leased than is necessary.

With regard to ornamental expenses, the lessee shall not be entitled to any reimbursement, but he may remove the ornamental objects, provided no damage is caused to the principal thing, and the lessor does not choose to retain them by paying their value at the time the lease is extinguished.

Contrary to respondents’ position, Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code did not apply.  Under these provisions, to be entitled to reimbursement for useful improvements introduced on the property, respondents must be considered builders in good faith.  Articles 448 and 546, which allow full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is made, apply only to a possessor in good faith or one who builds on land in the belief that he is the owner thereof.  A builder in good faith is one who is unaware of any flaw in his title to the land at the time he builds on it.

Respondents are not entitled to reimbursement for the ornamental expenses under the express provision of Article 1678.  Moreover, since they failed to remove these ornaments despite the opportunity to do so when they vacated the property, then they were deemed to have waived or abandoned their right of removal.

(1) petitioner Serafin Cheng is ORDERED to pay  respondents, spouses Vittorio and Ma. Helen Donini, the amount of P171,650.95 as indemnity for the useful improvements; and

(2) respondents, spouses Vittorio and Ma. Helen Donini, are ORDERED to pay petitioner Serafin Cheng the following sums: (a) P100,000.00 moral damages; (b) P50,000.00 exemplary damages and (c) P25,000.00 attorney’s fees.

G.R. No. 153829 Case Digest

G.R. No. 153829, August 17, 2011

Roman Catholic Archbishop of San Fernando

vs Eduardo Soriano, etc.

Ponente: Villarama

Facts:

RCA claimed that it is the owner of the vast tract of land located in Pampanga covered with a registered TCT. RCA alleged that several individuals occupied the land and refused to vacate despite repeated demands. RCA, filed an ejectment case against the alleged intruders.

On the other hand, defendants countered that the RCA has no cause of action against them because its title is spurious. They contended that the subject land belonged to the State, but they have already acquired the same by acquisitive prescription as they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in continuous possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years.

RTC ruled in favor of the RCA. During the pendency of the ejectment case in the MCTC, some of the defendants claimed they are in actual possession of the land in the concept of owners and alleged that the title in the name of the RCA is fake.

Issue: Essentially, the issue before us is whether the CA erred in not holding that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to dismiss filed by the RCA.

Held: We affirm the ruling of the CA.

Well-entrenched in our jurisdiction is the rule that the trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a certiorari proceeding under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.  This is because a certiorari writ is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. The appropriate course of action of the movant in such event is to file an answer and interpose as affirmative defenses the objections raised in the motion to dismiss. 

The only exception to this rule is when the trial court gravely abused its discretion in denying the motion. This exception is, nevertheless, applied sparingly, and only in instances when there is a clear showing that the trial court exercised its judicial power in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.

The CA explained that the requirement stated in Article 477 is not a condition precedent before one can file an action for quieting of title.  Rather, it is a requisite for an action to quiet title to prosper and the existence or nonexistence of the requisite should be determined only after trial on the merits. The CA also agreed with the trial court in ruling that the RCA cannot raise in a motion to dismiss the ground that the complaint is already barred by laches for it still remains to be established during trial how long the plaintiffs have slept on their rights, if such be the case. 

The complaint filed with the RTC pertinently alleged that the claim of ownership by the RCA is spurious as its title, denominated as OCT No. 17629, is fake for the following reasons: (1) that the erasures are very apparent and the title itself is fake; (2) it was made to appear under Memorandum of Encumbrance Entry No. 1007 that the title is a reconstituted title when in truth, it is not; and (3) the verification reveals that there was no petition filed before any court where an order was issued for the reconstitution and re-issuance of an owner's duplicate copy. It is thus clear from the foregoing that the case filed questioning the genuineness of OCT No. 17629 is a direct attack on the title of the RCA.

In this case, the defendants in the ejectment case possess no such legal rights that merit the protection of the courts through the writ of preliminary injunction.  The MCTC has already rendered a decision in favor of the RCA and ordered the defendants therein to vacate the premises.  Their appeal to the RTC was dismissed and the decision has become final.  Evidently, their right to possess the property in question has already been declared inferior or inexistent in relation to the right of the RCA in the MCTC decision which has already become final and executory.

G.R. No. 154270 Case Digest

G.R. No. 154270, March 9, 2010

Teofisto Ono, etc.

vs Vicente Lim

Ponente: Bersamin

Facts:

1992, Lim filed in RTC Cebu a petition for reconstitution of the owner's duplicate copy of OCT, alleging that the same OCT was lost during World War 2 by his mother, Luisa. This land was located in Balamban, Cebu which was sold to Luisa by spouses Ono. Although the deed evidencing the sale was lost, the only legitimate son of Ono had executed a notarized document in favor of Luisa denominated as confirmation of the sale which was duly filed in Provincial Assessor's Office of Cebu.

Now, Spouses Ono's successors-in-interest opposed Lim's petition contending that they had the certificate of title of the land.

Lim then converted the petition into a complaint for quieting of title, averring that they had been in actual possession of the property since 1973, cultivating and developing it, enjoying its fruits and paying taxes corresponding to it.

The other party claimed that the land was never sold to Luisa, and that the confirmation by the legitimate son was fabricated, the signature not being authentic.

RTC ruled in favor of Lim. CA affirmed the RTC. The CA ruled that the action for quieting of title was not a collateral, but a direct attack on the title; and that the Lims' undisturbed possession had given them a continuing right to seek the aid of the courts to determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on their own title.

The petitioners raise the following issues:

Whether or not the validity of the OCT could be collaterally attacked through an ordinary civil action to quiet title;

Whether or not the ownership over registered land could be lost by prescription, laches, or adverse possession;

Whether or not there was a deed of sale executed by Spouses Ono in favor of Luisa and whether or not said deed was lost during World War II;

Whether or not the confirmation of sale executed by Antonio in favor of Luisa existed; and

Whether or not the signature purportedly of Antonio in that confirmation of sale was genuine.

Held: Petition has no merit.

(1) Action for cancellation of title is not an attack on the title. The attack is direct when the objective is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof.

(2) Prescription was not relevant. Prescription, in general, is a mode of acquiring or losing ownership and other real rights through the lapse of time in the manner and under the conditions laid down by law. However, prescription was not relevant to the determination of the dispute herein, considering that Lim did not base his right of ownership on an adverse possession over a certain period. He insisted herein, instead, that title to the land had been voluntarily transferred by the registered owners themselves to Luisa, his predecessor-in-interest.

G.R. No. 159284 Case Digest

G.R. No. 159284, January 27, 2009

Heirs of Bernardo Ulep

vs Spouses Cristobal Ducat

Ponente: Austria-Martinez

Facts:

Subject matter is lot no.$ in a survey plan prepared for Agustin Ulep by a private land surveyor which was approved by Bureau of Lands, year 1964.

Prior to the approval of the Survey plan, Agustin and Ducat executed an agreement whereby Ducat is to perform necessary procedures for the registration and acquisition of the title of the lands. Before accomplishing this task, Agustin died. His son Cecilio took over as administrator.

Ducat then registered lot no.4 under their names and Flora Kiong and subsequently declared the property in his name for taxation purposes. The heirs then filed for reconveyance of lot no.4 with damages. The heirs alleged that Ducat fraudulently maneuvered the improper amendment of the survey plan to alter the description of the land.

MTC dismissed the complaint of the heirs for failure to prove their cause of action by competent and preponderant evidence. The heirs appealed in the RTC, but RTC rendered the same. Their subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied too, on the ground that it was filed beyond the reglementary period.

They then filed a motion to resolve for reconsideration on the merits,the court a quo reversed the MTC judgment and ordered the spouses Ducat and Flora Kiong to reconvey the property to the heirs and pay for damages and attorney’s fees.

Ducat and Kiong appealed with the CA. CA then ruled that the heirs failed to discharge the burden of proof to establish that the spouses wrongfully acquired title over the land. Heirs now appealing.

Issue:

Whether CA erred in reinstating the decision of the MTC.

Held:

Petition has no merit.

The questioned waiver of Rights and Quitclaim containing some erasures and alterations is not enough proof of the fraud the heirs alleged. Heirs had to present clear and convincing evidence to establish ownership of the land.

Note:

- for an action for reconveyance based on fraud to succeed, the party seeking reconveyance must prove by clear and convincing evidence his title to the property and the fact of fraud.

G.R. No. 165907 Case Digest

G.R. No. 165907, July 27, 2009

Spouses Narvaez

vs Spouses Alciso

Ponente: Carpio

Facts:

Larry Ogas owned a parcel of land, and a portion was subject to a 30-year lease agreement with Esso standard eastern, Inc. Ogas sold the property to his daughter Rose Alciso. Rose later sold the property to Jaime Sansano, repurchased the property then sold it again to Celso Bate. I the deed of sale, it stated that it recognizes the lease over the property in favor of ESSO, upon sale, the rights over the land as lessor and seller were likewise transfers in full to Bate. The TCT was then cancelled and new TCT was issued in the name of Bate.

Bate then sold the property to Narvaez. Alciso demanded a stipulation be made in the deed of sale allowing her to repurchase the property from the Narvaez. Upon repurchasing the property, Narvaez and Alciso did not reach an agreement for the price.

Alciso filed a complaint claiming that the intention of the parties was to enter into a contract of real estate mortgage and not a contract of sale with right of repurchase.

RTC held that (1) the 25 August 1979 Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase became functus officio when Alciso repurchased the property; (2) the action to annul the 28 March 1980 Deed of Absolute Sale had prescribed; (3) Alciso had no legal personality to annul the 14 August 1981 Deed of Sale of Realty; (4) the 14 August 1981 Deed of Sale of Realty contained a stipulation pour autrui in favor of Alciso — Alciso could repurchase the property; (5) Alciso communicated to the Spouses Narvaez her acceptance of the favor contained in the stipulation pour autrui; (6) the repurchase price was P80,000; (7) Alciso could either appropriate the commercial building after payment of the indemnity equivalent to one-half of its market value when constructed or sell the land to the Spouses Narvaez; and (8) Alciso was entitled to P100,000 attorney’s fees and P20,000 nominal damages.

Spouses Narvaez appealed to the CA claiming that (1) the 14 August 1981 Deed of Sale of Realty did not contain a stipulation pour autrui — not all requisites were present; (2) the RTC erred in setting the repurchase price at P80,000; (3) they were purchasers for value and in good faith; and (4) they were builders in good faith.

Court of Appeals held that (1) the 14 August 1981 Deed of Sale of Realty contained a stipulation pour autrui; (2) Alciso accepted the favor contained in the stipulation pour autrui; (3) the RTC erred in setting the repurchase price at P80,000; (4) the 14 August 1981 Deed of Sale of Realty involved a contract of sale with right of repurchase and not real estate mortgage; (5) the Spouses Narvaez were builders in good faith; and (6) Alciso could either appropriate the commercial building after payment of the indemnity or oblige the Spouses Narvaez to pay the price of the land, unless the price was considerably more than that of the building.  The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the RTC for determination of the property’s reasonable repurchase price.

Issue:

Narvaez claimed that Alciso did not communicate her acceptance of the favor contained in the stipulation pour autrui; thus, she could not repurchase the property.

Held:

The petition is unmeritorious.

 Article 1311, paragraph 2, of the Civil Code states the rule on stipulations pour autrui:

If a contract should contain some stipulation in favor of a third person, he may demand its fulfillment provided he communicated his acceptance to the obligor before its revocation.  A mere incidental benefit or interest of a person is not sufficient.  The contracting parties must have clearly and deliberately conferred a favor upon a third person.

down the requisites of a stipulation pour autrui: (1) there is a stipulation in favor of a third person; (2) the stipulation is a part, not the whole, of the contract;      (3) the contracting parties clearly and deliberately conferred a favor to the third person — the favor is not an incidental benefit; (4) the favor is unconditional and uncompensated; (5) the third person communicated his or her acceptance of the favor before its revocation; and (6) the contracting parties do not represent, or are not authorized by, the third party.  

All the requisites are present in the instant case: (1) there is a stipulation in favor of Alciso; (2) the stipulation is a part, not the whole, of the contract; (3) Bate and the Spouses Narvaez clearly and deliberately conferred a favor to Alciso; (4) the favor is unconditional and uncompensated; (5) Alciso communicated her acceptance of the favor before its revocation — she demanded that a stipulation be included in the 14 August 1981 Deed of Sale of Realty allowing her to repurchase the property from the Spouses Narvaez, and she informed the Spouses Narvaez that she wanted to repurchase the property; and (6) Bate and the Spouses Narvaez did not represent, and were not authorized by, Alciso.

G.R. No. 190106 Case Digest

G.R. No. 190106, January 15, 2014

Magdalena Villasi

vs Filomeno Garcia, substituted by his heirs

Ponente: Perez

Facts:

In 1990, Villasi engaged the services of Fil-Garcia Construction, Inc to construct a 7-storey condominium building in QC. For failure to fully pay, FGCI initiated a suit for collection of sum of money. Villasi filed an answer n=denying the lateral allegations of the complaint, averring that she delivered the total amount but FGCI accomplished only 28% of the construction. RTC ruled in favor of FGCI.

Villasi appealed with CA, CA reversed the judgment of RTC. FGCI filed a petition for review on Certiorari, but CA denied the appeal for being filed out of time. To satisfy the CA judgment, the sheriff levied on a building registered under Garcia, then later a public auction was scheduled.

To forestall the execution, Garcia filed an affidavit of 3rd party claim to set aside the sale execution for they are the lawful owners of the building levied by the sheriff. Garcia claimed that the city assessor made a mistake in the assessment of the property levied. RTC suspend the execution.

Villasi filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by RTC. Thus this instant petition.

Issue:

Whether CA erred in granting Villasi ownership of the property.

Held:

It is a basic principle of law that money judgments are enforceable only against the property incontrovertibly belonging to the judgment debtor, and if the property belonging to any third person is mistakenly levied upon to answer for another man’s indebtedness, such person has all the right to challenge the levy through any of the remedies provided for under the Rules of Court. The duty of the sheriff is to levy the property of the judgment debtor not that of a third person.

The right of a third-party claimant to file a terceria is founded on his title or right of possession. Corollary thereto, before the court can exercise its supervisory power to direct the release of the property mistakenly levied and the restoration thereof to its rightful owner, the claimant must first unmistakably establish his ownership or right of possession thereon.

Spouses Garcia failed to prove that they have a bona fide title to the building in question. Aside from their postulation that as title holders of the land, the law presumes them to be owners of the improvements built thereon, the Spouses Garcia were unable to adduce credible evidence to prove their ownership of the property. In contrast, Villasi was able to satisfactorily establish the ownership of FGCI thru the pieces of evidence she appended to her opposition.

Although tax declarations or realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property.

Finally, the issue regarding the piercing of the veil of corporate fiction is irrelevant in this case. The Spouses Garcia are trying to protect FGCI from liability by asserting that they, not FGCI, own the levied property. The Spouses Garcia are asserting their separation from FGCI. FGCI, the judgment debtor, is the proven owner of the building. Piercing FGCI’s corporate veil will not protect FGCI from its judgment debt. Piercing will result in the identification of the Spouses Garcia as FGCI itself and will make them liable for FGCI’s judgment debt.

Sheriff is directed to proceed with the sale on execution.

G.R. No. 167232 Case Digest

G.R. No. 167232, July 31, 2009

DBT Mar-bay Construction, Inc.

vs Ricaredo Panes, etc.

Ponente: Nachura

Facts:

A parcel of land was conveyed by Regalado to DBT through a dacion en pago for services rendered. On June 24, 1992, the respondents Panes and his sons filed a complaint for quieting of title with damages and petition for injunction against Regalado and DBT.

In the complaint, Ricaredo alleged that he is the lawful owner of the land which he had declared for taxation purposes in his name. Respondents alleged that per certificate issued by the DENR the land was verified to be correct and on file.

Respondents also claimed the Ricaredo and his immediate family had been and still are in actual possession of the subject property, and their possession preceded the 2nd world war. To perfect his title, Ricaredo filed with the RTC QC.

Respondents averred that in the process of complying with the registration, it was found out that a portion of the land was with the subdivision plan of Regalado which was conveyed by Regalado to DBT.

On December 28, 1993, then defendants Spouses Jaime and Rosario Tabangcura (Spouses Tabangcura) filed their Answer with Counterclaim, claiming that they were buyers in good faith and for value when they bought a house and lot covered by TCT No. 211095 from B.C. Regalado, the latter being a subdivision developer and registered owner thereof, on June 30, 1986. When respondent Abogado Mautin entered and occupied the property, Spouses Tabangcura filed a case for Recovery of Property before the RTC, Quezon City, Branch 97 which rendered a decision in their favor.

On its part, DBT, traversing the complaint, alleged that it is the legitimate owner and occupant of the subject property pursuant to a dacion en pago executed by B.C. Regalado in the former’s favor; that respondents were not real parties-in-interests because Ricaredo was a mere claimant whose rights over the property had yet to be determined by the RTC where he filed his application  for  registration;  that the other respondents did not allege  matters  or  invoke  rights  which  would  entitle  them  to   the  relief prayed for in their complaint; that the complaint was premature; and that the action inflicted a chilling effect on the lot buyers of DBT.

RTC's Ruling:

The testimony of Ricaredo that he occupied the property since he was only 16 had not been rebutted; Ricaredo's occupation and cultivation of the land for more than 30 years vested him equitable ownership.

DBT filed a motion for reconsideration based on the grounds of prescription and laches. While this motion was still pending, judge Bacalla died.

Then an intervenor claimed that portions of the subject land was part of the estate of certain Don Jose de Ocampo.

CA's Ruling: CA reversed and set aside the RTC Orders dated November 8, 2001 and June 17, 2002 and reinstated the RTC Decision dated June 15, 2000. The CA held that the properties described and included in TCT No. 200519 are located in San Francisco del Monte, San Juan del Monte, Rizal and Cubao, Quezon City while the subject property is located in Brgy. Pasong Putik, Novaliches, Quezon City. Furthermore, the CA held that Engr. Vertudazo's testimony that there is a gap of around 1,250 meters between Lot 503 and Psu 123169 was not disproved or refuted. The CA found that Judge Juanson committed a procedural infraction when he entertained issues and admitted evidence presented by DBT in its Motion for Reconsideration which were never raised in the pleadings and proceedings prior to the rendition of the RTC Decision. The CA opined that DBT's claims of laches and prescription clearly appeared to be an afterthought. Lastly, the CA held that DBT's Motion for Reconsideration was not based on grounds enumerated in the Rules of Procedure.

Issues:

(1) Did the RTC err in upholding DBT's defenses of prescription and laches as raised in the latter's Motion for Reconsideration? (2) Which between DBT and the respondents have a better right over the subject property?

Held:

(1) Affirmative. The facts demonstrating the lapse of the prescriptive period be otherwise sufficiently and satisfactorily apparent on the record; either in the averments of the plaintiff's complaint, or otherwise established by the evidence. However, the conclusion reached by the RTC in its assailed Order was erroneous. The RTC failed to consider that the action filed before it was not simply for reconveyance but an action for quieting of title which is imprescriptible.

Therefore, laches will not apply to this case, because respondents' possession of the subject property has rendered their right to bring an action for quieting of title imprescriptible and, hence, not barred by laches. Moreover, since laches is a creation of equity, acts or conduct alleged to constitute the same must be intentional and unequivocal so as to avoid injustice. 

         Thus, respondents' claim of acquisitive prescription over the subject property is baseless. Under Article 1126 of the Civil Code, acquisitive prescription of ownership of lands registered under the Land Registration Act shall be governed by special laws. Correlatively, Act No. 496, as amended by PD No. 1529, provides that no title to registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall be acquired by adverse possession.  Consequently, in the instant case, proof of possession by the respondents is immaterial and inconsequential.

Note:

 - action for reconveyance can be barred by prescription. When an action for reconveyance is based on fraud, it must be filed within four (4) years from discovery of the fraud, and such discovery is deemed to have taken place from the issuance of the original certificate of title. On the other hand, an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years from the date of the issuance of the original certificate of title or transfer certificate of title. The rule is that the registration of an instrument in the Office of the RD constitutes constructive notice to the whole world and therefore the discovery of the fraud is deemed to have taken place at the time of registration.

G.R. No. 200265 Case Digest

G.R. No. 200265, December 2, 2013

Laura Paraguya

vs Spouses Alma Crucillo and Emeterio crucillo

Ponente: Perlas-Bernabe

Facts:

December 1990, Paraguya filed before the RTC a complaint against Crucillo for annulment of some deeds, with prayer for receivership and damages alleging that Escurel obtained the aforesaid title through fraud and deceit. She claims to be the lawful heir to the subject properties by her paternal grandfather, while Escurel was Merel their administrator.

RD denied the fraud, maintaining that its issuance of OCT No. was his ministerial duty. Crucillo then filed their answer with motion to dismiss, averring that Paraguya's complaint had already been barred by laches and/or prescription.

RTC granted Paraguya saying that the requisites of the registration was not complied and Escurel's ownership over the properties was not proven. A motion for reconsideration was filed by heirs of Crucillo, who had substituted the latter due to his death. But the motion was denied, prompting them to elevate the case to the CA.

CA reversed the RTC and ordered for the dismissal of Praguya's complaint. Citing Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529,19 otherwise known as the “Property Registration Decree,” it held that OCT No. P–17729 became indefeasible and incontrovertible after the lapse of one (1) year from its issuance on August 24, 1979, thus barring Paraguya’s complaint. Moreover, it found that the express trust relationship between Escurel and Estabillo was not sufficiently established. Finally, it pointed out that Paraguya was not a real–party–interest since she has not proven her title over the subject properties, stating that the titulo posesorio she held could no longer be used as evidence of ownership.

SC's Ruling:

The petition has no merit.

It is an established rule that a Torrens certificate of title is not conclusive proof of ownership. Verily, a party may seek its annulment on the basis of fraud or misrepresentation. However, such action must be seasonably filed, else the same would be barred.

In this relation, Section 32 of PD 1529 provides that the period to contest a decree of registration shall be one (1) year from the date of its entry and that, after the lapse of the said period, the Torrens certificate of title issued thereon becomes incontrovertible and indefeasible.

G.R. No. 161027 Case Digest

G.R. No. 161027, June 22, 2009

Francisco Calma

vs Arsenio Santos, et. al.

Ponente: Nachura

Facts:

The subject property of this case is the Calangain Fishpond registered in the names of Celestino Santos, a widower and his children. When Celestino died, Calma purchased some shares from the fishpond.

Calma then demanded from the co-owners of the property the identification and segregation of the shares he purchased from the rest of the fishpond. Due to the failure of the heirs to do so, Calma filed a complaint for specific performance and partition before RTC Pampanga.

In their answers, the heirs admitted the existence of the deed of sale and other agreements covering the sale but they alleged that (1) the deeds were suffering from insidious, grave and vital defects. (2) Celistino Santos and Jose Santos have already sold their shares before their death. (3) Calma has been delinquent for many years in the payment of the lease rentals. (4) herein petitioner has abused his rights as lessee by subleasing portions of the Calangain Fishpond to other persons; (5) The herein petitioner’s rights as lessee over the Calangain Fishpond had already expired; (6) The herein petitioner has no cause of action for partition against the herein respondents, as not all the persons who have an interest in the Calangain Fishpond were impleaded as parties in this action; (7) With respect to the shares of Celestino Santos, Jose Santos and Leonardo Santos, the herein respondent Arsenio Santos has prior right thereto superior to that of the herein petitioner; and (8) The herein respondents Arsenio Santos, Natividad Santos, Ligaya Santos and Erlinda Santos have a right of legal redemption over the undivided shares of the Calangain Fishpond sold to the herein petitioner.

RTC ruled in favor of Calma. Respondents appealed to the CA. CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision.

Held:

After evaluating the foregoing circumstances, we are of the opinion that they are not sufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity in favor of the validity of the questioned Deed.  First, notwithstanding the first three circumstances mentioned, petitioner failed to clearly establish that, at the time the Deed was executed, Celestino was no longer capable of entering into any transaction regarding his share of the Fishpond.  Even if it is true that Celestino did not personally appear before the notary public in Quezon City, as claimed by petitioner, this alone does not nullify or render the parties’ transaction void ab initio.  It does not overcome the presumption of truthfulness of the statements contained in the notarized document.

However, the other conveyances covered by the deeds of absolute sale and the receipts of payment in favor of petitioner involving the shares of the Santos siblings in their own right cannot be voided.  Article 493 of the Civil Code provides that “(e)ach co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved.…”  Thus, the co-owners, being owners of their respective aliquots or undivided shares in the subject property,   can validly and legally dispose of their shares even without the consent of all the other co-heirs.  Accordingly, the vendors, co-heirs of respondents, should return whatever amount they received from petitioner corresponding to the 1/2 share of Celestino, which they were supposed to have inherited and sold to petitioner, had Celestino not disposed of this 1/2 share to respondent Arsenio. 

Interpreting this provision, we have enumerated the requisites for the exercise of legal redemption, as follows: (1) there must be co-ownership; (2) one of the co-owners sold his right to a stranger; (3) the sale was made before the partition of the co-owned property; (4) the right of redemption must be exercised by one or more co-owners within a period of thirty days to be counted from the time he or they were notified in writing by the co-owner vendor; and (5) the vendee must be reimbursed the price of the sale.

G.R. No. 135385 Case Digest

G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000

Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa

vs National Commission on Indigenous Peoples

Facts:

Petitioners view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples. They argue that IPRA and its implementing rules will amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State's ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources, in violation of the regalian doctrine of the Constitution.

Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of "ancestral domains" and "ancestral lands" which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private landowners.

In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the ground that these provisions violate the due process clause of the Constitution.

Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that "the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination." They contend that said Rule infringes upon the President’s power of control over executive departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.

As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.

Notes:

Puno: "When Congress enacted the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA), it introduced radical concepts into the Philippine legal system which appear to collide with settled constitutional and jural precepts on state ownership of land and other natural resources. The sense and subtleties of this law cannot be appreciated without considering its distinct sociology and the labyrinths of its history. This Opinion attempts to interpret IPRA by discovering its soul shrouded by the mist of our history. After all, the IPRA was enacted by Congress not only to fulfil the constitutional mandate of protecting the indigenous cultural communities' right to their ancestral land but more importantly, to correct a grave historical injustice to our indigenous people."

The IPRA recognizes the existence of the indigenous cultural communities or indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs) as a distinct sector in Philippine society. It grants these people the ownership and possession of their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, and defines the extent of these lands and domains. The ownership given is the indigenous concept of ownership under customary law which traces its origin to native title.

Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples refer to a group of people or homogeneous societies who have continuously lived as an organized community on communally bounded and defined territory. These groups of people have actually occupied, possessed and utilized their territories under claim of ownership since time immemorial. They share common bonds of language, customs, traditions and other distinctive cultural traits, or, they, by their resistance to political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and cultures, became historically differentiated from the Filipino majority. ICCs/IPs also include descendants of ICCs/IPs who inhabited the country at the time of conquest or colonization, who retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions but who may have been displaced from their traditional territories or who may have resettled outside their ancestral domains.

To recognize the rights of the indigenous peoples effectively, Senator Flavier proposed a bill based on two postulates: (1) the concept of native title; and (2) the principle of parens patriae.

"Sec. 3 a) Ancestral Domains. - Subject to Section 56 hereof, refer to all areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously to the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects or any other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private individuals/corporations, and which are necessary to ensure their economic, social and cultural welfare.

b) Ancestral Lands.- Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to land occupied, possessed and utilized by individuals, families and clans who are members of the ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, under claims of individual or traditional group ownership, continuously, to the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth, or as a consequence of government projects and other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private individuals/corporations, including, but not limited to, residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, widen farms and tree lots."

The rights of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands may be acquired in two modes: (1) by native title over both ancestral lands and domains; or (2) by torrens title under the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act with respect to ancestral lands only.

Native title refers to ICCs/IPs' preconquest rights to lands and domains held under a claim of private ownership as far back as memory reaches. These lands are deemed never to have been public lands and are indisputably presumed to have been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest.

Article 12

Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.

The State shall protect the nation’s marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.

The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fish workers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.

The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources.

The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its execution.

Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law according to the uses to which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof, by purchase, homestead, or grant.

Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development, and subject to the requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine, by law, the size of lands of the public domain which may be acquired, developed, held, or leased and the conditions therefor.

Section 4. The Congress shall, as soon as possible, determine, by law, the specific limits of forest lands and national parks, marking clearly their boundaries on the ground. Thereafter, such forest lands and national parks shall be conserved and may not be increased nor diminished, except by law. The Congress shall provide for such period as it may determine, measures to prohibit logging in endangered forests and watershed areas.

Section 5. The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development policies and programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social, and cultural well-being.

The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain.

Section 6. The use of property bears a social function, and all economic agents shall contribute to the common good. Individuals and private groups, including corporations, cooperatives, and similar collective organizations, shall have the right to own, establish, and operate economic enterprises, subject to the duty of the State to promote distributive justice and to intervene when the common good so demands.

Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.